THE APOLOGY

OF PLATO.
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WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the Philebus in 1860, the Apology, Crito, Phædo, and Symposium were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The Digest of Idioms, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the Apology seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix
on the δαιμόνιον of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to print it himself, and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the Apology and the Digest of Idioms by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In reference to the Orators the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor Orators and Reiske in Demosthenes. In the Dramatists Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the Poetæ Scenici published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the Orators, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the Dramatists. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.
The text of the Apology itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted: but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

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INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

1. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING.

The trial of Socrates took place before a Heliastic court, according to the forms of an ordinary γραφή δήμοσία. The indictment (ἐγκλήμα) is called ἀντωμοσία 19 Β, 24 Β, and ἀντι-γραφή 27 Κ,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the άνάκρισις before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms ἀντιγραφή, ἀντωμοσία, proper at first to the defendant, came to be used of the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (ἐγκλήμα) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

2. THE ACCUSERS.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's Euthyphro 2 Β. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the Apology. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 Α), and again observes (36 Α) that the penalty for not obtaining ½ of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, Disp. xxxix. p. 228, Μέλετος μὲν ἐγράψατο Ἀντωμοσία ἄνου μὲν ἐιλήγαγε Λύκων μὲν ἐδόξωκε. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—κατεδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔδησαν δὲ οἱ ἐνδέκα ἀπέκτεινε δὲ ὁ ὑπηρέτης—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, magis oratorie
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quam verè dicta. See Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 709. n. 19.

Of Meletus, the ostensible prosecutor of Socrates, in reality little more than the tool of Anytus, we only know that he was a young tragic poet. He is characterised by Plato (Euthyphro 2 B) as νέος τις καὶ ἀγνώστης, and is ridiculed as a poet by Aristophanes (Ran. 1302). The Meletus (Andoc. de Myst. 94. p. 12) who was one of the four who arrested Leon (Apol. 32 C) may have been this Meletus' father, who bore the same name, but there is nothing to show it.

Lycon, a rhetorician, is mentioned by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1301) with Antipho.

Anytus was by far the most considerable of the three accusers, whence they are described (Apol. 18 B) as τοὺς ἀμφή "Ἀνυτοὺς, and Socrates is called by Horace (Sat. II. iv. 3) Anytus. He was a leather-seller (Xen. Apol. Soc. 29), and had been a rich man. As a sufferer and worker for the popular cause he had earned a reputation second only to Thrasybulus. With Thrasybulus he had fled from Attica, and the Thirty had confiscated his estates and included him in the decree of banishment (Xen. Hell. II. iii. 42). He held a command in the camp at Phyle (Lys. xiii. 78. p. 137), and at the restoration was joint author with Thrasybulus of the Act of Amnesty (Isocr. xviii. 23. p. 375). Plato (Meno 90 B) represents him as high in popular favour. His was nevertheless (Athenaeus XII. p. 534 E) not a spotless character. Aristotle moreover (ace. to Harpocratin on the word δεκάξεων) says that he was the first man who bribed an Athenian court; and Diodorus, who repeats this (xiii. 64), adds that it was on his trial for treason (Zeller, Philos. der Griech. II. p. 142 n.). As Anytus was the most influential accuser, so there is reason to think he was the most inflamed against Socrates. Meletus and Lycon were actuated at most by a class-prejudice,—if indeed we should not rather regard them as mere tools of Anytus. All three however belonged to classes 1 which Socrates had offended by his incessant censure.

1 Socrates is made by Plato (Apol. 23 E) to represent his three accusers as all actuated by class-feeling in their attack upon him. 'Εκ τῶν ταυτῶν καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτοὺς καὶ Δύκαν, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀγθόμενος. Ἀνυτοὺς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Δύκαν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν βιττόρων. The contrast which is implied in this sentence between βιττόρες and πολιτικοὶ shows that the words severally denote definite classes.
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of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the Apology itself of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (Sokrates p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petitus' Comment, in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii, that there was any order of ῥήτορες, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the ἵστασις which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, even the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Orators or earlier (see the latter part of Cleon's speech in Thucyd. III. 40) these ῥήτορες had attained a mischievous importance. ἐσχήνεσ speaks of them (iii. 3. p. 54) as δυναστείας ἰαυτοῦ πε- ριποιούντες, and in Alcib. II. 145 A it is said that ὅσα δὴ ποτέ ἡ πόλις πράτ- τει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτή καθ' αὐτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥήτορων ἐμποδίσα ἀπαντά γίνεται. To be a ῥήτωρ had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name ῥή- τορική, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the Gorgias (448 D)—τὴν καλομένην ῥητορικὴν. In their capacity of συνήγοροι the ῥήτορες were brought into prominence (Heer- ren, Polit. Hist. of Anc. Greece, c. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Transl.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less as σύμβουλοι to the Assembly that the ῥήτορες were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendency is dated by Isocrates (viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ βιβλίου δυναστείαν) from the Decelean war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, συμ- βουλευτικὴ and ἐκαστική, of Aristotle's triple division of ῥήτορική in his treat- tise correspond with this double scope of the ῥήτωρ's profession. The πο- λιτικός as a class must have emerged at the same time as the ῥήτορες. In itself πολιτικός means no more than 'Statesman' in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato's time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by πολιτικό that class of men who made public business their profession.—τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λεγοµένους, Plat. Politic. 303 C. Our conception of the πολιτικός will be best completed by comparing them with the ῥήτορες. Down to Pericles' time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the As- sembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (Pol. V. v. 7), ὅν δὲ τῆς ῥήτορικῆς ἑξηκοµίησε οἱ δυνάµειοι λέγειν ὁµαχαγοῦσι µὲν δὲ ἀπείρον δὲ τῶν πολεµικῶν οὐκ ἐπιθέται. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradistinguished: cf. Plato, Gorg. 520 Α, Phdr. 258 B, and the general terms in which the ῥήτορες are described—e. g. by Lysias (xxviii. 16. p. 150) as οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράτ- τοιτες.
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(21 C—22 C). Illustrations occur also abundantly elsewhere. We see from the Ion (533 E) how poets were brought under this censure for parading inspiration as the substitute for reason. The rhetoricians 2 again as in the Gorgias were censured for producing persuasion without knowledge. Yet stronger and yet more incessant was the denunciation of the mischievousness and presumptuousness of undertaking politics ἀπὸ ταύτων ἀτού (Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 3), or without knowledge of principles (Alcib. I. 113 C). But Anytus was actuated, over and above such a class-feeling, by personal animosity. One ground of this has been said to have been his "amor spretus Alcibiadé 3." so Luzae and Wiggers. Plato further (Meno 94 E) makes him threaten Socrates with mischief in bewildering and mortification at being told, in effect, that in teaching 4 his son the family business he had done nothing towards his real education. These personal motives, however, remained in the back-ground; and so again, if he entertained yet another grudge against Socrates as the teacher of Critias, the avowal of it was incompatible with the Act of Amnesty. Therefore he made the attack under cover of defending the democracy. The ἐπιείκεια of the restored people did not last long (Plat. Epist. VII. 325 B), and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions.

3. Number of the Judges.

The statement of Wiggers (Sokrates p. 132 note), and of Matthie (Miscell. Philol. vol. I. p. 252. note 35), that the number of the judges on Socrates' trial was 556 or 557, has been repeated without question even by Mr. Grote (Hist. Gr. vol. VIII. p. 654, chap. 68). It is, however, as Dr. Cron 5 remarks (in his note on Apol. 36 A), merely an assumption from the false reading τρεῖς in this passage, taken in connection with the

2 The enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Socratists (Luzae de Dig. Soc. Sect. II. § 4).
3 The story of this "amor Alcibiadé" rests on the testimony of Phatarch and of Satyrus apud Athenaeum, but is unlikely in itself, and because Plato and Xenophon are wholly silent about it.—Zeller II. p. 141 note.
5 Platon's Ausgewählte Schriften erklärt von Christian Cron und Julius Deusehle.—Teubner, 1865.
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statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. v. 40), κατεδικάσθη διακο- σίας ὑγοήκουτα μὲ πλεῖοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολυουσῶν, whence the numbers are supposed to have been 281 for condemnation, 275 for acquittal.

There is no reason (as Mr. Grote allows) for mistrusting the precise statement of Diogenes, nor is there any more reason, if we have regard to Greek habits of expression, for doubt that the 281 represented the aggregate majority, not the amount by which it exceeded the minority.

Hence, accepting the reading τριάκοντα here, the whole number cannot have been 556 or 557. An independent argument against such a number would be that it resembles no other recorded numbers on trials. Those which we find, such as 200 (Dem. in Mid. 223. p. 585), 500 (frequently), 700 (Isoer. xviii. 54. p. 381), 1000 (Dem. in Mid. 223. p. 585), 1500 (Plutarch. Vit. Pericles, 72), 2000 (Lysias, xiii. 35. p. 133), 2500 (Dem. in Dem. 52. p. 96), 6000 (Andoc. i. 17. p. 3), even if they are only approximate, must stand for something near multiples of 100.

Now Pollux (VIII. 48) mentions 401 and 201 as the numbers in two different cases of φάσις, and elsewhere 1001 and 1501. This affords the clue to a conjecture of much probability (Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 140), that this was a provision not exceptionally but uniformly for an odd number of judges, (frustrated sometimes, it would appear, by the default of individuals at the last moment), but that the common way of indicating the number was, for brevity’s sake, to mention the variable constituent, omitting the invariable 1. And Heffter (Athen. Gerichtsverfassung, p. 55) clenches this by a passage from Ulpian’s Commentary on Demosthenes’ oration against Timocrates: διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ὃ εἰς προσετίθετο ἀεὶ τοῖς δικασταῖς ἦν μὴ ἵσαι γένους αἱ ψήφοι. Thus a Heliastic court always consisted of some multiple of 100, + 1.

Accordingly, if we take the total number of Socrates’ judges

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6 [Ulpian’s note is on the words δικαστηρίων δύων εἰς ἑνα καὶ χιλίους ἐπυφυσμέναν (Dem. c. Thnocr. 9. p. 702) and stands as follows: ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις καὶ ἐπουρανίοις τράγματι συνήγοντο ἐκ δύο δικαστηρίων πλη- ροῦντες ἄρθρων χιλίων καὶ ἑνὸς. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ὃ εἰς προσετίθετο ἀεὶ τοῖς δικασταῖς ἦν μὴ ἵσαι γενομένων τῶν ψήφων ἐξ ἱσης ἀπέλθοι...]
as 501 (which is also Heffter's conclusion), and the number of
those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal.
Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides,
would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the
odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

4. Form of Indictment.

Plat. Apol. 24 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρων
καὶ θεοὺς οὐς ἢ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων ἑτερα δὲ δαμώνια καυνά.

Diog. Laert. Π. 40. ἡ ἀντωμοσία τῆς δίκης εἰς τούτον τὸν
τρόπον ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἐτι καὶ νῦν, φησι Φαβρώμος 7, ἐν τῷ Μη-
τρώῳ. Τάδε ἐγράφατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πυθέως
Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκίθεων 8 Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὐς μὲν ἡ
πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἑτερα δὲ καυνὰ δαμώνια εἰσηγού-
μενος ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. Τύμημα θάνατος.


From Ἀσχίνης (iii. 197. p. 82) we learn that in a γραφή
παρανομών the time assigned for the trial was divided into
three equal lengths: ἐγχειται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὕδωρ τῷ κατηγόρῳ
... τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὕδωρ τῷ τῆς γραφής φεύγουται καὶ τοῖς εἰς
αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα λέγουσι (i. e. τοῖς συνηγόροις, not the witnesses
whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the
pleadings: cf. Λυσ. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μου ἐπιλαβεῖ τὸ
ὕδωρ) ... τὸ τρίτον ὕδωρ ἐγχειται τῇ τιμῆσει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς
ἀρχής τῆς ψυτέρας (i. e. for the prosecutor to speak ἀρχαῖον
on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and
the judges to vote).

The second of these three lengths would be occupied by
the defence of the accused and his συνήγοροι, represented by
the main part of the Apology, i. e. as far as 35 E. The Χενο-
phonontean Apology says (22) that speeches were made ὑπὸ τε
αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ, but the Platonic
manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself
alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges,
and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is
declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

7 [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]
prosecutor in advocacy of the penalty he had named; and the remainder of it would be occupied by Socrates' ἄντιτίμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread (35 E—38 C). It was open to the prosecutor to ask now for a lighter penalty than that which he had named in the indictment. It was in the defendant's speech on the ἄντιτίμησις that he brought forward his wife and children ad misericordiam.

Then would follow the voting of the judges upon the amount of the penalty.

Here the formal trial would end, and the condemned person would be led away by the officers of the Eleven (cf. Apol. 39 E). This is the moment, however, to which the concluding portion of the Apology (from 38 C) belongs. Whether or not the indulgence of such a concluding address was historically conceded to Socrates, there must have existed sufficient precedent for it to give verisimilitude to the ascription of it to him. The Xenophontean Apology (24) agrees here.

The raised platform, called βῆμα, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses, whence the phrase ἔγω παραχωρῶν, Apol. 34 A, and similarly Andoc. i. 26. p. 4, καὶ σιωπῶ καὶ παραχωρῶ εἰ τις ἀνωβαίνειν θελέται, and Αἰσχ. iii. 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τὸν βῆματος ἐκὼ ἄν εἰπης.


We find that speeches were made by all the three. Compare for Meletus Apol. 34 A, and for the other two Αpol. 36 B, ἀνεβη ὁ Ἀντύς καὶ Ἄλκων. It is implied however that Meletus spoke first.

Grote (VIII. 647. c. 68) conjectures that they made a partition of their topics, "Meletus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lycon would dwell on the political grounds of attack." More accurately, Meletus' business would be to support the indictment proper, while the political charges and insinuations would be dwelt on by Anytus as carrying with him ἡδικὴ πίστις in this topic, and by Lycon as familiar with it in his capacity of διαφθείσις Σωκράτης, ἦδη ἄν ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖσ ἐπιτηδεύσσετε ὁ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παινάσσαι διαφθαρῆσονται ἐν νὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ
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The other citations are general; e.g. 17 A, χρή ὑμᾶς ἑυλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐξαπατηθήτε ὡς δεινὸν ὑπὸς λέγειν, and 33 B, καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ ἐίτε τις χρηστὸς γλύνεται ἐίτε μὴ ὑμὶν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχομι—an allusion to the alleged deterioration by him of Critias and Alcibiades, which was made much of by the prosecution according to Xenophon.

In the Memorabilia of Xenophon likewise the citations are all ascribed in general terms to ὁ κατήγορος. Mem. I. ii. 9, Ἄλλα νῇ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποιεῖ τῶν καθεστῶτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων ὡς μιμόν εἰπ τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κλάμῳ καθιστάναι. . . . τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώτης πολιτείας καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους. Ib. 12, Σωκράτης ὀμηλήτα γεγονόμενον Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείτα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Ib. 49, Σωκράτης. . . . τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανολάς ἐλόντα καὶ τὸν πατέρα ὄς ἦν, τεκμηρίω τοῦτο χρώμενος ὡς τὸν ἀμαθότερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμων εἰς δεδεσθαι. Ib. 51, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτυμίᾳ ἐνιαῖν παρὰ τοὺς αὐτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὔτε τοὺς κάμποιντας οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὄφελοσθίν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἱπτοὶ τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖς ἐπιστάμενοι. ἔφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φιλῶν αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὥς οὔδεν ὄφελος εἰσφοντοι εἶναι εἰ μὴ καὶ ὄφελεῖν ὅπιστονται μόνον δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύειν ὃνισχέντες. ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτὸν ὡς αὐτὸς εἶναι σοφότατος τε καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφοῖς, οὐτὸ διατίθεται τοὺς αὐτῷ συνόντας ὅστε μηδαμοῖς παρ’ αὐτῶν τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸν. Ib. 56, ἔφη δ’ αὐτῶν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ ποιητῶτα καὶ τούτους μαρτυρίον χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακοῦργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικοὺς, Ἡσιόδου μὲν τὸ

Ἐργὸν δ’ ὠδέων ὑνείδως ἀργεῖ ἔτε τ’ ὑνείδος.

τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτῶν ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύοι μηδενὸς ἔργον μήτε ἀδίκου μήτε αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει. . . . τὸ δὲ Ὁμήρου ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτῶν λέγει ὄτι Ὅδυσσεῦς

Ὅμως μὲν βασιλῆα κ. τ. λ.
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raτα δὴ αὐτῶν ἐξηγείσθαι ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς ἐπαινοῖ παλαιόθα τοὺς ὁμότας καὶ πένθας.


(i.) The defence.

Socrates speaks in presence of a large audience of Athenians over and above his judges (cf. Apol. 24 E, where he speaks of ὁ δὲ ἀκροασθαὶ in pointed distinction from ὁ δικασταῖ), but he is addressing professedly his judges alone6 (cf. Apol. 17 C, εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσινέα, 18 A, δικαστῶν μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἁρετή). It is therefore these alone who are designated by the ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναίοι at the opening and throughout: Steinhart observes that the appellation ὁ ἀνδρεὶς δικασταῖ is reserved until the final address to be applied only to the judges who vote for acquittal. For mention of such audiences cf. Lysias xii. 35. p. 123, πολλοί καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ἕξων ἣκουσιν εἰσόμεναι τίνα γνώμην περὶ τούτων ἔχετε, Ἐσχ. i. 117. p. 16, ὅρων πολλῶν μὲν τῶν νεωτέρων

6 The δικασταὶ were very animated listeners. They answered speakers on being appealed to: cf. Ἐσχ. iii. 202. p. 82; so Andoc. i. 33. p. 5, εἰ μὲν ॐν ἕμα τοῖς ἐπικαίν περὶ τοιάντων ἀπολογηθῆσαι δηλώσατε μοι ἵνα προθυμήσατε περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολογηματία. Or they stopped a speaker to put a question: cf. Andoc. i. 70. p. 10, εἰ τίς τι ὑμῶν ποθεῖ ἀναστὰς ἱππομηχανότος, and Ἐσχ. ii. 7. p. 29. They used the interpellation of κατάβασις Aristoph. Nesp. 979. It seems to have been a common practice not only of political but even of judicial assemblies to express their pleasure or displeasure at what was said. The general word for such expressions of feeling was θέρυμα. That it was a word mediae significations we see from Plato, Legg. 876 B, δικαστήρια . . . . έστων μηδὲ σιγῶντα ἄλλα θέρυμα μετὰ καθαίρε ἑαυτα ἐπανοντά τε βοή καὶ ζύγωντα τῶν ἐπιθυμών ἐκάτερον ἐν μέρει κατηγορεῖν. And Ἐσχines ii. 31. p. 34, θερυπομάντων ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν ως δεινοῖς εἰς εἰς καὶ συντόμως τῶν δὲ πλείων ὡς πονηρῶς καὶ φοβερῶς. The word occurs in an unfavourable sense in Plato, Protag. 319 C, καταγελᾶσαι καὶ θερυπομάν, Andocides ii. 15. p. 21, Lysias xii. 73. p. 126, θερυβείτε ὡς οὐ ποίησατε ταῦτα, 74. p. 127, εἴπερ εἴτ' οὐ μέλοι αὕτω τοῦ ἢμετέρου βορίμβου. It was unrestrained in its nature: cf. Ἐσχ. i. 83. p. 11, μετὰ γέλατον θέρυμα, 164. p. 23, πολλὴ κραίνη παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτῷ ἀπαντῆσαται. i. 122. p. 70, κραίνη πολλὴ καὶ θέρυμα, Ἰσocr. xv. 272, θερυβοῦ καὶ βοή ἀπ' ἑκάτεροή πολλωτρεῖται τοῦ δικαστήριον. On the other hand it expressed applause unequivocally: cf. Ἰσocr. xii. 264. p. 258, οὐκ θερυβήσαι οἱ ποιεῖ εἰσπαύσαι ἐπὶ τοῖς χαριτῶς διελεγμέναις ἄλλα ἀνεβήσαιν ὡς ἀπερβαλλόντως εἰρήκτος. The θέρυμα which Socrates deprecates was of the unfavourable kind. This is implied by his urging that it is not his fault if the truth is unpalatable. Θερυμα would thus seem to be confined to the δικασταὶ, not joined in by the ἀκροαταί. The word is applied to Meletus in Apol. 27 B merely in the sense of interrupting by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering.
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It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the Apology to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so —μάρτυρας ὅ' αὐτοῦ ὑμᾶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι. Cf. Εσχ. ii. 122. p. 44, καὶ τούτων ὑμεῖς οἴ τῇ ψήφῳ μέλλοντες φέρειν ἐστὲ μοι μάρτυρες. Similarly, when at 21 Α—καὶ τούτων πέρι ὧν ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν αὐτὸν ὑπότασι μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε—he uses the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 Ε καὶ τούτων ὑμῶν ἐσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula τούτων δ' ὑμῶν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρεῖμαι (cf. e. g. Antipho v. 20. p. 131, and Lysias x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 Α, τούτου πᾶν τούναντίων εὐρώσετε is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 Α)—'Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it?'—and the subjoining of the conventional challenge εἴ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο νῦν παρασχέσων ἐγὼ παρασχωρῶ would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (Demosth. c. Steph. B. 10. p. 1131, τῶν ἀντιδίκων ἐπιλαμβάνεις εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλως τὸ ἑρωτόμενον μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μη), and with the common practice (cf. Lysias xiii. 30, 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a
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formal ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ, as for ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ elsewhere, and add Lys. xii. 24, 25. p. 122, where a specimen is given at length), Meletus is questioned by Socrates in 24 C and the following paragraphs. In 25 D Socrates himself appeals to the law in support of his right to put such questions—ἀπόκριναι, ὡ 'γαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὃ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

(ii.) Ἡ ἀντιτίμησις.

In the Xenophontean Apology (23) it is denied that Socrates made any ἀντιτίμησις—οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο οὔτε τοὺς φίλους ἔιασεν ἄλλα καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶθαι ὑμολογοῦντος εἶν ἄδικον. The Platonic ἀντιτίμησις, both of the σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείᾳ and of the 30 minae, is (waiving the question of its being historical or not) wholly ironical: there could be no serious expectation that such an offer would be accepted. Diogenes Laertius says that this ἀντιτίμησις turned 80 more of the judges against him—καὶ οἱ θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγενασαν προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὑγίοις. (iii.) The last words.

The latter part from τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένοις (29 E) we are to imagine as spoken ἐν φῷ οἱ ἁρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἤγουν, and only those who chose would hear it (cf. παραμεῖνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον, ibid.).
PART II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APOLOGY.

1. ITS ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.
   i. Its employment of commonplaces (τόποι).
   ii. The "old accusers."
   iii. The Delphic response.
   iv. The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.
   v. Its dramatic framework.

2. HOW FAR CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES.

3. ITS ADEQUACY AS A DEFENCE.

   1. ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

   A close examination of the structure of the Apology resolves the question how far it preserves to us the actual defence made by Socrates. The criticism of Wiggers and Schleiermacher, that the Apology is the purest extant relic of Socrates, fails to the ground before the internal evidence which the Apology itself supplies. Xenophon (Mem. IV. viii. 5) tells us that Socrates turned his thoughts away from the preparation of any defence—γινέται ὁμοίως ἐπικεφαλής τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἡμαρτιώθη τῷ δαμόνιον. Now the Apology is artistic to the core, whether in respect of the recurrence of received τόποι of Attic pleaders, or of the arrangement and outward dress of the arguments (observe especially the artifice of "the old accusers," of which presently), or of the tripartite dramatic arrangement of the whole. The art and the manner, worthy as they assuredly are of Plato, are also distinctively characteristic of him. The subtle rhetoric of this defence would ill accord with the historical Socrates, even had the defence of Socrates been as certainly as we know it not to have been the offspring of study and premeditation.
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(i.) Employment of commonplaces.

We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being δεινός λέγεω (cf. Lys. xix. 1, 2. p. 152, Isæus x. i. p. 79), the asking pardon for λόγους πολὺ τῶν εἰθυμεύων λέγεσθαι παρ' ύμιν ἐξηλλαγμένους (as Isocr. xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (Isocr. xv. 38. p. 318, οὕτως ἀτέχομαι τοὺτων ὡς οὐδὲς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν), the begging for an impartial hearing (Lys. xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the depreciation of θόρυβος (cf. e. g. Æsch. ii. 24. p. 31, ἐπαινῶ εἰς ύπερβολὴν ύμᾶς, ὡ ἀνδρεῖς, ὅτι συγῇ καὶ δικαίως ἢμῶν ἂκούετε), the disclaiming a style unbecoming an old man (cf. Isocr. xii. 3. p. 233, ἒγορμαῖ γὰρ οὗ χόροι ἀρμόττειν);—these topics, of which the exordium of the Apology is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges' prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of διαβόλοι (cf. Lysias xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a σοφὸς is dealt with has many parallels: cf. e. g. Isocr. xv. passim. No accusation was more indiscreminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of commonplaces.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so Lysias xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. Lys. xxvi. 5. p. 175, ταύτα χρὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ εὐθείας αὐτῷ εἰναι δοκῆτε.

Socrates alleges (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common τόπος. Cf. Lys. xvi. 13, xxi. i. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδὲν ἐποτοῦτον ἐγενόμην (33 A) with Isocr. xv. 85, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδένα πῶστε φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ' ἐμαυτῶν τίνι δὲ πόλιν ὅλην πειρώμαι πείθεω τοιοῦτοι πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ δὲ αὐτοί τε εὐθαμονησοῦσι κ.τ.λ.

The answer to the charge about perverting the young is
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paralleled by Isocr. xv. 240, τούς πατέρας ἀν ἐωρᾶτε τῶν συνών·

tovs irarepas av κoπaTaTrS>v ovov-

fjiuv nai tovs oIkc (ovs avavaKTOvvras Kal yypa(pop.a>ovs.

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35. p. 5, TOVTcav To'ivvv

tovs oIkc avbp&v ol p.ev rJKOven Kal denv evOabe &v be a-no6av6vTu)v etcri ttoXXoI TrpoariKOVTes' &v ocms fiovkcTai iv
tio ep.<2 Adyo) avafias pie £Xey£aTU>.

The argument (34 A) Kal aXXovs -noXXovs eyco ex 60 v ^ v

riva epr
tTa pkv kvk tu kavTov Xoy<o Ttapacry^aQai MeArj-

The leaving the event to God (19 A), τοῦτο μὲν ὑπ' οἴη τῷ

θεῷ φίλον, and (35 D), ὑμῶν ἑπιτρέπτω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνειν περὶ ἐμὸν

is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical oration of Antipho (i. 20. p. 113, ἡ δ' αἰτία. . . . ἐξει [τὰ ἔπίχειρα],

e'avn ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν, and ibid. 25, 31. p. 114), though indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are invoked at the outset of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown (p. 225).

(ii.) "The old accusers."

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, περὶ δὲ δια-

βολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὃν ἄν τις ὑπόληψιν ὑποχερῆ ἀπολύσαιτο· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἴτε εἰπόντος τινὸς, εἴτε μη.

An artifice in the Apology which demands separate notice is the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with. The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive and prominent portion of his defence should be directed specially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself. It was matter of exigency, therefore, to deal with it at once, and so we find it succeeding the exordium almost hurriedly. But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend
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them further, and the designation of it at once as a vox populi, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, not as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance have done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out ("except perhaps a certain play-writer"); in default of which,—the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—"the original accusers,"—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Ωί πρώτοι κατήγοροι are but a figure for ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή, and what makes the neutralising of this διαβολή at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ἥν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχέτε. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed.—"I hope, if possible, to convert you from a prejudice which you" (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) "have so long harboured" (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as vox populi—ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to "the old accusers," the ἡθικὴ πίστις which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the Apology, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptation of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

(iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to "the old
"accusers" is a rhetorical cloak for an attack on the prejudices of the judges, so the prominence given to the Delphic response (20 E sqq.) is a device of a semi-rhetorical character under cover of which Socrates is enabled to avoid an avowal of the real purpose which had animated him in his tour of examination,—which was to effect an intellectual revolution by substituting a sounder knowledge for the prevalent pretensions to knowledge, of the hollowness of which he entertained the deepest conviction. Such an explanation would, to say the least, not have been appreciated. What is to be noticed is, that he does not plead the oracle, (the authenticity of which there is no ground for doubting), as an after excuse for his necessarily unpopular mission,—which would have been natural enough. But he goes beyond this, and represents the oracle as the cause of his engaging in that mission; whereas (as Zeller observes) he must have already been committed to this and already been a marked person, before any such question as that put to the Pythia by Chærephon could have had any point or elicited any such remarkable answer. The representation of the oracle as giving him the first suggestion of his crusade against fictitious knowledge, as having throughout been the lodestar to which he shaped his course, and as having sustained him in the thankless labour of years, is unhistorical; but Socrates employs it in the exposition of his antecedents in a semi-rhetorical spirit, to bring the audience a certain distance on their way without the offence which a direct avowal of his purpose would have aroused in their minds.

(iv.) The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed
to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal justification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence which are concerned with these two points, as they are the fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an ἀγων ῥητοράς has prompted Plato to crown the Apology of Socrates with a further artistic completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the action; there is even some change in the dramatis persona. We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court. The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the declaration of their verdict. The second comprises the τίμησις of the prosecutor, Socrates' ironical ἀντιτίμησις, the intervention of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges, the other divested of the name and doomed to the consequences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty prophecy.

2. How far is the Apology characteristic of Socrates?

Zeller (II. 134, note) insists that there is an absence in the Apology of that free artistic handling which characterises the Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But the strength of this position is diminished by several considerations. In the first place we have seen how great an amount of art has found its way into the structure of the Apology; we have seen too how that same art has not been
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restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller's assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfil were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the Memorabilia, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic Apology was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher's defence. The Xenophontean Apology, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon's Memorabilia I. i, ii, IV. viii (see Steinhart's Anmerkungen I. 2 in Platon's Sämmtliche Werke über- setzt von Hieronymus Müller, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic Apology been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophontean Apology should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates' friends spoke at the trial as συνήγοροι, and again (23) that Socrates refused υποτιμάσθαι altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other Apologies extant besides these. Aristotle in the Rhetoric (II. xxiii. 13) quotes from a Socratic Apology of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, εἰς ποιόν ιερὸν ἡσέβηκε; τίνας θεῶν οὖ τετύμηκεν οὖς ἡ πόλις νομίζει; and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions; μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὖ
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\[ \text{peri } \Sigma \omega k\varphi \alpha t\varphi o\nu s \, \alpha l\lambda \, \pi e r i \, \varepsilon \pi t i \eta d\varepsilon \varphi \mu at\varphi o s, \, e i \, \chi r\varphi \, f i l o s o f \varphi e i \nu (18), \]

and \( \tau \delta \, d a i m\omega \nu o n \, o u d\varepsilon \nu \, \varepsilon \sigma t\nu \, \alpha l\lambda \, \hat{\eta} \, \theta e\sigma s \, \hat{\eta} \, \theta e\omicron \nu \, \hat{\epsilon}r\gamma \omicron \nu \), \( \kappa a\iota \nu i \, \delta \omicron t\omicron \, \omicron i\omicron \tau s \, \omicron i\omicron \tau e\sigma s \, \hat{\epsilon}r\gamma \omicron \nu \, \epsilon i\nu a i \, \tau o\tau i\nu o n \, a\iota \acute{\alpha}gk\gamma \, \omicron \iota \epsilon \sigma s \tau a i \, kai \, \theta e\omicron\upsilon s \, \epsilon i\nu a i \) (8). Once more, it is probable enough, that the story\(^9\) of Lysias having offered Socrates for use on his trial a defence of his own composing grew out of his having written an elaborate posthumous Socratic Apology.

It is then too much of an assumption, though countenanced by Zeller and Mr. Grote as well as by many older writers on the subject, that we can rely on the Platonic Apology as a substantial reproduction of the speech of Socrates. Independently of Plato's representation we know not what Socrates said, or whether he said much or little, or how far he concerned himself with a direct reply to the charges laid against him; nor, when we have studied that representation, do we know these things any the better. Even if the studied speech of Plato embodied authentic reminiscences of the unpremeditated utterances of his master, to disengage the one from the other is more than we can assume to do.

Notwithstanding, we can seek in the Apology a portrait of Socrates before his judges and not be disappointed. Plato has not laid before us a literal narrative of the proceedings and hidden us thence form the conception for ourselves: rather he has intended us to form it through the medium of his art. The structure is his, the language is his, much of the substance may be his; notwithstanding, quite independently of the literal truth of the means, he guarantees to us a true conception of the scene and of the man. We see that "liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam non a superbia" (Cic. Tusc. I. 29), and feel that it must be true to Socrates, although with Cicero himself we have derived the conception from Plato's ideal and not from history. We hear Meletus subjected to a questioning which, though it may not have been the literal \( \epsilon p\omega \tau \eta \varphi \omicron i s \) of the trial, exhibits to us the great questioner in his own element. We discover repeated instances of the irony, which, uniting self-appreciation with a true and unflattering estimate of others, declines to urge considerations

which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words εγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀπαξιῶμαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσωμαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ὑμᾶν (29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus while the problem of the relation of the Apology to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished us to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGY AS A DEFENCE.

That the Apology aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which is least characterized by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the Apology as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates’ whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the Apology as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone so little change

10 As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repented of Socrates' death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the repre-
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in favour of Socrates since his death, that the justification which was most calculated to satisfy it was identically that which would have been most to the purpose at the trial.

First, then, what sort of an answer is offered to the indictment of Meletus?

That indictment divides itself into two allegations, under the heads respectively (as we should say) of religion and of morality. The mischief to morality is the perversion of the youth; the offence against religion is the setting forth of strange gods in the place of those of the state.

Now though these are put into the form of specific charges against Socrates, they are so (all but that of the καυά δαυμῶνα) in appearance alone; they are really selected from the string of imputations currently brought against Philosophers and Sophists. The Philosophers, i.e. Physicists, were popularly associated with atheism, the Sophists with perversion of the youth. The allegations of "the old accusers," to which the Apology first addresses itself, are drawn from the same repertory, and arraign Socrates in like manner under the two heads of religion and morality as Philosopher and Sophist. It is true that the particular complaints there expressed are not the same; but it is not that the charges put forward here are less general than those. They are only omitted there because they were to come under consideration here. In the Clouds both these and those are put forward against Socrates, one after the other. And in the Apology itself (23 C—D) "the old accusers" are represented as eventually appending both "perversion of the youth" and "atheism" to their other charges.

The indictment therefore of Meletus contained no charge, save that of δαυμῶνα καυά, which would not be met (so far as might be) by the explanation Socrates had rendered of the deeper and wider and older prejudices, personified in "the old accusers," or by the justification he might be able to offer of the general method of his life.

sentation of Euripides' Palamedes (41 B. n.) is fabulous. Euripides pre-deceased Socrates by 7 years. Xenophon and Plato would have made the most of any such change of feeling; whereas we find Xenophon, five years after Socrates' death, dealing with the allegations against Socrates as if still in full possession of the popular mind. See Zeller, II. p. 138, note.
Here therefore Socrates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of ὀμονα κατά is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterised by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests τὸ ὀμόνον into ὀμόνων, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the ὀμόνων of the indictment as if it had been ὀμόνων πρόγματα. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Socrates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Socrates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean Apology enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Socrates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the more general imputations which connected Socrates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the Apology addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Socrates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Socrates' manner of life as a citizen.
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In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of "the old accusers" contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title σοφός ἁνηρ, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and φρόνιμος which we find in Aristotle (Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5, Θαλήν καὶ τοὺς παιότας σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ᾿ ὥσ πάνω εἶναι). It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation σοφός ἁνηρ consisted. The imputation contained in the words τὰ μετέωρα φροντίζων or ζητῶν, i. e. τὰ ιδεάνων, is equally general. The Scholiast on Aristoph. Nub. 96 says, κοινὸν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀπάντων ἐγκλήμα. In 431 B.C. Dioeithes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law εἰσαγγέλλειν τοὺς τὰ θεία μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταφύσων διδάσκοντας (Plutarch. Vit. Pericl. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380). Eupolis (Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490) says of Protagoras, ἀλανάτειται μὲν, ἀλήθειας, περὶ τῶν μετεώρων. Once more, the reference in τῶν ἴτων λόγων κρείττων ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκοντος is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of τῶν ἴτων κ.τ.λ., and from them the imputation was derived to others. Isocrates (xv. 15. p. 313) speaks of the charge being made against himself, ὁς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἴτους λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν, and again (30. p. 315), ὁς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκοντος καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν. Odium also attached to the profession of an instructor in speaking. Hence Ἐσχίνης' designation (i. 94. p. 13) of Demosthenes as λογογράφος, and (117. p. 16) ὁ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγέλλομενος τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν, crowned by the freedom of speech. How came the suspicion of ἀγών τέχνη to survive the Tyranny.
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designation σοφιστής (125. p. 17); cf. ii. 165, iii. 173, pp. 50, 78. Hence, weightier for its dispassionateness, a remark of Thucydides (VIII. 68) about Antiphon ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ ὀδόντων διακεκλεμένων, τοὺς μὲν τοις ἀγωνιζομένοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλείστα εἰς ἀνὴρ, ὅσοι ἔμβουλευσαντο τι, δυνάμενοι ὑφελεῖν. This odium, in which the profession was held, was akin to fear; Isocrates (xx. 230) explains it thus, ἦ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότητι ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίως ἐπι-βουλεύειν.

Thus the charges recited present us with nothing individually characteristic of Socrates, but only (as he himself calls them 23 D) τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦτων πράξειρα. These were the materials for the popular representation of Socrates, which accordingly (like the caricature in the Clouds) is a compound of the conventional lineaments of the Philosopher (Physicist), and of the Sophist. The μετέωρα φροντίζων is due to the Philosopher, and the τῶν ἡμῖν λόγον κ.τ.λ. to the Sophist, while the title σοφὸς ἀνὴρ stands12 alike for the one and the other.

To relieve himself from the yoke of these imputations Socrates fairly draws attention to the want of connection between himself and these two suspected classes. Of those speculative studies he13 denies any knowledge, and as to his having ever discoursed on them to others he courts further the testimony of his judges, of whom many had frequented his society.

The line of argument which he takes in distinguishing himself from the Sophists seems less cogent than it might have

12 Plat. Apol. 20 Α, Evenus is ἄνὴρ Πάρνοις σοφῶν, Xen. Mem. II. i. 21, Πρεδίκος ὡς σοφῶς is mentioned; as on the other hand σοφιστὴς is borrowed to express Philosopher.
13 There is no want of harmony between Socrates' disclaimer here and what he tells us in the Phaedo of his having taken up physical speculation in early life. He had given it up forthwith, on finding no satisfaction in it; and he could truly say (Apol. 19 C), ἐμοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν μέτεστι. Nor again is his disclaimer at variance with the fact, that he used to call attention to the evidence of design in nature as a help to piety (Xen. Mem. VI. iii. 3 sqq.), that he is in fact (as Zeller remarks, II. p. 117) the parent of the teleological idea which has given unity and ideality to the study of nature ever since his days. This half-religious view of his had nothing in common with those indemonstrable hypotheses, which the Physical Philosopher tried in turn to fit to the universe.
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been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, et tivos ἀκηδότες κ.τ.λ. 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clench the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy thenceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which-ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed) were incapable of appreciating the fundamental unlikeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Heliastic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason for these which they had never questioned, while in doing this he evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher
and Sophist when once Aristophanes\textsuperscript{14} had given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates’ parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despairs of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combated. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), \(\text{καὶ τοῦτο ἔστιν ὅ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάν περ}\)

\textsuperscript{14} Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the Apology here as elsewhere as true to facts?
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On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—ταῖτ’ ἐστιν ὑμῖν, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ταληθῆ, . . . . . . καὶ τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοὺς αἴτους ἀπεκθαυμαί (24 A).

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off; and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

15 The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was: 'No Philosophers!' 'Church and King for ever!'" And some persons, to escape their fury, even painted 'No Philosophers' on the walls of their houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were "not without apprehensions that an attack would be made on them, as the head and front of the 'Philosophers' of Birmingham'—Smiles' Life of Boulton, ch. 25.
It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See Xen. Mem. I. ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Aleibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates' abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his depreciating mention of the tradesmen in the Ecclesia (Xen. Mem. III. vii. 6), were not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only 'assent and consent,' but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betrayed in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he
was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates' cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermæ trials or after the battle of Arginuse. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight, however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

18 Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-
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for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applier of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Alcibiades, and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the
same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the Apology which still remains to be considered. We are now in a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Alcibiades and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dissatisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a political point of view, he would have had to expound all these points seriatim. We find him however reticent as to the first point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (30 E) of the high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point, the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-
taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i. e. was an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human inhibition (29 D),—the proof of the divine call, i. e. of the reality of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life in preference to dealing with individuals would have been neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of his work (inculcating righteousness, not training for professions or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of perverting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted independently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so without appearing to admit the political allegations of his accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have gained from a premised statement of the need of reform. But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness, the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly visionary. In representing himself as having done good service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unswervingly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, Socrates was traversing ground where they could not follow him. These things had for them no meaning. They required devotion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their righteousness. With this they were content, when the substance of the old religion and the old morality were really departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing that it could be any man's duty or mission to set himself up among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself says expressly in the ἀντιτῆμος (37 E—38 A). To us there may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to
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elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout in the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which ever since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer ἐγὼ διδάσκαλος αὐθεντός κ. τ. λ. finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athens of the day had no room for reformers.

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing 19 him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy.

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

19 It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an ἄγων τιμητός, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates' death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Kochly espouses) is directly at variance with the Apology, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it were better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister "laboured " till the going down of the sun to de-" liver him." The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation Σωκράτης δίκει κ. τ. λ., they gave their voice against the truth.
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inquiry into the worth of the Apology as a defence. Its art is consummately; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the Apology.

20 That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were themselves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to inflame that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II. p. 139.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.
B = Bekker.
S = Stallbaum.
Z = Zurich editors.
H = Hermann.
Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as ‘Codex Clarkianus.’

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the Apology anew for this edition, and also the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium.]
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

I. "Ο τι μὲν ύμεῖς, οὐ άνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, πεπόνθατε ύπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγóρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτών ολίγων ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοι ἀληθὲς γε, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, ὧν οὔδεν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἔθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὁν ἐψευσάντω, τούτῳ ἐν οὐ ἔλεγον ὡς χρήν ύμᾶς εὐλαβείσθαι, μή ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ως δεινοῦ ὡντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μή αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὃτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργον, ἐπειδάν μηδ' ὀπωσ-ιο τούν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτῳ μοι ἐδοξέων αὐτῶν ἄναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μή ἄρα δεινὸν καλούσιν οὕτω λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτῳ λέγοντιν, ὀμολογοῦν ἄν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτος εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὕτωι μὲν οὖν, ὦσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, 15

5. ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν] This qualifies the αἰδέων following, making it equivalent to ἐὰν τι ἦν αἰδέων below.

8. μή — ἐξαπατηθῆτε] This sentence is not affected by the tense of the main construction, because the contingency it expresses remains still future at the moment of its being addressed to the speaker. Digest of Idioms, § 90.

14. οὐ κατὰ] A thorough litotes: 'far above these:' 'a far greater orator than they.' Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μητέρα εἰρήσεις, οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδάτην τε τῶν Βοικόλον καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ.
1. ή τι ή οὐδέν] This form of expression we have from Homer, Od. iv. 80, 'Ανδρῶν δ' ή κέν τίς μοι ἐρίσομαι, ή καί οὐκι. So Hdt. iii. 140, ή τις ή οὐδείς. And Eurip. Dan. Fr. vi. Κρείσσου γὰρ οὕτως χρήματα πέφυκ' ἀμή, Πλὴν εἰ τις' ὁστὶς δ' οὕτως ἐστιν οὐχ ἄρα.

2. οὐ μέντοι] Proposed to ακόνισθεν π. τ. ἀλ.—You shall have the truth entire, but not drest up. This contrast is only carried as far as ὄνομας: after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστεύω γὰρ κ.π.λ. gives the rationale of ὄνεις δ'—ἀλήθειαν) and continues to εἰσίναι,—since πιστὲοι λόγους refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μερικώς, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. ὡσπερ οἱ] The nom. is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by ὡσπερ. The attracted construction, exemplified by ὡσπερ μερικώς below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. ῥῆματι ... ὄνοματι] What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist. 262 a, b, they distinctly mean 'verb' and 'noun,' in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly 'expression' and 'word' (Διὰ φιλος is the ῥῆμα, Δίφιλος the ὄνωμα). Now the conjoint phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical significance; cf. Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὄνομάτων καὶ ῥήματων τίς οὐκ ἐν εξεπλάγῃ ἀκούν; 199 b, ὄνομαν καὶ θεία τῆς ῥημάτων, 221 e, τοιαύτα καὶ ὄνοματα καὶ ῥήματα: whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Orators, where these words occur, we shall find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist.: cf. Læschin. iii. 72, p. 64, οὐ γὰρ ἐφὶ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα μέμνη- μαι ως εἰσί, διὰ τὴν ἀρδιάν τοῦ ὄνοματος) ἀπορρήτα τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν—where the ῥῆμα is the whole expression, the ὄνο- μα is ἀπορρήτα. Further, as Socrates could not speak without 'expressions' and 'words,' it is the artistic use of them he here disclaims; which, in the case of ὄνοματα, would consist in what Læschines—ii. 153. p. 48—calls ἡ τῶν ὄνομάτων σύνθεσις, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Isercr. ix. 9. p. 190, μη μόνον τῶν τεταγμένων ὄνοματι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐξεῖνα τὰ δὲ κανοῦ τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, while ῥήματα would extend to whole expressions, cf. Læschines' caricature, iii. 166. p. 77; τὰ μιμάρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπίθανα ῥήματα.
17. μένουσ, ἀλλ' ἀκούσθείς εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὑμῶν πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἀ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὔδὲ γὰρ ἄν δήποτε πρέποι, ὡς ἄνδρες, τῆς τῆς ἡλικίας ὀσπερ μειρακιόν πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίτεινα. καὶ μέν· τοι καὶ πάνω, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμας· εὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούστε μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὄντερ εἰῶθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπέζων, ἕνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκήκοασι, δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι, μὴτε θαυμᾶσε μὴτε θορυβέειν τούτων ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωσι· νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριων ἀναβῆσθικα, ἐτη γεγονὸς πλείω ἔβδομηκοντα.

12. πλείω] Hermann's note may satisfy us here: "Pleio vel contra Oxon. cum VBS retinere quam Cum Turicensibus omittere with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c).

4. ὀσπερ—εἰσίτεινα] Three peculiarities; 1. μειρακιόν is attracted into the case of πλάττοντι, cf. Dig. 176; 2. πλάττοντι is attracted into the case of ἡλικίας and 3. the gender of πλάττοντι notwithstanding follows the thought, cf. Dig. 184.

5. καὶ μένοι] A stronger form of καὶ—δὲ. Dig. 145.

7. τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] This has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefixed by the request, 27 b, μὴ θορυβέείν ἐν ἐν τῷ εἰωθώτι τρόπῳ τοῖς λόγοις σωμαί. But, as something like this was recognised in ordinary pleadings under the name of ἐρωτήσεις (see Introd. p. x.), the reference here probably extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 c), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it.


ὁμῶν πολλοί] ὑμῶν is emphatic. As Stallb. remarks, the frequenter of the τραπέζα would be of the richer class.


11. ἐπὶ δικαστήριων] The prep. has the notion of 'presenting oneself to the court. Cf. Isæus, Fr. vii. 1. l. 15, λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον. Ἀναβῆσθικα refers to the ἔδικα, cf. Introd. p. xv.
First part of Defence; — Justification of himself against the prejudices of the court, and his countrymen generally.

ΠΑΘΩΝΟΣ

5. δίκαιον | 'I request this of you as a piece of justice.'

Cf. 41 d, χρή . . . τοῦτο δια- 


νοείσθαι ἀληθὲς, Legg. 795 c,


παύσων δὴ τούτ . . . ἐν τοῖς ἂλ-


 λοις πάσι χρή προσδοκῶν ὄρθων


‘as the right thing.’

6. ἵσως μὲν γὰρ | The reason urged is a general one. The consideration of style, if allowed at all, will be operative just in those cases where it is better or worse than the case deserves,—just where it will interfere with true judgment.

9. αὐτὴ | This represents the preceding clause αὐτο — ἥ μη' being in fact τοῦτο, at- 

tracted into the gender of ἀρετή. Dig. 201.

14. καὶ πάλαι | This καὶ only emphasises πάλαι. Dig. 133.

And in καὶ οὖν—λέγοντες we have the common καὶ after πολ-


 λαί.—It was 24 years since the Clouds were represented: Forster.
18. toútoús deinoús: ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὃ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παῖδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθὸν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἄλληθες, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φρονιστής καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαίτα ἀνεξηθηκός καὶ ἐτὸν ἦττο λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὕτω, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτη τῆς φήμης κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατηγοροί: οἱ γὰρ ἄκοινοτες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταύτα ξητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεόν νομίζειν. ἐπειτὰ εἰσιν οὕτω οἱ κατηγοροὶ πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺς χρόνον ἱδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, εἰ ἢ ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὑντες, ἐνιοὶ δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ

3. μᾶλλον] BS omit: Z retain, and rightly; for the rhythm would be intolerable without it, or without (which Hermann would prefer) the three words μᾶλλον οἱ δὲν ἄλληθες.

2. τοὺς πολλοῖς] Closely with ἐκ παῖδων. They ἐπειθὸν all, but only most, not all, as children. Cf. below c. παῖδες ὑντες, ἐνιοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἐπειθὸν and κατηγοροῦν just in the same way as πολὺ μᾶλλον [κατηγ.] below, ε. Here it is intended to balance the comparative δεινότεροι—' were more busy in accusing me and trying to persuade you.'

4. σοφὸς—ποιῶν] This "accusation," both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. See Introd. p. xxiii. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist: the μετέωρα φροντ. points to the Philosopher, the τοῦ—ποιῶν to the Sophist. The title σοφὸς ἀνήρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation,—cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so as distinctly to exclude those of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxxii. n. 12.

13. παῖδες . . . μειράκια] We should have reversed the order, and said, 'when you were all of you young, and most of you mere children.'

14. ὁ δὲ—ὅτι] This is not a changed but an abbreviated
πάντων ἀλογώτατοι, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὅνοματα οἶνον τερ. 18. 
αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τις κωμῳδιστὸς ἄ 
τυγχάνει ὁν' ὅσοι δὲ φθόνοι καὶ διαβολὴ χρώμειν 
ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους 
πείθοντες, οὐτοὶ πάντες ἀπορώτατοι εἰσιν' οὐδὲ γὰρ 
ἀναβίβασασθαι οἰον τ' ἑστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοὶ οὐδὲ 
ἐλεγξαί οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὁσπέρ σκια-
μαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδένος ἀπο-
κρινομένου. ἀξίωσάτε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὁσπέρ ἑγὼ 
λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἐτέ-
ρους μὲν τοὺς ἀρτί κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς 
πάλαι, οὖς ἔγω λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνος ε 
πρῶτον με ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνον 
πρῶτον ἥκουστατε κατηγοροῦντον, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον

2. κωμῳδιστὸς] VH; κωμῳδιστὸς BSZ with 2 MSS. B quotes 
Fischer mistakenly asserting that at Phaedo 7ο c all the MSS. 
have κωμῳδιστ.; but this is untrue for Οξον. and 6 others. 
Métis' assertion that κωμῳδιστὸς is the Attic and the other 
the common form does not bind us.

construction. In full it would 
be δὲ πάντων ἐστίν ἀλογώτατοι, 
ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι. Dig. 247.

2. εἰ τις Aristophanes is 
named below, 19 c, and is 
doubtless chiefly meant, but 
not exclusively. Enoplis had 
said (Meineke ii. p. 553), Μυσ 
δ’ ἐγώ καὶ Σοκράτην, τὸν πτω 
χον ἀδικήσαχιν, ὃς τῆλα μὲν περὶ-
τικεῖν, ὁπέθεν δὲ καταβαγεῖν ἔχω 
τοῦτο κατημέληκεν. And a play 
of Αµείπσιας, represented with 
Aristophanes' Clouds, was called 
the Connos, and the Chorus 
was of Phrontistae (Athen. v. 
p. 218). It is likely enough 
(Zeller, ii. p. 41, note 3), that 
Ameipsias introduced the same 
fact, or the same fiction, as 
Plato (Menex. 235 c, Euthyd. 
272 c), and made the music-
master Connus Socrates' in-
structor.

3. ὅσοι δὲ includes all but 
Thei ἐτις that is, ὅσοι stands 
for ὅσοι ἄλλοι. Cf. Theet. 159 b, 
where πάντα ἐ is equivalent to 
πάντα τῆλα ἐ. This ὅσοι [ἀλ-
λα] is then subdivided into 
[ὁι μὲν] φθόνοι χρώμειν and ὁι 
δὲ—πείθοντες. The ὁι μὲν is 
supplied from ὁι δὲ by ana-
strophe; Dig. 241. The ἅλ-
λαν πείθοντες is put in to make 
the sense clear, but virtually 
repeats the idea of ὑμᾶς ἀνε-
πειθοῦν' it does not affect 
the regularity of the construction.
18. ἠ τῶν τῶν ὕστερον. εἰεν ἀπολογητεύον δή, ὁ ἄν-
τικ. δρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ύμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τήν
dιαβολήν, ἂν ύμείς εἰν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχέτε, ταῦτῃ
ἐν οὕτως ολίγω χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τούτῳ
οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἰ τι ἀμεινοι καὶ ύμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ
πλέον τί με ποιήσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἴμαι δὲ αὐτῷ
χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνω με λανθάνει οἶον ἔστιν.
ὁμοι τούτῳ μὲν ἰτώ ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλου, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ
πειστέναι καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγο-
ρία ἐστὶν, ἐξ ἂς ἡ ἡ ἡ μὴ διαβολή γέγονεν, ἡ δὴ καὶ
τοις ἔτι Μελητός με ἐγράψατο τήν γραφήν ταύτην.
εἰεν τι δὴ λέγοντες διεξαλλοῦν οἰ διαβάλλουτες;
ὡσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεὶ ἀναγνω-

3. ἐσχέτε] ΒΖΗ; ἐσχέτε Ν. The preposition ἐν would be strange
with ἐσχέτε if the meaning were 'have entertained during so long
a time.' ἐν means rather 'within the limits of;' and so, with
respect to the further limit, 'at the distance of.' Thus ἐσχέτε
exactly falls into its place; 'ye first came to have so long
ago.'

4. ἐν οὕτως] Though this collocation is rarer than οὕτως ἐν ὀλ., yet it occurs; e.g. below 24 a (where this passage
is alluded to); Ἰσαῖος vi. 33. p. 59. ἐν πάνω ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, Λύσιας,
xix. 8. p. 152, ἐν οἴτω ἐεινῷ καθέσθεν. The rhythm
doubtless probably determines the order. There is no need for the
οὐτώς of Ω.

2. τὴν διαβολήν] Not the
name of σοφός (cf. 20 d, τῷ τῆς
ὅμως καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, and again
23 a); nor 'calumny' simply
(cf. below, ἡ κατηγορία . . . ἐς ἂς
ἡ ἡ ἡ μὴ διαβολή)· but calumny
believed, i.e. 'prejudice.'

7. οὗ πάνω here as elsewhere
retains its meaning of 'hardly,'
'scarce;' but this is to be in-
terpreted as a litotes:—'I can
hardly say I do not know.'

Dig. 139.

11. ἡ δὴ] The antecedent of
ἡ is διαβολή. Cf. 28 a, καὶ τοῦτον
ἐστὶν οὗ μὲν ἀλήθεια, . . . οὗ Μελη-
τος, . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δια-
βολή.

13. διεξαλλοῦν οἴ διαβάλλουτες] This fulness of expression is
common in Plato, and gives
the air of deliberateness. Dig.
262.

14. ὡσπερ qualifies not only
κατηγόρων but also ἀντωμοσίαν
and ἀναγνώσαμεν. They are quasi-
prosecutors; it is a quasi-in-
dictment; and Socrates makes
believe to read it.

ἀντωμοσίαν] So 24 b. This
 term, like ἀντιγραφὴ 27 a, is used to designate the ἕγκλημα. Both ἀντωμοσία and ἄντιγραφὴ were properly said of the defendant's plea, presented in writing and sworn to, in the ἀνάκρισις, or preliminary proceeding before the Archon Basileus. But as the ἕγκλημα was likewise then presented in writing and sworn to, the same words came to be applied to it also. See Introd. p. ix.

7. ὧν ἐγώ] The antecedent of ὧν must be the matters in the ἀντωμοσία, not the immediately preceding words.

οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα] Accus. cognate, not accus. of the object; Dig. 6. Ἑπαύο is intransitive.

8. καὶ οὐχ ὃς—ἐστι] This is well-marked irony. Socrates declines here to pronounce, before an audience who would have welcomed it, a condemnation of studies against which at other times he had freely declared himself, on the double ground (1) that human nature ought to be studied first, Xen. Mem. I. i. 12, and (2) that the Physicists got involved in questions which were really beyond the powers of the human mind, ib. 11, and arrived moreover at impotent conclusions, ib. IV. vii. 6. 7.

10. τοσαύτας] 'Upon so grave a charge' as that of pronouncing upon things of which he
19. δίκας φύγοιμί ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοὺτον, ὁ ἄνδρες
δ' Ἀθηναίοι, οὐδεὶς μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοῦς ὑμῶν
tοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἂξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἄλληλοις
dιδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοὶ πῶποτε ἀκη-
κόατε διαλεγομένων πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιούτοι εἰσίν: 5
φράζετε οὖν ἄλληλοις, εἰ πῶποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα
هةυσά τις ὑμῶν ἐμοὶ περί τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομέ-
νων καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστι καὶ
tάλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἄ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, οὐδὲ γ' 10
εἰ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώ-
ποι καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄληθες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶος
τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὁσπέρ Γοργίας τε ὁ

3. τοῖς] H. brackets. But if we read aitois just before, following the weight of MSS. tois is required by the Greek.

was ignoraut.—the fault he himself so strongly reprobed
in others.

1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But the truth is.' Dig. 147.


ἄλληλοις διδάσκειν τε καὶ φρά-
ζειν] This is a hysteron pro-
teron: Dig. 308. With φρά-
ζειν is to be supplied of course ἄλληλοις, dropped by an idiom of abbreviation : Dig. 233.

14. ὁσπέρ Γοργίας] Gorgias is spoken of by Isocrates as having made greater profits by teaching than any other man of his profession. Yet the sum was but small; ὁ δ' ἐδίδασκεν κτησάμενος ὃν ἠμεῖς μημονεύομεν,

Γοργίας ὁ λεευτίως, though a
single man and unburdened by
Liturgies, χιλιόν μένους στατήρας
The ἐποκρατι, he says, ib. 157,
made much greater fortunes.
Nor indeed is Socrates saying
that the profits made by the
Sophists were great. The sum
which Socrates mentions below,
20 b, as Evenus' price, 5 minae
(500 francs), seems to have
been above the average: Iso-
crates, xiii. 3. p. 291, speaks of
3 or 4 minae (3-400 fr.) as a
common price. Isocrates has
been said, it is true, to have
taken as much as 10 minae for
his rhetorical course; Gorgias
and Prodicus even 100. But
what made the frequenting of
Sophists' courses expensive was
that people never thought they
had had enough of them.
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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. p. 19
tοῦτων γὰρ ἐκαστος, ὃ ἀνδρες, οἷος τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν eis ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἔαντων πολιτῶν προϊκά ἔννειναι ὃ ἂν βούλωνται, ἐτούτων πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ἐξουσίας ἀπολιπόντας p. 20
σφίσι ἔννειναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἅλλος ἁνήρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὅν ἐγὼ ὅσθόμην ἐπιδιδομόντα: ἐτυχον γὰρ προσελθόν ἅνδρι ὃς τετελέκε χρήματα σοφισταίς
10 πλείω ἡ ἐξύπαντες οἱ ἅλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου
tοῦτον ὃν ἁνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο νῦε— ὡς Καλλία, ἦν ὅι ἐγώ, εἴ μὲν σου τῷ νῦε πῶλο ἡ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτῶν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἐμελλεν αὐτῶ καλῶ τε καὶ
15 ἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν ἦν δ' ἂν βοῦτος ἡ τῶν ἰππικῶν τις ἡ τῶν γεωργίκων νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἁνθρώπω ἐστῶν, τίνα αὐτῶν ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἁνθρώπινης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν; οἶμαι γὰρ

14. καλὸ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ] So Oxon. It seems unnecessary to introduce a synaloapha.

5. τοῦτων πείθουσι] The construction is changed from the infinit. to a finite verb. Dig. 277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.

6. προσειδέναι] The πρὸς stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its prepositional sense. Dig. 129.

7. ἐπεὶ καὶ] The connecting thought is—'and at Athens there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.'

8. σοφιστὴσθωμην] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἐστίν ἐνθάδε.

20. σε ἑσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νεών κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἦ οὐ; Πάνω γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδατός, καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Εὐηνός, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν καὶ ἑγὼ τὸν Εὐηνὸν ε ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὁς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὔτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἑκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἥβρυνόμην ἃν, εἰ ἦπιστάμην ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὁ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναίοι.

V. ῾Ὑπολάβοι ἄν οὖν τὶς ὑμῶν ἴσως; ἀλλ' ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν αἰ διαβολαὶ σοί αὐτὰ γεγονασίν; οὐ γὰρ δῆποι σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπείτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν εἰ μή τι ἐπρατετεὶς ἄλλοιοι ή οἱ πολλοὶ. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, δ ἵνα μὴ ἴμείς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι 15 δοκεῖ δικαία λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κάγῳ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαί, τί ποτ' ἐστι τούτο ὁ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε

6. ἐγὼ οὖν.] So Oxon. and 2 other MSS. ἐγὼ ἐστι not wanted here.

9. ῾Ὑπολάβοι ἄν οὖν.] Here Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with 'the old acusers,' passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed σοφὸς to an account of the personal dislike which had befallen him individually. See Introd. p. xxxiv.

10. πράγμα.] In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or study or the like. Cf. Crito 53 d, ὁ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα, Euryd. 304 a, τοῦ τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν, c, χαρίεν γε τι πράγμα ἐστιν ἢ φιλοσοφία.

The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to σφῶν. 'What is it, then, that you (since we are not to identify you with the σοφοί) have been about?'

13. εἰ μῆ—πολλοί.] This clause is the double of σοῦ γε—πραγματευομένον an instance of the widely extended idiom which I have ventured to call Binary Structure; Dig. 207. Very parallel is Thuc. V. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀφαλές ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἀν παρασχοῖτε . . . . , εἰ μὴ περιγένεσθε,—where εἰ μὴ περιγένεσθε repeats διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι. Cf. also Hom. Od. ii. 246, ἐ ἐπερ γάρ κ' ὀδύσσεις κ.λ., ἀλλὰ κεν αὐτοῦ δεικεὶ πότῳ ἐπίσποι, ἐ ἐπλέωσεσι μάχοιτο. c. Exposition of the verifiable peculiari ties in himself, which had been mistaken for those of Physicist and Sophist,—viz. his conviction of the holowness of the prevalent pre- tensions to knowledge,
1. ὅνομα] Of σοφός. See note on σοφός, 18 b.

5. ἣπερ κτ.λ.] 'My wisdom is precisely (περ) that only wisdom, as I believe (ὑσωσ), which is possible to man;' namely (21 d, 23 b), knowledge of his own ignorance. Socrates speaks of this as knowledge because it implies two things;—(1) the possession of a standard or ideal of knowledge, with the conception of a method for attaining it; and (2) self-knowledge, such as would result from the Socratic system of self-examination (cf. 38 a, note), revealing the amount of actual short-coming. This is knowledge until the positive knowledge is attained, and if that never can be, then this is the only knowledge. Socrates' faith, however, in the partial attainableness of positive knowledge never wavered, and his misgiving here must be restricted to the possibility of complete attainment.

8. ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω] 'Or some wisdom that—Ι know not how to characterise it.' It is some predicate, alternative with μείζων ὥς κατ' άνθρωπον, which Socrates affects to be at a loss for. The idiom is an expedient for abbreviation; the sentence is hurried to its conclusion after its point has been expressed, by a clause superseding the enumeration of further particulars: cf. Dig. 257, where the present passage is especially compared with Gorg. 494 d, (Α) Φημί τὸν κνώμενον ἡδῶς ἐν βιώναι. (Β) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλήν μόνον κυρίσω, ἢ ἐτί τι σε ἐρωτῶ;

12. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν] Cf. Symp. 177 a, ἢ μὲν μου ἄρχῃ τοῦ λόγου ἐντι κατὰ τὴν Ἑλεφτίδον Μελανίππην οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μίθος ἀλλὰ Φαιδροῦ τοῦτο. Cf. also Ale. I. 113 e. The verse in the Melanippē was Οὐκ ἔμος ὁ μίθος ἀλλ' ἔρης μητρὸς πάρα. So Eur. Hel. 513, λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔμοι, σοφὸν δ' ἔποι. 

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όνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ὅσως μὲν ἡ ὁδὸς τισιν ὑμῶν παίξειν, εὗ μέντοι ὑστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τούτο τὸ ὅνομα ἐσχηκα. 5 ποιαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἢπερ ἐστὶν ὅσως ἀνθρωπινή σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύον ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὔτοι δὲ τάξιν αὖ, οὗ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζων τινὰ εἰ ἡ κατ' ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἔπισταμαι, ἀλλ' ὡστε 10 φησὶ πειδεύται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολὴ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μὴ δ' εὰν ὁδὸς τι ὑμῶν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν
20. λόγον, ὃν ἄν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεον ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τὶς ἐστὶ σοφία καὶ οία, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξουμαι τῶν θεῶν τῶν ἐν

21. Δελφαῖς. Χαιρεφάντα γὰρ ἵστε ποι. οὕτος ἐμὸς τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλῆθει ἐταῖρος τε 5 καὶ Ἐνυνέψυγε τὴν φυγήν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ οίος ἦν Χαιρεφάνι, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὰ τι ὀρμῆσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτὲ καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἑτολμήσε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καὶ, ὀπέρ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὃ ἄνδρες· ἥρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἰ τις ἐμὸν εἰς σοφάτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα

3. μάρτυρα—Δελφαῖς] "There is no need (says Zeller, Phil. der Griechen II. p. 45. note 2), to deny the authenticity of the oracle, but we cannot regard it as having given the primary impulse to Socrates' tour of enquiry. Socrates must have been already a known personage for Chærephon to have put his question to the Pythia, or for her to have taken it up." It is therefore semi-rhetorically that the oracle is here represented as the cause of Socrates' eccentric and unpopular proceeding. The Iambic form—σοφὸς Σωφοκλῆς &c.—in which the response appears in Diog. II. 37, and Suid. σοφὸς, is a later invention—an expansion of the Pythia's simple negative recited here.

6. καὶ ὑμῶν—κατήλθε] This allusion to Chærephon's antecedents is added not without purpose,—to dispose the court to hear more indulgently the story which is to follow.

In detail:—The full point of the phrase πλῆθει ἐταῖρος is to be found in the contrast of the adherents of the Thirty; more especially the ἐταῖροι of the oligarchical clubs, and the body of 3000 hoplites organised by the Thirty from their partisans. φιγῇν refers to the subsequent expulsion of all not included in the 3000 from Athens, and their withdrawal presently after (when they found no safety in Attica) to Thebes, Megara, Oropus, Chalcis, Argos, &c. This flight, as an event still vividly remembered, is called ταύτην, 'the recent.' So Isocr. matches it with the old troubles under the Pisistratidae;—τῆς δημοκρατίας... εἰς ἓκαταλείπεσαν, καὶ τὰς φαγὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τραύμων καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοστα γενομένα, viii. 123. p. 184. With κατὴλθε cf. Lyæas, x. 4. p. 116, εἰ ὦν ἑμὶς κατελθῆσην it is the recognised description of the restoration of democracy and end of the eight months' reign of the Thirty, signalised by the solemn return of Thrasybulus and the exiles from Piræus to Athens.
VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὃν ένεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλων b γὰρ ὡμάς διδάξειν, θευ μοι ἡ διαβολή γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεβυμοῦμην οὔτωσι· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἕγω γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἔννοια ἐμαυτὸς σοφὸς ὄν· τί οὖν ποτὲ λέγει φάσκων ἐμء σοφότατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ὁδήποτε ζευδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ· καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἡπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόνις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τωιατήν τινα ἐτραπόμην. ἥλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ε ἐνταῦθα, εἰ πέρ ποι, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαυτεῖν καὶ ἁπο-

15 φανῶν τῷ χρήσμῳ ὅτι οὔτος ἐμοὶ σοφότερός ἐστι, σὺ δὲ ἐμε ἐφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—οἵματι γὰρ οὔδεν δέομαι λέγειν, ἣν δὲ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς οὖν ἐγὼ σκοτῶν τοιοῦτον τι ἐπαθοῦν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξε μοι οὔτος

20 ὁ ἀνήρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς

2. μαρτυρήσει The μαρτυρία is to be supposed to follow at once. Introd. p. xviii.
10. οὐ γὰρ θέμης αἰτῶ Cf. Pind. Pyth. ix. 42, τῶν οὐ δεμι-

των φεύγειν βιγείν.
17. τῶν πολιτικῶν In itself this word means no more than ‘statesman’ in the sense in which it might have been ap-
plied to Pericles, and is applied, Legg. 693 a, to the old law-
givers and settlers of Hellas. But an Athenian of Plato’s time speaking of Athens would

mean by πολιτικοὶ that class of men who made public business a profession,—τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λεγομένους (Politic. 303 e). As distinguished from the ρήτορες, they were men who sought appointments to public offices, while the ρήτορες were professional speakers in the E-

clesia. Cf. 23 c, and see Introd. p. x. note i.
19. διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξε μοι] This inversion of govern-
ment is of common occurrence among the forms of changed construction: Dig. 271. ἔδοξε is ‘I came to think,’ as 32 b.
21. ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ’ οὐ̂ κατείται ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἶνοι μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς, εὖ δ’ οὖ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τοῦτο τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοὶς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ’ οὖν ἀπιὸν ἔλογγομῆν ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφῶ-3 τερός εἰμι: κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθων εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ οὕτως μὲν οἴεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ, ὀσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴμοι; έοικα γοῦν τοῦτο γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τοῦτο σοφῶτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴμοι 10 εἰδέναι· ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ’ ἀλλον ή τῶν ἐκείνου δο-κούστων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μου ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινο καὶ ἀλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν ἦδη ἐφεξῆς ἡ, αἰσθανόμε-15 νος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὃμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδοκεὶ εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαί· ίτεόν οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἀπαντας τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. 22. καὶ νη τὸν κύνα, ὁ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίου· δει γὰρ πρὸς 20 ὑμᾶς τάληθη λέγεω· ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθόν τι τοικτούν· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξάν μοι ὅλιγον δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ἔποιεσθαι κατὰ τὸν θεοῦ, ἀλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαινότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ἡμῶν τὴν 25 ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὀσπρο πόνους τινὰς πονοῦν·

20. νη τὸν κύνα] What was meant by this oath is clear from Gorg. 482 b, μὰ τὸν κύνα τῶν Ἀἰγυπτίων θεῶν,—that is, the dog-headed or, more correctly, jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato this oath is only found in the mouth of Socrates. In Ari- stoph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias, uses the same oath. 23. τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς] Cf. Euthyd. 292 v, τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῶν ἐνδεῖ ἢ ἐτί πλείονος.


1. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος] H's conjecture καὶ ἀλεγκτός (1) is mere conjecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since ἀλεγκτός is not 'contradicted' but 'admitting contradiction'; and (3) if it did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates' leading principle throughout is that the oracle must be true, and that the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true sense.

12. ἐν ὀλίγῳ] H's conjecture ἐν λόγῳ is needless. For ἐν ὀλίγῳ means the same, viz. 'in short,' not 'in a short time;' just like ἐν βραχεί, Symp. 217 a, ἐν διαχίστη, Isocr. i. 40. p. 11.

If course ἐν ὀλίγῳ occurs also, c. g. Lysias, xiii. 38. p. 133; and H might have argued something from the variation of reading between κατ' ὀλίγον and κατ' λόγον, Thuc. vi. 34. med.

1. ἵνα μοι — γένοιτο] 'With the object of finding positively unimpeachable proof of the divine declaration.' A double meaning is wrapped up in μοι, —it is both 'by my agency' and 'for my satisfaction.' καὶ signifies the superaddition of demonstration, which all the world must accept, to the certainty which had been in Socrates an exercise of faith. μαντεία signifies (1) the process by which oracles are obtained, or (2), as here, and 29 a, the fact oracularly communicated. This signification still remains distinct from that of μαντείων, which was the form of words in which the oracle was given; μαντεία is the meaning of the μαντείων: a distinction to feel which we have only to remember that to get at the meaning from the words was in the case of oracles a process involving exactly that degree of difficulty which suited the god or his prophet.

11. οἱ παρούσαι] With Stallb. and against Wolf, we must take this to mean 'those present at each several time,' and not 'the present audience.'
22. τούτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφῶς ποιοῦν ἃ ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ φύσει ετυμῶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὡσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοῦν· καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιούτων τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεποιθότες· καὶ ἄμα ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰκομένιον καὶ τὰλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπήμα οὖν καὶ ἐντεύθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἡμι. 10 ἀξιωτικῷ γὰρ ξυνηθεὶν οὖν ἐπισταμένον, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, τοιούτως δὲ ἐγὼ ἦδειν ὅτι εὐρήσουμε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τοιοῦτοι μὲν οὐκ ἐφεύσθην, ἀλλὰ ἡπισταντο ἡ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλα, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ταύτων 15 μοι ἐδοξάν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξηγόγακέσθαι ἐκαστός ἢξίου καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατο εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνη εἰτὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν ὡστ' ἐμε ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερω— 20

20. ἀποκρύπτειν] This is the reading of one MS. Φ. The dominant reading of the MSS. (including Οξον.) is ἀποκρύπτειν. The editors have espoused ἀπέκρυπτειν but such a text would not account for such a variant as ἀποκρύπτειν in the best MSS.

Ἀποκρύπτειν itself is scarcely possible (on the principle of πεπραγ-
which experiments further supplied the key to the intensity of the prejudice against Socrates individually, in the personal enmities which they had excited;

IX. 'Ek taunthi dē tīs ēxetāseos, o ἄνδρες ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαὶ μοι γέγονασι καὶ p. 23. οἶαι χαλεπώτατα καὶ βαρύτατα, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβόλας ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, 10 σοφὸς ἐιναι. ώστε γὰρ μὲ ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτῶν ἐιναι σοφὸν, ἃ ἄν ἄλλον ἐξέλεγξο τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὅ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὡς τὸ θέος σοφὸς ἐιναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τοῦτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἄνθρωπινη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ ὀὐδένος· καὶ 15 φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτην, προσκεχρήσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὅνοματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὅστε ἂν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι οὕτως ὑμᾶν, ὅ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατος ἐστίν, ὅστις ὅστερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι ὀὐδένος ἀξίος ἐστὶ τῇ ἄληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μάτεμαι, ἀπερίκα, Φαέδος 99 φ, ἰγὼ ib. 98 b); but points to ἄνθρωπον, which is to be governed by ἐδοξή understood from ἐδοξᾶν, which gives also the best sense.

6. ταυτηθι [The -ι is not always strictly δεικτικόν. Lob. Path. Pars II. p. 230, "Sepe Oratores, etiamsi de absentibus loquuntur, quos modo designarunt et aditoribus quasi spectandos proponeunt, iota demonstrativo utuntur, et sæpius etiam neglignant, si de praesentibus." Cf. τοιτ, 37 c. ἐκείνως] We cannot follow Oxon. and 3 other MSS. in reading ἐκεῖ, which is the result of an old contraction misread. 15. τοῦτ' οὖ] This conjecture of F. A. Wolf we must needs adopt for τοῦτον of the MSS.

9. ὅνομα δὲ—εἶναι [Lit. 'and I am called by this name, that I am wise.' The subject of λέγεινai is [ἐμὲ], not ὅνομα. And σοφὸς εἶναι is by attraction for [τὸ] εἶναι με σοφὸν.

11. τὸ δὲ] Accus. of pronoun nenter, standing for the whole sentence immediately following: Dig. 19.

14. καὶ ὀὐδένος; 'or nothing:' the καὶ is disjunctive.
23. μὲν ἐτι καὶ νῦν περιών ζητῶ καὶ ἔρευνο κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἄστων καὶ ἔξων ἢν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐν- δεικνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι σοφός. καὶ ὡτὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραξάι μοι σχολὴν γέγονεν ἢξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' εν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

c X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτων οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἰς μάλιστα σχολῆ ἔστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίροντων ἀκούοντες εξεταζόμενων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται· εἰτ' εἰπεῖν προσφέροντι ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν κάπετα, οἴμαι, εὑρίσκοντι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένῳ μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὅλιγα ἡ οὐδέν. ἐντεύθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν εξεταζόμενοι ἐμὸν ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τῆς ἐστὶ μιαρώδες τατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις

1. μὲν ἐτι] Οξον. gives μὲν ἐξω ἐτι, but in the hand of a restorer, and not on the traces of the old letters. (Gaisf. wrongly represents ἐξων as the reading. ἐξων would be redundant, like ἐξων φιλαρείς, &c.) 2. καὶ ἔξων] So Οξον. and 3 other MSS. Edd. καὶ τῶν ἔξων. But the variation is in the spirit of Plato: cf. Dig. 237, and add Phædo 85 a, αἰτή ἦ τε ἄθιδων καὶ καλιδών καὶ ὁ ἔποψ. 11. μιμοῖνται] So Οξον. &c. μιμοῖνει is a conjecture of Hermann.

4. ὑπὸ ταύτης] Later, 31 c, he gives a second reason for abstaining from public life.
6. ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία] Cf. Legg. 677 c, the beautiful expression μυρίαν τινά φοβερῶν ἐρημίαν, Rep. 520 c, μυρία βελτίων.
For the fact, with respect to Socrates, cf. with Stallbaum Xen. Οἰκον. ii. 3. 11. καὶ αἰτοὶ—ἐξετάζειν] For-}

ster compares Rep. 539 b, οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγῳ γένουσα, ὡς παυδὰ αἰτοὶ κατα- χρῶσα, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρω- μενοι, καὶ μιμοῦμενοι τοῖς ἐξελε- γχοντας αἰτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι ... καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων δὴ αἰτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλου φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοῖς ἄλλους διαβῆληται.

ἐμὲ μιμοῖνται] By practising upon each other.
and lastly, in combination


4. ταῦτα] Latin ista; idiomatically expressive of contempt, Dig. 318.

ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα] Understand ἤτοι or the like, by comparison of 19 b.

12. ἐκ τούτων] 'It is upon this footing'—namely that of an old general prejudice, aggravated by supervening personal animosity,—'that I am now attacked by,' &c. The meaning 'in consequence of' would be too strong, both for the sense here, and for the idiomatic use of the phrase; cf. Dig. 116: the meaning 'upon the strength of' would also exceed the warrant of the Greek, though not of the sense, cf. 19 a, ὃ δὴ καὶ πιστεύ̂ εν ὁΜέλητος κ.τ.λ.

καὶ Μέλητος—ῥήτορον] For an account of Socrates' three accusers and their motives, and of the classes of persons called here πολιτικοὶ and ῥήτορες, see Introd. p. x. note 1.

The δημοιοργοὶ are here joined with the πολιτικοὶ, because Anytus represented a trade himself, and herein was but one of many instances of the same conjunction of pursuits in those times at Athens. Socrates was wont to speak slightly of mechanical arts (Xen. Econ. iv. 3), —a view which would seem to connect itself with his praise of σχολὴ (Diog. ii. 31, Æl. Var. x. 14): and a conversation, in which he pressed an uncommercial view of education upon Anytus himself with reference to his son, seems to have been among the causes of Anytus' personal hatred of Socrates. (See again Introd. p. xii.)
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respective classes, but merely
that they were to be regarded
as representatives of the feelings of those bodies.
9. toIs atToIs] Lit. 'through
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against the

counts of
the indictment,separately;—


a. Perversion of the youth.

Two answers (both dialectical); 1. the hypocrisy of the charge;


3. σπουδή χαριενίξεται] Oxymoron: 'is playing off a jest under solemn forms.' The machinery of the law, with all its solemnity of circumstance and all its serious consequences, is set in motion by him for his mere amusement. Cf. χαριενίξεις in the same sense 27 a, where it is explained by παιζόντος.

8. Καὶ μοι κ.τ.λ.] The examination of Meletus by Socrates, which now follows, though it naturally affords scope for exhibiting Socrates' characteristic talent, is legally speaking the customary ἔρωτις, to which either party was bound to submit at the requisition of the other. Introd. p. xviii.

18. ἀμείνους] 'Better citizens,'—better toward others: whereas βελτίως above means, strictly speaking, better in themselves.
44. Μέλητε; οίδε τους νέους παιδεύειν οίοι τέ εἰσιν καὶ βελτίων ποιοῦσι; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντεῖς, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ’ οὐ; ἴνα Μέλητε. Εὖ γε νῦ τήν Ἦραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ωφελούντων. τί δὲ δὴ; οίδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίων ποιοῦσιν, ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὕτωι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα, ὡς Μέλητε, καὶ εὐ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκευοι βελτίως ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκευοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς οὗτοι, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἀκριβῶς ἀκριβῶς, εὐ οὐκ ἀφθονίαν. Πάντα σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ’ ἐμοῦ κατ’ ἐγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι ἢ καὶ περὶ ἐποιεῖτε οὕτωι σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίως ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνδρωποί εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ή συναντίοι τοῦτον πάν ἐς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίως ὁδὸς τ’ ὄν τοις εἶναι καὶ ἐπί τὰς ὁλίγας, οἱ ἐποικοὶ οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐὰν περὶ ἐποικοὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐποικοὶ, ἀπαντός δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ἀπάντων ἐποικοὶ, πάντως δὴ-ποιεῖ τίς τοὺς ποιοῦσιν; διαφθείρων; οὐχ οὔτως ἔχει, ὡς Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἐποικοὶ καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ἀπάντων ἐποικοὶ, πάντως δὴ-καὶ ἀναπτύσσεται ἐπί τὰς ἐνυδαιμονίας εἰς περὶ τοὺς νέους. εἰ εῖς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ’ ἀλλοὶ ὕψωσιν. ἄλλα γὰρ, ὡς Μέλητε, ἑκατὸν ἐπιδείκνυται ὁτι οὐδεποτε ἐφροντίσας τὸν φιλότου, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνει τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰςάγεις.

24. ἄλλα γὰρ] 'But the truth is;' as above 19 c, &c. Dig. 147.
26. ἀποφαίνεις—ἀμέλειαν] Between ἀμέλειαν and Μέλητε a play upon words is doubtless intended; see several instances in Plato collected Dig. 324. In this case the probability is strengthened by the constant
XIII. "Ετι δὲ ἡμῶν εἰπὲ ὃ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, p. 26

πότερον ἐστιν οἰκεῖν ἁμείνον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἡ πονηροὶς; ὃ τὰν, ἀπόκριναι οὐδὲν γὰρ τοι χαλεπῶν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς 5 ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν ὡντας, οἱ δ' ἁγαθοὶ ἁγαθὸν τι;

Πάνω γε. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅστις βουλεταὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ξυ- 
νόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ὥφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκρι- 
ναι, ὃ γαθε' καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 
ἐστο' ὅστις βουλεταὶ βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δὴτα. 

Φέρε 10 δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς 
νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους πισοῦντα ἐκόντα ἡ ἀκοῦντα;

ἠκόντα ἔγωγε. Τι δήτα, ὃ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον εὖ 
ἐμοῦ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὃν, 
ὡστε εὖ μὲν ἐγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργά-
15 ξοντα ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἁγα-
θοὶ ἁγαθῶν ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἁμαθίας ἥκω, 
ὡστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἄγνοῳ, ὅτι, εἰν τινα μοχθιρὸν ποιῆσο 
τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐ-
τοῦ, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὸν ποιῶ, ὡς 
20 φῆς σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὃ Μέλητε, 
οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲνα' ἀλλ' ἢ οὗ 
διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ' 
ἀμφότερα ψεῦδεi. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιοῦ-
των καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰςά-
25 γειν ἐστῖν, ἀλλ' ιδία λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν'

recurrence of the juxtaposition; see 24 c above, and
26 b below.

1. eipte — Μέλητε] The address ὃ Μέλητε has suffered
tmesis by the interlacing of
eipte πρὸς Διὸς with it: Dig.
288. See also Rep. 332 c, τί

26 b below.

8. ὁ νόμος] See note, 24 c.
13. τηλικόσδε] Meletus was
a very young man: cf. Euthyth., 2 b, c, and below 26 c
extr.—Stallb.
δὴ λογ. γὰρ ὅτι, εάν μάθοι, παιδευμαί τι γε ἄκων ποιῶν
οὐ δὲ ἔμνῃσται μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφιγες καὶ
οὐκ ἡθελησα, δεύρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οὐ νόμος ἑστὶν εἰσά-
γεις τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλὰ οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοῦτο μὲν 5
dῆλον ὡδὶ ἐστὶν, ὅ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μέλητῳ τούτῳ
οὐτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πόποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ
ὁ λέγε ἦμῖν, πῶς μὲ φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὁ Μέλητε,
tοὺς νεωτέρους· ὥ δῆλον ὡδὶ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφῆν,
ἡν ἐγράφωσ, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐ τὸ πόλις 10
νομίζει, ἔτερα δὲ διαμόνια καὶνά· οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι
dιδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα
λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὁ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν
θεῶν, ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν, εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ
ἐμὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄνδράσι τοποσάντ. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι 15
μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν μὲ νομίζειν εἶναι
tινὸς θεοὺς; καὶ αὐτὸς ἅρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ
οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταῦτη ἁδικώ, οὐ
μέντοι οὐσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἐτέρον, καὶ τοῦτ'
ἐστιν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρον εὐ πανταπασί με 20
φῆς οὔτε αὐτῶν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα
dιδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις

2. ἐφιγες] 'Didst decline.'
Cf. Λρ. Αχ. 717, Κάζελανες χρὴ τὸ λαυτῶν, κἂν φήγῃ τίς ζη-
μωίν. With Plato, however,
this meaning of the word is more common in the com-
174 a. ἐφιγες and οὐκ ἡθ.
form a hysteron proteron,
thought not a strongly marked
one.
cognate after ἐμέλησεν, not
nom. to ἐμέλησεν. Dig. 6.
14. ὅν νῦν] 'Whom the argu-
ment at present concerns:'
equivalent to οἷς λέγομεν as
distinguished from περὶ ὧν λέ-
γομεν.—Stalb., rightly. Cf.
Soph. 263 a, σον ἐφιγον δὴ φρά-
ζειν περὶ οὐ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου
[ὁ λόγος], Legg. 678 a, πόλεως
καὶ πολιτείας περὶ καὶ νομοθεσίας,
ὅν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρέστηκεν,
... μήμην ειναι.
3. Μά Δή'] Understand οὐ νομίζει.

5. 'Αναξαγόρου] Xcn. Mem. IV. vii. 7, makes Socrates re-

fute the alleged opinion of Ἀναξαγόρας, τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπτυρον εἶναι. Ἀναξαγόρας' formula was μύδρον διάπτυρον, which others took to mean a mass of iron. Of the moon he asserted that it had οἰκήσεις, λάφους, φάραγγας, whence that he believed it to be γῆ was an inference.

8. βιβλία] "Is secundum Laert. II. iii. 8, et Clem. Alex. ibi ab interpr. lauda-
tum, philosophorum primus βιβλίων ἐξεδώκε συγγραφῆς, ἐνε

brum a se scriptum edidit."—Forst.

9. καὶ δὴ καὶ] Ironical :

'and so then.'

10. ἀ—πραμένους] The doc-

ctrines, not the books. ἐνιοτε' that is, if they should happen to see a play in which these doctrines are promulgated, as in Eurip. Orest. 982, μελοψυ 

τὰν οὐρανοῦ μέσον χειμών τε τετα-

μέναν αὐτορήμασι πέτραν ἄλοστη χρυσότισι, θερμομένα δίωμα, βδο-

λον εἰς Ὀλυμπον. Dacier, as Stallbaum observes, curiously mistook the sense of this pas-
sage, and imagined that a volume of Anaxagoras might be bought at that time for a drachma. But in fact the price of paper itself was then excessive at Athens. Emile Egger, in a letter to Firmin Didot (Revue Contemporaine du 15 Septembre, 1856), men-
tions fragments of an account rendered by certain Athenian officers in 407 B.C., in which the price of sheets of paper (χάρται), for writing copies of these accounts (ἀντίγραφα) upon, was 1 drachma and 2 obols each, i.e. 1 fr. 20 cent.—a sum which, according to Boeckh's computation, accepted by Eg-

ger, would be equivalent to 4 fr. 80 cent. now.

εἴ πάνω πολλοῦ] 'At the most;' the same expression occurs Lcieb. I. 123 ε, ἀξιος ἐλην περικόστα εἴ πάνω πολλοῦ, Gorg. 511 d, εἰνύ πάμπολε... 

δύο δραχμάς ἐπράξατο. The ut-
most the θεατρώνης could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two oboli. See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. ἂλλος τε καὶ] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhart has well observed that the meaning of ἄτοπα is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar,' etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Cf. the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he would uphold the gods.

3. οὐτωσί — εἶναι] The two sentences οὐτωσί σοι δοκῶ and οὐδένα — εἶναι are both descriptions of the same fact, the re-statement being the more precise; οὐτωσί σοι δοκῶ stands by a sort of attraction for οὐτωσί σοι δοκῆ περὶ ἐμοῦ, of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been ἐμὶ οὐδένα — εἶναι. Dig. 207, 208.

5. Ἀπιστός κ.τ.λ.] The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—οὐτωσί σοι δοκῶ; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that. and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i.e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.

4. νομίζειν] Oxon. alone has νομίζω, which, though anacoluthic after δοκῶ, has a vividness of its own, and certainly points to the right way of understanding the sentence as an instance of binary structure: see Commentary. But we cannot claim acceptance for νομίζω with such preponderating authority in favour of νομίζειν.
ἀώπερ αὐνιγμα ἐξυνθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, ἄρα γνώσε- 
ται Σωκράτης ὃ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριευτηρωμένου καὶ 
ἐναντὶ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος; ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτῶν καὶ 
tοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαί-
5νεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, 
ἀώπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νο-
μίζουν, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζον. καὶ τοι τοῦτο ἔστι 
παίζοντος.

XV. Συνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, ἢ μοι φαί-
10νεται ταύτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ήμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὃ Μέλητε· 
ὑμεῖς δὲ, ἀπερ καὶ ἄρχας ὑμᾶς παρηθησάμην, μέμνη-
σθε μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς 
λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὡστὶς ἄνθρωπων, ὃ Μέλητε, 
ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἄνθρώπους δὲ 
15 οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ 
ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἐσθ' ὡστὶς ἱπποῦς μὲν οὐ νομίζει 
eιναι, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητάς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, 
αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἀριστε ἄνδρῶν· 
eἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοι λέγω καὶ τοῖς

1. διαπειρωμένῳ] 'He is like one, who, by framing a 
mock-riddle, is trying (as he 
says to himself) whether will 
Socrates,' &c. We have here 
one participial clause (ἀώπερ 
—ἐξυνθ. within another (δια-
πειρ.,) as Rep. 555 c, τῶν δὲ 
ἰππείκων ἑνότερα ἀργύριον τριτο-
σκοντες. Notice, that it is ἀώ-
περ αὐνιγμα, 'a mock-riddle,' 
one which has no answer.

2. ἐμοῦ χαριευτ. The use 
of the genitive, after verbs of 
knowing, seeing, and shewing, 
seems to be limited in Attic 
Greek to a noun joined with a 
participle. After verbs of men-
tioning, it is not so limited. 
Dig. 26. Cf. Lobeck on Soph. 
Α. 136.

15. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα] Similar 
expressions are—Euthyd. 273, 
ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες, 
Phldr. 235 a, ὥς οἶδο τὸν, ταὐ-
τὰ ἑτέρως τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγον, 
ἀμφοτέρως εἰς εἴριν ἀριστα, 271 d, 
ἐστιν οὖν εἰδὴ τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ 
τοία καὶ τοία, Legg. 721 b, χρῆ-
ματι μὲν τῶν τῶν καὶ τῶν τῶν, τῇ 
καὶ τῇ ἐν ἀτύμια, Philcb. 24 d, 
tὸ εἰς ἁθίς τε καὶ ἁθίς,

16. θορυβεῖτω] Merely by 
making irrelevant remarks in-
stead of answering;—brawl-
ing, as we might say.
27. ἀλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι· 
ε ἐσθ’ ὡστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαἰ-
μονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστων. Ἡς ὤνησας, ὅτι 
μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τοιτων ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν 
δαιμόνια μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ 5 
οὖν καὶνὰ ἐτε παλαία· ἀλλ’ ὡστις οὐ δαιμόνια γε νομίζο 
κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ δισμόσω ἐν τῇ 
ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δή-
πον πολλῆ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μὲ ἔστων’ οὖχ οὕτως 
ἐχεί; ἔχει δὴ’ τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ 10 
οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε 
ήγομεθα ἡ θεών παῖδας; φής ἡ οὔ; Πάνω γε. 
Οὐκοῦν εἰπερ δαίμονας ἠγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν 
θεοὶ τινὲς ἐσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἰ σὺ ἐγὼ φημί 
σε αἰνίππεσθαι καὶ χαριεντ蒋εσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἠγοῦ— 15 
μενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς ἂδη ἠγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴπερ 
γε δαίμονας ἠγούμαι: εἰ δ’ ἂδ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες 
ἐσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἡ ἕκ νυμφῶν ἡ ἕκ τινων ἄλλων, ὡν 
δὴ καὶ λέγοντα, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας 
ἥγοῖτο ἐσι, θεοὺς ἃ δὲ μὴ: ὀμοίως γάρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἰν, 20 
ἐ ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἥγοῖτο ἡ καὶ ὀνων

6. δαιμόνια γε] To make 
the reasoning sound, δαμόνια 
here and δαμόνια πράγματα 
above ought to mean the 
same; which it must be ac-
knowledged they do not. It 
must be observed, however, 
that the original perversion 
lay with Meletus, whose charge 
of δαμόνια καὶνὰ was based sim-
ply on Socrates’ τὸ δαμόνιν. 
Now by this Socrates meant 
a divine agency, but Meletus 
had wrested it into the sense 
of a divine being. So that here 
the equivocation of Meletus is 
simply returned upon himself. 
Contrast, where Socrates is 
speaking uncontroversially of 
his monitor, the distinctly ad-
jectival θεῶν τι καὶ δαμόνιν 31 
c. See Appendix A, on τὸ 
δαμόνιν.

8. ἀντιγραφῇ] The ἐγκλημα 
is so called, as it has been al-
ready called ἀντιγραφα. See 
19 b note.

18. ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων ὧν] That 
is, ἐκ ἄλλων ὧν τινῶν.
Third part of Defence; — Justification of the pursuit in which his life had been spent, viz., that of a moral reformer, interwoven with notices of the reformatory doctrine itself.

XVI. 'Alla γάρ, ὥ άνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικώ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλὴς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἰκανά καὶ ταῦτα: ὥ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλεγον, ὅτι πολλὴ μοι ἀπεχθεία γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εἴ ὢστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτ ἐστὶν ὅ ἐμε αἰρήσει, ἐἀντπε αἱρή, οὐ Μέλητος οὔδε Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἀ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας ἦρηκεν, οἷς καὶ δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεων οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. ἦςως δ' ἄν οὖν εἶποι τις:

6. πείθοις ἄν ὡς οὐ] The οὐ is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational. It is a confused antici-pation of the coming negative οὐδέμια. Dig. 264.

18. οὐδεν—στῇ] 'The rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case.' This use of οὐδεν δεινὸν is idiomatic: cf. Gorg. 520 d, οὐδεν δεινὸν αὐτῶ μὴ ἄθησθη, 'we need not apprehend for him any injury,' Phaedo 84 b, οὐδεν δεινὸν μὴ φοβησθη, 'we need not apprehend that the soul will have to fear.' The 'apprehension' is supposed to affect the speaker and his hearers, as interested in the contingency under discussion. So here Socrates is speaking half ironically, interesting himself, as it were, for the rule, against himself. στῇ is also idiomatically used, as a quasi impersonal; — that is, a vague nominative, such as 'the course of events,' is understood. See Dig. 97; where among other parallels is given Ar. Eth. Nic. VI. ix. 9, στῇ σετα γὰρ κάκει. στῇ is literally 'come to a stand still.' Stallb. is wrong here.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 73

28. εἴτε οὐκ αἰσχύνει, δ' Σωκράτες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτίθευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο ἄν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείησαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὥς ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οἷεὶ δεῖν κινδύνου ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ἣν ἡ τεθνᾶναι ἄνδρα ὅτι τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφελὸς 5 ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἡ ἀδικα πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἐργα ἡ κακοῦ. φαύλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οὗ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦν, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κιν- 10 ὄνυν κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μῆτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμομένῳ 'Εκτορά ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὔτα, οὔτωσι πως, ὥς ἐγὼ- μαι; ὥ παi, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλω τῷ ἐταίρῳ τοῦ φόνου καὶ 'Εκτορά ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐ- 15 τίκα γὰρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' "Εκτορά πότμος ἐτοίμος· ὁ δὲ ταυτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὀλγιώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μάλλον δείσας τὸ ἥνις κακὸς ὁν 1 d καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθείς τῷ ἀδικουντὶ, ἣν μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω κατα- 20 γέλαστος παρὰ νυσί κορωνίσων ἄχθος ἀροῦρης. μὴ αὐτοῦ οὐεί φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὔτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἄλθείᾳ· οὐ ἂν τις ἐαυτοῦ τάξιν ἐγγεσάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡ ὑπ' ἄρ- χουτος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα 25

4. ὑπολογίζεσθαι] See below, d note.
5. ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν] 'A man of any worth at all.' This idiomatic concurrence of καὶ with σμικρὸν τι is frequent: Dig. 132.
10. ὁ τῆς Ἐτέθος] The same illustration is used in Symp. 179 e. The reference in what follows is to Hom. II. xviii. 92.
23. ὅ ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.] The former ἥ in this sentence is hyperbatically postponed to ἐαυτοῦ τάξιν, which in sense is included under it. Dig. 290*.
kündueneiv, μηδὲν υπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 28. ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἄν εἰςν εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἀνδρὲς 'Αθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν μεὶ αἱ ἀρχοντες ἔταττον, εἰς υἱὸς υἱοὶς εἰλεσθε ἀρχεῖν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαια καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιτόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ εἰκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτωντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήβην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, ϕιλοσοφοῦντα με δεῖν ξῆν καὶ εἶξετά-ζοντα ἐμαυτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖσ p. 29. θάνατον ἣ ἄλλο ότιον πράγμα λίποιμ τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν μὲντ' ἄν εἰ, καὶ ός ἀληθῶς τὸτ' ᾳν με δικαίως εἰσαγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἰναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιῶς θάνατον καὶ οἴόμενος σοφὸς εἰναι οὐκ ὄν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὡς ἀνδρὲς, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἰναι μη ὄντα: δοκεῖν γάρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἄ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἴδε μὲν γάρ οὐδέσ τὸν θάνατον οὔδ' εἰ τυνχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὅ των ἀγαθῶν, δεδίαις δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἑστὶ. καὶ b τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὐτῆ ἡ ἐποιείδιστος, ἢ

1. ὑπολογιζόμενον] 'Giving any countervailing weight to;' literally, 'reckoning per contra.' The ὑπο conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the signification of meeting from an opposite direction: see Dig. 131.

5. Ποτίδαια—Δηλίῳ] At Potidaea (see Charm. init., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 429 B.C., Socrates rescued Alcibiades but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of bravery. Delium, 424 B.C., witnessed his famous retreat, (Symp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 B.C., we know less.

10. ἐνταῦθα δὲ] ἐνταῦθα repeats τοῦ θεοῦ τάπτωντος κ.τ.λ.—δὲ marks the apodosis.

20. καὶ τοῦτο . . . αὕτη] Not pleonastical; but 'what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance?' τοῦ ἀφέσθαι which follows is a genitive exephegetic of ἀμαθία. Dig. 24.
2. τούτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.] ‘In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that’ &c. The former as well as the latter toύτω both relate to the same fact, to the same στι.—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 ε, λαμπρός τ’ ἐστιν ἕκαστος εν τούτω, κατ’ τούτ’ ἐπειγεται, Νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος, ‘Ἅν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυχάνει βέλτιστος ἄν. The suppression after τούτω ἄν is a graceful evasion of self-assertion. See Dig. 255.

10. ἀπιστήσαντες] ‘Disbelieving’ the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not ‘refusing to follow Anytus’ counsel’ to put Socrates to death. It is therefore to be connected, not with the words immediately following (ὁς ἑφη ἢ τὴν ἄρχην οὐ δεῖ ἐμὲ δεύρο εἰσελθεῖν ἡ ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἴον τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅσ, εἰ διαφευγοίημην, ἦδη ἄν ὑμῶν οἱ νείσ.

13. ἥδη ἄν] The construction of the fut. indic. with ἄν is abundantly established. ἄν here belongs to διαφθαρήσονται, and to refer it to the part. ἐπιτηδεύσαντες is a shift which will not apply to other passages (Dig. 58), and dislocates this. Observe, as to διαφθαρήσονται itself, that its not being affected by the Oratio Obliqua is to be accounted for regularly; it is because the event it denotes is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by Socrates. Plato is never arbitrarily irregular in this class of constructions: Dig. 90. It might be said here, that διαφθεῖσθαι denotes an event equally in the future. But
the plan being, to teach the paramount value of the soul, and the duty of caring for it, and the need of consciously-possessed principles of action.

then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

4. ἐφ' ὁπε... πεινοσφείν] For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.

8. ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ] "Ἀσπάζομαι est aliquem salutare ita, ut cum amplectaris; φιλῶ ita, ut cum osulceris." — Stalib.

Here of course both words are used, by transference, for the feelings which those actions betoken. Note too, that the transference affects both: it is not that φιλῶ already expresses a feeling, and thus gives the turn to ἀσπάζομαι: their coordination in the phrase requires that they should enter into it homogeneously.

πεισομαι—ὑμῶν] The parallel is striking to the declaration of the holy apostles, Acts v. 29, πεισομαι· δει Θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὁνθρώπους.

14. ἵχων] Stalib., after Fischer, "de animi magnitudine et fortitudine."
30. ἐν εἰδώ ὅτι τὰ πλεῖστον ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστον ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φανερὰ περὶ πλείονον. ταῦτα καὶ νεώτεροι καὶ πρεσβυτέροι, ὅτως ἄν ἐνυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένω καὶ ἀπό, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσοι μον ἐγγυνήτερο ἦστε γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὐ 5 ἱστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδὲν πω ὑμῖν μεῖξον ἀγαθῶν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μὴν σωμάτων

b ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω τοι οὐφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡπώς ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετή γίνεται, ἀλλ’ εὖ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τάλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἰδια καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων δια−φθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ’ ἀν εἰὴ βλαβερά’ εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ 15 φήσιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἀν, ὁ Ἀθηναίων, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἡ μὴ, καὶ ἡ ἀφίετε ἡ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὅσ ἐμοῦ οὖν ἄν ποιήσοντος
c ἄλλα, οὐδ’ εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθηναί.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλ’ ἐμμείνατε μοι οἷς ἐδείηθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν εὖ, οἷς ἄν λέγω, ἀλλ’ ἀκούειν καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὠνή−σεθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἂττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, εὖ, οἷς ἱσως βοήσεσθε ἁλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὐ γὰρ ἤστε, εάν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοι− 25 οὕτων ὁντα, οἰον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μεῖξον βλάψετε

15. ταῦτ’ ἀν εἰ] ‘If preaching virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.’ The ταῦτα is not identical with the ταῦτα of the line before, but is more comprehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase ταῦτα λέγων, and means ‘this practice of mine.’

5. ἀτιμώσειν] II substitutes a conjecture of his own, ἀτιμώσειν, quite needlessly; for ἀτιμώσω, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἄτιμος, while ἀτιμώς is to make ἄτιμος, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, περὶ τῶν ῥέων ἀρχαῖα ἡμῖν πάντας. 23. κρούσαντες] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of II. occurs here,—κρούσαντες, because (he says)

13. εἰ καὶ γελοιώτερον refers not to the words immediately succeeding, namely, προσκέειμεν—θεοῖ, but to the simile which follows them. 23. κρούσαντες] 'With a single tap,'—as you would a μύσφ.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 79

1. ἄν μὲ, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτω, ἡμίδιως ἄν ἀποκτείνατε, ἔτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίων καθεύδουτε διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τίνα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὤμην ἐπιπέμψει κηδόμενος ὤμων. ὅτι δέ ἔγω τυγχάνω ὧν τοιοῦτος, οἶος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδοσθαί, ἐνθένδε ἄν κατανοῆσαίτε 5 οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνω ἐοίκε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμε- λουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἄει, ἕδια ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὅσπερ πατέρα ἡ ἀδελφῶν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ 10 μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἀπέλαυνον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· ὅν δὲ ὀρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ, ὅτι ὁι κατήγοροι τάλλα πάντα ἀνασχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τούτῳ γε οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, 15 ὃς ἐγώ ποτὲ τινα ἡ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἡ ὑπηρσ. ἰκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ἀληθῆ ὡς λέγω, τὴν πενίαν. XIX. Ἰσως ἄν οὖν δόξειν ἄτοπον ἐίναι, ὅτι δὴ κρούσαστες is 'debile pulsandi verbum.' Such a word however is just what was wanted. 14. οἱς οἷοι τε] They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι—μάρτυρα lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb ἀπαναισχυντῆσα. See Dig. 303. as its singularity alone might suffice to shew.

19. Ἰσως ἄν οὖν] The dominant reason of Socrates' abstinence from public affairs was not so much the impossibility of maintaining himself in a public position without sacrifice of principle or of life; but rather, that he felt his mission to be a moral and an individual one, and that from his point of view it was infinitely less important to rectify a
éγώ ἵδια μὲν ταῦτα ἐξυμβουλεύω περιοδω καὶ πολυ- πραγμονώ, δημοσιά δὲ οὖ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ἐξυμβουλεύων τῇ πόλει. τουτοῦ δὲ αἰτίον ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκήκοατε πολ- 
5 λαχού λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείων τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνε- 
ται φωνή, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικυκροδῶν Μέλη-

tos ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτ' ἐστιν ἐκ παιδός ἀρξάμε-
νον φωνῆ τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὡταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀπο-

τρέπει με τούτο ὃ ἄν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ 
10 ὀὕποτε· τούτ' ἐστιν ὃ μοι ἐπαντιούται τὰ πολιτικὰ 
πράττειν· καὶ παγκάλως γε μοι δοκεῖ ἐπαντιούσθαι 
ἐν γαρ ἤστε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπε-

χείρσα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἄν ἀπολῶλῃ καὶ οὔτ' ἄν ὑμᾶς ὀφελήκη ὀὐδὲν οὔτ' ἄν 
15 ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθ' οὔ

5. γίγνεσαι φωνῇ] All MSS. have this φωνῇ, and all edd. except V bracket it. Needlessly; Fischer points out the parallel to the next sentence, τούτ' ἐστιν ἐκ παιδός ἀρξάμενον φωνῆ τις γιγνο-

μένη. 9. τούτο ὃ ἄν] Ed. prefer τούτον. But ἀποτρέπει πρά-

τειν τοῦτο is a construction borne out by Theat. 151 a, ἐνίος μὲν 

τὸ γιγνομένον μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποτρέπει εὐνεία, [Dem.] Proem. xx. 

p. 1431, δεῖξα ὃ τότε ἡμάρτενε, νῦν ἀπετρέψατο τοῦτο παθεῖν, 

and analogous constructions such as Xen. An. III. i. 20, πορίζεσαι τὰ ἐπιτίθεια κατέχοντι ἡμᾶς. τοῦτο here is the reading of five MSS. 

besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented 

than τοῦτο. 15. καὶ μοι μὴ] H alters this into καὶ μή μοι, 

comparing Phaedo 105 b. But καὶ μοι is a common commence-

ment of a sentence in the Orators.

particularly policy, than by laying 

hold of individuals and making 

statesmen of them to raise the 

standard of statesmanship.

2. ἀναβαίνων] To the Pnyx ; 

as in the famous πῶς ὃ ὅμοι 

ἀνω καθήη, Dem. de Cor. 169, 

p. 285.

5. θείων τι καὶ δαμῶν] See 

Appendix A, on τὸ δαμῶν. 

6. ἐν τῇ γραφῇ] When he 

spoke of the ἐτέρα κακά δαμό-

να,—a perversion of the truth 

which Socrates characterises 

as a caricature by his use of 

the word ἐπικυκροδῶν, which 

seems to mean 'selecting for 

caricature.' So ἀκώστεν εἰς 

to mock at, ἐπικυκροδῶν to mock 

at some particular trait in a 

person.
γάρ ἐστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται εὑτε υμίν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδεὶς γυνῆς ἔναντιομένου καὶ δια-κωλυών πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχού-μενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μὲλλει ὁλίγους χρόνους σωθήσεθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἄλλα μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ’ ἐγώγε υμῖν τεκμηρία παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὅ υμεῖς τιμάτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δ’ ὑμοὶ τὰ ἐμοὶ ἐξυμβεβηκότα, ἐν εἰδήτε ὅτι οὐδ’ ἂν ἐν ὑπεικάθουμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδίᾳς θάνατον, ἵνα ὑπείκοικον δ’ ἁμα κἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρώ δ’ ὑμῖν ὕφος τικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δε. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὁ’ Ἁθη-

II. ἁμα κἀ’] This is Ast’s conjecture. MSS. are chiefly divided between ἁμα καί ἁμα ἂν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἁμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην, and ἁμα καί ἁμ’ ἂν ὑπ. Of the edd., VSZ have ἁμα καί ἁμ’ ἂν, Ἡ ἁμ’ ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην. It seems vain to find more than a shadowy justification for ἁμα καί ἁμα. The variants may easily have come from ἁμα κἀ’, in the form ἁμα καί ἂν. My friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἀλλα καὶ ἀλ’ ἂν ὑπ., ‘should be ready to meet death in sundry forms’: cf. Soph. O. T. 661, ὅ τι πιματον ἀλοιμαν. 12. δικανικά] H conjecturally prefixes ὃ, observing “quis credat, Socratem, qui statim a principio se εἶσον ἔχειν τῆς εἴσαθε λέξεως professus est, nunu judicialia verba promittere?” But equally how then should Socrates know that what he was going to say was not δικανικά? Besides, the speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of technicalities; cf. 34 a, ἐί δ’ ὑτε τότε κ.τ.λ. See Commentary below.

8. ἤ—ἐργα] ‘What your body is wont to appreciate highly, the actions of a life.’ ὑμεῖς (says Socrates).—not as individuals, but as representing Athenians generally, when acting as judges in the Ἐκκλησία, or the Ἁλεία, —‘you particularly are susceptible to such appeals.’

Here appears, in a refined form, the common τόπος of rehearsing a man’s past services in his defence; of which practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123, says, ε’ν τῇ δ’ τῇ πόλει εἰδαμενον ἐστὶ, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογεσθαι, peri’ δ’ εἰ δ’ εὐ τον αἰττῶν . . . ὡς στρατηγῶν ἄγαθοι εἰσὶ κ.τ.λ. Whence again Socrates says just below, he is ‘about to employ a topic of vulgar use, and one that savours of the law-courts.’ II. ὑπεικον δ’] ‘But would be ready to perish at once as the price of not yielding.’
stands here in its simple meaning of 'vulgar' in the sense of 'common,'—not as implying (as Fischer and others think) self-assertion or bad taste; a meaning which (1) would make ἕρω ὑμῖν sound blunt even to harshness; (2) does not harmonise with δικανικά, for an arrogant tone is not characteristic of persons addressing their judges; and (3) does not suit the parallel passage Gorg. 482 c, εἰς τοιαύτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημιουργικά, . . . ἀ φύτει μέν οὐκ ἐστὶ καλά, νόμω δὲ. δικανικὰ is likewise a colourless word;—not 'lawyerlike' in the sense of 'dry,' nor yet 'streitsüchtig' (Steinhart), but simply 'characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.'

3. τοῦ δέκα] Strictly only eight; for Conon was not included, and another of the ten was dead. Xenophon, in one of his accounts (Mem. I. i. 18), speaks with more definite inaccuracy of ἑνενεκα στρατηγοῦς.

5. παραπλῆμος, in two respects; (1) that they were tried ἀθροία (sec Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. IV. App. 2, where it is shewn that this right of separate trial is not to be traced to the decree of Camonius); and (2) that they were not heard in their own defence; for in the assembly in which the charge was brought first informally, they only (Xen. Hell. I. vii. 5) ὑπερτείας ἐκαστός ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προκύπτῃ σφόν λόγος κατὰ τῶν νόμων and in that in which they were condemned they were not heard at all.

7. ὑπαντώθηκα . . . ἑναντία ἐφη-φαιμα[. What is the precise reference of these expressions? Was ὑπαντώθηκα a refusal to put the question? This is left for uncertain by Mr. Grote, who says that upon Xenophon's shewing 'it can hardly be accounted certain that Socrates was Epistates.' (Hist. Gr. ch. 64.) Again, to what act does ἑναντία ἐφηφαίμα refer?

It may be well to give the other accounts of this occurrence at length:—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18. βοῦλευσάς γάρ ποτε. . . ἐπιστάτης ἐν
2. νόμοις καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην, καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων

tῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις ἐννέα στρατηγοῖς μᾶλ ψήφων ἀποκεῖσαι πάντας, οἷς ἥθελεν ἐπιψηφίσας, ὀργιζόμενον μὲν αἵτω τοῦ δήμου πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δικαιῶν ἀπειλοῦν
tων.

(b) Ib. IV. iv. 2, ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οἷς ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις ψηφίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἡναντιώθη τοιαύτῃ ὁμῇ τοῦ δήμου κ.τ.λ.

(c) Xen. Hell. I. vii. 9-15, ἐνείλεθαν ἐκκλησίαν ἑποίου, εἰς ἣν ἡ θεαλ. ἐίσηνεκε τὴν ἐαρτί γράμμην, Καλλίζειον εἰσότος, τήδει . . . τῶν τοῦ προτάτων τιμῶν οἵ φασκάνων προβέθησέ τινας ἀναφη
tσιον παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις, αὐτός Καλλίζειος ἄνωθεν καθηρύμει αἰ-
tῶν τὰ αἴτα. οἱ δὲ ἐδῶν καλείν τοῖς οἱ φαίκανοι, οἱ δὲ προτά-
tνεις φροθήνετε ἀμολόγου πάντες προβέθησέν, πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ
Σωφρονίσκον ὦς οὖς δ' οίκ έφη, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ νόμων ποίσσεν.

(d) Axiochus, 368 d. . . . οἱ πρώτων δικὰ στρατηγοὶ ὁτ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἳ ἐπηρῄνη τὴν γράμμῃν οἳ γὰρ ἐφαίνετο μοι σεμύν μανομένῳ δήμῳ συνεδρίεσθαι οἱ δὲ περὶ θηραμένη καὶ Καλλίζειον τῇ ἑσπερίᾳ προέρχοντο ἐγκαθέστοις ὑφεύγεις κατεχειροτόσησαν τῶν ἀν-
δρῶν ἀκριτον ἔπανος. The word ἐγκαθέστοι is explained by Esch. III. 3. p. 54. καὶ ταῖτα ἐτεροί τινες τὰ ψηφίσματα επιψηφιζόμε
σιν, οἷς ἐκ τοῦ δικαιώτατον πρό-
tου λαχόντες προεθέτειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ
παρασκευής καθεύμενος.

(e) Gorg. 474 a, πρύσι βου-
λείειν λαχόν, ἐπειδή ἡ φιλὴ ἐπι-
tάνει καὶ ἐδει με επιψηφίζειν,
γέλοια παρέχον καὶ οἶκ ἡπιστά-
μην ἐπιψηφίζειν. For this, as
Luzac aptly remarks, is the
historical fact before us dis-
guised by Socratic irony.

That Socrates was Epistates
is at least a probable conclu-
sion from (a), (b), and (d), to
say nothing of (e); in further
support of which, (b) and (d)
imply that he carried his point,
which he could not have done
but as Epistates.

The reference of ἡναντιώθην
must therefore be to Socrates' re
fusal to put the question,
which resulted, as (d) credibly
relates, in the adjournment of
proceedings to the next day,
when a more pliable Epistates
presided.

The other clause, ἐναντία
ἐφηφ., is, equally with ἡ

There was Epistates'

The reference of ἡ

The other clause, ἐναντία

The word ἐγκαθέστοι is explained by Esch. III. 3. p. 54. καὶ ταῖτα ἐτεροί τινες τὰ ψηφίσματα επιψηφιζόμεσιν, οἷς ἐκ τοῦ δικαίωτατοῦ τρόπου λαχόντες προεθέτειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ παρασκευῆς καθεύμενος.

G 2
προβούλευμα, would be to lay the scene of it too far from that of ἡγαντιώθην ὑμῖν with which it is coupled, and would make μῦνος τῶν πρυτάνεων flat, since the πρυτάνεις had no prominent functions in the council. The remaining alternative, and this is in itself a plausible one, is to refer it to the first stage of proceedings in the assembly, where, preparatorily to the προβούλευμα being read out by the κήρυξ, it was handed to the προεδρι, who with the νομοθετα had to pronounce whether it contravened any existing law. Here was the precise moment at which legal provision had been made for entertaining the very objection taken by Socrates. We may then, with at least some probability, refer ἑνατία ἐφήφισαμένη to Socrates' condemning the bill as illegal when it was referred in due course to the joint consideration of the προεδρι and νομοθετα. The hysteron proteron is on Greek principles natural: ἡγαντιώθην—νῦν precedes, because it, and not the earlier opposition, was the conspicuous and crowning act in Socrates' whole proceeding; Dig. 308.

With Socrates' more glorious refusal to put the question may be compared the conduct contemptuously attributed to Demosthenes by Ἀσχινα. ii. 84. p. 40, ἀναγνωσθέντος τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἀνατίτις ἐκ τῶν προεδρῶν Δημοσθένης οἰκ ἐφι τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπανηγιμών βοῶντων δὲ ἔμων καὶ τοὺς προεδρίους ἔπι τὸ βῆμα κατ' ἀνομα καλοῦντων, οὗτος ἀκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεφθασθη.

The series of checks which the forms of the Ecclesia imposed on bills in progress, with a view to guard existing laws, was as follows:—1. The προβούλευμα was handed to the προεδρι, who after conferring with the νομοθετα pronounced whether or not it contravened existing laws; and, if they passed it, it was read out by the κήρυξ. 2. After this, it was open to any citizen to stop it by lodging an ἐπωμοσια in earnest of his intention to bring against its author a γραφη παραβασιων. 3. Or the Epistates might refuse to put the question—under liability, of course, to ἐνδειξε if he refused improperly. 4. Or the rest of the προεδρι (by a majority, we may suppose,) might in like manner refuse their consent. See Ἀσχ. ii. 65, iii. 39. pp. 36, 59.—Schömann de Com. Ath. ch. xi.

1. ἐνδεικνύαι καὶ ἀπάγει 'To procure my suspension or arrest.' The processes of ἐνδειξε and ἀπάγωσι are often mentioned in conjunction, as here, and Dem. c. Timoc. 146. p. 745. Lept. 156. p. 594. Anti- pho v. 8, 9. p. 130, &c., and in the Βουλευτικος ὑρκος as it stood after the amnesty. Amid several divergent accounts of these processes, the best is Heffer's (Ath. Gerichtsverf. p. 195). "Ἐνδείξε might be instituted, among other cases, against any who should hold an office while he owed public money; or (a luculent
instance) against any prytanis or proedrus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. c. Timocr. 22. p. 707). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, and to ἐνδείξις, which ἐνδείξις was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The Thesmothetæ had exclusive cognisance of ἐνδείξις. The statement of Pollux, that it pertained to the Archon Basileus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of ἐνδείξις, on which some writers rely,—that it was ὁμογενεῖον ἀδέκμιστος, οὗ κρίσεως ἄλλα τιμωρίας δεσμόν, is called by Hefter a mere jingle of words. Ἀπαγωγή was of wider application than ἐνδείξις. Moreover, its object was the bringing the offender into custody, which in ἐνδείξις was not the rule, ἐνδείξις was an interdictory procedure, ἀπαγωγή a procedure of summary arrest. To be liable to it, a person must be taken ἐν αὐτοφώρῳ, in perpetration of an illicit act. The body which had cognisance in ἀπαγωγή was the Eleven, who registered (Hefter p. 210) the apprehension of the criminal and the cause of arrest (Lys. xiii. 86. p. 138), and who further, supposing the arrested person to be already under sentence of law, had charge of the execution of this sentence.

7. ἔδωκα] The building where the prytanes, and while they lasted the Thirty, daily banqueted and sacrificed. It was near the council-chamber.

10. ἀπαλήπτα. This word, like implere in Latin, is used idiomatically of communicating pollution; whence here ‘implicate.’ See for example Phaedo 67 a.; and cf. especially with the present passage Antiph. ii. A. a. 10. p. 116, συγκαταπλαμβάνω τοῖς οὐανίστοις.
d. (In answer to a supposed objection) that the innocent tendency of the reformatory doctrine, which was simply to teach uncompromising adherence to righteousness, and not to train for professions or impart knowledge, excluded the suspicion of perverting the youth.

10. XXI. 'Ar' ónν ἄν μὲ οἶσθε τοσάδε ἐτή διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἐπράττων τὰ δημοσία, καὶ πράττων ἀξίων ἀνδρὸς ἅγαθον ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὡσπερ χρῆ, τούτο περὶ πλείστων ἐποίουμην; πολλοῦ γε δει, ὃ ἄνδρες 'Ἄθηναιοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἄλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσία τε, εἰ ποὺ τί ἐπράξα, τοιοῦτος φαινόμαι, καὶ ἰδία ὁ ἄντις οὕτως, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἕγγυσαν όθεν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλο ὦτε τούτων οὐδενὶ, οὐς οἱ διαβάλλοντες μὲ φασίν ἐμοῦς μαθητὰς ἐίναι. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπὸ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὕτως πώποτ' ἐγένομην' εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεὶ ἀκούειν, εἰτε νεότερος εἰτὲ πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνισα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων b

9. ἵμων] So MSS. and edd. generally. ἵμων is a conjecture of Η.


20. διδάσκαλος οὕτως] He means (see b below) that he imparted no μάθημα,—no professional knowledge; even of καλοκαγαθία he never ἐπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι Xen. Mem. I. ii. 3. Cf. his declining ἐπιμε- λείθαι Nicias' son, Laches 208 d. What he sought to impart was rather a habit of mind; "not to dispense ready-made truth like so much coin, but to awaken the sense of truth and virtue; not to force his own convictions on others, but to test theirs."—Zeller.
33. διαλέγομαι μη λαμβάνων δ', οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλούσιω καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρωτάν, καὶ ἕαν τις βούλησαι ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν δὲν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἔγω εἴτε τοις χρήστοις γίνεται εἴτε μή, οὔκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι δὲν μὴτε ὑπεκόμην 5 μηδενὶ μηδενὶ πῶποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα: εἰ δὲ τις φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πῶποτε τι μαθεῖν ἡ ἀκούσαι ἰδία ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εἰδότε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρονυί ὁ τινὲς πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἀν— δρεσ 'Αθηναίοι: πάσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγώ εἰπον· ὅτι ἀκούσατε χαίρονου ἐξεταζόμενοι τοῖς οἰκόμενοι μὲν εἰναί σοφοῖς, οὕτι δ' οὖ ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀγδέσ. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτο, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐρωτήμων καὶ 15 παντι τρόπῳ, ὁπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁπερ τόυ οἰκόν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ 'Αθηναίοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστι καὶ εὐελεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ 

1. εἰπον'] So Stallbaum, rightly. εἰπο, Hermann. See Commentary.

2. καὶ εἰν τις] This is a soft way of saying, 'And I am ready to question him, if he chooses.'

12. ὅτα ἀκούσατε] Stallb. rightly joins this with ἀλλα διὰ τι—diatρίβοντες; the ἀκηκόατε—εἰπον' being interjected. Then ὅτα is 'because.' See the examples which Stallb. quotes—Euthyphro 3 b. Rep. I. 332 a, III. 402 e, 410 d.
2. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] BS om.; VZ retain; H brackets. The likelihood is not great that the words have been inserted from the end of the former sentence (H brackets them there, by mistake); the rhythm almost requires them; and there is point in attributing the same vindictive feeling to the kinsmen as to the youths themselves. The repetition is like Brutus' repetition of 'for him have I offended,' in Shakespeare's Jul. Cas. Act III. Scene ii.

4. Κριτοβοῦλος &c.] With Critobulus Socrates holds conversation in Xen. Mem. I. iii, II. vi. He is mentioned also in Athen. V. 220a, with Eschines, distinguished from others of the name as ὁ Σωκρατικὸς, the son of Lysias (see Diog. Laert. II. 60), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (Schol. in Menex.). He was at variance with Aristippus (Luzac de Dig. Soc. sect. II. § 2), and there is a fragment of an invective written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socratic: he is of the company named in the Phaedo (59 b). Epigenes is mentioned Xen. Mem. III. xii. 1, and Phaedo 59 b: his father Antipho is not otherwise known. Democritus, the father of Paralus and Theages, is an interlocutor in the Theages. Of Theages it is said, Rep. 496 b, εἰδ' ὃν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἠμετέρου ἑταίρου θεών χαλκὸς οὖς κατασχεῖν καὶ γὰρ θέαγε τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκποιεῖν φιλοσοφίαν, ἥ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείρουσα αὐτῶν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. Adimantus is an interlocutor in the Rep. (357-368, 548). Apollodorus appears in the Phaedo (59 a, 117 d) as passionately attached to Socrates, and in the Symp., says of himself (172 e), ἦγος Σωκράτει συνθεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιμελῆς πεποίημα ἑκάστης ἡμέρας εἴδέναι τι ἄν λέγῃς ἡ πράττῃ, and is said (173 d) to have got τὴν ἐπιστημὴν τὸ μανός καθιεσθαι. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Antiphorus are only mentioned here.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 89

33. τετελευτηκεν, ὅστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνος γε αὐτοῦ κατα-
34. δειθεὶ—, καὶ Πάραλος ὤδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὐ ἢν
θεάγος ἄδελφος· ὤδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος,
οὐ ἄδελφος οὔτος Πλάτων, καὶ Ἀιαντόδωρος, οὐ
Ἀπολλόδωρος ὤδε ἄδελφος. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὅν τινὰ ἔχρην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν
τῷ ἑαυτῷ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλιττον μάρτυρα:
εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάβετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἔγὼ παρα-
χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτων
πάν τοιναντίων ἐφήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ τὸ
βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζό-
b μένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασί Μέλιττος καὶ
Ἀντός. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ’ ἂν
λόγον ἔχοιν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσ-
βύτεροι ἦδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα 15
ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγου βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ’ ἡ τὸν
ὄρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον, οτι ἔννισασι Μέλιττῳ μὲν ἰεν-
δομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἶνεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες ὦ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμι
ἀν ἀπολογείσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα 30
e τοιαύτα. τάχα δ’ ἂν τίς ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσεις ἄνα-
μεθέλεις ἑαυτοῦ, εἶ ὃς μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τοιου τοῦ
ἀγώνος ἁγώνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδείηθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε
τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παυδία τε
αὐτοῦ ἀναζησάμενος, ὃν ὃ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθεῖη, 25
καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ

1. καταδειθεὶν] The kata-
implies absence of all reserve
or modification: here in a bad
sense it expresses an unprin-
cipled act. Dig. 122.
8. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ] The full
expression occurs Ἐσχίν. iii.
165. p. 77. παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ
3ηματος. ἐως ἂν εἰπησ. Note by
the way, that the examination
of witnesses was extra to the
time allowed for the pleadings;
 cf. Lysias xxiii. 4. 8. pp. 166,
167, καὶ μοι ἐπιλαβές το ἓνωρ.
26. ἐγὼ ἐκ ἀρα] And then
finds that I.'
οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, p. 380 ὡς ἄν δοξάσιμον τὸν ἔσχατον κινδυνεύον. τάχι οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοίσας αὐθαδέστερον ἀν πρὸς με σχοίνη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θείτο ἀν μετὰ ὀργής 5τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὖτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἄξιόν ἂν γὰρ ἐγογγεί· εἰ δὲ οὖν, ἐπειδῆ ἂν μοι δοκοὶ πρὸς τούτων λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὃ ἀριστεῖ, εἰσὶ μὲν ποῦ τίνες καὶ οἰκεῖοι καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδέ ἔγω ἀπὸ δρῶν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ πέτρης πέ-10 phi, ἀλλὰ εξ ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσὶ καὶ νεῖς, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιοι ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλὰ ὁμοίον οὐδέν ἀυτῶν δεύρῳ ἀναβαβασάμενοι δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὐδέν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδικόμενοι, ο 15δὲ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲ ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζουν, ἀλλὰ εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἔγω ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μή, ἀλλὸς λόγος, πρὸς δὲ οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἔμοι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδέν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε οὕτα καὶ τότῳ τούτω κατανέμει, 20εἰτ᾽ οὖν ἀληθές εἰτ᾽ οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλὰ οὖν δεδογμένοι γε ἐστὶ τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν

21. τῷ Σωκράτει] VBS τὸν Σωκράτη, ZH τὸ Σωκράτη, both with some MS. authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ὡς ἄν δοξάσω] Refers to κινδυνον, not τὸ ἔσχατον—‘danger, as he would think it.’
5. οὐκ ἄξιόν μὲν γὰρ] γάρ refers to εἰ—‘[I say if]’ for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the supposition] if it should be so.’
6. ἐπειδῆ] ‘Conciliatory.’
15. εἰ μὲν] ‘Whether I can look death in the face or not.’—Whewell.
19. τοῦτον] The name of σοφός· cf. 20 d, and below, εἰς σοφία εἰτε κ.τ.λ.
against both this and τὸν Ἀθηναίων stands the consideration, that the meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that Socrates is to differ;' it is the form of a resolution which is to take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τὸ Ἀθηναίων stands this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardy (Syntax, p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

2. ἀνδρεία] Oxon. here has ἀνδρεία, but is not consistent. Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀνδρεία alone is the true form, —as proved (1) by the Ionic diaeresis ἀνδρηα (2) by the fact that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require ἀνδρεία (except in Eur. Here. P. 475, πατήρ ἐπίργου, μέγα φρονών εἴπ’ ἀνδρεία, which Elmsley has emended εἰλανδρεία); (3) by the testimony of Etym. M. p. 461. 53, that the traditional orthography was ἀνδρεία till Apollonius invented ἀνδρεία (4) by the preponderating adherence of the MSS. to ἀνδρεία. 13. οὕτε ἢμας] VH ἢμας, BSZ (following 2 MSS.) ἢμας. H says "ἵμας commodum sensum præbet; nec plebem, modo aliquo loco haberi velit, facere, nec si singuli faciant, permittere debere."

3. ἐσονται] 'If we are to have such conduct on the part of those,' &c. εἶν would have given a different turn to the meaning.
ἀκροάστηκα τοῦ δικαίου μου δοκεῖ εἶναι δείσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ. οὐ δὲ τὸ φαντάζομαι τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἴσον ἂγόντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δοξῆς, ὁ ἄνδρες, οὔνυν δικαίων μου δοκεῖ εἶναι δείσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ. οὔνυν διδάσκεω καὶ πείθω. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ καθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμόμοιον οὐ θαρείσθαι οἷς ἀν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσεως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὖκοιν χρῆ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίκεων ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν, οὔθε ὑμᾶς ἐθίκεσθαι οὔνυν τεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῦν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦσε με, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τουαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἢ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε οὔσια. άλλως τε μέντοι καὶ ἀπεθανατός φηύστηκαν ὑπὸ Μελητοῦ τοιοῦτοι. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείσθωμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δείσθαι βιαζόμην ὁμομοκτόνας, θεοὺς οὖν διδασκομιν μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογοῦμενος κατηγοροῦν ἂν ἐμαυτῷ ὁς

9. ὁμόμοιον] Part of the judge’s oath was ἡ μὴ ὁμοίως ἀκροάστηκα τῶν κατηγοροῦντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογομένων’ Isocr. xv. 21. p. 314.

χαρακτήρα] ‘That he will not favour whomsoever he feels inclined to favour.’

10. ἡμᾶς] Defendants in general.

11. ἐθίκεσθαι] ‘Allow yourselves to be habituated;’ an instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.

15. ἀλλος—καὶ] ‘But, by Zeus, especially, when I am on my trial at Meletus’ instance for impiety.’ A remarkable hyperbaton. The phrase ἀλλος τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the μέντοι καὶ Δία (which is also a familiar sequence, Phaedo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a), which could have found no other convenient place. What makes such a tmesis possible, without prejudice to perspicuity, is the very fact that ἀλλος τε πάντως καὶ is a sufficiently familiar phrase to admit of this dismemberment and yet be recognised: Dig. 294. Thus Bekker, in reading arbitrarily ἀλλος τε πάντως καὶ Δία μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ, is wide of the mark.
ΧΧV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς 'Αθηναῖοι, ὅσοι οὕτως τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ᾠστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

12. τριάκοντα] So ZH: τρεῖς VBS. Of MSS. Oxon. with five others has τριάκοντα which also approves itself independently.

5. καὶ ἔμην] The defence of Socrates, which would occupy the second division of the pleadings, being thus concluded, there would follow here the voting of the judges, and the announcement of their verdict, declaring the charge proven. Then would begin the third division of the pleadings, consisting firstly of a speech on the side of the prosecution in advocacy of the penalty named, and secondly of Socrates' ἀπολογίας, where the Apology again takes up the thread. Introd. pp. vi. xi. xvi.

8. καὶ οἶκ—τοίτο] The halting connection (grammatically speaking) between this clause and the preceding part of the sentence is idiomatic. The shortest way is taken to arrive at the particular which is the point of the sentence: Dig. 258. It is incorrect to supply, as Stallbaum does, καὶ "εἴ καὶ τοίτο ὅτι" σεκ, κ.ρ.λ. Rather there is a substitution of a shorter form of expression, complete in itself, but not agreeing with the plan on which the sentence set out.

11. οἴτω παρ' ᾧ ἔληγον] Hyperbatical for παρ' ἐντὸς ᾧ ἔληγον' Dig. 298. Lit. 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared: i.e. 'so close.' Dig. 124.

12. τριάκοντα] The number of condemning votes was 281, out of a court of 501: so 30 in round numbers, or 31 exactly, changing sides, would have effected an acquittal. See, for the fuller discussion of this point, Introd. p. xii sqq.
Proposition on the footing of full justice, —ironical.

The implication in μόνα that the majority would recommend the corruption of τριάκοντα into τρεῖς. In Andoe. iii. 4. p. 23, ουκ ἑτέρωσιστα is a necessary emendation for πέντε. Cf. Taylor, Lectt. Lys. cap. vi.

2. ἀποτεφευγα] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Meletus gets less than 100, i.e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indictment stood in Meletus' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus: see again Introd. p. x.

6. τὸ πέμπτον μ.] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the' indispensable 'fifth.'

10. παθεῖν ἡ ἀποτίσια] A technical legal expression; ἀποτίσια applies to a pecuniary penalty, παθεῖν to death, imprisonment, or the like. So Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅτοι ἂν καταγγέλῃ ἡμιαία, τιμᾶτα περὶ αὐτοῦ παραχωρήμα, ὅτου ἂν δοκῇ ἀξίας εἶναι παθεῖν ἡ ἀποτίσια (part of the νόμος ὡς βρέσος), in Timocrat. 105. p. 733.

ὁ τί μαθὼν] 'For having taken it—into my head, in the disposal of my life, to deny myself rest.' ἐν is not 'during.'

13. ἄλλων] Here is the idiomatic use of ἄλλος for 'besides:' Dig. 46. ἄλλος agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides,—magistracies, clubs, and factions.'

Εὐνομοσίων] These associations were as rife at Athens under the Thirty as in the Peloponnesian war.
5. ἐπὶ δὲ—εἰεργετίαν] This clause is repeated in the word ἐπιταῖθα, and governed by ἦγα and the ἱὸν with εἰεργετίαν is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker's mind, to which ἵον would be essential, namely, οὐ δὲ ἰδία ἐκαστὸν ἐμελλὼν ἵον εἰεργετίαν, i.e. οὐ δὲ ἵον ἐμελλὼν ἰδία ἐκαστὸν εἰεργ.)

14. τιμάσθαι] 'That I should lay the penalty.'


17. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς] This is the form of comparison with ὡς, complicated by the redundant insertion of οὕτως. Dig. 164.

20. ἐπιτιγμένων ὡς] Here this word plainly stands for three or four horses. Hesychius in voc. says καὶ ἐπὶ τριῶν καὶ τεσσάρων ἔτοιασον.
ο μὲν γὰρ ύμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαιμόνιας δοκεῖν [εἶναι], ἐγὼ ὑ. 36. δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ ε displeases. μᾶσθαι, τούτων τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείᾳ σητήσεως.

5  ΧΧVII. Ἐσος οὖν ύμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παρα-
πλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτον καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆσεως, ἀπαυβαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιὸνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκών εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώποιν, ἀλλὰ ύμᾶς τούτο οὖ πείθω· ὁλίγον· γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διει-
λέγεμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὅς ἐγγέμαι, εἰ ἦν ύμῖν νόμος, ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μιὰν ἥμεραν b μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν νῦν δ' οὐ ράδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὁλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολάς ἀπολύ-
10εσθαι. πεπεισμένοι δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσεως καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτόν ἔρειν αὐ-
tός, ὁς ἄξιός εἰμι τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιοῦτον τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ, τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τούτο, οὐ Μέλητός μου τιμᾶται, ὁ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτε εἰ 20ἀγαθὸν οὔτε ις κακὸν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τοιότο δὴ ἔλωμαι ὄν εν οἴδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὀντῶν, τοιοῦτον τιμήσαμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζην ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, c δουλεύωντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένη ἄρχῃ, τοῖς ἐνδέκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἐως ἄν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ

12. ἀλλοις ἀνθρώποις] The Lacedaemonians, for instance. See Thucyd. i. 132.
21. ὅν—ἵπτων] Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of knowing, &c.: Dig. 26. The clause however is complicated by the presence of ἅν, indicative of a mo-
mentary intention to adopt a finite instead of a participial construction: Dig. 279.
23. τοῖς ἐνδέκα] εἰς ἄφ' ἐκάσ-
tῆς φιλίας ἐγύρθετο, καὶ γραμμα-
tέτειν (secretary') αὐτῶν συν-
ηρμθεῖτο' Poll. viii. 102. They had charge of the prisons, as well as of the execution of sentences.
ΑΠΟΔΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 97

37. ταύτον μοί ἐστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὅτοθεν ἐκτίσω. ἄλλα δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἵσωσ γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαστε. πολλὴ μὲν ἂν με φιλοψυχίᾳ ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλογιστὸς εἰμι, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολλαί μου οὐχ οἶοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τάς ἐμᾶς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἄλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόναι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὡστε ἡτείτε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγὴν· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτῶς οἴσουσι βαδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος τοι ἐν ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἅλλην ἐκ ἅλλης πολίων πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζήν. εἰ γὰρ οἶδα ὅτι, ὅτι θεοῖ ἕλθοι, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροαστον ὦν νεῶ ὀσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελανών, οὐτοὶ ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείδοντες τοὺς ἐπεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελανών, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκείων δὲ αὐτῶς τούτως.

XXVIII. Ἰσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σῶκρατες, οὐχ οίος τ' ἔσει ἦμῖν ἐξελθὼν ἥν; τοῦτ᾽ ἐν ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατων τοι πεισαί τινας ήμῶν. εὰν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τούτ' ἐστί καὶ διὰ τούτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν 38. ἄγειο, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένως· εὰν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυχάναι μέγιστον ἄγαθὸν ὄν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖν εἰσθαί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲ ὑμῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούειν


2. ἄλλα δὲν] Introduces the last of a series of suppositions. Dig. 142.
9. ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα] Ironical.
11. ἐξελθόντι] 'If I quit the city.' as below e. ἐξελθὼν ἥν.
20. τοῦτο] Namely. οὗτοι οὐχ οίδαν τε ἐσομαι.
The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed.

The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, ἱσθαὶ σεσαῦτων. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:

1. knowledge of one's own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:—οἱ ἐμοὶ τῶν ἐπισκεψάμενοι ὁποῖος τίς ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρώπινην χρείαν κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 25:

(2) review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one's life—Laches 187 c, δέδωκα περὶ αὐτῶν λόγων, ὡσαν τρόπων νῦν τε εἴ ἢ καὶ ὡσαν τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον βεβιωκεν and below 39 c, δέδωκα ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου.

(3) examination of one's opinions, their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one's own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one's knowledge: Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230 b—d:

(4) investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one's own nature is a prerequisite: Alc. I. 133 c, ἄρ' ἄνων μὴ γιγνωσκόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς... ὅταναμεθ' ἢν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθά;)—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16, περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁταν διελέγετο σκοποῖν τί εὑστεξές, τί ἀσεξές, τί καλῶν, τί αἰσχρῶν, τί δίκαιων, τί ἀδικων, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνβείεια, τί δείλια, τί πόλις, τί πολεμικός, τί ἀρχικὰ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὲς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αἱ τοις μὲν εἰδώτας ἡγεῖτο καλὸν καὶ τά κακὸν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγροφόνας ἀνθραποδοξεῖς ἄν δικαῖον κεκλησθαντας and here (just above) τυγχάνει μεγίστον ἄγαθον ὑν ἀνθρώπω τοῖς, ἐκάθετα ἥμερας περὶ ἀρετῶν τὸν λόγουν ποιεῖταν.

But this examination was not a mere discipline ending in itself, but a preparation to qualify a man for receiving culture and improvement (Alc. I. 124 d, ἐπιμελείας δεδομένη, Laches 188 b, ἀξιόντα μανάδαινες ἐσκεπτε ἐν τοίς, for attaining connectedness of knowledge and rational method in action, and for doing the best by himself and the state.

Socrates seems to have employed the strongest terms he could find to assert the indispensableness of this discipline: —Xen. Mem. I. i. 16 (quoted above), III. ix. 6, τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ἐμοὶ, καὶ ἡ μὴ ἀλήθεία δοξαίζειν ταῖς καὶ ὁπειραίς γιγνώσκειν, ἐγκατά τιμιάτα μανίας ἐλογιζέσθαι εἰναι, Soph. 230 d, τὸν δ' ἀνέλεγκτον αὐτομορίτιν, ἀν καὶ τεχνώνησις βασιλεῖς ὥσας ὁ μέγας ἄν, τὰ μέγιστα αἰκαίωτα ὅταν, ἀπαίτων τε καὶ αἰτερίων κ.τ.λ., Hiep. Ma. 394 c, τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοεῖν καὶ ὁπείρα ὀφείλεται, οἷον σου
38. ἑτεροι πείσεθε μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὖτως, ὡς ἔγω φημι, ὁ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ρήδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμ ᾧν εἴθυσομαι ἐμαυτῶν ἀξίον ποιοῦν κακὸν οὖν δενὸς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτύμησάμην ἐν ἁν χρημάτων ὑπα ἐμελλὼν ἐκτίςειν. οὔδεν γὰρ ἀν ἐβλάβην νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἃρα ὡς τὸν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίςαι, τοσοῦτον ψεύδεθέ μοι τιμή- σαι. ὡς ὁ ἁν δυναίμην ἐκτίςαι ώμὲν μνάν ἁρ- γυρίον τοσοῦτον οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὃδε, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελέουσι με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμή- σασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγύασθαι τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτον, ἐγγυητά τι ὑμῖν ἐσονται τοῦ ἁργυρίου οὖτοι ἀξίο- χρείαν.

κρεῖττον εἶναι ὃν μᾶλλον ἡ τεθνα- ναι; and in the passage be- before us.

And was there not a cause?

The current opinions, drawn from men's practical exigen- cies, imperfect observation, and debased morality, were no sounder than their sources. It was abhorrence of this mass of error and conventionality (which meanwhile the Sophists were accepting as the material of their system), which impelled Socrates to seek to reconstruct human opinion on a basis of 'reasoned truth.'

3. καὶ ἐγὼ ἂμ'] A supplementary reason;—'Were sile- nce possible, it would be no less a κακόν which therefore I should decline imposing on myself.'

6. νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ] This com- bination of particles occurs always in setting aside a hy- pothetical case which is the opposite of the existing state of the case. The ἐι and the γὰρ enter simultaneously into the combination, where there is no ellipse nor apothecesis. Dig. 149.


13. ἀξίωχρείαν.] The third and last division of the pleadings being thus concluded, there would follow first the final voting and then the final ver- dict of the judges: by which the formal trial would be con- cluded.

After this, however, some 'last words' are still conceded to Socrates, who continues to address those of his judges
C. Last reflections, addressed to the judges:

a. to those who had voted for his condemnation:

XXIX. Of πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς p. 357 '

'Αθηναῖοι, ὅνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιποῖς, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἀνδρα σοφῶν φήσουσι γὰρ δή με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ 5 καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίκευε. εἰ οὖν περιεμένατε ὁλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἢν ὑμῶν τοῦτο ἐγένετο: ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλίκιαν, ὃτι πόρρῳ ἦδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἔγγυς. λέγω δὲ τούτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ δ 10 καταψηφισμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτούς τούτους. ὑσως με οἴεσθε, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλακέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ὡμην δεῖν ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὡστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία 15 μὲν ἐἀλωκα, οὐ μὲντοι λόγου, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναι- σχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλεων λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οὗ ἂν ὑμῖν ὡδίστῃ ἤν ἀκούειν, βρηκοῦντός τε μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἀλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλά ε καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὃς ἐγώ φημὶ. οἷα δὴ καὶ εἰθασθέ 20 ὑμεῖς τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήθην

who choose to remain and hear him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates, or whether it was only a sufficiently common practice to give verisimilitude to the fiction, is a question which can hardly be determined. See Introd. p. xv.

1. οὗ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου] Socrates is telling the Athenians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take her own course. 'It was but a brief space after all, by forestalling which they were entailing on themselves the reproach.' ἔνεκα marks here the efficient not the final cause; the meaning is not 'you will incur reproach for the sake of taking from me a brief remainder of life,'—but 'a brief space will be the cause of your incurring it.' The 'brief space,' accordingly, is not that between the present moment and his execution, but that between his execution and the moment when he would have died in the course of nature.
38. δεῖν ἐνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πράξει οὔτεν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὔτως ἀπολογητικοῦ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὡς καὶ ἀπολογητικόν τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ἐξεπεί οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ᾿ ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ᾿ ἐν τοῦτῳ οὐδένα δεῖ τούτοις μηχανάσθαι, ὡς ἰπώς ἂν ἐπεφεύζηται πάν ποιῶν βάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δήλου γίνεται ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγωι καὶ ὁπλα ἄφεις καὶ ἐφ᾿ ἰκετεῖαν τραπέμονος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναῖ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὡςτε διαφεύγειν τὸ βάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πάν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὔ τοῦτ᾿ ἢ χαλεπῶν, ὃ ἄνδρες, βάνατον ἐκφύγειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν βάττον γάρ βασινόν θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν βραδὺς ὤν καὶ πρεσβύτης ύπὸ τοῦ βραδύτερον εάλον, οἳ δ᾿ ἐμοὶ 15 κατήγοροι ἂν δεινοὶ καὶ ὃς ὄντες ύπὸ τοῦ βάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἂπειμυ ὑφ᾿ ὑμῶν βανατὸν δίκην ὀφλοῦν, οὗτοι δ᾿ χυλὸ τῆς ἀληθείας

7. τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις] Before αὐ VH have ῥαν—BSZ reject it. H 989 in thinking that ῥαν exists in Oxon.—no doubt misled by Gaisf. Lectt. Plat., in whom “p. 39 a 3 ῥαι” must be an erratum for “ῥαν om.”

4. ἐκεῖνος] Understand ἀπολογητικοῦ again.

12. μὴ . . .?] An instance of the presumptivest variety of the deliberative conjunctive. It is confined to negative sentences. Dig. 59 note.

13. βάττον γὰρ θ. θεὶ] This refers to the reflex effect of wickedness on the evildoer’s soul, which it degrades and ruins. Cf. Crito 47 ε, ἀλλὰ μετ᾿ ἐκείνου (sc. the soul) ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτῶν διεφθαρμένου, ὧ τοῦ ἄδικου λρβάται κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 α, μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἄδικα τῷ ἄδικῳ. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stalib.’s quotation of Odyss. viii. 329, Οἶκ ἀρετή κακὰ ἥργα κεχανεί τοι βραδίς ὁκίνησις is not to the point.

18. ἵπτο—[φρενίστε]ʼ Sen-
tenced by Truth to receive the penalty of.’—Whewell.
οφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἔγω τε τῷ ἔποιηματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὕτω. ταῦτα μὲν ποὺ ἰσως οὕτω καὶ ἐδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἷμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἐχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμοδῆγας, ὥς κατανυφησάμενοὶ μου· καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ σὲ ἑνδῶ ἐνταῦθα, ἐν δὲ μάλιστ' ἀνθρωποί χρησμοδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γὰρ, δὲ ἀνδρεῖς, οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἦξεν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον τολύ χαλεπωτέραν νῦ ἸΔ' ἢ οἶαν 10 ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε' νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργασάσθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ

io. οἰόμενοι] After οἰόμενοι H inserts conjecturally μὲν, taking this to be suggested by οἰόμενοι μὲ of some MSS., and by an erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably μὲ, for an accent has been erased also from —οι. This however may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such as for instance must have been that at Crito 53 d, where stands δὲ φθέραν with an erasure between—δεφθέραν being plainly the true reading.

1. ἔγω τε ... καὶ οὕτω] 'I as well as they.' ἔγω has the stress, and stands (in accordance with Greek arrangement) first for that reason. Dig. 307.

6. εὐ φ—χρησμοδοῦσιν] The opinion, which connects prophetical enlightenment with the approach of death, has maintained its hold upon mankind in all ages. Patroclus foretells Hector's death, II. xvi. 851, and Hector the death of Achilles, II. xxii. 378: instances to which classical writers often appeal; thus Xen. Apol. 32, ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ οἵμοροι ἐκείνοι οἰς τῶν ἐν καταλυσί τοῦ βίου προγεγρώσκει τὰ μέλλοντα, οὐδ' οἶνι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμοδῆγαμ τῇ, Cie. De Div. I. 32. Facilis evenit appropinquante morte ut animi futura auguretur; ex quo et illud est Calani, de quo ante dixi, et Homerici Hectoris qui moriens propinquant Achilli mortem denuntiat. So Shakspere, Rich. II. Act II. Sc. i. (Gaunt) "Methinks, I am a prophet new inspir'd; And thus, expiring, do foretell of him." And Sir H. Davy ("Remains," p. 311) speaks of himself as "looking into futurity with the prophetical aspirations belonging to the last moments of existence"—in a letter dated just two months before his death.


11. διδόναι ἔλεγχον] Namely, under the process of ἐξέσθησιν. cf. 38 a note, and esp. Laches 187 e there quoted.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 103

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένοις ἤδεως ἐν διαλεγθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι ὁ δὲ ἑλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνᾶναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὃς ἄνδρες, παραμείνετε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδέν γὰρ κωλύει διαμιθολογησαί πρὸς ἄλληλους, ἐως ἐξεστιν. ὥμων γὰρ ὃς φίλοις οὕσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νῦν μοι ἐμιμβεβηκός τι ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὃς ἄνδρες δικαίως ἐστι—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὁρθῶς ἂν καλοῖν—θαυμάσιον τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰσελθεῖ συν μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ διαμονοῦ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνῇ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικρῶς ἐναντίον-μένη, εἰ τι μέλλομι μὴ ὁρθῶς πράξειν· υνι δὲ ἔστ

15. οἱ ἄρχοντες] That is, οἱ ἐνδέκα.
20. δικασταί] Steinhardt remarks that up to this point, where first the true and false judges are separated, the form of the address used has been ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθροίοι.
22. ἡ εἰσελθεῖ] The direction I am wont to receive from the divine voice.' See App. A, on τὸ διαμόνον.
24. πάν ἐπὶ σμικρῶς] ἐπὶ σμικρῶς, to which it belongs: Dig. 298.
ξυμβεβηκε μοι, ἀπερ ὅρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταυτί ἀ γε δὴ π. 40
οἰηθεὶς ἃν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξώπτε ἐωθεν οὐκοθεν ἦμαντιώθη τὸ τοῦ Ἰ ἥθεον σημεῖον, οὔτε ἵμικα ἀνέβαινον ἐναυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἑρείν· καίτοι εἰν ἀλλὰν λόγους πολλαχοὺ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύν· νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξεων οὔτ' ἐν ἐγρῷ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἦμαντιώτατοι μοι. τί οὖν αὐτῶν εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ύμῖν ἐρὸν· κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἁγάθον γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐσθ' ὅπως ἴμεις ὁρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακῶν εἶναι τὸ εἰ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτον γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἦμαντιώθη ἃν μοι τὸ εἰσθανοῦσανει, εἰ μή τι ἐμελλὼν ἐγὼ ἁγάθον πράξεων.

XXXII. Ἐννοϊσμοιν δὲ καὶ τῆδε, ὡς πολλή ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἁγάθον αὐτό εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάπερον ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἶνον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἰσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἐχειν τὸν τεθνέωτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ 2ο λεγόμενα μεταβολῆς τις τυγχάνει υἱόν καὶ μετοίκησις

5. μελλοντι τι] This accurately represents the reading of Oxon., which stands μέλλοντι (τι being prima manus), importing that τι should follow μέλλοντι. Gaisford here is inexact in his representation. 7. ταύτην] So VBII; αὐτήν ΣΖ. It is impossible to find a clear meaning for αὐτήν, which is the reading of Oxon. and five other MSS. Cf. Phaedo 6ο a, where Oxon. (alone) has ταύτην for αὐτήν.


18. αἰών'] 'As it were,' Par- renthetical to the construction. The words which it qualifies are μηδέν εἶναι. (The subject of μηδέν εἶναι is τὸν τεθνέωτα). Dig. 16. Cf. below, οἶνον ὄπως, and again ε, οἶνον ὄπως ἀποθημέρσαι.

19. τὰ λεγόμενα] In the popu- lar religious teaching.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 1

p. 40. Τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθέντε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. d καὶ εἰ γε μηθεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἂλλ' οἶον ὑπνος, ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὑπὲρ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἰη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἴμαι, εἰ των ἐκλεξάμενον δει ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ἃ οὕτως κατέδαρθεν, ὡστε μηδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντι-παραβέντα ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δεόν σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἁμείνον καὶ ήδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβαιοκεφ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἴμαι ἂν μὴ 10 ὡς ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινα, ἄλλα τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατος ἐστὶ, κέρδος ἐγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλεῖων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἡ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημήσαι 15 ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθέντε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἡλιθῇ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὅσ ἀρα ἔκει εἰσὶν ἀπαντείς οἱ τεθ- νωτεῖς. τί μείζων ἄγαθον τοῦτον εἰη ἂν, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀἰδον, ἀπαλ- λαγείς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρίη- 20 σει τοὺς ὁς ἡλιθῶς δικαστάς, οἴπερ καὶ λέγονται ἑκεῖ δικαζέων, Μίνως τε καὶ Ἀδάμανθους καὶ Αἰακὸς

21. ὡς] So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon. has it above the line but in first hand. The ὡς is constantly added where it is a popular appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently found after the article, as Phdr. 256 b, τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν, Rep. 345 e, τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρχοντας, &c., &c.

1. Τῇ ψυχῇ] An intensified form of the dative of reference, equivalent nearly to a genitive: Dig. 28.

12. αὐτῶν] A resumption of ὡς ἐπέτη τινὶ καὶ καύσης, after the intervention of εἰσαριθμ. ἃν εὑρεῖν.

22. Μίνως τε—ἄλλοι] These nouns are in the nominative by attraction to the interposed relative clause, as the nearest construction: Dig. 192.

Nowhere else does Triptolemus occur as judge of the dead (though in Hom. Hymn.
Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth). Also Plato is the only Greek who styles Ἀεας judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 e; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and to the remaining two more widely recognised judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamantus, his assessor, is his countryman. Ἀεας was the hero of Ἑγίνα, where there were (Pausan. II. 30, Origen adv. Cels. vi. 290, c. 22, Lucian, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Düllinger, Gent. and Jew, Vol. I. Bk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the ἀλλοι τῶν ἡμιθέων, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamantus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. vii. 323), and therefore antece-dently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἐμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ] I. e. 'I should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'
8. ὁπότε—τεθηκέναι] This depends upon ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι. The whole sentence ὁπότε—ἀνδρές εἰς is a re-statement more at length of θαυμαστή ἂν εἰς ἡ διατριβή, which it follows asyndetically,—an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.
9. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι] Socrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Socrates' death, when, at the words ἐκάνετε ἐκάνετε τῶν πάνσοφων, ὁ Δαμαί, τῶν οιδέν ἀλ- γύρωσιν ἅγθανε Μουσάων τῶν Ἐλλάδων τῶν ἀριστων, the whole
p. 41. λοντι τα ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τα ἐκεῖνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐξῆς εἰη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἑξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὀσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μὲν, ἐστι δ' οὖ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὡς ἄνδρες δικαιοῦσι, δέξαιτο ἑξετάζαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγωντα τὴν πολλὴν καὶ στρατιῶν Ἡ Ὀδυσσέα Ἡ Σίλυψον, ἡ ἀλλοις μυρίους ἂν τις οἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἔνθελευναι καὶ ἑξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἰη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπο τοῦτο γε ἑνεκα οἶς ἐκεῖ ἁποκτείνουσι τὰ τε γὰρ ἅλλα εὐδαιμονιόστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὡς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἁληθῆ ἐστίν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ γίμας χρῆ, ὡς ἄνδρες δικαιοῦσι, εὐδιπίδια εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τι 13 ἄ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι ἄληθες, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄνδρὶ ἁγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ἄξωντε οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τα τοῦτο πράγματα; οὔτε τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἄλλὰ μοι δὴλον ἐστὶ τούτο, ὅτι ἡδὴ τεθνᾶναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμ. 20

6. ἄγωντα] Edd. ἄγαρώντα. But there is strong syntactical justification (besides the weight of Oxon. and five other MSS.) for ἄγωντα. See Commentary.


6. ἄγωντα] Participle of the imperfect, which gives greater fullness and vividness than the aorist would have given. Cf. Legg. 635 a, καθίστη μάντις ἀπὸ τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τεθνήτου αὐτὰ (meaning Lycurgus or Minos). 677 c. Θωμέν δὴ τὰς ἐν πεδίῳ πόλεις ... ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφειβεσθαί (meaning at the Deluge).

7. ἡ ἀλλοις—εἴποι] The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: Dig. 257.

16. ἄληθες] 'As a verity.' See 18 a, note.

6. δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν] Edd. μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι, and so all MSS. except Oxon. But which collocation most exactly suggests the emphasis required? The position of μέντοι has often to be referred to a subtle ear. Cf. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι, and Dig. 294. 17. ἦ] So edd., rightly. The weight of Oxon. with four other MSS., giving εἰ, is diminished by the itacism.

3. οὐ πάντως πληροῖς τετυχηκέναι τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίων τὸ χαλεπώτατον ἀπέλυσε κ.τ.λ.  

8. ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες] By plying them unweariedly with warning and remonstrance.
APPENDIX A.

Τὸ δαίμόνιον.

The word δαίμων was used to denote either θεὸς or a spiritual being inferior to θεὸς. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being in his dealings with men. From Homer to Plato δαίμων is persistently marked by this meaning. Δαιμόνιον therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and τὸ δαίμόνιον denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhct. Π. xxiii. 8), τὸ δαίμόνιον οἶδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἐστὶ θεὸς ὁ θεὸς ἐφ᾽ ἔργον, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 e), ἐὰν ἐστιν ὣσπερ οὖν ἐστι θεὸς ἄν τι θείον ὁ ἔρως. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), διετεθηκέναι ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαίμόνιον ἔστιν σημαίνειν ὑπὲρ δὴ καὶ μελιστὰ μοι δοκοῖσαν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ δαίμόνια εἰσφέρειν, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by τὸ δαίμόνιον a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. In the Apology Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression ἐπικωμιῶν, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. δαίμων πρᾶγματα. That Socrates is not speaking of a being is clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 c), ὅτι μοι θείοι τι καὶ δαίμονοι γίνεσθαι, or (Phdr. 242 b), τὸ δαίμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰσβολὸς σημείον γίγνεσθαι, or (Euthyd. 272 e), τὸ εἰσβολὸς σημείον τὸ δαίμόνιον, or (Theat. 151 a), τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαίμόνιον. Nor does Plato, who recognises the common notion

1 In Plat. Symp. 202 d — 203 a, this view of δαίμων appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that θεὶς ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μέγεθει, all μαντική is the province of the δαίμων.

2 Whence the phrase of Ἐσχίνη (iii. 117. p. 70) ἰσαὶ δὲ καὶ δαίμονιον τινὸς ἐξαμαρτάνειν αὐτῶν προσαγομένον is indeterminate.
of a personal attendant ἀδιψῶν (Legg. 730 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller remarks, Π. 65. n. 2) gives no personality to τὸ δαιμόνιον. 'Ἡ φωνῆ ἢ τοῦ δαιμόνιον (Theag. 128 e) is ambiguous. Plato's use is sometimes adjectival (e. g. τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον), and sometimes elliptically substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency. Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates' δαιμόνιον as a being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by divinum quiddam, Divin. I. 54, not by genius) until it was revived by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this δαιμόνιον σημείων?

Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are these:

Mem. I. i. 2–5, διεσπέρασμεν γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν ὄθεν δὴ καὶ μᾶλλον μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτῶν αἰτιάσασθαι κανά δαιμόνια εἰσέφερεν. ἢ δὲ οὐδὲν κανίστερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὡσοι μαντικῶν νομίζοντες οἰωνίον τε χρώματα καὶ φήματα καὶ συμβάλλειν καὶ θυεῖαι. οὕτω τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνεις οὐ τοὺς ἀριθμας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τῶν αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κάκεινος δὲ οὕτως ἐνώμεζεν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλείστοι φασίν ὑπὸ τὰ τῶν ὑμίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι. Σωκράτης δὲ, ὡσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἐφή σημαίνειν καὶ πολλοί τῶν ξυνάντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμόνιον προσημαίνοντο καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνείπερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

IV. iii. 12–13, Σοί δ', ἐσφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, εὐίκασαν ἐτι φιλικότερον ἢ ἄλλοις χρήσασθαι [οὶ θεοὶ], εἰ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνοντες σοι ἃ τε χρή ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ. Ὅτι δὲ γε ἀλήθη λέγω καὶ σὺ, ὁ Εἰδύδημα, γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμείξης ἑαυτὸν ἀν τὸς μορφᾶς τῶν θεῶν ἑδρι, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκικὴ σοι τὰ ἐγγα ἀυτῶν ὑρόντες σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμὰν τοὺς θεοὺς.

IV. viii. 1, φασκυντὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἃ τε δεχόμεθα καὶ ἃ μὴ δεχόμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν δικαιῶν κατεγράφη διὰ τοῦτο.

'IV. viii. 5–6, Ἀλλὰ νῦν τῶν Δία, φανάι αὐτῶν, ὁ Ἐρμύγενες, ἢδι μον ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαιῶς ἀπολογίας ἱματισθῆ τὸ δαιμόνιον. καὶ αὐτῶν εἰσέπερν, Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις, τῶν δὲ, Θαυμάζεις, φανά, εἰ τοῦ θεοῦ δοκεί βελτίων εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτῶν τῶν θεῶν ὑδῇ;'

IV. viii. 12, εὑσθῆς αὐτῶν ὡστε μηδὲν ἀνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Synp. viii. 5, τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζῆμενος οὐ διαλέγει μοι τοτὲ δ' ἄλλου τοῦ ἐφιμένου.
To which must be added still from the Memorabilia. I. i. 19, Σωκράτης ἡγεῖτο πάντα μὲν θεοὶ εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λέγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ συγγραφεύμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοὺς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of Socrates' δαιμόνιον, save that it was the instrument through which divine intimations reached him unsolicitedly. He adheres (unless we admit as his the θεοὶ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται in § 12 of the Xenophontean Apology) to the expression σημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον, meaning by this expression (as already said) that τὸ δαιμόνιον is but the instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in other passages we have as equivalent expressions [θεοὶ] προσημαίνειν (Mem. IV. iii. 12), τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ (ib. viii. 6), θεῶν γνώμη (ib. 11). Its intimations differ from those obtained by ματική in being given spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (Mem. I. i. 19) πάντα μὲν θεοὶ εἰδέναι . . . , πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοὺς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων, he seems either to have directed others to ματική (Mem. I. i. 6), or the oracle (Cic. de Divin. i. 54), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intimations (Mem. I. i. 4). He however believed that if others had not this gift, it was by their own fault (Mem. IV. iii. 13).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from the identification of its province with that of ματική, which is defined in Mem. I. i. 6–9, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τις πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτεθείως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία συνεβαλλείν καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνώμιζεν ἄριστῷ ἐν πρακτη- ναί· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄηδάν ὅπως ἀποδηματο μαντευσμομέναι ἑπεμεῖν εἰ ποιητέα· καὶ τοῖς μέλλονται οἷοι τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκίσοντες ματικής ἐφή προσείδεοι τεκτονικῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ χαλκειτικήν ἡ γεωργικήν ἡ ἀνθρώπων ἄρχησιν ἡ τῶν τουιότων ἔργων ἐξεταστικῶν ἡ λογιστικήν ἡ ἀληθημερίαν ἡ στρατηγικῶν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπων γνώμη αἱρετά ἐνώμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἐφή τοῖς θεοῖς ἐαυτοῖς κατα- λειπόσθαι, ἃν οὔιδεν ἐξην εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἐφή δὲ δεῖν ἄ μέν μαθημάτα ποιεῖν ἐδῶκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἀ δὲ μὴ δὴλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειθάσθαι διὰ ματικής παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πινθάνεσθαι τοῖς θεσὶ γάρ οἷς ἄν δοσιν ἰδεῖν σημαίνειν.

This accords with Plato, Apol. 40 a, ἡ ἔκλεξθ' μοι ματική ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου. It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical
—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognisance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends,—on the other hand it pronounced 3 not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere pre-sentiment, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man's own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates' belief a definite character of expediency or inexpediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these:—Apol. 31 c-d, τούτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἦστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλὰκε ἐκηκάτε πολλαχοὺ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θέων τι καὶ δαμαίνον γίγνεται φωνή, ὃ δή καὶ εἰ τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικομισοῦν Μέλητος ἑγράφατο. ἔμοι δὲ τοῦτ' ἦστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνῆ τις γεγομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται ἂν ἀποτρέψῃ τοῦτο, ὃ ἦν μέλλων πράττειν, προτρέψῃ δὲ οὔπως. τούτ' ἦστιν δὲ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. 40 a-b, ἡ γὰρ εἰσῆλθα μοι μακτικῇ τῷ δαμαίνον ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντί πάνω πυκνῇ ἂν ἦν καὶ πάνω ὑπὶ συμκρύων ἐναντιομένη, εἰ τὰ μέλλοντα μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξῃν. νῦν δὲ ἐξυμβεβήκε μοι, ἀπερ ἀράτε καὶ αὐτοῖ, τατί, ἣ γε δὴ ὑδηθεὶ τῶν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἑστάτα κακῶν εἶναι. ἔμοι δὲ οὔτε ἔξεντι ἑδών οὐκοῦν ἡμαντωθῇ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνεβαινόν ἐνταῦθ' ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδὰμῳ μέλλοντι τι ἐρείν' καίται ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ μὲ ἐπίσχει λέγοντα μεταβεῖν. 

νῦν δὲ οὐδαμῷ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἐργῷ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναπτυσσάται μοι.—Euthyd. 272 e, κατὰ θεοῦ γὰρ τών ἐκείνων καθήμενων ἐνταῦθα, οὔπερ σὺ με εἰδεῖς, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρήματι μόνος, καὶ ὅτι ἐν νῷ ἐξαινοῦ ἀναπτυσσάτων ἀνατηροῦν μὲν οὖν ἐγένετο τὸ εἰσόδος σημείων τὸ δαμαίνον, πάλιν οὖν ἐκαταθέσατο.—Phdr. 242 b, ὡςίκ' ἔμελλον, ἄγαθε, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαμαίνον τε καὶ τὸ εἰσόδος σημείων μοι γένεσθαι εγένετο— ἢν δὲ με ἐπισχεῖ δ' ἂν μέλλων πράττειν—, καὶ τίνα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτὸθεν ἀκοῦσαν, ἢ μὲν οὐκ ἐάν ἀπίεαν πρώτ' ἂν ἄφιεσθαι σωματικῶς, ὡς τὸ ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θείον.—Aleib. I. init. 103 a-b, τούτον δὲ τὸ αὐτίον γέγονεν οὔκ ἀνθρώ-πειον, ἀλλὰ τὰ δαμαίνον ἐναπτύμα, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ δύναμιν καὶ ὑπονοίᾳ πενεί, νῦν δ' ἐπείδη οὐκέτ' ἐναντιοῦται, οὔτω προσελήλυθα. εὐελπίς δὲ εἶμι καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ μὴ ἑναντιώσομαι αὐτῷ.—Theet. 151 a, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γεγονόμενον

3 Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the Apology. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (28 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the δαιμόνοι (31 d).
μοι δαμόνιων ἀποκωλύει ἔννειαι ἐνίου ὧν εὖ.—Rep. 496 c, τὸ δ΄ ἰμέτερον οἰκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαμόνιων σημείων ἦ γάρ ποῦ τινι ἀλλῳ ἦ οἶδεν τῶν ἐμπροσθεν γέγονε. The passages in the Theages consist in part of parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and variations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign, which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds to the μαντική of other men. It is represented as a gift almost peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.); or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave the φωνή unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that its function was a negative one—ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει βε οὖποτε (Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself, which Socrates accounted for by the δαμόνιων σημείων, was a sudden sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the expediency of abandoning it,—or, Xenophon would add, of prosecuting it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates' account of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psychologist, and, while in his own belief he was merely describing his own consciousness,—or, as Xenophon says, ἄσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν οὗτο καὶ ἔλεγε,—he was really importing into his description an inference of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams (Phædo 60 e), but more by his absolute faith in μαντική and its use in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained unasked through the σημείων; and, thirdly, because while he believed himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly unconscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of "all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works." If, then,
declining Socrates’ account, we are disposed to refer the phenomenon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily, provided we confine our attention to Xenophon’s account alone. All Xenophon’s notices of it encourage the view, that it was a quick exercise of a judgment informed by knowledge of the subject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose and unperturbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties, especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to forecast and forejudge might become almost an immediate sense. But it must be confessed that some of the features in Plato’s account are a little embarrassing to this view. The singularity ascribed by Plato (Rep. 496 c) to the gift need not rank among these difficulties, since Xenophon mentions it as a singular characteristic of Socrates (Mem. IV. viii. 11) that he was φρόνιμος ὡστε μὴ διαμαρτάνεις κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω, μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδείσθαι ἄλλ’ αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνώσιν, which is the rationalised description of this very phenomenon. But the statement that Socrates enjoyed the gift from his earliest days is not fully consistent with the explanation just put forward,—with any consideration, that is, of the effect of observation, experience, moral training, or habit of mind. Again, as we have seen, two of the instances of the occurrence of the σημεῖα which are related in Plato preclude the explanation of an act of judgment. It is no judgment, however penetrating, which recalls Socrates from the stream he had purposed crossing and brings him back to Phaedrus, or which forbids him to leave his seat just before the fortuitous entrance of Euthydemus and his companions. If we are to accept these features as historical, we must give up all attempt to rationalise the phenomenon at all, and fall back upon Socrates’ own account as final. But, first, we have seen that there are reasons against accepting his account, and, secondly, against the historical probability of these two instances stands the fact that, though paralleled in Plutarch, they are unlike any other instances given by Xenophon and Plato; for (setting aside the Theages as apocryphal) in all the other instances it is implied that the course of action forbidden by the warning is prejudicial, not through its fortuitous consequences, but through something amiss in itself, and that the course upon which the agent is thrown back leads to the good result by a chain of means and not by a chain of accidents.
We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates' boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato's genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato's account the well-known restriction of το δαμόνων to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (Apol. 31 d), δει ἄποστρέψει με τούτο θ᾽ αὐτόν, πράττειν προστρεπεῖ δι ὁστότε. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such: the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (Mem. IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αἰτοῦ το δαμόνων, προσβαίνων τε δεῖ καὶ μὴ δεῖ ποιεῖν. cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (De Divin. i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (De Socr. Dæm. c. 11. p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as κωλίνῃ κελεῖν.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in Apol. 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconciliation of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say δει ἄποστρέψει με, he
describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function,—as if there were no such thing as "an approving conscience." In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato's notice points, the words προτέρεια δέ οὖσα αὐτος would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no impulse; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.

The fact which τὸ δαμόνον represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was κριτική, not ἐπιτακτική. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates' substitute for ματική. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every
part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—nor on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would comprehend it. What Socrates did was to halve each of these views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.
APPENDIX B.

DIGEST OF IDIOMS.

Idioms of Nouns:—Accusative Case, §§ 1—23.
Idioms of Nouns:—Genitive Case, §§ 24—27.
Idioms of Nouns:—Dative Case, §§ 28—29.
Idioms of the Article, §§ 30—39.
Idioms of Pronominal Words, §§ 40—55.
Idioms of Verbs, §§ 56—110.
Idioms of Prepositions, §§ 111—131.
Idioms of Particles, §§ 132—162.
Idioms of Comparison, §§ 163—178.
Idioms of Sentences:—Attraction, §§ 179—203.
Idioms of Sentences:—Binary Structure, §§ 204—230.
Idioms of Sentences:—Abbreviated Construction, §§ 231—261.
Idioms of Sentences:—Pleonasm of Construction, §§ 262—269.
Idioms of Sentences:—Changed Construction, §§ 270—286.
Idioms of Sentences:—Arrangement of Words and Clauses, §§ 287—311.
Rhetorical Figures, §§ 312—326.

§ 1. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—ACCUSSATIVE CASE.

Besides the Accusatives governed by Verbs Transitive, as such, occur the following, of a more Adverbial character.

A. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Cognate Accusative.

a. Direct and regular instances of the Cognate Accusative. It will suffice, as a notice of these, to point out that they are of two kinds only, viz.—

a. the Accusative of the Act or Effect signified by the Verb.

b. the Accusative of the Process indicated by the Verb.
Virtual Cognate Accusatives, i.e. such as are cognate in sense only and not etymologically, are intended to be here included. The "Accusative of the General Force of the Sentence" is really an Accusative of Apposition. See below, F (§§ 10-12).

§ 2. b. Accusatives which must be analysed as Adjectives or Pronouns in agreement with an unexpressed Cognate Accusative. These are commonly neuter (not always; cf. Hdt. v. 72, κατέδησαν τὴν ἐπὶ δανάω).

Phaedo 75 b, ὃραν καὶ ἄκοινει καὶ τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι—perform the other acts of the senses.

Ib. 85 b, ἡγούμαι ... οὐ χείρον ἑκέινων τὴν μαντικὴν ἐχειν.

Symp. 205 b, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλως καταχρώμεθα ἀνόμασιν, i.e. 'in the other cases.' Stallbaum takes this of 'the other (εἶδη) species of things' which have to be named, 'quod ad cæteras attinet formas.' This might be; but the construction of the particular verb χρῆσθαι leads us the other way; cf. Thuc. ii. 15, τῇ κρίσῃ ... ἐγγὺς οὐσῃ τὰ πλείστον ἄξια ἔχωντο, Hdt. i. 132, χράται [τοῖς κρέασιν] ὅ τι μυν λόγος αἰρέει.

Phdr. 228 c, (A)"Ως μοι δοκεῖσ οὐ οὐδαμῶς μὲ ἄφησεν κ.τ.λ. (B) Πάνω γὰρ σου ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

Thuc. 193 c, δεξία εἰς ἄριστερὰ μεταρρεοῦσης.

Legg. 792 c, τούτ' οὐκέτ' ἂν ἐγὼ ἐνακαλουθήσαμ' ἂν—this is one step further than I can go with you.' Exactly parallel are the Homeric τοῦ ἱκάνεις, τόδε χάρε, &c.

Crat. 425 c, εἴ τι χρηστὸν ἔδει αἰτᾶ δικλέσθαι.

§ 3. c. Adjectives as well as Verbs are followed by a Cognate Accusative, or by one referable to the same principle.

X Apol. 20 b, καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἄρετήν.

Ib. d, κωδυνεῶ [σοφίαν] ταίτην εἶναι σοφός.

Men. 93 b, ταίτην τὴν ἄρετήν, ἥν αὐτοὶ ἄγαθοι ἦσαν.

Rep. 349 c, οἶκοῖς καὶ ὅπερ φρόνμουν ἄγαθον [εἶναι λέγεις];—'good at those things in which he is wise.'

Ib. 579 d, δοῦλος τὸς μεγίστας θωτείας καὶ δουλείας.

Laches 191 c, τοῖτο τοῖνε ἄτιον ἔλεγον ὧτε ἐγὼ ἄτιος.

So Thucyd. i. 37, αὐτορκῇ θέσιν κεμένη, v. 34, ἄτιοις ἐπούησαν ἄτιμαν τοιάνδε.

(B, C, and D, which follow, are to be regarded as very near akin to each other.)
§ 4. B. Accusatives of the part to which the action, or characteristic, is limited, as ἀπὸ τοῦ πόδα, βρύχεων ὀδώρας. (Lobeck). Adjectives as well as Verbs, of course, are followed by this Accusative.

Charmid. 154 c, θαναστός τὸ κάλλος.

§ 5. C. Accusatives Quantitative (or, in all the instances following, Adjectives in agreement with such Accusatives), expressing how much of the subject is brought under the predication.

Legg. 958 d, ἀ δὲ ἡ χάρα πρὸς τούτῳ αὐτῷ μόνων φύσει ἔχει, ... ταῦτα ἐκπληροῦν.

Ib. e, ὅσα τροφὴν ... ἡ γῆ ... πέφυκε βούλεσθαι φέρειν.

Rep. 467 e, οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἐσονται—′ to the extent of human capacities.' It is hard to hit upon the exact ellipse, comparing other instances; but it cannot be wrong to look on the Accusative as quantitative.

Crito 46 e, σὺ γὰρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν αὑριον.

Ib. 54 d, ἀλλὰ ἄσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦτα, ἕάν τι λέγησι παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς.

Rep. 405 e, iatρικῆς δείσθαι ὃ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἀργίαν.

Phdr. 274 a, οὐ γὰρ ... ὁμοδουλοῖς δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετῶν ..., ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον.

Tim. 42 e, ἄριστα τὸ θυτῶν διακυβερνῆν ζῶον, ὃ τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αὑτῶν.

Ib. 69 d, σεβάζεμεν μαίνειν τὸ θείον, ὃ τι μὴ πάσα ἢν ἀνάγκη.

Ib. 90 e, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμνηστέον, ὃ μὴ τὶς ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν.

§ 6. Hither are also to be referred the following instances, with the distinction that here the quantitative accusative is applied metaphorically, as the measure of the degree of the act or process.

Legg. 679 a, οὐδὲ ἐν προσδέονται σιδήρου. As we say, 'not one bit.'
Cf. τί δεί; (′ what need ?' not ' why is there need ?') illustrated by Isæus, ii. 39, τί ἐδε αὐτοῖς ὄμωναι ... ; οὐδὲ ἐν δίπου.

Phædo 91 d, σῶμα γ' αἱ ἀπολλύμενον οἶδεν παῖεται—′ ceases not one bit.' To join it with σῶμα would ruin the sense. And cf. 100 b, ἀπερ ... οἴδεν πέπαιναι λέγων, and Euthyphro 8 c, οἴδεν μὲν οἷς παῖεται ταῦτ' ἀμφίσβητοίνατε.
Phædo 99 c, τάγαθον καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν οὐδὲν ὀνταί.
Euthyd. 293 c, ἕπτον οὖν τι οἰκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ;
Charm. 174 c, ἥπτον τι ἡ λατρικὴ ἐγιαίνει ποιήσει;
Crito 47 c, τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μὴδὲν ἐπαίτων. Note, that ἐπαιτῶν is intransitive (as infra d, εἶ τίς ἑστιν ἐπαίτων), and therefore μὴδὲν ἐπ. is not 'who understand nothing,' but 'who do not understand one bit.'

Acad. 19 c, ὁν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν πέρι ἐπαίτω.
— Ib. 21 b. ἐγὼ . . . οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν ξύναι αὐτόφι σοφὸς ὄν.
— Ib. 26 b, Μελήτω τοιτῶν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν—where, in accordance with the two last instances, οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν is not the Nom. to ἐμέλησεν, nor in regimen with τοιτῶν, but in agreement with the Acc. Cognate after ἐμέλησεν. In Crat. 425 c, οὐδὲν έἴδοτε τῆς ὕλης. and Legg. 387 c, ὅσοι καὶ σμικρόν νοῦ κέκτηται, the case is different.

Crito 46 c, πλείω τῶν παρόντων . . . ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται.
Phileb. 23 e, πολλὰ ἐσχισμένων.
Symp. 193 a, ἄπαντα εὑσεξείν περὶ θεοῖς—'in all his acts to act piously towards the gods.'
+ Apol. 30 c, ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε.

Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάττω δύναται σῶσειν.
Cf. Homer's πάστα, as in Od. iv. 654, τῷ δ' αἰτῷ πάστα ἐφκει, and the common expression τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ.

§ 7. D. Accusatives of the way, or manner—
Symp. 207 d, τῶν αἰτῶν ἑκείνω λόγων, ἡ ὑπηθῇ φύσις ζητεῖ αὐτὶ εἶναι.
Politic. 296 e, τῶν ὄρον . . . ὧν ὁ σοφὸς . . . διοικήσει τὰ τῶν ἀρχο-μένων.
Rep. 416 b, τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εἰλαθείας παρεσκευασμένοι—'on a footing of the greatest possible caution.' (τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εἰλαθείας like τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς, Thuc. vii. 3, &c.)
Cf. Ar. Pax 232, καὶ γὰρ ἐξείναι, γνώμην ἐμὴν, μελλεῖ.

§ 8. Refer to this the common phrase τῶν αἰτῶν πρόποσ, &c.: and, probably, the "Accusative Absolute,"—on such and such a footing.'
Protag. 314 c, δόξαν ἡμῶν ταῖτα, ἐπορευόμεθα.
Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρήμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρότον ἂν μὴ δυνάμεθα πίνως ἀποδοῖμαι συγγραφώσκειν χρέων.
Phileb. 13 b, τί οὖν δὴ ταίτων . . . ἐρών, πάσας ἥδων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι
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προσαγορεύεις; Cf. Andoc. i. 92. p. 12, σκέψασθε τί αἰτοῖς ὑπάρχον ἐτέρων κατηγοροῦσι.

§ 9. E. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Accusative of Time or Space.

To designate them thus is not an idle periphrasis; it seems to include, together with the instances of an Accus. of Time or Space in the literal meaning, those in which the notions of Time or Space are applied metaphorically. Only the latter need be noticed here.

Phileb. 59 c, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄρ' οὖ μνημώνιοι αἰτές ἐπιχειρητέον;—where 'after' means in the order of discourse.

Soph. 259 b, τὸ δὲ ... μνῆμα ἐπὶ μνημίοις οὖκ ἐστι—'ten thousand times twice told' for 'in so many instances.'

Phdr. 241 d, οὐκέτ' ἄν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ λέγοντος—'saying anything further' for 'saying anything more;—a real metaphor, as discourse only metaphorically takes up space. As to the construction, τὸ πέρα is not governed, transitively, by ἀκούσας, but follows λέγοντος.

Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτή τοῦ καλλοῦς τῶν ὑμομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὖκ ἄν ἐξπλάγη ἀκοῦσων; τὸ ἐπὶ τελ. is a metaphor from space, probably, rather than time. Either way, Stallb. is wrong in explaining the construction by his favourite 'quod attinet ad.'

§ 10. F. Accusatives in Apposition with, or standing for, sentences or parts of sentences.

These Accusatives may be either (1) Noun-Phrases; see a below: or (2) Pronouns Neuter, agreeing with Nouns understood,—viz. either Relative Pronouns; see b below: or Demonstratives, &c.; see c below.

The doctrine here advanced asserts two positions, which are worthy of notice; viz.

§ 11. (i.) These Noun-Phrases and Neuter-Pronouns are Accusatives. The prevalence of the Neuter Gender makes this difficult to prove; but such instances as are decisive afford an analogy for the rest:—

Thuc. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸν κολοφώνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 603, καὶ τῶν ἔλεγχων ... πεῦδω, and the Adverbs ἄρχη, ἄκαμψη, τὴν πρώτην, &c.

§ 12. (ii.) They represent, by Apposition or Substitution, the sentence itself. To say, that they are Cognate Accusatives, or in Apposition with the (unexpressed) Cognate Accus., would be inade-
quate to the facts. For (1) in most of the instances the sense points out that the Noun-Phrase or Pronoun stands over against the sentence, or portion of a sentence, as a whole; (2) in many of them, not the internal force but merely the rhetorical or logical form of the sentence is in view. It might be said that they are Predicates, while the sentence itself is the Subject.

§ 13. a. Accusative of Noun-Phrases in Apposition—

Legg. 736 a, τοίτοις, δι' εὔφημίας ἄπαλλαγήν, ὅνομα ἅποικίαν τιθέμενος.

Crat. 393 d, ὃν καὶ τέλος, ἡ πατρίς ἀνετράπτεστο.

Crito 45 d, τό σῶν μέρος, δ' τι ἀν τίχωσι τοίτο πράξουσι.

Soph. 260 a, το μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφία ἀν στηρθείμεν.

* Apol. 25 b, ἡ τοιονιτίον τοίτου πᾶν, εἰς μὲν τις κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 691 a, τό μὲν εἰκός καὶ τό παλύ, βασιλέως τοίτο εἶναι νόσημα.

Political. 293 a, ἐπώμενον δὲ τοίτῳ, τὴν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν δὲι ζητεῖν.

The Accusatives in the instances which follow characterise the logical or rhetorical form—

Symp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ ... ἐπιθυμία ... ἕρω.


Theaet. 153 c, ἐπί τοϊτος τὸν κολοφώνα, ἀναγκάζω προσθάζων κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 66 e, δυὸν ψάτερον, ἡ σίδαμον ἐστὶ κτήσαται τὸ εἰδέαν, ἡ κ.τ.λ.

Similarly 68 c (plural), and Charm. 160 b.

Illustrations from other writers begin with Homer: Π. iv. 28, ὁ λαὸς ἀγεροῦση, Πριάμω κακά, 155, βάνατον νῦ τοι ὁρκ' ἐταμυν, ix. 115, ὅτι τειχίδος ἐμάς ὅτας κατέλεξας, xxiv. 735, ὅψεται ... ἀπὸ πῖργου, λυγρῶν ὀλέθρου, Od. xxi. 35, ἔγχος ἔδωκεν, Ἀρχίν ἑξωσιν. Ἑσχ. Αγ. 225, άυτήρ γενέσθαι θυγατρός, γυναικοποίουν πολέμων ἄρωγαν, ἐργάζεσθαι διαφοράν, ἑργαζόμενον, 1406, νεκρός ... τήςδε δειγμᾶς χερῶς ἔργον, Cho. 200, εἴσε συμπενθεῖν ἐμοί Ἀγαλμα τύμβου, κ.τ.λ., 205, Καὶ μὴν στίξου γε, δέμηρον τεκμήριον, Ποδῶν ὁμοῖοι, τοῖς τ' ἐμοίσιν ἐμφερεῖς. Eur. Or. 1105, Ἠλίουν κτάσωμεν, Μενέλαος λίπσαν πτερών. Ar. Acharn. 411, ὅλις εἶτος χολοεῖν ποιεῖς. (So Virg. Άen. xi. 383, Proinde tona eloquio, solutum tibi.) Thucyd. iii. 111, πρόφασιν ἐτί λαχανασμῶν ἐξελθότατ' (and similarly v. 80): cf. the Homerid precedent Π. xix. 302, ἐτί δὲ στενάχουσι γυναῖκες, Πάτρωκλος πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αἰτῶν κινδύνου ... ἐκώστη (not, as Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 580, πρόφασιν in Apposition to Πάτρωκλον). Ar. Vesp. 338, Τοὺ δ' ἐφεξ' ὡς μάταις, τοιτα δράν σε θολεταί; Antiph. v. 63, p. 136, ἀλλ', αἰτο
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§ 14. The formula of Quotation falls under this head—

Alicib. I. 121 d, ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ καμαρδοποιοῦ, οὔδ' οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα αἰσθάνονται.

Apol. 34 d, καὶ γὰρ, τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου, οὔδ' ἐγώ ἀπὸ δρυός κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 77 d, δοκεῖσ... δεδεῖναι, τὸ τῶν παίδων, μή ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνέμος κ.τ.λ.—where τὸ τῶν π. is not connected with δεδεῖναι, but refers to the sentence ὁ ἀνέμος αὕτη... διασκεδάζουσιν' that is, does not mean 'to fear, as children fear,' but 'to fear lest it be as children think it is, that the soul goes into the air.'

§ 15. b. Accusative of Relative Pronoun Neuter in Apposition, with a sentence following—

Protag. 352 c, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃς φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἥδουων ἠττάσθαι—

which is what men describe when they say they are,' &c.

Soph. 217 c, δι' ἐρωτησέων, οὖν ποτὲ καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξόμενοι λόγους παγκόλους παρεγενόμεν ἐγώ. The illustration which Socrates means to impress on the stranger is not simply Parmenides' use of ἐρωτήσεις, but the whole scene,—the λόγοι πάγκαλοι in which the ἐρωτήσεις were interwoven, and his own presence on these occasions. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 40, ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθίᾳ μὲν βρασός λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκλιν φέρει' and vi. 55, οἷς ὡς ἀδελφός νεώτερος ὑπ' ἦτορας ἐν φ' οὐ πρότερον ἐνυέχως ἀμμιλήκε τῇ ἀρχῇ—where ἐν φ' is not = ἐν τούτῳ ἐν φ', but = ἐν τούτῳ ὃ, i.e. 'in a predicament which was that of his not having,' &c. And in the common expressions ἃνθ' δ'ν = ἀντὶ τῶν, ὃ, and οὕν'κα = ἐνεκα τοῦ, ὃ, the Relatives ἃ and ὃ are instances of the same construction, agreeing with the sentence which they introduce.

Gorg. 483 a, ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ, τοῦτο τὸ σοφῶν κατανενοθώ, κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—'and this is exactly how you, profiting by your knowledge of this subtility, cheat in argument.'

Theat. 158 b, (A) ἃρ' οὖν οὔδὲ τὸ τοῦτο ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖ...; (B) τὸ ποίον; (A) ὃ πολλάκις σε οἴμαι ἀκριβῶς ἐρωτώντων, τί ἂν τις ἐξου τεκμήριον ἀποδείξῃ κ.τ.λ.—'that which is expressed by the question, which I dare say you have often heard, what,' &c.

Symp. 188 c, ὃ δὴ, προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν τοὺς ἔρωτας —where ὃ δὴ agrees with the whole of what follows—'And thus it stands, accordingly;—μαντικῇ is charged with the care of,' &c.
§ 16. So with the ‘parenthetical’ οἷον,—in Apposition with the entire sentence—

Rep. 615 b, καὶ οἷον εἰ τινες πολλῶν θανάτων ἦσαν αἵτιοι . . . . , κομί- 

σαυτό. So Politic. 298 a, Tim. 19 b.

Euthyphro 13 a, λέγομεν γάρ ποι,—οἷον φαμέν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίστα- 

ται θεραπεύειν κ.τ.λ.

Political. 267 e, οἷον οἱ ἐμποροι καὶ γεωργοὶ καὶ . . . διαμάχουν’ ἄν οἴτοι 

ἐξέπταυτες κ.τ.λ.

Or with a portion of a sentence or a single word.

Phdr. 243 d, ποτιμῶ λόγῳ οἷον ἀλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι.

Political. 277 c, τὴν οἷον τῶν φαρμάκων καὶ τῇ συγκράτει τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνέγραψε.

Phaedo 64 d, ἠθενᾶς τὰς τουάδες, οἷον σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν.

Ib. 73 c, (Α) πῶς λέγεις ; (Β) οἷον τὰ τουάδε.

Ib. 78 d, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν οἷον ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 83 b, κακῶν ἐπαθέν ἀπ' αἵτων . . . οἷον ἡ νοσήσας ἡ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 40 c, δυνών βατερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι’ ἡ γάρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι . . . τὸν τεθνεώτα ἡ κ.τ.λ.

All these instances of οἷον show that 1 it stands outside the con- 

struction of the sentence. But its being in a particular number 

and case still requires explanation, and the only explanation is, 

that it is in Apposition with the sentence or some portion of it. 

Note, that this οἷον has two shades of meaning. according as it 

introduces (a) a metaphor, when it means ‘as it were;’ or (b) an 

instance, when it means ‘for instance.’ A different analysis is re- 

quired for οἷον δῇ, οἰα δῇ, οἰα, e. g. in 

Critias 112 c, οἰα θέρους, κατεχρώντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αἵτως.

Symp. 203 b, ἐπείδ' ἐδὲ ἐδείπησαν, προσατήσουσα οἷον δῇ εἰσώχια 

οὖσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πεινία.

Here the same principle so far appears, that the Neuter Ante- 

cedent to which the Relative refers is (not a Cognate Accus. but) 

the whole clause,—viz. in the former instance, κατεχρώντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα 

αἵτως, in the latter προσατήσουσα. The Relative sentence is ellip- 

tical; cf. the use of Relatives generally with δῇ, and the fuller 

expression in 

Phaedo 60 a, τουάτ—ἀττα ἐπεν οἰαι δῇ ἐιώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες.

1 The οἷον in οἷον δῇ stands exactly in the same position.
Eur. Androm. 209, Σὺ δ᾽ ἦν τὶ κυσθῆς, ... Μενελεως δὲ σοι Μείζων Ἀχιλλεως· ταῦτα τοι 'εχθεί πόσις. 2 St. Pet. i. 5, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δὲ, σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες, ἑπιχορηγήσατε κ.τ.λ.

§ 19. γ. For a sentence expressed immediately after —

Phaedo 105 a, ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὖτως ὅριζει, μὴ μονὸν τὸ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίῳ μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐκεῖνο,—ὅ ἂν ἐπιφέρη τι ἐναντίῳ ... ἐναντιώτατα μηδέποτε δέχασθαι.

Protag. 326 a, οὗτος εἰς καιροῦ καὶ οὐκ εἰς τοῦτα, σωφροσύνη ἐπιμελοῦσα.

Rep. 334 b, τούτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐτί, ὃφελεῖ μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.


Soph. 248 d, τὸ δὲ, ὡς τὸ γιγανόσκειν εὕπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγανοσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ συμβαίνει πάσχειν.

Legg. 630 d, τὸ δὲ,—πῶς χρὴν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;

Pl. 803 d, τὸ δ᾽,—ἥν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὔτ᾽ οὐν παιδιὰ πεφυκία οὔτ' ἀν παιδεία.

Ἀπολ. 23 a, τὸ δὲ,—κινδυνεύει ... τὸ ὡστὶ οὗ ὧς σοφὸς εἶναι.

Cf. St. Paul, 2 Cor. ix. 6, τοῦτο δὲ, ὁ σπείρων φειδομένως, φειδομένως καὶ θερίζει, St. Mark ix. 23, τὸ, εἰ δῦνασθαι πιστεύσαι—(the τὸ throws emphasis on the succeeding words). Cf. also the common idiom τοῦτο μὲν—τοῦτο δὲ (each a pre-statement of the clause which it introduces).

§ 20. δ. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (generally τίς or ἄλλος) standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed—

Phaedo 58 c, τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν βάπτων; τὶ ἦν τὰ λεχείατα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 204 d, (A) ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρῆ; (B) Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ—where τί stands for a whole dependent sentence, thus; 'he who desires things beautiful desires that they should—what?'

The dependent sentence is thus left unexpressed, but that τί stands for it is proved by the answer, which supplies one.

Exactly parallel is Ἀσχ. Ag. 953, (Α) Τί δ᾽ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος, εἰ τάδ᾽ ἦνσε; (B) Ἐν τοικίδιος ἂν κάρτα μοι βῆναι δοκεῖ. So St. John xxi. 28, Κύριε, οὖτος δὲ τί;—where τί is the implicit completion of the sentence.
On this principle are to be explained the phrases which follow.

Apol. 26 d, ὅσα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; (similarly Symp. 205 a.)—There is no γένεται to be supplied; τί in itself is the full representative complement of the sentence; the actual complement is of course suspended in the interrogation.

Meno 86 e, εἰ μή τί (similarly Rep. 509 c). and Symp. 222 e, εἰ μή τί ἄλλο. The sentence is complete; the τί and the τί ἄλλο stand for full propositions.

Symp. 206 e, (A) εἰ τὸι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως . . . (B) ἄλλα τί μήν; (A) Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Here the τί refers back to the words τοῦ καλοῦ, and itself stands for a similar phrase; which is proved by the answer Τῆς γεννήσεως. Except on the principle now before us, the phrase would have been variable, and we should in the present instance have found (what Steph. conjectures) ἄλλα τίνος μήν; Similarly 202 d. The phrase may of course equally stand for a whole sentence, as Rep. 362 d, 438 b ("and what then?"). The same explanation holds of the τί in the phrase of polite assent, τί μήν; 2 (literally 'if not, then what?') The explanation of τί; in the sense of 'why?' is the same; and of the answering particle διὰ, 'because'.

§ 21. In the following instances the significance of the τί is hinted in a second interrogation following.

Phdr. 234 e, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος;—οἴχ ὑπερφυῶς εἰρήσθαι;
Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν ταῦτα;—ἡ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει;
Soph. 266 c, τί δὲ τίν· ἡμετέρων τέχνην;—δρ' οίκ. αἰτήν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῆς φόροσμεν ποιεῖν;
Phaedo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . .; ἂρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἦ κ.τ.λ.; (The genitive τῶν—καλῶν is suspended in a loose construction, which the second interrogation supersedes.)
Phileb. 27 c, τί δὲ ὁ σῶς [βίος] . . . .; ἐν τίνι γένει ἄν λέγοιτο;
So probably Phaedo 64 d, (A) φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρίς εἶναι ἐσπονδακέα εἰναὶ ἐπιπονθείσα ἐπὶ τάς ἱδέας καλουμένας τάς τουίσθαι κ.τ.λ.; (B) ἡ ἡκιστα. (A) Τί δὲ τάς αὐθροδυσίων; (B) Ωδήμως. (A) Τί δὲ τάς ἄλλας τίς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπεῖας;—δοκεὶ σοὶ ἐντύμους ἤχεσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; See more instances under Binary Structure (§ 207).
Legg. 630 c, οἴκ. ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τίν τιν μεγίστην ἀρέτην μιαίστα βλέπων

2 Add τί μέλλει: as in Hipp. Mi. 373 d, Rep. 349 d. μέλλει can be invariable, though attracted sometimes into μέλλωμεν.
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Phaedo 105 a, ὥρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὀφιζεῖ, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναυτὸν τὸ ἐναυτίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο,—ὁ ἄν ἐπισφέρῃ τι ἐναυτίον . . . ἐναυτίστη τις ἠπεδροτε δέχασθαι.
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/ Apol. 23 a, τὸ δὲ,—καδυνευεῖ . . . τὰ ὅτε ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.
Cf. St. Paul, 2 Cor. ix. 6, τοῦτο δὲ, ὁ σπείρων φειδομένως, φειδομένως καὶ θερίζει, St. Mark ix. 23, τό, εἰ δύνασαι πιστεύειν—(the τὸ throws emphasis on the succeeding words). Cf. also the common idiom τοῦτο μὲν—τοῦτο δὲ (each a pre-statement of the clause which it introduces).

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Symp. 204 d, (Λ) ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τὶ ἐρᾷ; (B) Γενέσθαι αἰτῶ—where τὶ stands for a whole dependent sentence, thus; 'he who desires things beautiful desires that they should—what?' The dependent sentence is thus left unexpressed, but that τὶ stands for it is proved by the answer, which supplies one.
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ACCUSATIVE CASE. 129

On this principle are to be explained the phrases which follow.

Apol. 26 d, ἄνα τί πατά λέγεις; (similarly Symp. 205 a.)—There is no γένεται to be supplied; τί in itself is the full representative complement of the sentence; the actual complement is of course suspended in the interrogation.

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Protag. 309 b, τί οἶν ταίν;—ἡ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει;

Soph. 266 c, τί εἰ τίν ἡμετέραν τέγνην;—δὴ οὐκ αἰτήν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομική, φίλοσομεν τοιείν;

Phaedo 78 d, τί εἰ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . . . . ἄρα κατὰ ταίτα ἔχει, ἦ κ.τ.λ.; (The genitive τῶν—καλῶν is suspended in a loose construction, which the second interrogation supersedes.)

Phileb. 27 c, τί εἰ ὤ σος [ℏs] . . . . . . ἐν τοῖς γένει ἄν λέγωστο;

So probably Phaedo 64 d, (A) φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφουν ἀνθρώπω καύναι ἐποιεικάκειν πείρας ἡδονᾶς καλοµένας τὰς θούσθες κ.τ.λ.; (B) Ὑπεροθοικάστα. (A) Τί εἰ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφροδισίων; (B) Ὑπεροθοικάστα. (A) Τί εἰ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περί τὸ σώμα θεραπεύεις;—οὐκεί σοι ἐνίγμως ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; See more instances under Binary Structure (§ 227).

Legg. 630 c, οἶχ ἄλλο ἦ πρὸς τήν μεγαστὴν ἄρετὴν μάλιστα ἔλεσην

2 Αδεὶ τί μέλλει: as in Hipp. Mi. 373 d. Rep. 349 d. μέλλει can be invariable, though attracted sometimes into μέλλειν.
§ 22. The Adverbial Interrogatives ἄλλο τι ἢ and ἄλλο τι are instances of the same principle; and may conveniently be discussed here once for all.

They have the following points in common: (1) as to their use, they both expect an affirmative answer; (2) as to their construction, the ἄλλο in both (as in the instances heretofore given) is used proleptically; and (as we have said) both are instances of the Neuter Pronoun Accusative standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed.

But from this point we must investigate them separately.

Ἄλλο τι ἢ challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence. It may be that it sometimes affects the whole; but (unlike ἄλλο τι) it can, and in most instances does, affect a particular portion of the sentence. And the interrogation is, in strictness, limited to the part affected.

Apol. 24 c, ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὃς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεότεροι ἔσονται; The interrogation is made as to περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ.

Rep. 372 a, ἄλλο τι ἢ σιτόν τε ποιούντες καὶ ὑποδήματα; The interrogation is made as to σιτόν τε π. κ. ὑποδήματα, to the exclusion of the Verb διατηροῦνται.

Alc. I. 129 b, τῷ διαλέγεις σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί; The phrase gets its meaning thus; the speaker, about to name a certain fact or thing, gives it emphasis by first asking whether any other ought to be named instead of it.

Some doubt might be felt whether ἢ is 'than' or 'or.' Certain phrases would point to 'or,' such as
ACCUSATIVE CASE.

§ 22.

Gorg. 459 b. τοίτο συμβαίνει γὰρ ἄλλοι τινες;

Political. 266 b. (A) μᾶλλον ἄλλως ποιεῖται, ἡ κατάληξις εἰς τὸν προτότοκον ἄλλως.

Legg. 633 e. ἢ κατάληξις ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἄρχοντας, καταλήξειν μᾶλλον ἀκόμη καταλήξειν ἢ τοσάτοις;

Protag. 330 c. τον ἄλλην ψυχόν ἔξοι: τὴν αὐτὴν ἔμοι ἄλλην;

But more decisive for 'than' are

Protag. 357 e. οὰ τοιοῦτον ἄλλον τι, ἀδυνάτου ἵνα, and the variations,

Soph. 120 e. τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον τινι: τὴν θυσίαν ἀρρατοποιεῖν;

Phaedo 91 d. ὁμοίως ἄλλοις ὀπίσθος ἡ κατάλεξις: καὶ τὸ καταλέγον κατάλεξις ἄλλοις τῷ ἄρχοντας;

Thus ἄλλοι τι challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.

Rep. 337 c. ἄλλοι παρὰ οἷον αὐτῶν καὶ τοιούτων: —you mean, do you, that you will do so?

Ib. 369 d. ἄλλοι προσαράγησαν αὐτὸν ὅτι ὅτι εἰς ἄλλως ἄλλοις ἐν ἀντίθεσι καὶ τοιούτως: —where the force of the ἄλλοι τι cannot stop short of the whole sentence.

Gorg. 467 d. ἄλλος τίνι οἷον ἄλλως καὶ τοιοῦτως: —ταύτα τι πραγματεύονται τοιοῦτοι· ὥστε ἄλλοι προσαράγησαν αὐτὸν: —where the interrogation must go on to the end; and, besides, the whole sentence is gathered up in the pre-announcing clause αὐτῷ καὶ τοιοῦτως.

Phaedo 79 b. (A) οἷον τινι δὲ τοῖς αὐτῶν παρὰ αὐτῶν: οἷον τὶ παρὰ τοῖς αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῖς αὐτῶν;

Syrp. 221 a. ἄλλοι: ἄλλοις: ἄλλως: ἄλλως αὐτῶν: οἷον αὐτῶν: αὐτῶν τοιοῦτοι: (In Euthyd. 156 c. ἄλλοι τινὶ περί τοιοῦτοι: αὐτῶν: the interrogation goes through several clauses: but here two MSS. omit τι.)

Thus ἄλλοι τι affects the whole of the sentence, like the French n'est-ce pas que. The interrogation it makes is not restricted to any particular portion of the sentence.

But how does it come to have its meaning? For there is no colour for supposing that it stands for ἄλλοι τι.

It represents an unexpressed sentence (according to the use of the Neuter Pronoun at present before us: —namely, 'any different proposition from that about to be enunciated. The speaker, by ἄλλοι τι, puts the question about this shadow of a proposition, but anticipates the judgment by offering simultaneously for acceptance his own view. Thus the interrogation strictly speaking belongs to
the ἄλλο τι alone, though it spreads from it to the whole sentence beyond.

§ 23. The last use to be mentioned of the Neuter Accusative of ἄλλος as standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed, is in winding up an enumeration.

Symp. 176 a, ἁσαντας τὸν θεόν καὶ τῆλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα.

Theet. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδωντα δή καὶ πάντα δ' ἐν διήλθομεν. (I class this passage under the present head, because by the sense πάντα must stand for τῆλλα πάντα. Cf. § 249.)

In neither of these passages can the Accusative be said to be Cognate, as if it were subjoined by καὶ to the unexpressed Cognate Accusatives of ἁσαντας and καθεύδωντα: for it is really other participles that are added, co-ordinate with ἁσαντας in the one case and καθεύδωντα in the other.

Theet. 145 a, ἢ καὶ ἀστρονομικός καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικός καὶ όσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

Phdr. 227 c, τέπητα μᾶλλον ἢ πλονσίκα καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ νεωτέρῳ καὶ όσα ἄλλα ἐμοί πρόσεστι.

Ib. 246 c, τὸ δὲ θεῖον καθὸν σοφῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτον.3

§ 24. Idioms of Nouns:—Genitive Case.

A. Genitive of Epexegesis.

Apol. 29 b, ἄμαθια . . . αὐτή ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ ὀξεθαυ εἰδέναι ὃ ὀκ οἴδειν.

Phaedo 78 b, τοῦτο τὸ πίθος . . . , τοῦ διασκεδάζωσθαι. [So Oxon. and one other MS.]

Ib. 96 b, ὃ τάς αἰσθήμεις πιερέχων τοῦ ἀκούων καὶ ὁμήν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

Ib. 97 a, αὐτή ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῦς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ εὐνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθήμισι.

§ 25. B. Genitive of a Substantive with ὅς, loosely, denoting the agent to whom a particular effect is to be referred.

Symp. 212 c, καὶ ἐξαίφνης τῆν αὐλειον θόραν κρονομένην τολίν ψόφον παρασχεῖν ὡς κωμαστῶν—where ὡς κωμαστῶν does not closely follow ψόφον, but characterises the general effect produced.

3 [Under these three examples is written in the MS. "Proof to be subjoined that these are Accusatives."
§ 26. GENITIVE CASE.

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Cf. Arist. Eth. I. xiii. 18, οὕτω δή καὶ τοῦ πατρός . . . . φαμέν ἕχειν λόγου, καὶ οὐχ ὀστερ τῶν μαθηματικών—('not in the sense in which mathematicians use the expression.') Ἀesch. Eum. 628, θανεῖν . . . . Τούδος ἐκηθδολεῖν, ὡστ' Ἀμαιάζων, Cho. 990, ἕχει γὰρ αἰσχυνθηρος, ὡς νόμον, δίκην (the law being personified into an agent, as frequently elsewhere). Soph. Aj. 998, ὧδεία γὰρ σου βάζει, ὡς θεοῦ τινός, Δήλθ' Ἀχιοῦς ('like a deity φήμη, that is.'). Trach. 768, προστίθεται Πλευραίσιν ἀρτικόλλος, ὡστε τέκτονος ('like carver's work.') Πb. 112, πολλὰ γὰρ ὡστ' ἀκάμαστος ἦ νότου ἢ βορέας τις κύματα . . . ἔσι—which points again to the Homeric τῶν δ' οὕτως κύματα λειτεὶ Παιντοίων ἀνέμων, Πλ. ii. 396.

§ 26. C. Genitive of a Noun with a Participle, after Verbs of knowing, seeing, shewing.

/ Apol. 27 a, ἄρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφός δὴ ἐμού χαριεντιζομένιν; Ἰb. 37 b, δὲν εὐ οἴδ' ὃτι κακῶν ὄντων.

Crat. 412 a, μηνὶείς ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομείωσι τῆς ψυχῆς.

Rep. 558 a, ἡ οὕτω εἰδε . . . αἰτῶν μενότων;


Probably of the use of these Verbs with a Genitive unaccompanied by a Participle there is no clear instance in Plato.

In Charm. 154 e, ἐθεασάμεθα . . . τοῦ εἰδείς, the Genitive is very possibly Partitive, as also in

Rep. 483 b, μαθίματος . . . δ' ἂν αἴτων δηλοὶ ἐκεῖνης τῆς οἰκίαις.

In Legg. 646 d, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διαγραφῆς ὡσταύτως διάνοισιν, the Genitive has tacit reference to περὶ in the question previously put, οἶκοιν χρή καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηθειμάτων πέρι διανοεῖσθαι τῶν αἰτῶν τρόπον;

In Rep. 375 d, οἴσθα γὰρ ποιοῦν τῶν γενεάων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοϊτό φίλει αἰτῶν τὸ ἱθος, κυνῶν is governed by ἱθος.

D. Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after Verbs of mentioning.

Meno 96 a, ἤχεις οὖν εἶπεῖν ἓλλον ὄποιον πράγματος, οὗ κτλ. ;—Why

*The passage, Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τοῦτον ὃν καλὸς ἕχει λέγειν ὃν κτλ., is to be construed otherwise; τοῦ τοῦ to is governed by χειρ. See under Binary Structure (§ 225).
this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191.)

Legg. 804 e, καὶ οἴδεν φοβηθεὶς ἀπομακρύνεται τόν λόγον οὕτω ἵππικι ὀφθη εἰς ναρίσσει μὲν πρέπον ἀν εἰς, γυναῖξι δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1236, Ποίον κέκραγας ἀνδρός ὀφθη ἐπερέφρωνα; and ib. 1257, Ο. C. 355, 'Α τοῦ ἔχρησθη σώματος, Trach. 1122, Τῆς μητρὸς ἦκο τῆς ἔμης φρύσων.

In Homer, Verbs of knowing &c. also thus govern a Genitive of a Noun without a Participle.

Il. xii. 229, Εἰδεῖν τερμάων. Od. xxi. 36, Γρώτην ἀλλήλον, and so xiii. 109, Γνωσόμεθα ἄλληλον. Il. xiv. 37, ὑψείοντες ὑὐτῆς, xvi. 811, διδασκόμενος πολέμοιο.

§ 27. E. Genitive of a Noun placed at the beginning of a construction, for the sake of premising mention of it, without any grammatical justification of the genitive.

Phædo 78 d, τι δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ὥρα κατὰ ταυτάτα ἔχει, ἢ κ.τ.λ. ;

Legg. 509 d, τι δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἁμάκειν; πότερον . . . ἢ καὶ κ.τ.λ. ;

Legg. 751 b, δῆλον . . . ὅτι . . . τοῦ πῶλων εὖ παρεσκευασμένην ἄρχας ἀνεπτυθεῖσαν ἐπιστήσατο τοῖς εὐ κεκλίσσοις νόμοις, . . . οἴδεν πλέον εὖ πεθέντων [ἐστὶ].

Rep. 576 d, ἀλλ' εἰδαμονίας τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτους, ὡσαύτωσ ἢ ἄλλως κράνεις ;

Cf. Ἀσch. Ag. 950, Τούτων μὲν οὕτως and Eum. 211, Τί γὰρ γνωσθήκον ἐγὼ ἀνέδρα νοσθής ; also Arist. Pol. Ι. iν. Ι. ἀραπτῷ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀριστόμεναι τέχναις ἀναγκαίοιν ἂν εἶπε ἐτίμησι τὰ οἰκεία θραύνα, εἰ μελλεί ἀποτελεσθήσεται τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The principle seems to be that the intended mention of the thing is regarded from the side of the genitive as limited and occasioned by it. Near this use stands also

Legg. 969 e, τῷ πῶλῳ ἐστίν τῆς κατοικίσεως.

§ 28. Idioms of Nouns:—Dative Case.

Certain intensified uses of the 'Dative of Reference' are noticeable. a. Where the Dative is only justified by making the notion of Reference concentrated enough to include Possession.

a. Dative of Nouns.

Apol. 40 c, μεταβολὴ τῆς τυχικοῦ νόθου καὶ μετοικησες τῇ ψυχῇ.

Phædo 62 b, ἡμᾶς τούς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τοὺς κτηματάς τῶν θεῶν εἶναι.
§§ 29, 30.] DATIVE CASE. THE ARTICLE. 135

Phileb. 58 c, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ἕπαρχειν τέχνη δίδοις πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν.

Legg. 760 e, τῷ τόπῳ ἐκάστῳ τῆς ἐπιμελεῖαν εἶναι τοιάνδε τινά.

Ib. 820 e, ἄστρων . . . τὴν μάθησιν τοῖς νέοις.

β. Dative of Pronouns.

Charm. 157 e, ἡ πατρόφα ὑμᾶν οἰκία.

Legg. 624 b, ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέοτος τοὺς νόμους.

Theæt. 210 b, ἡ μανικτική ἦμῖν τέχνη.

Phædo 60 c, θέος . . . ξυνήθεν εἰς ταῖτόν αἱτότις τὰς κορυφάς.

Ib. 72 e, ἤν που ἦμῖν ἢ φύση [Oxon.], and ibid. ἦμῖν ἢ μάθησις.

Cf. Thuc. i. 6, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αἱτότις τῶν εὐδαιμόνων. Isæus vi. 6. p. 56, τῷ μὲν οἷν ἄδελφῳ αὐτῷ . . . ἐπελευθητάτην.

§ 29. b. Where the Dative is justified by making the notion of Reference include that of the Object.

a. In the case of the latter of two Substantives.

Symp. 194 d, ἐπιμεληθῆσαι τοῦ ἐγκώμιον τῷ ἕρωτι.

Rep. 607 a, ὑμον τὰ μεὸς καὶ ἐγκώμιον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

Legg. 653 d, τάς τῶν ἱσοτῶν ἀμοιβὰς τοῖς θεοῖς.

Ib. 950 e, ἀγαθῶν τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς.

β. In the case of the remote Object after a Verb.

This usage is partly owing to the force of Attraction, and the instances are given under that head (§ 183).

§ 30. Idioms of the Article.

a. As a Demonstrative Pronoun Antecedent.

Theæt. 204 d, ἐν γε τοῖς δοσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί. So Protag. 320 d,

Phileb. 21 c.

Soph. 241 e, τεχνῶν τῶν δοσα περὶ ταῦτα εἰσί.

Phdr. 239 b, τῆς ὑδεν ἀν κ.τ.λ. (referring to συνοισία.)

Ib. 247 e, ἐν τῷ ὧν ἐστίν ὑν ὑπως.

Phileb. 37 a, τὸ φ τῷ ἡδομένου ἦδεται.

Tim. 39 e, τῷ ὧν ἐστὶ ξιὼν.

Critias 115 b, τῶν ὅσος ξίλεως (referring to καρπός.)

Legg. 761 e, περὶ τοῖς ὧν ἐπιμελοῦσαν.

Ib. 905 b, ἐκείνων τῶν ὧν κ.τ.λ.
§ 31. b. Prefixed to Personal Pronouns, laughingly.

Theat. 166 a, γελάων δή τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξέ.

Soph. 239 b, τὸν μὲν τοῖς ἐμὲ γε κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 20 b, δεινον προσδοκῶν αὐθέν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ.

Ib. 59 b, τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίλησθον Χρή συχνὰ χαίρεων ἐὰν.

Lysis 203 b, παρὰ τίνας τοῖς ἐμᾶς;

Phdr. 258 a, καὶ ὅσ εἶπε, τὸν αὐτῶν δὴ λέγων, κ.τ.λ.

Jelf, G. G. § 452, says “this construction seems to be confined to the Accusative.”

§ 32. c. When the Substantive has a plurality of Adjectives qualifying it, the order is disturbed, with a view of relieving the heaviness of the term, in various ways.

a. By postponing the Substantive, when one of the Adjectives ought to have followed it,

Crat. 308 b, ἐν τῇ ἄφασία τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ.

Ib. d, τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὸν φωνὴν.

Symp. 213 e, τὴν τοῦτον ταντηρί τὴν δυναμιστὴν κεφαλήν.

Legg. 732 e, τῷ θυτῶν πῶς ζῶων.

Phaedo 100 a, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὄντων [so Oxon. and seven other MSS.]—i. e. τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἀπάντων.

β. By bringing in the Substantive before its time.

Phileb. 43 a, τὸν λόγον ἐπιτεφρόμενον τοῦτον.

Legg. 659 d, τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὑμᾶν εἰρημένον.

Ib. 790 c, τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μέθων λεχθέντων.

Ib. 793 b, δ' νῦν δὴ λόγος ἵμαν ἐπικυθεῖς.

§ 33. Upon these principles are to be explained the seeming anomalies which occur, in the Tragic Poets especially, in the collocation of Substantives with a plurality of epithets preceded by the Article.

a. Ἀσχηλ. Cho. 496, φιλτυτον τὸ σῶν κάρα (for φ. κάρα τὸ σῶν), Suppl. 9, αἰτογενῆ τὸν φυζώρα γάμου (for γάμου τὸν φυζ.). Soph.
§ 34.] THE ARTICLE. 137

Phil. 133, 'Ερμής ὁ πέμπτων δόλιος (for 'Ε. δόλιος ὁ πέμπτων). Thuc. i. 126, ἐν τῇ τοῦ Δίως τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ. Lysias vii. 24. p. 110, ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις τοῖς ἐμοῖς χερίσις. Ἀρ. Ῥ. 1323, ἐν ταῖς οὐσεχαϊνοιν οἰκεὶ ταῖς ἀρχαιοίς 'Αθηναῖς (the last three instances from Jelf).

3. Ἀσχ. Agam. 1642, ὁ δισφιλεὶς σκῦτῳ λιμῷς ἐνικοῖς (where λιμὸς is anticipated), Eum. 653, τὸ μητρὸς αἱμίς ἐμμοῦν (perhaps, for the αἱμ' ὧμιμον might otherwise be regarded as virtually a single word, as in Ἀσχ. in Ἀσχ. iii. 78. p. 64, ὁ γάρ μισότεκνος, καὶ πατήρ πουηρός, οἴκ· ἀν ποτὲ γένοιτο δημαγωγὸς χρηστός, where πατήρ πουηρός is for the purpose of the sentence a single word), Suppl. 349, τὰς ἱκέτες φιγάδα περίδρομον. Σοφ. Ἀ. 134, τῆς ἀμφιρίτου Σελαμίνου . . . ἀγαμίλου, ib. 1166, τὸν δειμνηστὸν τάφον εὐρίεντα. Phil. 394, τῶν μέγαν Πάστωκον εὐχρυσον, O. T. 671, τὸ σῶν . . . στόμα Ἑλεοῦν. ib. 1199, τὰν γαμψώ- νεχα παρθένων χρησμοβόν. Pind. Ol. V. 4, τῶν σῶν πόλιν . . . λαστράφον. Thuc. i. 96, ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεῖς, ν. 11, πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἄγαμος οἴς ἔση (these two from Jelf).

The anomalies which remain unexplained are those in which a Possessive Pronoun is concerned,—in all the instances ἐμός. Ἀσχ. Agam. 1226, τῷ μολώτις διεστότῃ Ἐμό. Σοφ. Ἀ. 572, ὁ λυμεῖαν ἐμός, O. T. 1462, Ταῖν δ' ἀθλίαν οἰκτράϊν τε παρθένου ἐμαῖν. Eur. Hipp. 583, Ζεῖς ὁ γενητὼρ ἐμός. All that can be said in explanation of the exceptional form of these passages, is that they are exceptional in meaning. Generally, where there is a Possessive Pronoun attached to the Substantive, it is that which makes it definite; here the Substantive is perfectly defined in its application independent of the Possessive Pronoun.

§ 34. d. Omitted with the former of two Substantives in regimen. Observe, that a different shade of meaning results from this deviation from the common form; a shade of meaning which would be rendered equivalently by attaching the second Noun more loosely to the former.

Rep. 395 c, δημιουργοὶς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως—artificers of freedom for the city.'

Symp. 182 c, συμφέρει . . . φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίνεσθαι τῶν ἄρχο-
μένων—'that high-spiritedness in the ruled should be strongly developed.'

Ib. 196 b, περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ—'beauty as attributable to the god.'

Theet. 175 a, ἀτόπα αἰτή catafainen tῆς σμικρομοιρίας—'a marvel in the way of minuteness.'
Crat. 391 b, ὁρθοτάτη τής σκέψεως—'truest manner of viewing'—
ἡ ὁρθοτάτη would have been 'the truest part of the view.'

Hipp. Ma. 282 a, φθόνον τῶν ζώντων—'envy against the living.'

Cf. Thuc. iii. 82, τῶν τ’ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτευχήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωρίων
ἀτοσία, vi. 76, εἰ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρία. Hdt. ii. 19, τοῦ ποταμῶν
dὲ φύσιον πέρι (φύσιος being a topic of enquiry).

Different are addresses, as Legg. 662 c, δ ἄριστοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, 817 a,
δ ἄριστοι τῶν ξένων, 820 b, δ βέλτιστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, where the Vocative
supersedes the Article.

§ 35. e. Omitted with the latter of two Substantives in regimen.
The meaning indicated by this peculiarity is the close union of the notions
represented by the two Nouns.

Symp. 187 c, ἐν αἰτῇ τῇ συντάσει ἄρμονίας τε καὶ ῥύθμου.
Cf. Thuc. iv. 92, τὸ ἐσχατὸν ἐγώνος. Hdt. i. 22, τὸ ἐσχατὸν κακοῦ.

§ 36. Different is the case where the latter Substantive is the name of a country or of the inhabitants of a country or city; for
before such Nouns the Article is habitually omitted. This is worth
observing, for the sake of precluding misapprehension of the con-
struction, where there is a concurrence of Genitives.

Phædo 57 a, οὗτε γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς ἐπιχειράζει τὰ νῦν
'Αθήνας—'for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,' &c.

That is, Φλιασίων is governed by οὐδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν.

Legg. 625 c, τῆς τῆς κόρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσι—where Κρήτης is
governed by κόρας φύσιν.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 109, τῶν ἐνυπατηγῶν Ἀκαρνάνων, vii. 30, διεύθειραν
... Θηβαίων τῶν Βουσταρχῶν Σειρφάωδαν.

§ 37. f. Omitted after οὗτος preceding a Substantive.

Rep. 399 c, ταύτας δύο ἄρμονίας.
Ib. 621 b, οὗτος, δ Γλαύκων, μίδος ἐσώθη.
Symp. 179 c, τούτῳ γέρας.
Soph. 237 d, τὸ τί τούτο μῆμα.

V Gorg. 489 b, οὗτοι άνήρ.
Ib. 505 c, οὗτος άνήρ.
Phileb. 16 c, ταύτην φήμην.
Tim. 52 d, οὗτος ... δεδόθη τὰ λόγω.

§ 38. g. Omitted before ἀνήρ or ἀνθρωπος standing (as Forster
expresses it) "pronominis loco."
Phaedo 58 e, εἰδαίμων γὰρ μοι ἀνήρ [so Oxon. and three other MSS.] ἐφαίνετο, ὡς Ἐξέκρατες—(ἀνήρ being the subject.)
Ib. 98 b, ἐπειδὴ προϊόν καὶ ἀναγρήγωρός σω ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οἶδεν χρώμενον.
§ 39. h. (from Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 459) "Ταῦτα, θάτερον. sometimes take the Article, as, their original Article being lost in the Crasis, they are regarded as simple words: 
Tim. 37 b, περὶ τὸ ταῦταν.
Ibid. 6 τὸ θατέρων κύκλος.
Ib. 44 b, τὸ τε θάτερον καὶ τὸ ταῦταν."

§ 40. Idioms of Pronominal Words.

Dialogue gives great occasion for the use of Pronouns, and Plato has imparted to his use of them a great appearance of freedom and variety. It is like a skilful chess-player's use of his pawns.

A. Use of Neuter Pronoun to represent a sentence, or portion of a sentence. This has been treated of at length under the Accusative Case (§§ 15–23).

§ 41. B. Use of Plural Neuter Pronoun to express a singular fact. This usage contributes to the enrichment of the style; firstly, by varying it; and secondly, by representing the fact as a complex phenomenon, an aggregate of many parts, the sum of many constituents, the meeting-point of many relations.

Taûta is so constantly thus used, that it is only remarkable in particular juxtapositions:—

Protag. 323 c, ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . ἀποδέχονται κ.τ.λ., ταῦτα λέγω ὅτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., τοῦτο σου μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξει.
Symp. 173 c, εἰ οὖν δέι καὶ ἕμων ἐνιγμασθεῖν, ταῦτα χρῆ ποιεῖν.
Ib. 198 b, οἷς ὑδὼς τ' ἐσομαι οἴδ᾽ ἐγγὺς τοῖς—where τοῖς = τοῦ ὑδός τ' εἶναι.
Ib. 204 b, Ἐρωτα . . . μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦ. αὐτία δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἡ γένεσις.
Phaedo 62 d, τάλ᾽ ἄν οὐθεὶν ταῦτα, φευκτέων εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσποτοῦ.
§ 42. Αντά.

Phædo 60 c, εἰ ἐνενοήσεν αὐτὰ Λύστωσος.
Τὰ ἐτερα, ἀμφότερα, πότερα, &c.

Phædo 68 c, τυγχάνει ὅν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἐτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Crito 52 a, δύοιν βάτερα. So Phædo 76 a [δυοῖν τὰ ἐτερα Οξον. and Ven. II].

Legg. 765 d, πατὴρ μάλιστα μὲν νιέων καὶ θυγατέρων, εἰ δὲ μὴ, βάτερα.

Cf. Isæus i. 22. p. 37, δύοιν τοῖν ἑπαντιωτάτων βάτερα, iii. 58. p. 43, δυοῖν τὰ ἐτερα. Xen. Mem. II. ii. 7, πότερα οἷς θηρίῳ ἀγριότητα δυσφορομέτερα εἴαι ἢ ματρώος; Antipho v. 36. p. 133, ποτέρφ χρήσονται τῶν λόγων; πότερα ὑ πρῶτον εἴπεν ἢ ὁ ἕστερον; Lysias iv. 15. p. 102, ἢ μὲν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ δεσσαν, ἐλθόντας ἡμᾶς ὡς τοῦτον, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν.

§ 43. The same tendency is observable in the case of Adjectives which admit of it: a chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.

Tim. 69 a, οὐ δυνατὰ [ἐστί].
Acilb. I. 134 c, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα.

Legg. 828 a, ἐχύμενα ἐστὶ τάξισθαι ... ἑορτά.
Menex. 235 b, ἡμέρας πλεῖον ἢ τρεῖς.

Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάττω δυνατὰ σῶζειν.

Apol. 30 c, οὐκ ἐμε μεικώ βλάψετε.

And primarily Homer.

§ 44. C. Use of Irregular Pronominal Correlatives.

As Pronouns form a prominent feature in contrasted or cor-
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relative clauses, so they also contribute their share to the want of symmetry which such clauses often exhibit.

We find ὁ μὲν—ὁ ἔτερος, των—οι δὲ, &c. as Correlatives: or by Anastrophe the former Correlative is omitted. For instances at length see below under Abbreviated Construction (§ 241).

§ 45. (The heads which remain treat of the uses of particular Pronouns.)

D. a. Use of ἄλλος and ἔτερος.

Though these words are not equivalent, they are often interchanged by Plato. Every ἔτερος is an ἄλλος, though the converse is untrue: and, under this limitation, the words circulate into each other's place in every possible way. Wherever there is question of two parties or things, both words are liable to be called into requisition. Even when the number exceeds two, for the first two of the series either word is used. Or the whole former part of a series is thrown into an aggregate, to justify the use of ἔτερος in the latter part.

Logg. 872 a, ἐὰν βουλεύσῃ βάνατὸν τις ἄλλος ἔτερω (though equally we have 879 b, ὥσ ὁ ἄλλος ἄλλον τρῶσῃ.)

Critias 109 b, τὸ μᾶλλον ἄλλοις προσῆκον, τοῖτο ἔτεροις αἴτιοι κτᾶσθαι.

Euthyphro 2 b, (A) οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνῳ γε καταγρώσομαι, ὡσ σὺ ἔτερων [γεγραφαί]. (B) οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (A) ἄλλα σὲ ἄλλος; (B) Πάνω γε.

Phileb. 61 d, ἥδον... ἔτερας ἄλλη... ἀκριβεστέρα.

Politics. 262 a, τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἔτερα τις εἶναι. τῶν δὲ αὐθηρίων ἄλλη τροφή.

Soph. 224 c, τὸ μὲν... ἔτερω, τὸ δὲ... ἄλλῳ προσρητέον [ἀνόματι].

Th. 232 d, (A) τὰ... περὶ τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν... (B) Καὶ πόλλων γε ἔτερων.

Symp. 196 c, ἃ γὰρ τις ἡ μὴ ἔχει ἡ μὴ οἴδειν. οὔτ' ἀν ἔτερῳ δοίη οὔτ' ἀν ἄλλου διδάξει. Here it is possible that the words would have lost appropriateness by being reversed; because a thing can be given only to one, while it can be taught to any number. Theæt. 184 e, ἃ δὲ ἔτερα δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δὲ ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεσθαι.

§ 46. ἄλλος, besides.'

Gorg. 473 c, πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων.

Apol. 36 b, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγικῶν καὶ δημη-

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γορίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχων καὶ ξυνωμοσίων καὶ στατέων.

II. B.
§ 47. E. Uses of αὐτός.

a. Αὐτό. The Neuter Singular of αὐτός is used peculiarly in Apposition to express the essential nature of a thing, sometimes in the Platonic and sometimes in a more popular sense.

Rep. 363 a, οἷον αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπανοίγετα. So 472 c.
Phedo 65 d, φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιων αὐτὸ ή οὖδέν; Protag. 360 e, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ή ἄρετή.
Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ή νόσος.

In the more popular sense, but not in the Platonic, αὐτός in Concord, and αὐτὸ τοῦτο in Apposition, are used also. E.g.

Phileb. 62 a, αὐτὴς περὶ δικαιοσύνης.
Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.
Phedo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο . . . ψυχήν.

The remaining uses of αὐτὸς are not exclusively Platonic.

b. αὐτός in the sense of sponte.

The most noteworthy instances are with Semi-Impersonal Verbs, and will be found below (§ 99).

γ. αὐτός in the sense of solus.

Symp. 179 a, οὐδεὶς οὗτος κακὸς οὖνα οἷον αὐτός ὃ Ἐρως ἔνθεσιν ποιήσει πρὸς ἄρετήν.
Ib. 187 c, ἐν μὲν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συντάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ μυθοῦ οὐδεὶς χαλεπῶν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγγελώσκειν.
Ib. 198 d, τάληθ' λέγειν . . . , ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλειγμένους ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα τιθέναι.

Apol. 21 d, σμικρὸ τιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφότερος.

Euthyd. 293 c, (A) οὐκούν ἐπιστήμων εἰ; (B) Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.

Legg. 836 b, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἔσμεν.

Rep. 437 c, αὐτὸ τὸ δεσμὸν . . . ἐπιθυμία . . . αὐτοῦ πάθος—'thirst, according to the simple notion of it:’—whence we see how Use a flows from this.

§ 48. δ. αὐτοῦ (Adverbal) in the sense of 'on the same spot as heretofore.'

Symp. 216 a, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τοῦτῳ καταγημάσω—i.e. not ' here' nor ' there,' but 'rooted to the spot.'
Ib. 220 c, ἐξωνύχαια γὰρ αὐτόθι ἐσθεν τι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν. (The order is hyperbatric for ἐξωνύχαια ἐσθέν τι, αὐτόθι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν)—'stood without moving from the spot where he was.'
§ 49. PRONOMINAL WORDS.

Soph. 224 d, αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν τοῖς.

Cf. Hom. II. ii. 237, τόνδε δ’ ἔχομεν Αἰτοῦ ἐνὶ Τροῖῃ γέρα πεσσέμεν, 332, Ἀλλ’ ἂγε, μίμνετε πάντες, εὐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοῖ, Αἰτοῦ, εἰσόκεν ἀστυ μέγα Πράμασος ἐλώμεν. Thuc. iii. 81, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἵππων διέβαλαν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἄλληλοι, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μιλησίων αὐτοῦ Φιλιππον καθιστάσι.

§ 49. F. Use of ἐκεῖνος.

Instances occur frequently in Plato, in which the same object is designated successively, in the same sentence or contiguous sentences, by αὐτός or the oblique Cases of αὐτός, &c., and ἐκεῖνος. This mobility of language serves as an index of the onward movement of the thought, and helps and incites the hearer (or us the readers) to keep pace with it. As new objects are brought into the centre of the field of observation, the objects which were just now full in front drop behind.

(Two or three of the following instances are quoted by Stallbaum.)

Phædo 60 d, λέγε τοίνυν αὐτῷ . . . ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο βούλομένος . . . ἀντι-τεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῖτα. Here ἐκεῖνο is identical with αὐτῷ.

Ib. 68 e, φοβοῦμεν ἐτέρων ἥδονοι στερηθήναι, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν ἐκεῖ-νον, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ἕπτ’ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. The ἐκεῖνο are identically the ἐτέρα.

Ib. 73 c, ἐὰν τίς πρότερον ἦ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας . . ., μή μόνον ἐκεῖνο γρη, ἄλλα καὶ ἐτέρου ἐννοήσῃ.

Ib. 100 b, εἰ μοι διόδος τε καὶ ἐνγχειρεῖ εἶναι ταῖτα . . . Σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκεῖνοι. Cebes’ answer has intervened, and Socrates refers in ἐκεῖνοι to the same things which he had just called ταῖτα.

Ib. 106 b, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττόν μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐπίῶτος τοῦ ἄρτιον, ὡσπερ ὁμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ’ ἐκεῖνον ἄρτιον γεγονέναι. The αὐτὸν and ἐκεῖνον both refer identically to τὸ περιττόν, αὐτοῦ becoming ἐκεῖνον as ἄρτιον is brought forward.

Ib. 111 b, τὰς δὲ ὀρας αὐτοῖς κράτιν ἔχειν ταυτήν, ὡστε ἐκεῖνον αὐτόσου εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ἔχειν πολύ πλείο τῶν ἐνθάδε—where αὐτοῖς fades into ἐκεῖνοι as mention τῶν ἐνθάδε approaches.

Crat. 430 c, δείξαι αὐτῷ, ἃν μὲν τίχη, ἐκεῖνον εἰκόνα.

Laches 186 b, εἰ τις ἡμῶν . . . ἔχει . . . ἐπιδείξαι τίνες Ἀθηναίων . . . δὴ ἐκεῖνον ὁμολογούμενον ἀγαθὸν γεγόνασιν.

Politic. 277 c, τῶν στοιχεῖον ἐκαστοῦ ἐν ταῖς Βραχυτάταις καὶ μάζαις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἠκανοῦ διαστάνονται, καὶ τάληθε φράζειν περὶ ἐκεῖνα δύνατον γίγνονται . . . ταῖτα δὲ γε ταῖτα ἐν ἄλλας ἀμφιγροστίντες
§ 50. G. Uses of *tis (indefinite).

In the sense of ‘a particular this or that,’ *tis is made to contribute to give liveliness and variety to the language. Thus

a. In illustrations *tis gives the force of ‘for instance,’ or rather the French ‘par exemple.’

Symp. 199 d, ei [έρων] μητρός τινος ἡ πατρός ἄετι.
Phaedo 66 c, ἄν τινες νόσου προσπέσσουσιν.
Phdr. 230 d, θαλλόν ἡ τινα καρπίων προσείστετε.
Hyp. Ma. 292 a, δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄετι;

§ 51. β. Or it draws the attention away from the particular illustration given to the kind of notion intended by it,—thus softening the effect of it.

Phdr. 261 c, ei μὴ Γοργίαν Ἕστορό τινα κυπασκευάζεις, ἡ τινα Θρασύ-

machon te kai Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.
Phileb. 16 c, διά τινος Προμηθέως.
Cf. Ἀσεχ. Agam. 55, ὑπατος δ' αἰῶν ἡ *tis 'Ἀπόλλων ἡ Πώλ κ.τ.λ.
Ar. Ran. 912, Ἀχιλλεία τιν' ἡ Νάξηρ κ.τ.λ.

§ 52. γ. In enumerations it has the force of ‘this or that’; but, specially, added (capriciously, as one might say) to one member of the enumeration, it serves the purpose of creating variety, which in enumerations Plato specially affects for the purpose of keeping the attention alert.

Symp. 203 a, ὅ... περὶ τέχνας ἡ χειροπραγίας τινὰς [σοφὸς] θάνατος.
Phaedo 65 c, μήτε ὁκή μήτε ὁψι μήτε ἀλγηδῶν μήδε τις ἠδονή. [So
Hermann from Oxon.]
Apol. 27 d, ei oi δαίμονες θεῶν παιδές εἰσι νόθοι τινές ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινών ἄλλων.
Phdr. 235 c, ἡ σοι Σαφήνοι... ... ἡ Ἀνακρέοντος... ... ἡ καὶ συγγρα-

φέων τινών.
Polit. 305 b, μὴ ὡς ὑπὸ τινος δώρον μήθ' ὑπὸ φόβων μήτε οἰκτῶν μήθ'

ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλης ἐχθρας μηδε φιλίας.
§ 53. H. Uses of τοιοῦτος.

a. Conversationally, for ‘such as I am thinking of’—but have not yet explained.

§ 54. Φ. As a mere substitute or symbol for a particular word preceding, to avoid repetition of the same sound.

§ 55. This Idiom extends to other kindred Pronouns.

§ 53—55.] PRONOMINAL WORDS. 145

§ 53. H. Uses of τοιοῦτος.

a. Conversationally, for ‘such as I am thinking of,’—but have not yet explained.

Symp. 210 c, ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ἣ ἐστι καλὸν τοιοῦτε ὁ γὰρ ἄν ... παθαγωγηθεὶς ... κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλὸν κ.τ.λ.—the explanation of τοιαύτην beginning immediately after it, with ἣ ἐστι.

Phaedo 73 c, ... ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τὰ τρόπον; τόν δὲ [so Stallb. and Herm.] εἶν τις κ.τ.λ. The τοιοῦτο expresses that it is such as the speaker has in his mind; his explanation of it to others follows at λέγω δὲ.

§ 54. β. As a mere substitute or symbol for a particular word preceding, to avoid repetition of the same sound.

Phaedo 67 a, καὶ οἴτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμεναι ... μετὰ τοιοῦτων ἐσώμεθα—i. e. μετὰ καθαρῶν.

Ib. 80 c, εἰπὶ μὲν τις χαριστῶν ἔχων τὸ σώμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ εἰς τοιαύτην ὄφρα—where τοιαύτη simply means χαριστή.

Ib. d, ἢ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἄειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπου ἔτερον οἰχόμενον—where τοιοῦτον ἔτερον means άειδή.

Ib. 84 a, τὸ ἄληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη ... αἰτεῖ ... ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὰ ἐνεγγενές καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι—where τὸ τοιοῦτον stands for τὸ ἄληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον.

Ib. 79 c, πλανάται καὶ ταράττεται κ.τ.λ. ἢτε τοιοῦτων ἐφαπτομένη—where τοιοῦτων is a substitute for πλανομένων καὶ ταραττομένων.

Symp. 208 d, ὑπὲρ ἀμετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης.

Legg. 723 d, οὔθε γὰρ ἄσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δράν—where ἄσματος is actually governed by τὸ τοιοῦτο δράν, because this is the substitute for προτείνασι προοίμιον in the foregoing sentence: cf. Symp. 210 b, quoted above (§ 17).

§ 55. This Idiom extends to other kindred Pronouns.

Rep. 507 b, πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ἄγαθὰ καὶ ἐκαστὰ οἴτως—where οἴτως personates πολλὰ.

Legg. 853 b, νομοθετεῖν πάντα ὅποια νῦν μέλλομεν τοιοῦτο δράν—where τοιοῦτο δράν represents εἰς δικαστὰς ὄγειν or the like, implied from ἥν δεὶ λαμβάνειν αὐτὸ τιμωρίαν καὶ τίνων ποτὲ δικαστῶν τυχάνειν preceding.
Cf. Hdt. iii. 82, ἀνδρὸς γὰρ ἐδύν τοῦ ἁρίστου ὁμοιον ἀναφορή γαρ τοιαύτη χρεώμενος—i.e. ἁρίστη. Ar. Eth. I. x. 11, ἡπάρζει δὴ τὸ ζητοῦμεν τῷ εὐδαιμον καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τουσίτως—i.e. εὐδαιμῶν, and VIII. iv. 1, ὁμαίος δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ γὰρ τουσίτων ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄγαθοί—i.e. χρήσιμοι. Add IX. vii. 6, ἢπάστον δε τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλήσι τοῦ ὁμαίος. Thuc. ii. 49, καὶ πόλλοι τοῦτο καὶ ἔδρασαν εἰς φρέατα—i.e. ἐρήμψαν σφόν αὐτοὺς, and iv. 64, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαίω ταῦτα μοι ποιήσαμεν, ὡς ἄλλων αὐτῶν καὶ μή ὑπὸ τὸν πολεμίον τοῦτο παθεῖν—i.e. ἡσυχᾶσθαι. Ar. Eth. IV. i. 11, φιλούνται δὲ οἱ ἐλευθέροι ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ, τούτῳ δὲ ἐν τῇ δύσει—where τοῦτο stands for ὠφέλιμοι εἰς, V. vi. 5, διὸ οὐκ ἔσωμεν ἀρχεῖν ἀνθρωπον, ὅτι ἐαυτῷ τούτῳ ποιεῖ [sc. ἄρχει], VIII. xiii. 7, ἢ δὲ ὡδική οὐκ ἐπὶ μητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλοι δωρεῖται, ἢ ὡτιδήποτε ἄλλα.

§ 56. Idioms of Verbs.

A. Mood.

a. Indicative Constructions.

a. The meaning assigned to Indicative Imperfects, Aorists, or Pluperfects, with ei, depending on a similar Apodosis with ἀν, holds equally (1) when they depend on a simple Infinitive.

Crito 52 c, ἐξήν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, ei ἐθούλον.

Ib. 44 b, οἶος τ' ἄν σε σώζειν ei ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαμεν.

Plædo 108 d, ei καὶ ἤπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεὶ . . . οὐκ ἔξαρκένις.

Soph. 246 d, [δοκεὶ δείω] μᾶλλον μὲν, ei τῇ δυνάτῳ ἢν, ἔργοι βελτίως ποιεῖν.

Legg. 790 c, οἰκεῖν [ξυμφέρει], ei δυνατόν ἢν, οἶον ἂν ἐλπίζονται.

§ 57. (2) In clauses connected by a Relative Adverb or Pronoun with an Indicative of unfulfilled past contingency.—The principle of Sequence here illustrated has not been observed except in the case of Indicatives following Relative Adverbs: whereas (besides the other outlying instances which come before us here) the principle applies equally to the Optative (see below, § 72).

Euthyd. 304 c, ἄξιον γ' ἢν ἀκουσάμεν κ.τ.λ., ἵνα ἄκουσας κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, ei γὰρ ὠφέλου . . . οἶοι τε εἴτι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα οἴοι τε ἔγιναν κ.τ.λ.

Theat. 161 c, τεθαύμακα ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν κ.τ.λ., ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς . . . ἢρξατο κ.τ.λ.

§§ 58, 59. VERBS.

Gorg. 506 b, ἥδεως ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἐώς αὐτῷ . . . ἀπέδωκα κ.τ.λ.

Charm. τοιῷ δ' ἦν ἂν, οὗ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον—"this would have been that of which they had knowledge.'

In the next instance ἃν heads a second clause in a different meaning.

Meno 89 b, ὥσ . . . ἂν ἐφυλάττομεν, ἢν μυθεῖς αὑτοῖς διεφθείρεσαν, ἀλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκουσα εἰς τὴν ἥλικιαν χρῆσιμως γίγνοντο.

In the next, ὅπως loses its power over the second of two clauses, and the meaning is supplied by ἃν.

Legg. 959 c, ζωτί ἂν ἔτει βοηθεῖς, ὅπως δ' τι δικαίωτατος ἄν καὶ ἀσιώτατος ἢ τε ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀτιμώρητος ἄν ἐγίγνετο.

Instances need not be multiplied: as an illustration, we may notice in conclusion the virtually but not formally identical construction in Soph. El. 1022, Ἐδ' ὄψεις κ.τ.λ. πάντα γὰρ κατεργάσω—where consequently we need not suppose an ellipse of ἃν. The usage begins with Homer: cf. II. vi. 348, "Εὖθα με κύμι ἀπόερσε.

§ 58. β. Future Indicative with ἃν.

Rep. 615 d, ὅχι ἤκει, οὐδ' ἄν ἤξει δεύρο.

Ἀπολ. 29 c, ζητή ἄν . . . ἐπιστηδεύοντες διαφαρμήσονται.

Συμπ. 222 a, ἵδων ἄν τις . . . εὐρήσει.

Εὐθυδ. 287 d, καὶ νῦν αὖ ἄν ὦτιον ἀποκρινεί;

Φδρ. 227 b, οἶκ ἄν οἴει με καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πράγμα ποιήσεσθαι;

The Future exceptionally retains this ἃν in Oratio Obliqua.

Legg. 719 c, τὸν αἰτῶν ἄν ἐπανέσοι.

Cf. Ισαῖς i. 32, προσηπείλησεν ὅτι δηλώσοι ποτ' ἄν.

§ 59. b. Conjunctive Potential Constructions.

The Conjunctive Potential has always a deliberative meaning, which however admits of further distinctions, according to various kinds of sentences.

a. In matters of abstract opinion, it is Presumptive.

In matters in which the will is concerned, it is

β. Deliberative (in a more special sense) when the sentence is interrogative:

γ. Hortatory or dehortatory, when the sentence is not interrogative.

Only the first of these heads requires illustration by examples here.

This use is confined to negative sentences.

L 2
a. Presumptive use.

With μή.

Gorg. 462 e, μὴ ἄγροικότερον γά τὸ ἄληθὲς εἶπείν.

Rep. 603 c, μὴ τι ἄλλο γά παρὰ ταῦτα;

Symp. 194 e, ἄλλω μὴ οὐχ οὔτε ἢμεῖς ὁμεν.

Apol. 39 a, μὴ οὐ τούτ’ ἐν χαλεπῶν.

The Indicative is also used with μή and μὴ οὐ similarly: e.g. Euthyd. 298 e, μὴ οὐ λίνων λίνῳ συνάπτεις; and (not interrogatively) Protag. 312 a, ἄλλα ἢρα μὴ οίχ ὑπολαμβάνεις—'but perhaps, then, you do not suppose.'

With ὅπως μή.

Crat. 430 d, ὅπως μὴ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν γά τούτο, . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀνόμασιν οὐ.

The Indicative is also used with ὅπως μή.

Meno 77 a, ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἴος τ’ ἔσομαι.

Phædo 77 b, εἰσέπτυκεν καὶ ὡν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε . . . . , ὅπως μή . . . . δια-σκεδάννυτα ἡ ψυχῆ.

§ 60. With οὐ μή.

Passing by the common use (Aorist), we have the Present with οὐ μὴ in

Rep. 341 c, οὐ μὴ οἴος τ’ ἡς.

Phileb. 48 d, οὐ μὴ δυνάσθω ὁ.


The following is only a variation of the use with οὐ μή, πολλοῦ δεί standing as a mere Adverb for οὐ.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεὶ μὴποτὲ τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται.

§ 61. c. Conjunctive Subjunctive Constructions.

The following alone need be mentioned.

a. After σκοπεῖν, ὁρᾶν, and the like, with μή. (This is as it were the Oratio Obliqua of b. a.)

Phdr. 260 a, σκοπεῖν μὴ τι λέγωσι.

Gorg. 512 d, ὁρᾶ μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον γά.

§ 62. This use is frequent in the Indicative: e.g.

La. 179 b, ὃρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἰεταί τι λέγεων.
§§ 63—65.} VERBS.

Soph. 235 a, διστάζομεν ἐτι μὴ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ.
Ly. 216 c, σκεψώμεθα μὴ . . . λαυβάνει κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 218 d, φοβοῦμαι . . . μὴ . . . ἐπετυχήκαμεν.
Phædo 84 e, φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερον . . . διάκειμαι.

§ 63. 8. After πρὶν, without ἕν, in negative sentences.

Phædo 62 c, μὴ πρῶτερον αὐτῶν ἀποκτινώναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγχην τινά ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ. [So all the MSS.]
Theæt. 169 b, τῶν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνὴρ πρὶν ἀναγκάσης . . . ἐπροσπαλαίσαι. [So all the MSS.]
Legg. 873 a, οὐδὲ ἐκπλητοῦ ἐκεῖνῶν γίνεσθαι τὸ μανθῆν πρὶν φῶνον φῶν ὁμοί ὁμοῦν ἡ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίσῃ.

§ 64. 7. After σκόπεῖν, ὅραν, and the like with ἕν.

Crito 48 e, ὅρα τῆς σκέψεως τῆς ἀμήν, ἕν σοι Ικανώς λέγηται.
Phædo 100 c, σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἐξής ἔκεινος, ἕν σοι ἐνδοκῇ ὅπερ ἔμοι.

§ 65. 8. With ὅς ἕν.

What is worth noticing upon this usage is, that ἕν gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual ἐ. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas ἐ would hint the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. Ἐάν is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as those just given, which relate to the conduct of the dialogue.

§ 65. 8. With ὅς ἕν.

The different shades of meaning presented by ὅς with the Indicative and ὅς ἕν with the Conjunctive are parallel with those just pointed out in the case of ἐ and ἕν after σκοπεῖν. The meaning of ὅς ἕν bears upon a doubtful reading in Phædo 96 a, presently to be mentioned.

Ly. 217 c, οἶον ἕν ἓ τὸ παρῶν, τοιαῦτα ἐστὶ—where οἶον ἕν ἓ leaves it quite undetermined of what kind τὸ παρῶν is.
Phædo 98 e, ἔμοι βελτίων ἑδοκότας ἑνῷδε καθήσαται, καὶ δικαίωτερον παραμένοντα ἐπέκειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἕν κελεύσωμεν. Here it is not that ἕν κελεύσωμεν has any future force, for the penalty had
been awarded: but it gives the meaning 'that it is right to stay and abide the penalty, whatever it be, which they have awarded.'

Phaedo 96 a, ἢν τί σοι χρῆσιν φαίνεται δὲν ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ δὲν ἄν λέγεις χρῆσει (taking for granted here the reading δὲν ἄν λέγεις)—‘you can apply it to satisfying yourself with respect to your objections, whatever they be.’ It is true that the objections had preceded; but this only makes the instance parallel to the last: and what δὲν ἄν intimates is, that Socrates does not wish to bind Cebes to the precise case he has stated. As just before he had said ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι βούλει προσθῆς ἄφελης,—to which Cebes had guardedly replied ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγογε· ἐν τῷ παρώντι οὕτ' ἄφελεν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι,—he now, by giving a general turn to the sentence, leaves a loophole open for future qualification.


a. Without ἂν, expressing simple possibility.

Legg. 777 c, πρὸς ἂ τις ἀπαντᾷ βλέψας διαπρόχειε. 

Enthyd. 298 c, (A) οὐκοῦν τὸν σαντοῦ πατέρα τύπτεις; (B) Πολὺ μέντοι δικαιότερον τὸν ύμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι.

Gorg. 492 b, τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αὐσχυν καὶ κάκιον εἴη;

Phaedo 88 c, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἰμὲν κραταί, ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὕτὰ ἀπαντᾷ ἢ—where the Optative, as distinguished from the Conjunctive, denotes a transitory as opposed to a permanent contingency.

§ 67. β. Without ἂν, this being understood from a preceding coordinate sentence.


Symp. 196 c, κρατοῦτ' ἄν ὑπὸ ἔρωτος, ὦ δ' κρατώ.

Phaedo 99 a, εἰ . . . λέγου, . . . ἀληθῆ ἄν λέγοις ὡς μέντοι . . . ποιῶ, . . . πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ραβυμία ἐν τοῦ λόγου. [So Oxon. and three other MSS.]

Charm. 174 e, (A) . . . ὄφελοι ἄν ἡμᾶς. (B) Η καὶ υγιαίνειν ποιοί;
§§ 68—70.] VERBS. 151

Rep. 382 d, (A) πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοίων ἃν ψεύδοιτο; (B) . . . (A) Ἀλλὰ δεδώς τοὺς ἔχοντοι ψεύδοιτο;

§ 68.  construed. With ἃν in clauses where the ἃν adheres closely to the Verb, and not to the Relative Pronoun or Particle by which the clause is introduced.

Symp. 187 d, ὥς ἃν κοσμιώτεροι γίνοντο . . . , δεὶ χαρίζεσθαι.

Ib. 190 c, δοκῶ μοι ἕξειν μηχανήν, ὡς ἃν εἶν k.t.l.

Phdr. 230 b, ἀκμὴν ἕξει τῆς ἀνθίς, ὡς ἃν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον.

Gorg. 453 c, ἢν οἴτω προφητεύει, ὡς μάλιστα ἃν ἡμῖν καταφανές ποιώ.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, οἴχ οἶός ὑ' ἁγδα πείθειν, ὡς . . . ἃν . . . ἐπιδιδοῖν.

Phædo 82 e, δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἃν μάλιστα αἰτῶς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλέπτωρ εὖ.

Protag. 318 e, εἰδολεία . . . ὡς ἃν ἀριστα διαϊκόί.

Ly. 207 c, προθυμοῦνται ὡς ἃν εὐδαιμονίας.

Crat. 395 a, κωδυνεύει τοιοῦτος τις εἶναι ὁ 'Αγαμέμνων οἶός ἃ ἃν δόξειν αὐτῷ διαποίησαν.

Ib. 398 e, oίδ' εἴ τι οἶός τ' ἃν εἴρνευς, οὐ συντείνω.

Legg. 700 c, ἦδονὴ εἴ τῇ τοῦ χάριτος, εἰτε βελτίων εἰτε χείρων ἃν εἴ τις, κρίνωτο ὅρθωτα.

Cl. Antipho i. 17. p. 113, ἐβουλεύοντο ἃν ἁγγίστω ὡς ἃν αἰτοῖς τὸ φάρμακον δοῦν, πότερα πρὸ δείπνου ἢ ἀπὸ δείπνου.

It may be noted, that these clauses are not Subjunctive, and that this difference marks off these instances from such as Rep. 412 d, φιλοῦ, . . . ὡς τῶν οἴστω k.t.l., Legg. 661 c, ἐλαστῶν [ἐστι κακῶν] ἃν ὡς ἀλήγοντος ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζωθεῖν, which must be separately accounted for.

§ 69. ἃ. With ἃν, equivalently for the Future.

(α') Following a Future in the Protasis.

Phædo 107 c, ὃ κύδνους εἶν δὴ καὶ δόξειν ἃν δεῖν εἶναι, εἴ τις αἰτῆς ἀμελήσει.

Apol. 35 a, εἰ . . . ἔσονται, αἰσχρῶν ἃν εἴη.

§ 70. (β') Following a Conjunctive with ἃν in the Protasis.

Rep. 556 a, ἃν τις προστάτη . . . , χρηματίζοιτο ἃν. So 402 d.

Symp. 200 c, ὡς τις λέγῃ, εἴποιμεν ἃν.

Phdr. 244 b, ἃν δὴ λέγωμεν . . . , μηκύνωμεν ἃν.

Phileb. 55 e, ἃν τις . . . χαρίζῃ . . . , φαίλον . . . ἃν γέρνοιτο.
§ 71. (5) Following an Indicative, involving a Future meaning.

Symp. 208 c, ei eβελείσ εις τὴν φιλοσοφίαν βλέψαι, βαμάξοις ἄν . . . ,
ei μὴ εννοεῖς κ.τ.λ.—where ei eβελείσ βλέψαι is a virtual Future.

> Apol. 37 c, πολλῇ ἂν με φιλοσοφεῖ τάξιν, ei στότοι ἀλογιστοὺς εἰμι κ.τ.λ.
because the fact is not so as yet.

Protag. 349 c, oὐκ ἂν βαμάξοιμι, ei . . . ἔλεγε—because I do not
know the fact as yet.

Crat. 428 b, ei μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, oὐκ ἂν
βαμάξοιμι.

Laches 186 c, ei δὲ Νικίας . . . μεμάθηκεν, oὐκ ἂν βαμάσαμι.

§ 72. c. Optative Subjunctive Constructions.
a. Under principal Optative sentence with or without ἄν (see
above, §§ 66, 67)—the Subjunctive sentence being
(a') Relative.

> Gorg. 512 e, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτον ὁν μέλλον χρόνον βιώναι ὡς ἄμετα
βιάφι;

Meno 92 c, πῶς oὐκ ἂν εἴδείς περὶ τούτος τοῦ πράγματος . . . , oὐ
παράπασιν ἀπειροὶ εἰς;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiii. 291, Κερδαλέως κ' εἴη . . . ὡς σε παρέλθοι, ἵν. 222,
"Οσ τὸ καταβρέχειν . . . ὡς κεν βάλοι, xv. 358, Λεγμαλέφ θανάτῳ, ὡς
μη βάνοι όστις ἔρωσε . . . φίλος εἴη.

§ 73. (a') Adverbial.

Legg. 730 c, μετάχος εἴη, ἣν ὡς πλείστον χρόνον ἅληθε ὡς διαβιοί.

Meno 98 c, ὡφέλητοι ἄνδρες ἂν εἶναι . . . εἴπερ εἴναι.

Rep. 541 a, ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γύνοιτο, δοκεῖς ἐν εἰπρέκεια.

Polit. 295 c, εἰπόμενοι . . . ἱππόν μελέτουτα . . . ἀπεσθεία . . . συνήχαν,
ὡς οὕτω, χρόνον, ἂν εβάλεις κ.τ.λ.;

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 214, ὁτ' ἐμείδι κάρη τάμοι ἄλλοτρος φῶς, ἕν ὡς ἔγω
τάδε τὸξα φαινότο ἐν πυρὶ θείῃ, Od. xii. 106, μὴ σὺ γε κεῖδε τοῦχος,
ὅτε ροιδήσθης, ib. 114, Τὴν δὲ κ' ἀμναίμην ὅτε μοι σύνιστο γ' ἐταίρους, xxii. 114, ὎χι κέ μοι ἀχνυμένοι τάδε δώματα πότισα μήτηρ
Λειποί ἄμφ ἄλλῳ ἵνα' ὅτ' ἐγὼ κατόπισθε λυπήματα.

§ 74. β. Under principal Indicative sentence, when the dependent
Verb is intended to belong to all time—the Subjunctive sentence
being
(b') Relative.

Legg. 759 b, oίς μὴ καθεστίκου καταστατέων [ἐστίν] ἱερέας.
§§ 75—77. VERBS.

Cf. Hom. II. v. 407, οὗ δηραιός, ὅς ἄνθανάτους μάχοιτο, Od. vi. 286, Καὶ δ' ἄλλα νεμεσῶ, ἢτις τουαίτα γε βέζου, iii. 319, 'Ex τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δέν οὐκ ἐλποιτό γε θυμῷ. Andoc. iii. 1, p. 23, τοῖς ἔργοις ἄφ' διν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο ἐναντιώνται.

§ 75. (2ο) Adverbial.

Rep. 410 c, οὗ ὄν ένεκά τινες δίονται καθιστάσιν, ἵνα ... θεραπεύοντο.
Euthyd. 296 e, οὐκ έχω ἄμων πῶς ἀμφισθήσων ... ὅπως οὔ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.

Gorg. 448 e, οὐδεὶς ἔρωτά, ποία τις εἰή ἡ Γοργίων τέχνη. [So most if not all of the MSS.]

Alc. I. 135 a, τυραννοῦντι δὲ, ὅς μηδὲ ἐπιπλήττο τις αὐτό, τί τὸ συμβασάμενον;  

§ 76. (2ο) Adverbial with ei.

Politic. 268 d, τοῦτο ... [ἐστι] ποιήσων, εἰ μὴ μέλλομεν κ.τ.λ.
Meno 80 d, εἰ εὐτέχους αὐτῷ, πώς εἶσει ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστὶν;  
Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὥρα γὰρ, εἰ ... τοῦτο φαίμεν εἶναι καλὸν.
Legg. 642 a, ὧρας τὸ ποιώμεν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἔσασαι κ.τ.λ.;  
Ib. 658 c, εἰ ... τὰ πάντα σμικρὰ κρίνοι παιδία, κρινοῖς τὸν τὰ βαῦματα ἐπιδεικνύται.

Charm. 173 c, εἰ δὲ βούλοις γε, ... συγχωρήσωμεν κ.τ.λ.
Phaedo 91 a, οὗ γὰρ ὅπως ... δόξει ἄλθη εἶναι προθυμήσωμαι, εἰ μὴ εἰή πάρεργουν. Cf. the same phrase, but under an Infinitive sentence, Rep. 411 e; and Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 5, λέγεται ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τουοὺτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τίς εἰς οἴκειον ὄνομα εἰη, τὸ κέρδος.


§ 77. γ. Under an Infinitive sentence—which necessarily leaves the time of the Dependent Verb, as under the last head, undefined.

Charm. 164 a, εἰ δοκεῖ τις ὀφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἑκείνῳ ὅν ἱέτο.
Lyss 212 d, εἰ ὁ ἐτερος φιλοι, φιλῶ εἰναι ἀμφιω.
Theet. 164 a, δεῖ γε μέντοι [τοῖτο φάναι], εἰ σώσουμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον.
Phædo 95 d, προσήκειν φης φοβείσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἰη, τῷ μὴ εἰδοτί.

Protag. 316 c, οίτε τούτο γενέσθαι, εἰ σοι ἔγγενοιτο.

Legg. 927 c, τῶν νοών, καὶ βραχὺς ἐνείη, προσέχοντα εὐεργετεῖν.

Phædo 85 d, κυνῳνεώντα διαπλέσασθαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναται ἀσφαλέστερον . . . διαπροευθύναι.

Cf. Hom. II. iv. 262, σῶν δὲ πλείον δέτας αἰεὶ "Εστήξ", ὃσπερ ἐμοί, πιέων ὦτε θυμὸς ἀνόγου, Od. xxiv. 253, Τοιούτῳ δὲ ἔοικας, ἐστὶν λοίπουτο φάγαν τε, Ἐιδέρεμενα μαλακός. Thuc. i. 120, ἄνδρων σωφράνων ἐπτίν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῦτο ἡσυχάζειν.

§ 78. Note that the principle of the Optatives classified under (β) and (γ) is the same essentially. Hermann (De Part. ēν) notices the usage under (γ); but the extent of the principle has not attracted attention.

§ 79. f. Infinitive Constructions.

Infinitive after Relative Pronouns and Adverbs.

Rep. 415 e, εἶναι . . . τοιαῦτας, οίας χειμωνίας τε στέγειν καὶ δέρους ἱκανὰς εἶναι.

Gorg. 457 d, εἰπόντες τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τούς παρόντας ἀϕιέρωσαν.

Protag. 334 c, χρήσασθαι ἐλαίῳ . . . ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι.

Thucet. 161 b, οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον, πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρἐτέρων σοφοῦ λαβέσθαι.

Protag. 330 e, φάναι τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἰναι οὕτως ἔχοντα . . . , ὡς οὐκ εἶναι κ.π.λ.

Symp. 213 a, παραχωρήσατι τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς εἰκόνιν καθίζειν.

Euthyd. 306 c, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ . . . ἀλλόκοτον εἶναι, ὡς γε πρὸς σε τάλανθεις εἰρήσασθι.

Ἄπολ. 29 c, ἀφίεμεν σε, ἐφὶ δὲτε μηκέτει φιλοσοφεῖν.

Phdr. 269 d, ὅτε δύνασθαι ὅστε ἀγωνιστὴν τελεον γενέσθαι.

Protag. 338 e, ἀδύνατον ἵμιν ὅστε Πρωταγόρῳ τοῦδε σοφωτερῶν τινα ἠλέεσθαι.

Politic. 295 a, ἱκανός γένοιτ' ἄν . . . ὅστε ἐκάστῳ προοτάττειν ὁ προσήκον.

Phædo 103 c, ἐστὶν ἄρα περὶ ἐνα νὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ὅστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τῷ εἰδος ἀξιούσθαι κ.π.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 2, νεμόμενοι τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστοῖ, ὅσον ἀποζύ. And likewise
§ 80. g. Infinitive Uses.

a. Future following ὁδός τε, δυνατός, &c.

Phaedo 73 a, οἷς ὁδός τε ἤσαν τοῦτο ποιήσειν.
Phdr. 277 d, οἷς πρότερον δυνατόν τέχνη ἔσεσθαι.

Cf. Lysias xxvii. 2. p. 178, ὃποτε ἀν δοκῶσιν αὕτω εἶναι ψηφιεῖσθαι ἤμα.

Isoer. xiii. 2. p. 291, ἡμῶν εἰνείδεσθαι βουλόμενος. [The Zurich editors give εἰνείδεσθαι.]

§ 81. β. Aorist equivalent in meaning to Future.

Symp. 193 d, ἐπίθεσις παρέχεται [ἡμᾶς] εὐθαίμονος ποιήσαι.
Luthyd. 278 c, ἐφάτην ἐπιδείξεσθαι τὴν προτρπτικὴν σοφίαν.

Protag. 316 c, τοῦτο δὲ οἷτα ὁ μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ οἱ ἐγγένεται.

Cf. Hom. Π. ix. 230, ἐν δοθῇ δὲ σαφοσίμεν ἢ ἀπολείσθαι Νῆς, xiii. 666, Πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ ἐκεῖ γέρων ἁγάθος Πολυίδος Νοῦσφ ἢπ' ἀργαλέη φθίσθαι, xxii. 119, ὅρκων ἔλωσαι Μή τι κατακρίσεις ἀλλ' ἀνδρα πάντα δύσεσθαι, Od. ii. 171, φημὶ τελευτῆθην ἄπαντα, iv. 253, ἡμῶν μὴ μὲν πρὶν . . . ἀναφήμαι, ix. 496, φαίμεν αὐτόθι ὀλέσθαι.

Thuc. i. 26, προεῖπον . . . ὡς πολεμίως χρήσεσθαι, 81, εἰκὸς Ἀθηναῖοι . . . μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεύει (so with οἷς ii. 10, iv. 85, viii. 46), iii. 46, τίνα οἴεσθε ἤστινα οἰκὶ ἀμενον παρασκεύασθαι; v. 22, οἷς δὲ . . . οἷς ἐφασαν δεξιάσθαι, ii. 3, εὐφώευσαν ἐπιθέμενοι μαθεσθαι κρατῆσαι, iv. 63, τὸ ἐλλιπές . . . ἵκανος νομίσατες εἰρήθηναι, i. 126, τῷ Κύλλῳ . . . ἀνείλεν ὁ θεός, καταλέξειν τὴν ἀκόπολιν, Aesch. Pers. 173, ἦσθι . . . μὴ σε δίς φράσαι, Agam. 1262, ἐπείρατο . . . ἀνατίθεσθαι (not 'prays' but 'boasts'). Soph. Phil. 1329, παῦλαν ἦσθι τῆς μὴ ποτ' ἐντυχεῖν Νάσον, Αἰ. 1082, Τάτηρ ναύμει τήν πάλιν χρόνο ποτὲ Ἐξ οἰρίων δραμοῦσαν εἰς βιον πεσεῖν (not aor. of custom, as Herm. and Linw.). Eur. Andr. 311, Σε μὲν γὰρ ήδεις θεᾶς βρέτας σώσα τοῦ. Ηϊδ. i. 53, προλέγουσα . . . μεγάλην ἄρχην μν καταλίσα, vi. 62, τὰ ἄλλα ἐφι κατανέσα. Lysias xiii. 15. p. 131, οἷς ἐφασαν ἐπιτρέφειν, ib. 32. p. 132, ὧν γὰρ αἶμα σε ἕξαρνον γενέσθαι, xxxiii. 2, ἡγήσατο τὸν ἐνθάδε στλλογον ἄρχην γενέσθαι. [So Bekker: the Zurich editors have γενέσθαι.] Αἰ. Nub. 35, ἐνεχύρωσασθάι φαιν.}

§ 82. γ. Present equivalent in meaning to Future.

Crito 52 c, ὄμολογες καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεῖσθαι. Gorg. 520 e, μὴ φάναι σὺμ.σουλεύειν, ἐὰν μὴ τις αἰτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ.
§ 83. δ. Infinitives following certain Verbs (of saying, thinking, &c.) sometimes contain a Dictative force. They are in fact Infinitives Oblique of the Deliberative Potential. In consequence of this force of the Infinitive in these cases, the governing Verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to ‘say’ becomes to ‘recommend’ or to ‘pray:’ to ‘think’ becomes to ‘think fit,’ or to ‘give counsel.’ But it is through the Infinitive, as being an Infinitive of the Potential, that the meaning of the governing Verb is strengthened; and not vice versa.

Protag. 346 b, Σμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς . . . τύραννον . . . ἐπαινεταὶ—'thought fit'—lit. 'thought it-was-incumbent-on-himself-to-praise.'

Crat. 399 d, ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι.

Hip. Ma. 291 a, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ . . . ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι κ.τ.λ.—not 'that we say' but 'that we should say.'

Plaedo 83 e, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοι τ' εἶσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δι' αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασίν. Here the meaning is not 'for the reason which the world attributes to them,' but 'for the reason for which the world says people ought to be [temperate].' That is, fasί is followed by κοσμίου εἶναι understood, and this εἶναι contains the Dictative force.

Ib. 104 e, ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσεσθαι—'what I proposed that we should define.'

Cf. Hom. II. iii. 98, φρονέω δὲ διακρινόμεναι ἐδη 'Ἀργείους καὶ Τρῶας ('I think good'). Thucyd. iii. 44, νομίζω περὶ τοῦ μέλλουσιν ἡμᾶς βιωλεύσατα, iv. 80, οὖδὲ ἀσάφη τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, vii. 42, νομίσας, οἷς οίων τε εἶναι . . . , οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ Νικίας ἐπαθεῖν (where the Dictative force is possessed by the second Infinitive only), ii. 42, τὸ ἠμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἠγησάμενοι ἣ τὸ κ.τ.λ., v. 40, ἠγούμενοι, ὡμὶ ἀν ἐγχορῆῃ, ἰσοδύναυ
§§ 84, 85.]

VERBS.

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**84. e.** Infinitive as a Noun Substantive, without the Article.


In Apposition.

Apol. 23 a, ὅνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφός εἶναι.

Protag. 323 b, δὲ έκεί σωφροσύνη ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τάληθι λέγειν.

Under government.

Rep. 429 b, κύριοι ἂν εἶν ἡ τοιαυτήν εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτην.

Symp. 209 b, εἰπορεί λόγων περὶ ἄμεσῆς καὶ περὶ οὗν χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα.

§ 85. ζ. An Accusative of the Infinitive, with the Article, sometimes occurs subjoined in justification of some expression of feeling just preceding. The "τὸ indignantis" is included in this use (it is exemplified in the first two passages following); but a more commensurate designation would be the 'Apologetic Infinitive.'

Phaedo 99 b, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ μαθηματικὰ εἶ ὑ τοῦ λόγου, τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷον τ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 177 a, οὐ δεινὸν, ἄλλοις μὲν τισὶ θεῶν ἔμνους κ.τ.λ.; ... ἧμακλέους καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπαίνους ... ἄλες ἐπαίνου ἵπτοτες ... καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα συχνὰ οἷοι ἃν ἐγκεκομισμένα. τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλῆς σπουδῆς ποιήσασθαι, ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.

The speaker justifies the warmth with which he has spoken by subjoining a studiedly dispassionate statement of the case.

Compare Eur. Med. 1051, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάρας. Τὸ καὶ προίσθαι μαθηματικὸς λόγους φρενίτις καὶ, exactly parallel, Alc. 832, ἀλλὰ σοι, τὸ μὴ φράσαι κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 60 b, ὅς βαθμασίως πέφυκε [τὸ ἡδί] πρὸς ... τὸ λιπηρὸν, τὸ ἁμα μὲν αἰτῶ μὴ ἑβδέλευ παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. The τὸ ἁμα κ.τ.λ. (taking for granted the reading here) is the justification of the expression ὅς βαθμασίως. [τὸ is the reading of Oxon. and one other MS.]

7 If an opinion must be hazarded as to the force of this Accusative, it must be that it is Causal. See § 18 above.
Cf. Antipho i. 28. p. 114, δανμάιο τάς τόλμης τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοίας, τὸ διαμόρφωσθαι. Similarly Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 3, ἄξιον εἶστι ἐπαινεῖ τήν πόλιν ἡμῶν τῆς προανέρκειως ἐνεκεῖ, τὸ προελέσθαι. Here the Infinitives justify the warmth of the expressions δαμαίο and ἄξιον εἶστι.

Symp. 204 a, αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὡσα καλὸν κάγαθον μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν. Here τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία: but, put as it is not in the common Causal form, but under this apologetic form, it also justifies the tone of impatience in which ἀμαθία has been mentioned.

§ 86. η. The Accusative of the Infinitive, expressing the result, in negative clauses, is common.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἄγανακτεὶν ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλά ξυμβάλλειν κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 74 d, ἡ ἐνδεί τι ἐκείνου τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι; [So Hermann without MS. authority.]

This use would seem to be confined to negative clauses.

Lach. 190 c, ἠγό αἰτίος ἐτερον, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τούτῳ διανοούμενος ἡρῴμην ἄλλ' ἐτερον, is no exception, since the negative is but postponed.

The Genitive of the Infinitive expresses the cause or purpose primarily, rather than the result, in both affirmative and negative clauses.

§ 87. B. Voice.

a. "Third sense of Middle Voice." The ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning,—'to get a thing done by another,'—is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (διδάσκεσθαι), by some passages in the Meno.

Meno 93 d, ἡ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς κληρόφαντον τῶν γιὸν ἵππεα μὲν ἐδιδάζαστο ἀγαθῶ; and, just after, ἐπαιδεύεσθαι—where the whole point of the passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself distinctively.

On the other hand, we have

Meno 94 c, Θεοκλίνθης αὐτὸ δύο νεῖσ ἔθρεψε ... καὶ τούτου ἐπαίδευσε τά τέ ἄλλα εἰ καὶ ἐπάλλασαν κύλλαστα 'Ἀθηναίων' τῶν μὲν γὰρ Σωθῆς ἐδοκε τῶν δὲ Ἔυδώρῳ—where the Active ἐπαίδευσε is as distinctively used of the father's getting his sons taught by others. Similarly ib. b, d, ἐδώδαξε.
As the favourite example, διδάσκεσθαι, thus falls to the ground, so do the rest. Δανείζεσθαι, for instance, is 'to take a δανείον,' as δανείζεω is 'to give a δανείον' that is, the general meaning of the Verb being 'to deal in δανεία,' the Middle means 'to deal in them for oneself.' So it is with other Verbs expressing transactions to which there must be two parties: χράν and χρησθαι express the active and passive side of 'dealing in oracles.' So, rather differently, 'bringing a man to justice' becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, κρίνειν, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, κρίνεσθαι.

The fact is, that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning 'to get a thing done by another;' neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that "qui facit per alium facit per se."

Examples of the Active Verb having this meaning may be found in Ἀσκ. Ag. 594, Ὄμος ἢ ἔθνον,—where Clytæmnestra attributes to herself the same action which was in v. 87 described by the words περίπεμπτα θυσίαις,—in Hdt. iii. 80, [ἀνὴρ τίραννοι] κτείνειν ἀκρι- τους, &c.

§ 88. b. There is a genuine inherent sense of Verbs, which deserves more distinct notice than it has received. It stands half-way between the Middle and the Passive.

'To allow oneself to be,' 'to expose oneself to be,' 'to get oneself,—subjected to this or that, may be designated the Semi-Middle sense. The following are examples.

Crito 48 d, ἐξάγοντες καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι—'allowing ourselves to be carried across the border.'

Phaedo 67 a, ἀναπιμπλώμεθα—'allow ourselves to be infected.'

And so Ἡπ. Ma. 291 a.

Soph. 253 b, [θούργον] τοῖς συγκεραυκομένοις τε καὶ μή—'which allow themselves to be united'—i. e. 'which harmonise.'

Μενο 91 c, μηδενα ... τοσαύτη μανια λαζοι, ὠστε παρὰ τούτων ἀλβώντα λωσθήσουν—'get himself into disgrace.'

Phileb. 58 c, ἀπεχθήσει Γοργία—'you will incur the hatred of Gorgias.'

§ 88. Verbs.

8 διδάσκασθαι also means 'to take a pupil.' So Pind. Ol. viii. 77, τὸ διδα- σκασθαί ἐς τοι εἰδοτι βίτερον, Simonid. ap. Gaisf. Fr. liv. p. 377; διδαξάμενος χορὸν ἀνδρῶν, Arist. Nub. 783. Ἡθελεῖν ἀπέρρι; εἰ δὲ ἄν διδαξάμην οendon (Simonides speaks.)
DIGEST OF IDIOMS.

§ 89. C. Tense.

A Dependent sentence following a Main Past Construction is not affected (in Tense or Mood) by the Tense of the Main Construction in the following cases.

a. When a fact contemplated in the Dependent clause as already extant continues so at the time of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Phaedo 98 b, ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστὴς ἑλπίδος φλόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ ὦρω ἀνθρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρόμενον κ.τ.λ. The fact of which Socrates had become aware was one which, with its consequence of disappointed hopes, still remained in full force at the time at which he was speaking.

Ib. 99 d, ἐδοξε τῶν μοι μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν,
The pursuit then already renounced had never since been resumed.

Apol. 21 b, ἡπόρουν τῷ ποτὲ λέγει. The judgment of the Oracle once uttered is regarded as remaining on record for all time.

Phædo 88 c, ἐδόκον ... εἷς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλέσ. μὴ οὐδενός ἄξιοι εἶμεν κρατά, ἣ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἀπιστὰ ἢ. There are here two Dependent clauses: the former, expressing a transitory contingency, is affected by the Main Construction and thrown into Oratio Obliqua; the second, expressing a hypothetical fact which if verified must be permanent, is not affected.

Tim. 32 c, ξυνέστησεν ὁ ἡμιστά ... τάδε διανοθεῖσ, πρώτον μὲν ἢν ... τέλεον ... εἶν, ... ἐτι δὲ ἢν ἀγήρων καὶ ἀνοσοῦ ἢ.

 Cf. Lysias i. 6. p. 92, ἐπειδῇ ... γυναῖκα ἡγαγώμην ... ἐφύλασσον ... ἐπειδὴ δὲ μοι παιδίων γίνεται κ.τ.λ.

§ 90. 3. When the event contemplated as future in the Dependent clause is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Apol. 17 a, ἔλεγον, ὡς χρῆν ἔμας εἰλαθείσθαι μὴ ἢτ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατήθη —because the deception threatened was to be looked for in the speech which was now but begun.

Symp. 193 e, πάνω ἢν ἑφοβούμην, μὴ ἀπορῆσωσι λόγων ... νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρό. At the moment at which this is said, the point of time when the contingency of ἀπορῆσαι will be decided is still future.

Apol. 29 c, ἐφῇ ... λέγων πρὸς ἔμας ὡς, εἰ διαφεύξωμην, ἣδη ἢν ἕμων οἱ νείς διαφθαρήσται. The reason why διαφεύξωμην is affected by the Oratio Obliqua, though equally future with διαφθαρήσται which remains unaffected, is that the Protasis describes an event purely hypothetical, not one assumed as about to happen at all. εἰ διαφεύξωμαι would have implied an assumption that Socrates would be acquitted.

Symp. 198 b, ἐνγεμμοίμενος ὡς ὁ ὀφθ ἢ τ' ἔσομαι ... οἰδὲν καλὸν εἰπέν, ὑπ' αὐθέντης ὄλιγον ὑποδράσ φχόμην. He has still the task before him, and still the feeling that he will be unequal to it.

Ib. 198 e, προκαρήθη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπως ἐκαστὸς ἢμῶν τῶν Ἐρωτα ἐγκυμοναζέων δούει.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 85. p. 254, ἄ νῦν οἴτος ἐφη συμβάλλεται, εἰν ἐγὼ στεφανῶμαι.
§ 91. The use of this construction is in Plato so carefully restricted to the cases just specified, that it would be unjustifiable to confound it with the simple irregular recurrence to the Oratio Recta, which is so common in other writers.

Symp. 190 c, ἐξουλεύοντο ὁ τι χρῆ αὐτῶν ποιήσαι would be an exception to the rule, if χρῆ were an ordinary Verb.

The rule seems to hold in Homer, II. v. 127, Od. iii. 15, and v. 23, and viii. 44, and xiii. 417, &c. Nitzsch (on Od. iii. 76) denies that the principle here pointed out is the true one. He points out two passages, II. v. 567 and xv. 596, as refuting it. But in both these (1) the reading varies between Optative and Conjunctive, and (2) in both two purposes are mentioned, so that if the Conjunctive is the right reading it may well have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing the nearer and the remoter purpose.

§ 92. b. Imperfect Tense used for the Oratio Obliqua of the 'Prophetic Present.'

Symp. 190 c, οὕτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναυεν εἶχον . . ., αἱ τιμαί γὰρ αὐτῶς καὶ οὐρὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἁθρώσων ἥφανεστο—where, just as οὐκ εἶχον is the Oblique Narration of the thought οὐκ ἔχομεν, 'they could not, they thought,' so ἥφανεστο represents them thinking αἱ τιμαί ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. ἅφανεται. Now ἅφανεται would have been a 'Prophetic Present,' and so ἥφανεστο is the Oblique Narration of this.

Cf. Antipho ii. A. β. 9. p. 117, ἀλοιοσ μὲν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἠδειν ἐκστρωμένος, τῆς δὲ πόλεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἐστεροίμην—'I felt I could not be.' Andoc. i. 58-60. p. 8, φονεύσ οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγνώμην κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα σκοπῶν εὐρισκον κ.τ.λ.—where the σκοπῶν shews that ἐγνώμην means 'I felt I was on the way to become.'

§ 93. c. Aorist.

a. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the construction in which it stands.

Phdr. 249 a, αἰ δὲ ἀλλαῖ, ὅταν ... τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἐνυχον.
Phdr. 484 a, εἰν ... φίλον ἴκανον γένηται ἐξον ἀνήρ, ... ἑπαναστάτις ανεφαίη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος.
Phileb. 17 d, ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα λάβης οὔτω τότε ἐγένεστι σοφίσ.
Phileb. 17 d, ὅταν δὲ τό γῆπος αὐταῖς ταυτόν τούτο χρώμα ἐπαγάγη, τότε ἐγένοντο ... λευκαῖ.

The Subjunctive construction with ἂν, not admissible with a past
VERBS.

Tense, constrains us to see in the Aorist the expression of an action instantaneously complete, rather than of an action necessarily past.

§ 94. b. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the context. Phædo 88 d, πὴ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; lit. 'overtook' (same metaphor as 89 c, εἰ . . . . με διαφείγαι [Hermann from first hand of Oxon.] ὁ λόγος). Cf. Pind. Ol. vi. 62, μετάλλασέν τε μν. Antipho ii. Α. α. 3. p. 115, ἐδώ ἄν διωξθῇ, 'until he is caught.'

Ib. ιοθ c, [ἡ μὲν] φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαι ἄκησιν ἦ δὲ . . . . φησι τὸν αὐτῇ ἐκάστῃ τόπον προσήκοντα—the good soul, without a moment of suspense, or sensible lapse of time, 'at once finds a home in' &c.

Symp. 172 a, οὔτος, οὐ περιμένεις; Κἀγὼ ἐπιστάμειν εἰρήμενα—not 'waited for him to come up with me,' but 'let him come up with me.'

Ib. 173 b, τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω μοι; Same phrase Protag. 310 a, 'why not at once relate it to me?' So Phædo 86 d, Sophl. 231 c, &c.

Cf. Arist. Vesp. 213, Τί οὐκ ἀπεκαμαθήμεν; Symp. 209 a, ἀ παθή προσήκει καὶ κυήσαν καὶ κυεῖν. κυήσαι is the first moment of the state κυεῖν.

Hence Apol. 21 c, 22 d, ἐδοξε, ἐδοξαν, 'I came to think.'

§ 95. D. Impersonal Verbs.

Impersonal Verbs in the same rigid form as in Latin do not exist in Greek. Even those which express the processes of inanimate nature, as ὁι, νιφεῖ, ἐσέισε (Thuc. iv. 52), are only impersonal in that particular use, and not always so even then.

We find, however, in addition to these,

§ 96. a. Passive Impersonals (the nearest approach in Greek to strict Impersonals).

Phdr. 232 a, οὖκ ἄλλοις αἰτοῖς πεπόνησαι.

Ib. 261 b, λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται.

Politic. 299 a, ἄν δ' ἄν καταψηφίσθη.

Legg. 914 a, δηλωσέντων (Genitive Absolute).

§ 97. b. Quasi-Impersonals (as we may call them), where a vague Nominative, such as 'the circumstances,' 'the event,' 'the course of events,' is understood. The common words ἐνδέχεται, παρέχει (Thuc. iv. 85 &c.), the phrase οὔτος ἐχει, &c., are such cases. We do not know always whether the vague understood Nominative is Plural or Singular, except where the Verb is represented by a periphrasis.
(as Hom. Il. iv. 345, ἕλθ' [ἡν], xiv. 98, Τρωϊ μὲν εὐκτά γένηται, xvi. 128, οὐκέτι φυκτά πέλωνται, xxi. 533, ὦ τι λοίγυ ἔσεσθαι, Od. ii. 203, ἤσα ἔσσεται, viii. 384, 'Ηδ' ἄρ' ἔτομα τέτυκτο, xi. 455, οὐκέτι πιστὰ γνώμαιξα, Thuc. ii. 3, ἐπὶ ἔτοιμα ἢν, i. 102, τοῦτον ἐνδει ὑπαίνετο, i. 7, πλοῦμωτέρων ὄντων, Hdt. vi. 52, δὴλα σφυ ἔσεσθαι, the common ἀδύνατα ἀστ, &c.), or where (as in several of the following) an Adjective stands in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Rep. 580 d, δεῖσται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν ἀπόδειξιν—'the case will admit.'

Ib. 452 d, καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο—'the result made this plain also.'

Phædo 73 b, εὰν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἀγγ ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὗτος ἄφει—'what ensues is proof positive,' &c.

Apol. 28 b, οὐδὲν δεινῶν μή ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ—lit., 'lest the course of events should come to a stand-still.' 'There is no danger of the rule breaking down in my case.' Cf. Ar. Eth. VI. viii. 9, στῆσαται γὰρ κακεὶ—'for there too demonstration must stop.' Hdt. iii. 82, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φῶνου ἀπείξῃ ἐσ μουναρχίνων.

Phileb. 25 d, ἀλλ' ἵσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτον δρᾶσει—'perhaps it will do equally well now.'

Phædo 118 a, ἐπειδὼν πρῶς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται—'when the action of the poison reaches the heart.'

§ 98. In the next instance, we find an Impersonal clause representing the Verb.

Tim. 24 e, ἐξ ὧς ἐπιβατῶν ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας οὕσωσ . . . ἐγγυνωτο.

§ 99. In the following instances we find an Adjective or Participle in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Phileb. 20 c, προϊὼν δ' ἐπὶ σαφέστερον δείξει—'the sequel of the argument will make this yet clearer.'

Phædo 117 b, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσατε—'the agent left to itself will complete its work.' 'There is delicacy in the vagueness with which both the deadly agent and its effect are designated.

Theop. 200 c, ὅ τῶν πιστῶν καθηγούμενος ἐφη ἂρα δεῖξεν αὐτό. A man who goes first through a stream, if asked, "How deep is it?", says, "How can I tell beforehand? we shall see." From this passage we gather that the expression was in popular use.

Critias 108 c, τούτῳ μὲν οὖν οὖν ἔστιν, αὐτῷ σοι τάχα δηλώσει.
VERBS.

Hip. Ma. 288 b, ὅτε μὲν ἔπιχειρήσει εὐθείας ἐι δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας ἐσται καταγελαστος αὐτὸ δεῖξει—'we shall see by the event.'

Protag. 324 a, αὐτὸ σε διδάξει.

Ib. 329 b, ἵκανος μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοί.

§ 100. Cf. Hdt. v. 78, δῆλον δὲ οὐ καὶ ἐν μοῦν, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ, ἡ ἴσηγορίᾳ ὃς ἔστι κρήναι σπουδαίων, vi. 86, οὕτω μέμνησι τὸ πρήγμα, οὕτω με περιφέρει οὐδέν εἰδέναι τούτων ἰμεῖσι λέγετε. Ἀesch. Choeph. 993, Φιλον τέως, νῦν δ' ἐχθρῶν, ὥς φαίνει, κακῶν ('as the event shews.') Ἀeschin. i. 40. p. 6, ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦργον ἔδειξεν. Αντιφω. v. 60. p. 136, αὐτῷ μοι πρόφασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει ἀποκτείναι τὸν ἄνδρα. Λύσιας x. 20. p. 118, ἀπλῶσει δε' (sc. id quod sequitur δηλώσει) οἰχήσεται γὰρ.

§ 101. We find also Non-Impersonal sentences on the model of some of the foregoing, e. g.

Crat. 393 c, τὸ ὄνομα, ὁ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν δηλώσει κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 402 c, τοῦτο γε (τὸ ὄνομα) ὀλίγον αὐτὸ λέγει ὁ αὐτό κ.τ.λ.
Soph. 237 b, καὶ μάλιστα γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἄν δηλώσει.


§ 102. E. Intransitive use of Verbs Transitive.

Some Verbs Transitive recede, in particular significations, into Intransitive Verbs. At the same time, they do not cease to be Active; neither do they become strictly Reflexive.

This happens in two cases.

§ 103. a. That in which the action was originally represented as passing on, is, or comes to be regarded as, a part of the Agent; and when further the mention of it can be dropped without marring the sense. "ἔχειν, in several of its senses, exemplifies this process.

From ἔχειν governing an Accusative of part of the Subject we have, e. g. Hom. Od. xix. 38, κινεῖς ἑψόν ἐχοτες—'holding,' properly not themselves, but their heads, or; vaguely, parts of themselves, aloft. So Hdt. i. 181, ἀνάβασις ἂν αὐτοῖς ἔχωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ πάντας τοῖς πύργοις ἔχωσα πεποίηται—where ἔχωσα has for its Object each part of the ἀνάβασις in succession.

From ἔχειν governing an Accusative of that which comes to be regarded as part of the Subject, we have e. g. Od. iii. 182, αἰτάρ ἔγωγε Πύλον ἐχον—'held my ship on her course for Pylos';—the
ship, as following the will of her captain, is, when we are speaking of his movements, virtually part of him;—whence simply 'I held on for Pylos.'

On the other hand, in the following passage κατέχεων has for its Object that which is literally a part of the Subject.

Phædo 117 c, οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν κατέχεων τὸ μὴ δικρύειν—'to keep themselves;'—but properly those parts of themselves which had to do with the particular affection in question.

So again the common εἰς δὴ (Crat. 439 a, Gorg. 490 b, Lach. 198 b, Legg. 639 d) is 'hold,' scil. your foot from advancing—your tongue from speaking—your thoughts from running on—as the case may be.

§ 104. Other examples in Plato are

Rep. 388 e, ὅταν τις ἐφιῆ ἵσχυρῷ γελωτί. So 563 a, ἤνυκαθίειναι.

Ib. 422 c, ἀναστρέφειν. So Lach. 191 e.

Ib. 467 b, ἀναλάβειν.

Ib. 473 b, μεταβαλέιν.

Ib. 540 a, 591 c, παρακινεῖν. So 573 c, ὑποκινεῖν.

Phædo 65 a, ἐγγύς τι πείνειν τὸν τεθνώναι.

Ib. 98 d, χαλώστα καὶ ἐνυτέωντα τὰ νεῖρα.

Phdr. 228 e, παῖν. Jelf instances this also in Hom. Od. i. 340, iv. 659. [In Od. i. 340 the reading seems doubtful.]

Politic. 258 a, θεατήτω, . . . ἐννέμιξα.

Phædo 72 b, εἰ τὸ καταστραβῶνει μὲν εἶη, τὸ δ᾽ ἄνεγερσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδόθη—lit. (as we might say) 'put in an appearance on the other side.'

§ 105. This Intransitive use of these Verbs becomes so natural, that, after it is established, when in particular cases it is convenient that the Object should be expressed, it is expressed in the Dative.

E. g. Il. xxiii. 686, ἀναστρέφοντα χερῶν στεφάνης. The language had been accustomed to ἀναστρέσθαι. Intransitive for holding up the hands; so that when, in order to characterise the hands, the poet desires to express the Object, it falls more naturally into the Dative.

So Od. ix. 489, 'ἐμπαλέλειν κόστης—ἐμπαλέλειν being used alone, e. g. in Aristoph. Ran. 206, for 'dashing in the ears.' (An erroneous interpretation of this last passage arises from neglect of the principle we are noticing.)

So Od. x. 140, ἵνα κατηγορώμεθα.
§ 106. b. When the Accusative of the Object, not being in any way referable to the Agent, is nevertheless so natural a sequence to the Verb, that the Verb itself will suggest it if omitted.

Symp. 196 d, περαστέων μὴ ελλείπειν—'to fall short'—lit. 'to leave a deficiency of so much in a given quantity.'

Phdr. 237 d, θέμενοι ὅρων, εἰς τοίτο ἀποθέπουσε καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιόμεθα, ἀναφέροντες, 'referring,' scil. our assertions and reasonings.

'Gorg. 512 e, ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τοίτων τῷ θεῷ—'entrusting,' scil. the decision.

§ 107. Some uses of ἔχειν illustrate this process also.

We find, Thuc. iii. 89, τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων—there is no need to express what they pervaded or occupied, since σεισμοὶ (so used) must be σεισμοὶ τῆς γῆς. Or when ἔχειν is used of an army occupying a position, the Verb alone suffices to express this. And (as we have seen in the parallel case) so fixed may this use become, that when the position occupied needs to be expressed, another construction is found for it; cf. Thuc. iii. 34, ἐν διατείχοματι εἴχον so viii. 28. Similarly a general moving his army is said ἄγειν. without any Object expressed: whence the next step is that the whole army, which strictly ἄγεται, is said ἄγειν' cf. Thuc. v. 54, 'Ἀργείων δ' ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταῖτην τάτα τῶν χρόνων, ἐσεῖβολ. [So Arnold: ἐσεῖ-βαλλ] Poppo and Göller].

§ 108. This is the account of a variation, which might else be taken merely for one of government:

Phaedo 58 ε—59 a, οὗτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηθείον ἔλεος εἰσῆις . . . διὰ δὴ ταῖτα οἷδεν πᾶν μοι ἔλεενον εἰσῆις. An emotion may be said either to enter the person himself (as in ἔλεος με εἰσῆις), or to enter his soul; but in this case if the reference to the person be made clear the mention of the soul may be spared; that is, the Verb becomes Intransitive, and is followed by a Dative of the person (as in the latter sentence of the passage quoted).

§ 109. F. Uses of the Participle.

a. Periphrastically, with Auxiliary Verb Substantive.

Politic. 273 b, πολλῆς ὑμνμείχον ὀτάξια.

Hb. 274 e, εἶναι γεγονός. 289 a, ἕν ἐν τελίν. 308 e, ἐστὶ τείνοντα.

Tim. 38 c, ἐστιν ὢς. 68 d, ἡμορρας ὑμνεῖ εἰς 77 c, εἰς διαιτείματος.
§ 110. β. Peculiar Intransitive use of ἔχων with Verbs.

Euthyd. 295 c, ἔχων φιλωρεῖς.
Phdr. 236 e, τι δήτα ἔχων στρέφει;

§ 111. Idioms of Prepositions.

'Ανά.

In Composition.

Phædo 87 a, ἀνατίθεμαι. Of withdrawing any deed or word. Not a metaphor from draughts particularly, though capable of being so applied—as in Hippiarch. 229 e, ὁσπερ πεπετεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι τι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων. Cf. Soph. Aj. 476, Προσθείσα καναθέσα τοῦ γε κατθανείν, and Lobeck's note upon it.

'Από.

Of the use of the bodily members.

Rep. 613 b, δρόσων ὁσπερ οἱ δρομῆς ὅσοι ἐν θέωσιν εἴ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μὴ—'who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodics (head, neck, arms) in bad form.' (Even supposing that κάτω could refer to the starting point and ἄνω to the turning point, which can scarcely be supported by instances, the absolute use of τὰ κάτω and τὰ ἄνω in this meaning is inconceivable.)

Legg. 795 b, τελέως παγκράτιον ἡσυχώς . . . οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀδύνατός ἐστι μάχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 656, λόγισαι φαύλως μὴ ψήφοις ἄλλες ἀπὸ χείρος.

§ 112. Διά.

a. With Accusative; 'by help of.' This is the use so common afterwards in the Orators.

Rep. 352 c, ἐνήν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιούσι, . . . δι’ ὑπὸ ἐπράξαν ἀ ἐπράξαν.

b. With Genitive.

Phædo 82 c, τῆν ψυχὴν . . . ἀναγκαζομένην . . . σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα . . . μὴ ἁπτῇ δι’ ἁπτῆς—'acting only by and through itself,' independently of anything external to itself.

So Rep. 510 b, αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι δι’ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιομένη, and similarly 511
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Rep. 463 e, εἰ ὄνοματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγομαι.

Ib. 580 b, δ’ ἔως πάντων κρίθης ἀποφαίνεται—the paramount judge decides absolutely.' An ordinary sense of διὰ πάντων, beginning with Homer.

Meno 74 a, τὴν μιὰν, ἢ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστὶ—'which is out beyond all these,' i.e. 'which all these run up to,' 'which is paramount to all these.'

Rep. 343 b, διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας—'night after night and day after day.'

Ib. 621 a, πορεύεσθαι διὰ καύματος τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ.

Symp. 220 b, ἀντιόδητος διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ἐπορεύετο. This use of διὰ in prose is unique: see Bernhardy's Syntax, p. 234. It obtains in poetry, beginning with Homer's διὰ νήσου ἰὼν in Od. xii. 335. Is its employment in the text intended for the sake of grandiloquence?

c. In Composition.

Symp. 221 b, διαπορεύεσθαι, and Critias 106 a, διαπορεία—of traversing a certain interval of space between two defined points, —'doing the distance.' Cf. διαθεῖν, Protag. 335 e.

§ 113. Eς.

a. Of progress along or in a certain route.

Phaedo 114 b, θερόνται ... εἰς τοὺς ποταμοὺς—not 'into' but 'along' or 'down' the rivers?.

§ 114. β. 'To the number of.'

Legg. 704 b, ἀπέχει θαλάττης εἰς τινας ὀχυρώκουτα σταδίους.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 124, ὀλίγον εἰς χίλιοι. So Xenophon and Demosth.

§ 115. γ. 'In regard to,' 'in the point of,' 'with a view to.'

Symp. 184 b, εὑρεγετούμενοι εἰς χρήματα.

Ibid. d, ὅ μὲν δυνάμειον εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἅλλην ἀρετὴν ἔμμαθλεσθαί, ὅ δέ δεόμενοι εἰς παρδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἅλλην σοφίαν κτάσθαι.

Ib. 196 e, εἰς γε ἄνδριαν Ἐρωτι οὐδὲ Ἀρτης ἄνθισταταί.

Ib. 219 d, ἀνθρώπῳ τουτίῳ οὐρί ἐγὼ οὐκ ἂν ὄμην ποτὲ εὐτιχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρπερίαν.

Theaet. 169 a, Ικανοὶ ἐαυτοῖς εἰς ἀστρονομίαν.

* [Under this example is in the MS. "Cf. Odyss."]
a. Eutlyd. 282 a, ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρασκευάζεται.
b. Apol. 23 a, ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο—*hereupon*—*the notion is of time rather than consequence.*

a. *In the point of.*

§ 118. *Επί.
a. *With Dative;—*in connection with*—*signifying a more material connection than it signifies with the Genitive.*
§§ 119—122.] PREPOSITIONS.

Tim. 48 e, ἵκαν ἕν ἑπὶ τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λεχθεῖσιν.
Cf. Andoc. i. 25. p. 4, τῶν φευγόντων ἑπὶ τοῖς μυστηρίως.

§ 119. b. Adverbially compounded.
Legg. 697 c, ἑπὶ ἑτροῖς.

§ 120. c. In Composition.
Crito 43 c, ἐπιλύεται—'exempts.' Perhaps the meaning of ἑπὶ is 'with a further result' or 'condition,' and so ἐπιλύεσθαι would be to obtain a man's release, under the condition of a ransom to be paid. Similarly would ἐπαγγελλεσθαι be 'to announce so as to bind oneself in time to come,' and so 'to offer,' 'promise.'
Symp. 172 a, ἐπιστάσ περιέμεινα. ἐπιστήμα is to stop in the course of progress from one point to another. στήμα is to stop, without any reference to moving again. So ἐπιλύεσθαι is to pick out, e.g. in passing along a line. ἐπιστάσ περιέμεινα is equivalent to the one word ἐπέμεινα. For ἐπιμένειν see under περί, § 127.
Phædo 62 e, ὅ ζωκράτις . . . ἐπιβλέψας πρὸς ἡμᾶς. From the notion of succession here again we should get 'looking [from Cebes] to us,'—'turning to us.' Cf. Apol. 31 d, ἐπικωμαδῶν.

§ 121. Katâ.

a. With Accusative.

Legg. 918 a, ἐπεταί κατὰ πόθα—'in close succession.'

Soph. 243 d, κατὰ πόθα γε, ὃ θεαίτητε, ὑπελαξες—'you have caught at once the train of the thought.' This is of course a pregnant use of the Preposition, implying κατὰ πόθα ἐπόμενος.

b. With Genitive, in Attributive sense.

Meno 74 b, μίαν ἀρετήν λαξείν κατὰ πάντων.

Ib. 76 a, κατὰ παντὸς σχήματος τούτο λέγω.

Ib. 77 a, κατὰ ὅλου εἴπων ἀρετῆς πέρι.

Phædo 70 d, μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων σκόπει μίνον τούτο—'consider this not as an attribute of mankind only.' The κατὰ, in a pregnant use, stands for ὡς κατ' ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενον.

Phdr. 260 b, συντιθεῖς λόγον ἐπαίνου κατὰ τοῦ ὅνου.

§ 122. c. In Composition.

a. Symp. 219 c, καταδαρβάνειν—'to earn by sleeping.'

b. Of doing a thing without regard to other considerations.
§§ 123—125.

§ 123. περιτρικα.

Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 487 e, μέχρι ὅσοι.

§ 124. Παρά.

a. With Accusative.

a. Soph. 242 a, παρά πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαυτῶν.


b. Apol. 36 a, οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον—literally, ‘up to so little’ difference from the other quantity compared, i.e. so near it.

γ. In Comparison; signifying not ‘beyond’ but ‘contrasted with’ (lit. ‘put coordinate with’).

Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλην λέγειν παρά φαίλην παιδίων.

Theatt. 144 a, ἀνθρώπον παρ' ὄντων.

For other instances see Idioms of Comparison, § 174. Cf. Thuc. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπεύθεσθε.

b. With Dative.

Rep. 366 b, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωποι πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν—‘our dealings both with gods and with men will be what we desire.’

Symp. 188 d, ὅ περι τὰγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης . . . ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς [Ερως]—‘temperance exercised in dealings between ourselves (men) and with the gods.’

§ 125. c. With Genitive;—‘obtained from’ or ‘proceeding from,’—of a sentiment or opinion.

Legg. 733 a, τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρῆ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν.

Soph. 226 d, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμὸς τις.

Legg. 692 b, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖον γυνώσκεσθαι ταῦτα . . . οὕτως σοφῶν—‘that these things should receive recognition from us.’

Crat. 412 e, παρὰ πολλῶν ὑμιλογεῖται.
§ 126. In the remaining instances the Preposition has a pregnant force: that is, the fact that an opinion or sentiment is referred to is left to be understood from the παρά.

Rep. 362 c, παρά θεῶν καὶ παρ’ ἄνθρώπων τῷ ἄδικῷ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεσον.

Ib. 461 π. 6, βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 612 c, μοσθὸς . . . ὄσους τε καὶ οίους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ’ ἄνθρώ¬

πων τε καὶ θεῶν.

Ibid. d, ὥσπερ ἤχει δόξης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρὰ ἄνθρωπων.

Tim. 52 d, οὕτως . . . παρὰ τῇ εὐ̣μήν ψήφου λογισθεὶς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ
dιδασκαλίᾳ λόγος.

With this use of παρὰ cf. that of πρὸς, Hdt. iii. 137, ἵνα φανῇ πρῶς

Δορείου ἔως καὶ εὖ τῇ ἐννοιᾳ δόκιμος. Antipho i. 25. p. 114, καὶ

γὰρ ἀν δικαιότερον καὶ ὀσιώτερον καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπων
gένοιτο ἕμν.

§ 127. Περί.

b10. With Dative—‘in the sphere of,’ literally.

Protag. 314 a, ὅρα μὴ περὶ τοῦς φιλτάτοις κυβερνήσει τε καὶ κινδυνεύσει.

Phaedo 114 d, ἄρρητων χρή περὶ τῇ ἐννοια τῇ ψυχῇ ἄνθρα. The feeling

is represented as locally watching over its object.

d. In Composition.

Phaedo 59 e, καὶ ἕμν εἰς εἰς ὁ θυρωρός . . . εἰπε περιμένειν, καὶ μὴ

πρότερον παρείναι κ.τ.λ. The meaning of περιμένειν will be eluci-
dated by distinguishing it from ἐπιμένειν. ἐπιμένειν is to stop

in the course of a progress from one point to another until

somebody comes or something happens. The ἐπι, as in ἐπιστή-

να, is local, and it also presupposes that the progress is to be

resumed. It answers to the Latin praestolari. περιμένειν is to
defer any intended proceeding, to remain in status quo, until

10 [In the MS. the uses of περὶ with the Dative are lettered b., its uses in Composition d. Apparently uses with the Accusative and the Genitive were to have come in, lettered a. and c.]
a certain future moment. The περί has reference simply to the lapse of the interval of time. Hence περιμένειν here is 'to wait a certain time,' which time is specified in the next words. επιμένειν would be unsuitable, as the admission of the visitors into the prison could hardly be regarded as a continuation of their walk to the prison.

Symp. 172 a, ὁ Φαληρεὺς, ἔφη, οὖν 'Απολλόδωρος, οὐ περιμένεις; Κἀγὼ ἐπιστὰς περιμένειν. Here the addition of the local ἐπιστὰς in the second sentence shows that περιμένειν is not local. οὐ περιμένεις; 'wait a moment' is more civil than 'wait there.'

§ 128. το ἐν γεγονός

a. With Accusative. Pregnant force;—i. e. not 'for' but 'in regard of fitness for': in other words, the Preposition is related to the sentence, in which it stands, not immediately, but through the medium of an unexpressed clause.

Phaedo 117 b, τέ λέγεις περί τούτων τοῦ πόματος, πρὸς τῷ ἀποστείατι τινι;—what sayest thou as to this draught admitting of a libation to a deity? lit. 'in regard of its fitness for a libation.'

Protag. 328 b, νοῦσα τινα, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν κἀκεῖθεν γενέσθαι—'to notice a person [favourably] in regard of his fitness for becoming' &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνθάν ἄλλον ἀναμνήσθῃσθαι ἔχοντες πρὸς ὁφέλειαν.

Legg. 757 c, νέμει τιμὰς μεῖζοι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μεῖζους π.τ.λ.

Phaedo 69 a, ἡ ὀρθῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῇ—lit. 'right in regard of fitness for making men good.'

Rep. 581 c, ἀμφισβητοῦσθαι ἐκάστοτε τοῦ έιδίου αἱ ἥδοναι . . . πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἰσχρόν ζῆν.

b. With Dative.

Phaedo 112 c, ἀναστεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους τοῖς ἰμέμασθι τὸ ἐκατέρωθιν γέγονεται μέρος. [So Oxon.]

Ib. 84 c, πρὸς τὸ ἐιρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν—'absorbed in.'


§ 129. c. In Composition with a Verb πρὸς sometimes has the general meaning of 'additionally,' and therefore rather qualifies the whole sentence than unites with the Verb, and does not affect in any way the meaning of the Verb.

Rep. 521 d, δὲ ἐρά καὶ τούτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα—'to have in addition.'

Ib. 607 b, προσεῖπωμεν δὲ αὐτῷ—'and let us say to her moreover.'
§§ 130, 131. PREPOSITIONS.

Theæt. 208 e, τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀλλων προσλάβῃ—'apprehends in addition its difference from other things.' So 209 d, προσ-

...βάσαν.

Apol. 20 a, σφίσα: ἕυνεινα χρήματα διδόντας, καὶ χάριν προσεδέναι.

Phædo 74 a, τόθε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν.

*Gorg.* 516 d, Θεμιστοκλέα ταύτα ταύτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζη-

...κέωσαν.

§ 130. 'Υπέρ.

'With a view to.'

Phædo 107 c, ἐπιμελείας δεῖται οὐχ ἐπέρ τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτον μόνον ἐν ὑπέρ τοῦ ζῆν.

Protag. 318 d, εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦτον ἐργαζόμενον.

Cf. Lysias xii. 78. p. 127, ὅψε ὑπέρ ἐμὸν ἀποθανόντος Ἐπιμελέους ἀλλ' ὑπέρ τῆς αὐτοῦ πονηρίας.

§ 131. 'Υπό.

a. Adverbially compounded.

Phdr. 242 d, ὑπὸ τι ἀπεβη[λόγου]—'somewhat impious.'

*Gorg.* 493 c, ὑπὸ τι ὑπόστα.

b. In Composition.

a. ὑπολογίζεσθαι.

Apol. 28 d, Crito 48 d, Phdr. 231 b.

Similarly,

Protag. 349 c, ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι.

Lach. 189 b, λέγ' οὖν μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἥλικιαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος.

Note, that ὑπολογίζεσθαι is not restricted to an unfavourable sense; cf. Lysias xxx. 16. p. 184, οὐδὲν εἰκὸς αἱτῶ τοῦτο ὑπόλογον γενέσθαι [so Bekker; οἰδέν ... τοῦτον Zurich editors]—where αἱτῶ means 'in his favour,' and xxviii. 13. p. 180, οὐδὲ ἀδίκως τοῦτοι φημὶ ἃν εἶναι ὑπόλογον τὴν ἑκείνων φυγήν,—not, as Taylor, 'honestam excusationem in suo exsilio habere,' but 'non injuria iis laudi imputandum.'

The word does not mean 'to subtract,' according to our notion of the operation; but 'to reckon against,' 'per contra':—the same meaning of ὑπό which we get in ὑπαντῶν, ὑπωμοσία ('an affidavit to stop proceedings), ὑποτιμάσθαι (equivalent to ἀντιτιμάσθαι).

b. ὑποτίμεως.

Rep. 372 d, μετρίως ὑποτίμεοντες.
§ 132. Idioms of Particles.

A. Kai expletive,—preceding and indicating the emphatic word.

1. In Relative Interrogative or Conditional sentences. Here kai may generally be rendered 'at all.'

Phædo 77 b, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀμφικάθαι—'before it came at all.'

Ib. 88 a, πρὶν καὶ γενόσθαι ἡμᾶς—'before we came into being at all.'

Ib. 110 a, ὅπου ἃν καὶ γεγονότει—'exists at all.'

Apol. 22 a, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαυτεία γίγνοντο. Here καὶ fastens itself to the latter portion of the compound ἀνέλεγκτος—'not to be called in question at all.'

Phædo 66 d, εάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται.

Ib. 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμεν—'if I even had had the knowledge.'

Ib. 110 b, εἰ δεί καὶ μίθον λέγει καλῶν—'if it is allowable to narrate a fiction at all.'

Cf. Thuc. i. 15, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένοτο.

This kai frequently enters into a set phrase with the Adjective σμικρός.

Apol. 28 b, ὅπου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφθέλοι ἐστιν.

Soph. 247 c, εἰ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι συγχωρεῖν.

Ib. 261 b, θαρρεῖν χρὴ τόν καὶ σμικρὸν τι διώκουσιν.

Phileb. 58 a, ἄμφιππον ὅσον νῦν καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρθηται.

Politic. 278 d, πῶς . . . δύνατ' ἃν τις ἀρχίμενος ἀπὸ δόξῃς ψευδοῦς ἐπὶ τι τῆς ἀλήθειας καὶ μικρὸν μέρος ἀφικομένου κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν;

The remaining passages shew the καὶ entering into Interrogative phrases.

Euthyphro 3 a, τι καὶ παιοῦντά σε φησι διαφθέρειν τοὺς νέους;

Ib. 6 b, τί γὰρ καὶ φήσαμεν;

Phædo 61 c, τί γὰρ ἃν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο;

Laches 184 d, τί γὰρ ἃν τις καὶ ποιώ;

11 Perhaps it is better to say that the key to these passages is e.g. Thuc. ii. 11, οὐκ ἐξουσιαζέω, εἶ τῷ καὶ δοκεῖ μὲν πλὴν ἐπέστη, τοῦτον ἔνεκα ἀμέλειστρον τι παρεσκευασμένον χαρέων—'if any one considers that we are a numerous force, as we are,'—or rather 'if we are a numerous force, which it might strike any one we were.' So Arist. Eth. Nic. V. xv. 9, εἰς & δὴ βλέποναι καὶ δωκεί εἶναι ἀδίκια πρὸς αὐτὸν—'upon this view there is, what we are inclined to think there is, injury of oneself.'
§ 133.] PARTICLES. 177

There is a latent affirmation in a simple Interrogative sentence with τι. The καὶ neutralises this affirmation. 'What have you done?' implies that you have done something: the first instance above shews how this implication is neutralised. It is not so with πῶς καὶ, ποῦ καὶ, &c., where the καὶ affirms the implied Proposition: Ἀσχ. Choeph. 528, Ποῖ καὶ τελευτᾷ... λόγος; 'what was the issue?'—implying expectation of one. [Dindorf with the MSS. reads Καὶ ποῖ. Cf. however Eurip. Phoen. 1354. Πῶς καὶ πέπρακται διπτύχων πάθους φόνοι;]

B. In Affirmative Independent sentences. Here the force of καὶ is often difficult to render by a word, but it seems to be always identical with the emphasis.

Phileb. 23 a, παντάπασιν ἀν τινα καὶ ἀτιμῶν σχολή.
Euthyd. 304 e, οὐτοσι γὰρ πως καὶ εἶπε τοὺς ἀνόμασι.
Rep. 328 c, εἰδα χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἑωράκειν αἰτῶν.
Ib. 395 e, πολλοὺ καὶ δεήσομεν. This phrase often recurs.
Symp. 177 a, φάναι δὴ πάντας καὶ βούλεσθαι.

Ibid. b, καὶ τοῖτο μὲν ἤττων καὶ θαυμαστῶν—where Stallbaum well compares Thuc. vi. 1. ἃ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπέθεντο, but wrongly joins καὶ, both there and here, with the Adverb. [So Stallbaum, but his reference is wrong. He seems to mean Thuc. iv. 1, where the old editions have ἃ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπέτιθεντο, Poppo and Göller with most of the MSS. ἃ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπέτιθεντο.]

Phædo 107 c, ὁ κύδνος καὶ δόξειεν ἃν δεινὸς εἶναι.
Phileb. 25 b, σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὥσ αἱμαι.

§ 133. Adverbs of intensity are often thus emphasized.

[Apol. 18 b, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἢτη.
Rep. 342 c, συνεχώρητεν ἐνταίθα καὶ μάλα μόγις.
Symp. 189 a. ἑφή εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη διὶ Καὶ μᾶλ' ἐπαύσατο.
Ib. 194 a, εὖ καὶ μᾶλ' ἤν φοβοίο.
Phædo 117 b, καὶ μᾶλα ἱλεως. Ibid. c, καὶ μᾶλα εἰχερῶς.
Protag. 315 d, στράμμασι καὶ μᾶλα πολλοίς.
Legg. 832 a, καὶ μᾶλ' ἐνώτε ὦκ ἀφείεις ὡτας.
Phædo 61 c, καὶ γὰρ ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.
Rep. 404 b, ἀπλῆ πον καὶ ἐπιεικῆ γυμναστικῆ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ περὶ τῶν πόλεμον.
Legg. 773 c, ἄ μὴ βουλόμεθα ἐνυμβαίνειν ἡμῖν, καὶ μᾶλλα ἐνυμβαίνει ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι.

Euthyd. 293 e, (A) Ἀλλ' οὖδεν ἀρα ἐπίστασθον; (B) Καὶ μᾶλα, ἢ δὲ ὅσ'—on the contrary.'

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 318, Δῶρον . . . δομενα οἰκώνδε φέρεσθαι, Καὶ μᾶλα καλὸν ἔλων, ib. 46, Καὶ λίην κείνος γε ἐσοκότι κείται ὄλῳβρφ, Π. xiii. 638, Τὸντέρ τις καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκλείδεται εἰς ἔρον εἴωι, Od. viii. 154, Κέφεία μοι καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ φρεσκὸν ἢπερ ἄεθλοι. Ἡδτ. ii. 69, οἱ δὲ περὶ Θῆβας καὶ κάρτα ἤγγεται αὐτοῦς εἶναι ἱροῖς (where of course καὶ κάρτα goes with ἤγγεται). Ἀθεμ. Π. V. 728, Ἀμαί' σ' ὀδηγήσουσι καὶ μαλ' ἀσμένως. Χοεψφ. 879, καὶ μᾶλ' ἥβωντος δὲ δει, Ἐκμ. 373, δόξαι τ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ μᾶλ' ὑπ' αἴθερι σεμναί κ.τ.λ. Σοφ. Ελ. 1455, Πάρεστι δῆτα καὶ μᾶλ' ἄξιολος θέα.

§ 134. Καὶ is subject to Hyperbaton in this use as in others. In the foregoing examples the καὶ indicates the stress laid on the word next following it: but when the word to be emphasized begins the clause the καὶ is sometimes postponed.

Phaedo 63 c, εἰπέρ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διασχυμαίμην ἃν καὶ τοῦτο—where the καὶ emphasizes διασχυμαίμην.

Ib. 68 c, ἣ σωφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοί ὄνομάζουσι σωφροσύνη—where the stress of καὶ includes ἢν.

Ἔσχ. 640 b, μόνοις δ' ἐγὼγε καὶ ὅμων τοῖς δημιγώροις καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχροεῖ μέμφεσθαι τούτο—where καὶ emphasizes μόνοις.

Cf. Ἡδτ. i. 191, ἐς ὁ δὴ καὶ τὸ κάρτα ἐπίθυμτο—i. e. (if the order allowed it) τὸ καὶ κάρτα.

§ 135. Μὴ.

a. In Indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition.

Thæt. 192 e, Σωκράτης ἐπιγκρόνυσκε . . ., ὅμιθ δὲ μηδέτερον—'but sees, by the supposition, neither.'

Phileb. 18 e, τοῦτ' αὐτῷ τοιοῦν ἡμῖς ὃ πρόσθεν λόγοι ἀπαιτεῖ πῶς ἔστιν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἅπερα εὑθὺς ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 106 d, σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἄλλο φθόραν μὴ δέχοτο. The meaning is not 'of all things that exist scarce anything could be, in such a case, exempt from corruption,' but 'there could hardly exist anything not admitting corruption.' The existence of the whole class 'inencorruptible' becomes questionable.

Hep. Ma. 297 e, ὃ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμῖς ποιῆ, μὴ τι πάσας τὰς ἕδωνας, ἄλλῳ ὃ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς—'suppose we say, not.'
PARTICLES.

§ 136—139. Hip. Ma. 299 d, ἃρ’ οὖν ἦδιν ἥδεος... διαφέρει τῷ ἦδιν εἶναι; μὴ γάρ εἰ μείζων τις ἦδον ἡ εἶλαττον.

Polit. 292 e, πεπεπατε τοσοίτου οίκ ἂν γέγονεντο ποτε, μὴ τι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε—‘let alone kings.’ Comparing this with the last instance but one, we see how the force of μὴ τι is enhanced by its following the clause with which it is contrasted.

Tim. 26 c, λέγαν εἰμὶ ἐτομος, μὴ μόνον ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Polit. 295 e, μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἑτέρα προστάτειω; (‘is he to be forbidden? ’)

Cf. Ἑσchin. iii. 21. p. 56, ὅτι ἦρξα, μὴ ἀποδημήσω; (‘am I not to’ &c. ?)

The μὴ in the Brachylogical combination μὴ ὅτι comes under this head; for instances see below, § 154.

§ 136. β. In the Deprecatory form of contradiction.

Euthyd. 294 c, (Ἀ) οἱκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι ἀκούσαι κ.τ.λ.; (Β) Μηδαμῶς

Ib. 300 a, (Ἀ) τί δέ; (Β) Μηδέν.

Protag. 318 b, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δαμαστῶν λέγεις· ἄλλα μὴ οὖτως.

Meno 75 a, (Ἀ) πειρῶ εἰπεῖν. (Β) Μή, ἄλλα σὺ εἰπέ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 854, (Ἀ) Οὔτος σὺ, ποῦ θεῖς; ἐπὶ καδίσκους;

(Β) Μηδαμῶς.

§ 137. γ. In the sense of ‘whether.’—For instances see above, § 61.

§ 138. δ. In the sense of ‘perhaps’—from which the sense of ‘whether’ just mentioned flows. See above, § 59.

Euthyd. 298 e, μὴ γάρ, ὁ Ἐιθόδημος, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις;—‘are you perhaps not joining’ &c.? i.e. ‘perhaps you are not joining.’

Protag. 312 a, ἄλλα ἄρα μὴ οἷς ἵπποι πολαμβάνεις—‘perhaps, then, you on the contrary do not suppose.’

§ 139. Οὐ πάνω.

The universal meaning of οὐ πάνω is ‘hardly,’ ‘scarcely.’

Theat. 149 d, οὐ πάνω τούτο ὁθα.

Ib. 172 b, οἶκ ἂν πάνω τολμήσεις φήσαι.

Symp. 180 c, οὐ πάνω διεμνημόνευεν.

Ib. 204 d, οὐ πάνω ἐφην ἐτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ προχείρω ἀποκρινασθαι.
Phædo 63 a, οὐ πάντων εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι.
Ibid. c, οὐκ ἀν πάνυ διαχειρισαίμην.
Ib. 85 d, οὐ πάννπ φαίνεται ίκανώς εἰρήσθαι.
Ib. 100 a, οὐ πάννπ ἐγχωρῷ.
Theat. 145 a, οὐ πάννπ ἀξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.
Ib. 176 b, οὐ πάννπ ῥάδιον πεῖσαι.
Phædo 59 a, ὀδὴν πάνῳ μοι ἔλεεων εἰσῆι.

Apol. 41 d, καὶ ἔγαγε τούς καταψηφισαμένους μον καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάννπ χαλεπαίνω.

The following three instances are decisive for the meaning 'scarcely.'

Euthyphro 2 b, οὐδ' αὐτῶς πάνω τι γεγυνώσκω, ἃ Εὐθύφρον, τὸν ἄνδρα.
Protag. 331 e, οὐ πάνω οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὐδ' ὡς οὐ μοι δοκεῖς ὀψεθαι.
Phileb. 41 a, σχέδων γὰρ τῷ ψεεδεί μὲν οὐ πάνω πονηρᾶς ἀν τις λύτας τε καὶ ἤδωνας θεία, μεγάλη δὲ ἄλλη καὶ πολλὴ συμπιπτοῦσας πονηρία.

The following three are to be interpreted on the principle of Litotes.

Symp. 195 e, κρανίων, ἃ ἔστιν οὐ πάνω μαλακῶς—'skulls, which can hardly be said to be soft things.'

Apol. 19 a, οἶμαι δὲ αὐτῷ χαλεπών εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνω με λανθάνει οἶνον ἔστιν—'I can hardly say I do not know.'
Ib. 41 d, καὶ ἔγαγε τούς καταψηφισαμένους μοῦ . . . οὐ πάνω χαλεπαίνω—'I can scarcely say I am displeased'—'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.'

§ 140. Different is Laches 183 e, οὐ πάνω ὀλίγοις ἐγὼ τούτων παραγένοντα—where πάνω goes closely with ὀλίγοις. Quite different also are πάνω οὐ, παντάπασιν οὖ, &c.

§ 141. Οὐδὲ.

The use of οὐδὲ for καὶ οὐ in the sense not of 'and not' but of 'also not' is worth pointing out in cases where the οὐδὲ qualifies specially not a Substantive (the common case) but some other Part of Speech.

Phileb. 23 b, σχέδων δὲ οὐδὲ ῥάδιον—λοι σχέδων δὲ καὶ οὐ ῥάδιον.
**PARTICLES.**

Legg. 730 d, τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν' ὁ δὲ μηδ' ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικοίςν ἀδικεῖν πλέον ἢ διπλασίας τιμῆς ἄξιος ἔκεινον—'but he who beyond this does not allow' &c.

Euthyphro 15 b, μέμησαι γὰρ πον ὅτι κ.τ.λ. ἢ οὔδε μέμησαι;—for ἢ καὶ οὖ μέμησαι; 'or on the contrary,' lit. 'or, which is also an alternative.'

Phaedo 72 a, ἵδε τοῖνυν οὖτως ὅτι οὔδ' ἀδίκως ὁμολογήκαμεν—i. e. ἵδε τοῖνυν καὶ οὖτως ὅτι οὐκ ἀδίκως ὁμ. Crito 44 b, ὥς εἴμι, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὔδὲ μία ἐνυφορᾶ ἐστίν, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Taking this reading now for granted [Oxon. and one other MS. have οἰδεμα], it will be explained by resolving the οὐδὲ, and attaching the καὶ to ὡς. 'since moreover the event of your death is to me not one misfortune, but' &c.

Ib. 45 a, καὶ γὰρ οὔδὲ πολὺ τάργυρον ἔστι—for καὶ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Ib. 45 c, ἐτὶ δὲ οὐδ' δίκαιον—for ἐτι δὲ καὶ οὐ δίκαιον. Cf. Isocr. xviii. 65, π. 383, ὅτι οὐδὲ οὔτω μᾶλλον ἢν—'when, besides, it was not easy.' Ar. Eth. V. viii. 10, ἐτὶ δὲ οὐδὲ—for ἐτι δὲ καὶ οὐ.

§ 142. Ἀλλά.

a. Introducing a supposed objection.

Rep. 365 c–d, we have seriatim ἄλλα γὰρ—ἄλλα δὴ. Apol. 37 b–c, we have the series πότερον—ἄλλα—ἄλλα δή.

β. Introducing an instance.

Symp. 196 d—197 a, we have the series πρῶτον μὲν—καὶ μὲν δή . . . γε—ἄλλα.

§ 143. Ἐἰθές, νῦν, αἰτίκα, πολλάκις, &c.

a. ἐθείς, 'from first to last,' Phdr. 259 c.

β. νῦν, 'as the case now stands,' Crito 54 b, Apol. 38 b.

γ. αἰτίκα, 'for instance,' Theaet. 166 b, Protag. 359 e, Phdr. 235 e, Legg. 727 a, Gorg. 483 a, ὡσπέρ αἰτίκα, Laches 195 b, ἐτι αἰτίκα.

δ. πολλάκις, 'perchance,' after μὴ, Protag. 361 c : after εἰ ἢρα, Phædo 60 e, Laches 179 b, 194 a, Politic. 264 b, εἰ τινῶν πολλάκις ἢρα διακήκοα, Phdr. 238 d, εἶν ἢρα πολλάκις νεμφοληπτός γένομαι. And perhaps Phædo 73 d, ὡσπέρ γε καὶ Σμμίαν τις ἴδων πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη.

ε. ὅτε, 'whereas.' 'Or' οὖν δὴ equivalent to ἐπειδὴ οὖν, Soph. 254 b, Tim. 69 a. So ὅποτε, Euthyd. 297 d, Laches 169 d.
§ 144. The remaining heads treat of Particles in combination.

B. In order to understand and to interpret certain combinations of Particles, regard must be had to the fact, that they enter simultaneously into the sentence, as it were speaking at once rather than in succession.

a. A familiar instance is the combination καὶ—δὲ, e. g.

Rep. 573 b, ἕως ἃν καθῆρη σωφροσύνης, καὶ μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακ-τοῖ. The δὲ and the καὶ enter into the meaning abreast of one another.

§ 145. b. Καὶ μέντοι only differs from καὶ—δὲ in that the μέντοι is stronger than the δὲ, and that the two Particles are not necessarily separated by the intervention of other words.

Symp. 214 e, καὶ μέντοι οὔτωσι ποίησον.

Ιb. 222 a, καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὲ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἄλλα καὶ Ἑαρ-μίδην κ.τ.λ.

| Apol. 17 c, καὶ μέντοι: καὶ πάντα τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι. |
| Ιb. 26 e, ἀποτόσι γ᾽ εἰ, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι σαυτῷ. |
| Ιb. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τοῦτων ἀπέλαυνον κ.τ.λ. |
| Euthyd. 289 e, καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν δαιμαστὼν. |
| Αλε. I. 113 c, καὶ μέντοι καὶ εἰ λέγεις. |

§ 146. c. Such a combination again is καὶ οὖν καὶ.

Protag. 309 b, καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ἐπέρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι.

. d. Such again is δ’ ἄλλα.

Soph. 235 d, σὺ δ’ ἄλλ’ εἰπὲ πρῶτον.

. e. And again δὲ—μέντοι.

Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρεια δὲ οὐκ ἢν μέντοι τοιαύτ’ ἄττα:

§ 147. f, 'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ.

Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that, whereas the γὰρ refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the ἄλλα belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition: for the ἄλλα sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the γὰρ does. 'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ has two meanings: one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of 'but be that as it may,' or 'but the truth is.'
§ 148.] PARTICLES. 183

Symp. 180 a, Λίσχυλος δε φιλαρεί κ.τ.λ.: ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῷ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 228 a, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαιδρὸν ἄγνω, καὶ ἑμαυτοῦ ἑπιλήστημαι: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲτέρα ἔστι τοῖτοι.

Phædo 87 d, μέτρι ἂν μοι φαίνοισι λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρωμόνη ἐστί, τὸ δὲ σώμα ἀσθενεῖστερον καὶ ὁλογραφιούστερον: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα καταστρέπει . . . ἀναγκαῖον μεν ἂν εἰ κ.τ.λ.—’but, he might say, be that as it may.’ &c.

Ib. 95 c–d, μνημεῖοι . . . οὗτοι πολυχρωμοὶ ἐστὶ ψυχῇ κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μάλλῳ ἢν ἄδιανατον.

Meno 94 c, ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥ εταίρε, μη όικ ἥ διδακτῶν ἄρετή—’but the truth is.’

Apol. 19 c, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄτιμαζον λέγω κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδέν μέστην. So Ibid. d. Ib. 25 c, &c.


§ 148. g. ’Ἀλλ’ ἦ, πλήν ἦ.

The joint meaning is ‘except.’ By the ἀλλὰ the exception to the negative which has preceded is stated flatly: the ἦ allows the negative statement to revive, subject to this exception alone.

Symp. 189 e, νῦν δ’ οἶκ ἔστων [ἀνθρώπων] ἂλλ’ ἦ ἐν οὐείδει δυνομαί κείμενον.

Phædo 82 b, μὴ φιλοσοφήσατι οἱ θεῖμις ἄφικείσθαι ἂλλ’ ἦ τῷ φιλο—μαθεί.

Ib. 81 b, ὡστε μιθὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἄληθές ἂλλ’ ἦ τὸ σωματουσίς.

Ib. 97 d, οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἄνθρωπῳ . . . ἂλλ’ ἦ τὸ ἀμιστόν.

Protag. 329 d, οὐδέν διαφέρει ἂλλ’ ἦ μεγέθει καὶ συμκράτητι.

Ib. 334 c, μὴ χρῆσθαι ἠλαιῳ, ἂλλ’ ἦ ὀ τι συμκρατάτω.

Ib. 354 b, ἦ ἔστε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν . . . ἂλλ’ ἦ ὁδονάς τε καὶ λίπας;—The interrogative is equivalent to a negative; so that the rule stands good that ἂλλ’ ἦ occurs only after a negative in the main construction. The ἄλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.

[Apol. 42 a, ἄδηλον παρὶ πλὴν ἦ τῷ θεῷ—again a virtually negative sentence. The ἄδηλον παρὶ being equivalent to ἐξ' οἴδεν. The analogy of ἂλλ’ ἦ perfectly justifies, so far as Syntax is concerned, the disputed reading πλὴν ἦ. The πλὴν and the ἦ enter the meaning simultaneously, introducing the exception]
each in its own way; πλήρες implies 'it is known to none—saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God.' ἡ, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.'

Cf. Thuc. v. 60, οὐ μετὰ τῶν πλειώρων βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνὶ ἄνδρὶ κοινώσας, 80, ἐφησάντω. . . μὴ ἑξεμβαίνω τῷ ἄλλῳ ἡ ἁμα. vii. 50, οἴκετι ὁμοίωσ ἵππαντοίτο, ἀλλ' ἡ μὴ φανερός γε αἰξίων ψηφίζεσθαι, viii. 28, οὐ προσδεχομένων ἄλλῳ ἡ Αττικᾶς τὰς ναῦς εἰναι.

§ 149. h. νῦν δὲ . . . γὰρ. This combination is always preceded by a hypothesis of something contrary to facts, and is parallel to the Protasis of that sentence, which it contradicts. The δὲ and the γὰρ exercise a simultaneous force; δὲ represents that the condition stands differently in fact from what it is in the supposed case, and γὰρ further represents that the inference must be different.

The combinations νῦν δὲ . . . γὰρ and ἄλλα γὰρ approach each other in meaning as well as in structure. Νῦν δὲ . . . γὰρ is however only used in contradicting the Protasis of a hypothetical proposition. There is of course no Ellipse to be supplied; that is, we are not to look on to a sentence beyond to supply a clause to the νῦν δὲ. The δὲ sits as close to the clause immediately subjoined as does the γὰρ: the νῦν ('as the case actually stands') belongs to both Particles equally. Some of the instances which follow would admit of the Elliptical explanation of the νῦν δὲ: but none of them necessitate it, and some others do not admit of it.

Euthyphro 11 c, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ἵσως ἄν με ἐπέσκυπτεν· νῦν δὲ σαί γὰρ αἳ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν· ἀλλοῦ δὴ τῶς δεῖ σκῶματος.

Protag. 347 a, σε οὕν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπίκειται καὶ ἄληθε, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐφέσων. νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γὰρ ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἄληθε ἴσως διὰ τούτα σε ἐγὼ ψέων.

Charm. 175 a–b, οὐ γὰρ ἂν παυ . . . ἀνωφελέσ ἐφάνη, εἰ τι ἐμαύ όφελος ἤν. νῦν δὲ πανταχῇ γὰρ ἤπτοτε θεᾶ.

Laches 184 d, εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθη τόδε, ἦττον ἂν τοῦ τουετοῦ ἐδει. νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐναντιῶν γὰρ Λήχης Νικία ἐβετο. εὖ δὴ ἐξει ἀκούσαι καὶ σοῦ.

Protag. 300 c, εἰ μὲν οὕν κ.τ.λ., δίκαιον ἂν ἦν κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ ὁμοίωσ γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγένομεθα. τι οὕν ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.;
PARTICLES.

§ 150. i. The cases of υ with μή and μή οὐ, when they make one negative, must be explained upon this principle of simultaneity of force. The resulting negation, though single, is both subjective and objective.

Of υ μή a single instance may suffice.

Laches 197 d, καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς οἴδε μή ἡσθήσαται ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Of the uses of μή οὐ Mr. Campbell, Theaetetus. Appendix B. has given a happy analysis and explanation. But it may be noticed that in a peculiar instance his restriction of μή οὐ to a Dependent clause, with the Infinitive or Participle, does not apply.

Phileb. 12 c, πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονὴ μὴ οἷς ὁμοίωτατον ἂν εἴη;—which however is virtually equivalent to πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐνδέχετο, ἡδονὴν ἡδονὴ μὴ οἷς ὁμοίωτατον εἴη;

§ 151. C. Many combinations of Particles are Elliptical. Such are those of a Negative with ὅτι or ὅπως which follow.

a. οὐ μόνον ὅτι—'I was not only going to say' (parenthetically).

Symp. 179 b, εἴθελουσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἀνδρεῖς, ἄλλα καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 751 b, οὐ μόνον οἴδειν πλέον εὐ τεθέντων. οἴδ᾽ ὅτι γέλως ἂν πάμπολος ἐπιμαίνωι. σχεδὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 85, καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αἰτοὶ ἀνθίσασθε, ἄλλα καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἡστὸν τις ἐμοὶ πρόσεισι.

§ 152. b. οἷς ὅπως has a similar meaning in Negative sentences. Whence moreover οἷς ὅπως is said to be equivalent to οἷς ὅπως οὐ which means that the Negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the οἷς ὅπως clause.

Meno 96 a, οἱ φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οἷς ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἄλλοι οἴδει αἰτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι.

Cf. Thucyd. i. 35, οἷς ὅπως καλίται . . . γενήσεσθε, ἄλλα καὶ . . . περιώψεσθε (where the Negative is borrowed by καλίται γενήσεσθε from περιώψεσθε, which being its opposite is a virtual Negative), iii. 42, οἷς ὅπως ἔτημοι ἄλλα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν.

§ 153. c. οἷς ὅτι—'not but that;' lit. 'I was not going to deny
that' (parenthetically). Occurring in sentences of Negative form, it borrows their Negative. It is quite different from οὐ μόνον ὅτι.

Theæt. 157 b, ὧστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχής ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό . . . τὸ δ' εἶναι παίσαχοδέν ἐξαρέτεων, οὐχ ὅτι ἢμεῖς . . . ἢμαγκασμέθα . . . χρῆσοιν αὐτῷ.

Protag. 336 d, Σωκράτης ἐγγυώμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει—'for all it be true that' &c.

Gorg. 450 c, οὐδεμιᾶν οὐμαί σε βουλέσθαι ῥήτορικῆ καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ρήματι οὕτως εἴπει.

Lysis 219 e, πάσα ἡ τουαύτη σπουδὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστοδασμένη . . . οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.

§ 154. d. Μὴ ὅτι—‘necum,’ ‘much less’ or ‘much more,’ according as the sentence is Negative or Affirmative: ‘not to say,’ i. e. not supposing us to say.

Symp. 207 c, μὴ ὅτι . . . ἀλλὰ καί. So 208 a.

Apol. 40 d, μὴ ὅτι . . . ἀλλά.

Protag. 319 d, μὴ τοιῶν ὅτι . . . ἀλλὰ.

Legg. 799 c, τάς ποινέοις, μὴ ὅτι πρεσβύτης.

Crat. 427 c, ὅτιοιν πράγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον.

Phileb. 60 d, καὶ ὅτιοιν εἶναι ἥ γένεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δὴ γε ἠδονὴν.

Phdr. 240 e, ἀ καὶ λόγῳ ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιστεφέν, μὴ ὅτι δὴ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 512 b, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήταν, οὔτε ἄλλον οἴδενός ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σώζειν.

§ 155. D. Elliptical also, but in a still greater degree, are the combinations which now follow.

a. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ—‘yet, so far from the contrary.’ After οὐ μέντοι is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἀλλὰ.

Symp. 199 a, χαρέτω δή' οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐγκομιᾶς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον' οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τὰ γε ἀληθῆ . . . ἐθελῶ εἰπεῖν—‘yet not so that I am unwilling,—on the contrary I am willing,—to utter the truth.’

Meno 86 c, (Α) βούλειν οὐν κ.τ.λ.; (Β) Πάντα μὲν οὖν, οὐ μέντοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔγγει ἐκείνῳ ἣν ἡδίστα σκέψαίμης—‘yet not so that it would not,—on the contrary it would,—be most to my taste to’ &c.

Crat. 436 d, ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἰκανῶς, τὰ λουτά φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνη ἐπάμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζομαι' ἄν εἰ καὶ τὰ ἐσμάτα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ οὕτως—‘yet I do not mean by this, that I should not wonder,—on the contrary I should wonder,—if’ &c.
§§ 156—160.] PARTICLES.

Cf. Thuc. v. 43, οὗ μέντοι ἄλλα καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικόν ἡναυτίοτο. So viii. 56, ἀφαίθα δὴ οὐκέτι ἄλλ' ἀπόρα νομίσαντες κ.τ.λ.

§ 156. b. Of οὗ γὰρ ἄλλα the same explanation holds; — 'for not the contrary, but,' i. e. 'for, so far from the contrary.'

Euthyd. 305 e, τί οὖν; δοκούσι σοι τι λέγειν; οὗ γὰρ τοι ἄλλ' ὁ γε λόγος έχει τινά εἰπρέπειαν—'for I must say,' &c.: more literally, 'for, do you know, so far from the contrary,' &c.

Ib. 286 b, πῶς λέγεις; οὗ γὰρ τοι ἄλλα τούτων γε τὸν λόγον . . . ἀεὶ βαμμάζω—'for, do you know, I must say I' &c.

Phædo 83 e, κάσμιοι τ' εἰσί καὶ ἄνδρειοι, οἷς δὲν οί πολλοὶ ἑνεκα φασιν . . . οὗ γὰρ ἄλλα οὕτω λογίσατι' ἀν ψυχῇ ἄνδρος φιλοσόφου—'for, so far from the contrary,'—i. e. 'for, most assuredly.'

§ 157. c. Οὗ μόνον γε ἄλλα.

Phædo 107 b, οὗ μόνον γ' ἄλλα ταύτα τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ἵπποθεσίας τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἴ πισταί ἵμιν εἰσίν, ὅμοι ἐπισκέπτεαι. The full construction is οὗ μόνον γε ταύτα εὖ λέγεις, ἄλλα ταύτα τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ κ.τ.λ.—'not only is what you say true, but a further observation in the same direction is true,' namely τὰς ἵπποθεσίας κ.τ.λ.

§ 158. What is to be noticed as to all the three expressions, οὗ μέντοι ἄλλα, οὗ γὰρ ἄλλα, and οὗ μόνον γ' ἄλλα, is, that the οὗ is not retrospective but proleptic, referring to a proposition which is not expressed but is indicated by its contrary expressed in the ἄλλα clause.

§ 159. E. Other noticeable combinations of Particles are such as follow.

a. Μὲν γε answered by δὲ, in working out a contrast between two characters.

Symp. 180 d, πῶς δ' οὗ δύο τῷ δεά; ἡ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. ἡ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 215 b, πολύ γε βαιμασιώτερος ἐκεῖνον' ὁ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. οὗ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 70, οἵ μὲν γε νεώτεροι. Dem. de Cor. 93, p. 257, ὁ μὲν γε σύμμαχος ὅν. [So Bekker: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Zurich ed.]

"Eschin. iii. 63. p. 62, ὁ μέν γε τὴν ἐξουσίαν δεδώκε.

b. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε.

Legg. 728 d—e, τίμιον εἶναι σάμα οὔ το χαλὸν οὐδὲ ἴσχυρόν κ.τ.λ., καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γ' ἐναντία, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.

§ 160. The following are various combinations with ὅν, to which γε is often subjoined.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 161, 162.

c. Kai μὲν δῆ, with and without ye subjoined.


Syrp. 196 e, δῇ πρέπει ἦμας μαρτυρῶν χρήσθων, ὅτι ποιηθή ὁ "Ερώς . . . πᾶσαν ποίησιν τίν κατὰ μονικήν . . . καὶ μὲν δῇ τίρ γε τῶν ξών ποίησιν τίς ἐναντίωσεται κ.τ.λ.;

Soph. 217 b, καὶ μὲν δῇ κατὰ τίχνῃ γε, δὲ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβουν παραπλησίων κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 231 d, καὶ μὲν δῇ εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So 232 b, 233 a.

d. 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ, without or with ye.

Crat. 428 b, ἄλλα μὲν δῇ—'well, no doubt.'

Crito 48 a, ἄλλα μὲν δῇ . . . γε—'well, but then' (in the mouth of an objector).

Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d, ἄλλα μὲν δῇ . . . γε—'but further'—in a consecutive proof.

e. 'Ατὰρ οὖν δῇ . . . γε. Politic. 269 d.


g. οὐ γὰρ δῇ . . . γε. Phædo 92 b.

h. 'Ὡς δῇ τοι—'how true is it that.' Rep. 366 c, Tim. 26 b.

i. 'Ὡς δῇ σὺ—ironical. Gorg. 468 e, 499 b.

j. Kai δῇ καὶ—'then, I suppose,' ironically. Apol. 26 d.

§ 161. F. Correlative Particles.

a. It is worth observing that in the Laws of Plato οὐ has more frequently δὲ contrasted with it than ἄλλα.

b. Instead of the common ἄλλως τε καὶ we find sometimes καὶ ἄλλως καὶ, as Laches 181 a, 187 e.

c. Irregular Correlatives.

Tim. 20 d, μαλὰ μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασι γε μὴν ἄληθος.

Legg. 927 b, ὥσ μὲν ἀκοίουσι, ἔλεποντι τε ὥσ.

Syrp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, κ.τ.λ. ἄλλ' οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Πb. 177 b, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὡς τοι καὶ θαυμαστόν, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 38 d, ἀπορία μὲν ἐδιωκα, σὲ μέντοι λόγων.

§ 162. Note, that μὲντοι is used, and not δὲ, (1) when particular emphasis has to be given to the opposition; (2) where, as in the instance here quoted, δὲ could not be conveniently used; (3) in expressing opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by δὲ.
§§ 163—165. COMPARISON.

§ 163. Idioms of Comparison.

A. Syntax of words of the Comparative Degree.
B. " " words of the Superlative Degree.
C. " " other Comparative words and formulae.

A. Comparatives.

a. Ordinary form.

The only case needing remark under this head is that of a clause compared by η, while its pronominal pre-statement (see above, § 19) is compared in the Genitive.

Phaedo 89 d, οὐκ ἂν τις μείζον τούτοι κακῶν πάθοι, ἡ λόγους μισήσας.

Crito 44 c, τίς ἂν αἰσχίνων εἰς ταύτης δόξα, ἡ δοκεῖν κ.τ.λ.;

So Lysias xxv. 23. p. 173, οὐδέν γὰρ ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς χαλεπότερον τούτων, ἡ πνεύμασθαι. We trace the Idiom back to Homer, Od. vi. 182, οὐ μέν γὰρ τούτο χρείασθαι καὶ ἀρείων, ᾧ ὅθεν ὁμοφρονεῖτε νοίμασαν οἶκον ἔχοντο Ἁμηρ ἢδε γυνή. So Hdt. i. 79, ὡς οἱ παρὰ δόξαι ἐσχε τὰ πρίγματα, ἡ ὡς αὐτὸς κατεδόκεε.

§ 164. b. Rarer forms.

a. ἂν as the Conjunction of Comparison.

Rep. 526 c, ἃ γε μείζω πόνων παρέχει οὐκ ἂν μαίως οἴδε πολλά ἂν εἴροις ὡς τούτο.

Apol. 36 d, οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὃ τι μᾶλλον πρέπει οὐτός ὡς . . . αἰσθέει.


§ 165. β. Comparative followed by Prepositions.

Παρά. Note, that the παρὰ in this construction is not ' beyond,' but ' contrasted with ' (lit. ' put co-ordinate with. ') Cf. Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδαν. And Thucyd. v. 90, ἐπειδή παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ἐπέθεσθε.

Polit. 296 a, εἰ τὰς γεγονόσεις παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἐμπροσθεν βελτίως νόμους.

Legg. 729 e, ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους ἀμαρτήματα παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θέων ἄνηρθημένα τιμωρίων μᾶλλον.

Πρό.

Phaedo 99 a, δικαίωτερον . . . εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φείγειν . . . ἐπέχειν . . . δίκην.

Crito 54 b, μήτε παιδάς περὶ πλεῖονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζήν μήτε ἄλλο μυθέν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.

Cf. Hdt. i. 62, οἴσε ὡς τιμανήν πρὸ ἑλευθερίας ἤν ἀσπαστότερον.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 166—168.

.§ 166. Irregularities.

a. Pleonastic form.

Crat. 433 d, ἐξεῖς τινὰ καλλίω τρόπον . . . ἄλλον, ἦ κ.τ.λ.;
"Gorg. 482 b, οἶμαι τὴν λύραν μοι κρείττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστέιν . . . μᾶλλον ἦ ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι.

Charm. 159 e, Politic. 286 a, Tim. 87 c, Legg. 729 e, 854 e; — all instances of a Comparative Adjective or Adverb with μᾶλλον or ἤπτον.

.§ 167. β. Comparative in regimen twice over.

Protag. 350 b, βαφμαλεώτερον εἰσίν αὐτῷ ἕαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἦ πρὶν μαθεῖν.

Symp. 220 e, προδημότερος ἐγένον τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβείν ἦ σεαυτῶν.
A compendious way of saying two things; one, that Socrates was anxious that Alcibiades should be chosen rather than himself; the other, that, though the generals too were anxious for this, Socrates was more anxious than they. This construction is illustrated by the other simpler instance.

Exactly parallel is Thuc. vii. 66, τὸ γ’ ὑπόδωκτον τῆς δόξης ἀυθενέστερον αὐτῷ ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν ἦ εἰ μήδ’ ὑφήθησαν.

.§ 168. γ. Case after ἤ assimilated to the Case before it, by Attraction.

Phædo 110 c, ἐκ [χρωμάτων] λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἦ τούτων.
Μεν 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἦ τουσακτῆς γραμμῆς.

This does not appear to be the regular construction. Compare the constructions with ὄσσερ, §§ 175, 176, below. The Homeric use with ἤ varies: on the one hand we have, II. i. 260, καὶ ἄρεισσον ἥπερ ύμῖν ἀνθράσιον ὡμίλησα· on the other hand, II. x. 557, ἀμείβωσεν; ἦ περ ύBuilderFactory "πατρὸς ὀνόματι χώρα· Od. xvii. 417, σἐ χρῆ δόμεναι καὶ λόγον ἦ περ ἄλλοι, II. xxiv. 486, Μνήμασι πατρὸς σὲ· . . . Τρυόμενον ὄσσερ ἐγὼν.
In Demosth. also there are both constructions with ἤ e.g. F. L. 27, p. 349, οὔδὲν ἐλάττωνος ἦ τούτου: but De Cor. 162. p. 281, τὸν πρότερον
§§ 169—172.

COMPARISON.

§ 169. a. Omission of ἤ.

Legg. 936 a, ὑφίν δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργον γνωσκός μᾶς ἔμηνον.

Ib. 958 e, ἵψηλοτερον πέντε ἀνδρῶν ἔργον.

Phædo 75 a, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἵσον ... μᾶλλον τι καί περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.

[Oxon. alone omits ἤ here. The other MSS. and the edd. have ἤ καί.]

§ 170. ε. Omission of μᾶλλον.

Rep. 370 a, ᾿ἄλλο ἵσος οὕτω βάδιον ἤ κεῖνος.

Meno 94 e, ἵσος μᾶλλον ἐστὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνδρῶποις ἢ εἴ.

Cf., as the Zurich editors suggest, Lysias xii. 89. p. 128, Isocrat. ν. 115. p. 195, viii. 50. p. 169.

Tim. 75 c, ἐνεδοξε τοῦ πλείονος βίον φαυλοτέρον δὲ τὸν ἐλάττων ἀλέον ἦντα παντὶ πάντως αἱρέτων.

Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. iii. 9, εἰ ἀρα τί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον ἤ ('other than') ἀνδρῶποις θεραπεύειν.


§ 171. B. Superlatives.

a. Ordinary form.

b. Rarer forms—with Prepositions.

'Επὶ.

Tim. 23 b, τὸ καλλίστον καὶ ἁριστὸν γένος ἐπὶ ἀνδρῶποις.

Perhaps this is consciously Homeric: cf. e. g. Od. xxiii. 124, σὴν γάρ ἁρίστην Μήτην ἐπὶ ἀνδρῶποις φάο' ἔμεινα.: Periphrastic with ἐν.

Legg. 742 e, τοὺς κεκτήμενους ἐν δλίγοις τῶν ἀνδρῶπων πλείστον νομίσματος ἄξια κτήματα.

Ib. 892 a, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἐμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη.

§ 172. c. Irregularities.

a. Legg. 969 a, ἀνδρείστατος τῶν ὑστερον ἐπιγρηγμοένων. Cf.

Phædo 62 a, τούτῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

β. Pleonastic.

Symp. 218 d, τοῦ ὡς ὧ τι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

Legg. 731 b, πρᾶον ὡς ὧ τι μάλιστα.

Ib. 908 a, ὡς ὧ τι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος.
§ 173. C. Other Comparative words and formulae.

a. With ἤ.

Rep. 330 c, οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἤ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά.
Ib. 534 a, ὡμι η’ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήγη ἤ ὡςον οἱ παρε- ληπιθεῖτε.
Ib. 455 c, διαφερόμετος ἔχει ἦ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν.
Phædo 95 c, διαφερόμετος ἦ εἰ εἶ ἄλλοι βίῳ βίους ἐτελεύτα.
Phdr. 228 d, διαφέρειν τὰ τού ἐρώτου ἦ τὰ τοῦ μή.
Crat. 435 a, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀναμοίρου γε ἦ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι.
Phileb. 35 a, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναυτῶν ἦ πάσχει. So Phdr. 275 a.
Gorg. 481 c, ἄλλα τε ἡμῶν ἵδιον τε ἐπαφές πάθος ἦ οἱ ἄλλοι.
Crito 53 e, τι ποιών ἡ εἰσοχούμενος ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ;

§ 174. b. With παρά.

Rep. 337 d, ἕτεραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταῦτας περὶ δικαίωσιν, βελτίων τούτων.
Phædo 105 b, παρ’ ἦν τὸ πρώτον ἔλεγον ἄλλην.
Laches 178 b, ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τίν τῶν αὐτῶν δόξαν.
Ib. 181 d, εἰν δ’ ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα.
Legg. 927 c, ποικιλουσίες ἐπιτηθείμασιν ἵδιοι τῶν τῶν ἁρμανῶν βίον παρὰ τῶν τῶν μή.
And, with παρὰ simply, Theat. 144 a, ἀνθρείον παρ’ ὀντινοίν.

§ 175. c. With ὡσπερ and the like Adverbs; and with correlative Adjectives of likeness.

Phædo 86 a, εἰ τις δισχυρίζωτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ σὺ.
Ib. 100 e, ἐὰν σοι ἔυδοική ὡσπερ ἔροι.

Gorg. 464 d, ἐν ἀνθράκων οὕτως ἔστησις ὡσπερ οἱ πάθες.

Apol. 17 b, κεκαλλιεπμένους λόγους ὡσπερ οἱ τούτοιν.

Politic. 274 d, ἐδει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοῦσ αὐτῶν ἔχειν καθὰπερ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος.

With Adjectives.

Gorg. 458 a, οὐδὲν οἷμα τοσοῦτον κακὸν, ὡσν δόξα θεοῦ.
Tim. 78 b, πλέγμα εἴ ἄρης καὶ πυρὸς οὗν οἱ κύριοι ἔναλυσθήμενον.

Protag. 327 d, ἄγριοι τῖνες, οἷοίπερ οὓς πέρυσι Θεοκρίτης ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ θραύς. So Crat. 432 e.

§ 176. Note, that where the Noun brought into comparison by ὡσπερ is the Subject of the Relative clause, there is a preference for the Nominative, in spite of such an Ellipse of the Verb as might have led to an Attracted Construction.

Cf. Hom. ii. xxiv. 486, ἦςαι πατρός σειο, θεοὶς ἐπιείκει' Ἀχίλλευ, Υήλικον, ὡσπερ ἐγὼν. Λύσια vi. 32. p. 156, αὐτουμένῳ ὡσπερ οἴτως. Isocr. xviii. 47. p. 380, τοῖς ὡσπερ Καλλίμαχος ἔξυικότας. This non-admission of Attraction often secures the meaning; as Ἀσchin. ii. 120. p. 44, τοῖς μικροτιτάς, ὡσπερ αἰτός, φοβεῖν τὰ τῶν μεικόνων ἀπόρρητα. [So Bekker: αἰτοὶς Zurich ed.] Jelf (Gr. Gr. § 869) notices, as rare instances of Attraction, Thuc. vi. 68, οἷς ἀπολέκτους ὡσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς, Soph. O. C. 869, δοὺς Ἵων Τοιοῦτον οἶον καὶ γράφαναι ποτέ, Λυσ. 492. 72, [i.e. xiii. 72. p. 136] οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἔστιν Ἀγώρατον Ἀθηραίον εἶναι ὡσπερ Ἐρατύσσουλ. We may add, however, from Plato, the instance in Apol. 17 c, οὐ γὰρ ἄν πρέποι τῆς τῇ ἕλικϊ ὡσπερ μειρακίων πλάστουτι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσινει,—where μειρακίω is affected by Attraction to πλάστουτι.

§ 177. d. Comparison of one Sentence as a whole with another.

Simp. 179 e, διὰ ταύτα δίκεν αἰτῶ ἐπέθεσαν, ... οἷς ὡσπερ Ἀχιλλέα ἐτίμησαν.

Ib. 189 c, δικοῦσί ... θυσίας ἄν ποιεῖν ... , οἷς ὡσπερ νῦν τοῖτων οὖδὲν γίγνεται.

Ib. 213 b, ἔλλοχον αὖ μὲ ἐναιδὰ κατέκειτο, ὡσπερ εἰώθης ἐξαιρήσης ἀναφαινεσθαί.

Ib. 216 d, ἐφωτικῶς διάκειται ... , καὶ αὖ ... οὖδὲν οὐδὲν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αἰτῶ τοῦτο οὗ Σειλήναδες; This sentence becomes an instance under the present head by the removal of the stop after τοῦτο. The liveliness of the passage gains by this, as much as it suffers by the common punctuation. The conversion of a categorical sentence at its close into an interrogative one is natural and common. [The Zurich editors have the common punctuation.]

Theet. 187 b, χρῆ, ὧ Θεατῆτε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἦ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὄνομα ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Apol. 39 c, τιμωρίαν ἐμῖν ἤξειν ... χαλεπωτέραν νη ἐρ ἦ ὡς ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.

Cf., perhaps, Thuc. i. 19, ἐγώντε σαν εἰτοίς ἐς τοῦτο τὸν πόλεμον ἦ ἰδία παρασκευή μείζων ἦ ὡς τὰ κράτιστα ποτὲ μετὰ ἀκραφνοῖς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἦνθησαν—taking ὡς to be not 'when' but 'how; but
§ 178. We may notice the graceful use of the vague Comparative expressing a modified degree.

Symp. 176 c, ἃπτον ἀν εἰν ἄρῃς.

Politic. 286 b, ἐσχε μήκος πλέον.

Phaedo 115 b, ἀπερ ἀεί λέγω, οὐδὲν κανώτερον.

Charm. 174 c, ἢπτὼν τι, Euthyd. 293 c, ἃπτον ὁν τι, in Interrogative sentences, are a soft οὐκ and οὐκοίν.

Cf. the Latin si minus.

§ 179. Idioms of Sentences:—Attraction.

A full scheme of all the varieties of Attraction may be constructed upon the instances found in Plato. The varieties which are treated of here include all but some of the most common.

A. Attraction of Dependent sentences.
   a. Infinitival sentences.
      a. The ordinary form of Attraction here is that to be seen in Ar. Eth. III. v. 3, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀρα τὸ ἐπεικέσι καὶ φαύλως εἶναι, or Lysias xxviii. 10. p. 180, τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ... ἐπιδείξετε πότερον χρή δικαίως εἶναι,—in distinction from the unattracted form, e.g. Ἀσχ. Choeph. 140, Λυτή τε μοι δόσω ζωφρονεστέραν πολὺ Μητρὸς γενέσθαι.

      Crat. 395 c, κατ' ἐκείνου λέγεται οὐδέν οὐν τε γενέσθαι προνοήσῳ.

      Ηιπ. Ma. 292 c, τὸ καλὸν, ὦ παντὶ, ὦ ἐν προσγείνῃται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλὸ εἶναι.

      It will be seen here that to present an opportunity for Attraction, there must be Ellipse of the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, and moreover its Copula and Predicate must be in distinct words. Where the subject of the Infinitival sentence is also the subject of the principal sentence, Attraction is invariable, and the construction cannot be conceived without it,—as Βουλομένων ἵμαυν προβῆσον εἶνα, Thuc. i. 71; where notwithstanding there is Attraction (though Lobeck denies it).

      β. A form, which in one or two particular Idioms is common, is developed in greater variety in Plato: where the Infinitival sentence is dismembered, and the Subject or some other prominent Noun of the Dependent sentence is placed in advance, under the direct government of the principal sentence.
One common type is (e.g.) Hdt. v. 38, ἐδεί ἔμμαχη ὁι μεγάλης ἐξευρεθήματι. And primarily Homer, II. xviii. 585, Ο λ ὁ ὕπαι δικεῖν μὲν ἀπετρωπώστο λέοντος, and vii. 409. Another common, though peculiar, type is ἕγιν δίκαιος εἰμὶ τοῖτο ποιεῖν which stands for δίκαιον ἔστιν ἐμὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν—the ἐμὲ being attracted out of the Infinitival government into that of the principal sentence. Cf. Hdt ix. 77, ἄξιον ἐφασαν εἶναι σφέας ἔμμαχαι.

§ 180. Of the Platonic type only specimens need be given here; for the rest cf. ‘Binary Structure,’ §§ 214, 220, below.

Symp. 207 a, ἔπερ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἐκτῷ εἶναι ἄει ἔρως ἔστιν—where τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, is separated from it, and placed under the government of ἔρως ἔστιν in the principal construction.

In the following it is not the subject, but some other Noun, of the Infinitival sentence, which is attracted.

Repl. 443 b, ἄρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζεων.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, τρόπον ὄντερ ἡργαλεία τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λέξις θέματος διαπεραίνειν.

§ 181. γ. In the following the two forms above exist together. The Subject of the Infinitival sentence suffers Attraction in the manner just mentioned, and secondly the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence is attracted into agreement with it.

Repl. 459 b, δεὶ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἄρχοντων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οἷον ἐπειδὴ μᾶς τῶν προτρητικῶν λόγων εἶναι.

§ 182. Note, however, that when both constructions have the same Subject, the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence reverts to the main construction.

Legg. 773 b, τὸν σετῷ ἔνειδότα φερόμενον.

Charm. 169 a, οὗ πιστεῖν ἐμαυτῷ ἴκανον εἶναι.

§ 183. δ. In another type, affecting the same class of sentences as the last, we have the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, after δίκαιον ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη ἔστιν, οἷον τε ἔστιν, and the like, or after Verbs of judging, turned into a forced Dative of Reference after δίκαιον &c. Doubtless, the Dative of Reference often finds its place in the meaning as well as the syntax; but this is not always the case,
e.g. in the passages from Hip. Ma. 294 b, Meno 88 c, and Crat. 392 a: whence the true account of it is Attraction.

Rep. 334 e, ἀλλ’ ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτος τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὀφελεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Crito 50 e, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἷεί δίκαιον εἶναι;

Phedo 75 c, ἀνάγκη ἦμιν αὐτὴν εἰληφθέναι.

Hip. Ma. 289 c, τὸ ὄρθως λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι.

ib. 294 b, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῦ μεγάλου εἶναι.

Charm. 164 b, γιγνώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἱατρῷ.

Meno 88 c, εἰ ἄρα ἄρετῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἔστι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὀφελέμφι ἐιναι.

Laches 196 c, ἀναγκαῖον οἷα τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἄνδριαν.

Menex. 241 a, οἷάν τε ἀμφιέσθαι ὀλίγως πολλῶς.

Phaedo 106 b, ἀδύνατον ψυχὴ ἀπολλυόνται.

Phldr. 242 b, αἰτίος γεγενήσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥήθηναι.

Phileb. 33 a, τῷ τῶν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἔλομεν βίον οἴσθ᾽ ὡς τούτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκολούθει ζην.

Crat. 392 a, ὀρθότερον ἔστι καλείσθαι χαλκίς κυμάκιδως τῷ αὐτῷ ὄρνω.

Phedo 92 c, πρέπει ξυνωδός εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας [λόγῳ].

Soph. 231 e, ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήσας περὶ ψυχῆς καθιρτὴν αὐτῶν εἶναι.

Rep. 598 d, ἐπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι εὑρήσῃ.

Apol. 34 e, δεδογμένων ἐστὶ τῷ Ἑσκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. [So Oxon. See note on the text, p. 90, above.]


Audoc. i. 140. p. 18, ταῦτα ἢμιν ἅξιον εὐθυμηθήμενα.

On the other hand we have, unusually,

Gorg. 458 d, αἰσχρῶν δὴ τῷ λοιπῷ γίγνεται ἐμὲ γε μη ἔδελεν.

§ 184. b. Attraction of Participial clause attached to the Infinitival sentence.

Here the unattracted form would be e.g.

Crito 51 d, προαγορεύομεν Ἀθηραίον τῷ βουλομένῳ . . . ἔζειναι λαβώντα τὰ αὐτῶν ἀπεικώναι.

Cf. Ildt. ix. 78, καὶ τοῖς θεὸς παρέδωκε ῥωσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα κλέος καταθέσθαι, and Hom. II. x. 187, τῶν ὑπρός ὄλωλει Νύκτα φυλασσόμενοι.
§§ 185—187. ATTRACTION.

Instances of the attracted form are

Apol. 17 c, oûèè γὰρ ἃν πρέτοι τῇ δὲ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ . . . πλάστωσι λόγους εἰς ἓμᾶς εἰσιν αὐτί—where πλάστωσι is attracted into correspondence with ἡλικία: though the Gender follows the thought, as in Legg. 933 a, τοῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δυσωπουμέναις πρὸς ἄλληλους. Cf. Hom. II. iv. 101, Εἰδέο . . . ἤξειν ἑκατόμβην . . ., Οἰκάδε νοστήσας.

§ 185. Reference to the unattracted form explains such places as

Symp. 176 d, οὕτε αὐτὸς ἑδέσσαιμι ἃν πιεῖν, οὕτε ἄλλοι συμβούλευσαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραταλώντα—where κραταλώντα agrees regularly with the subject of the πιεῖν understood after συμβο- 

§ 186 c. Dependent sentences introduced by Conjunctions or Oblique Interrogatives.

a. Here, too, as in the Infinitival sentence, the sentence is torn asunder, and a portion of it, consisting of a Noun or a Noun-phrase, brought under the direct government of the principal construction.

This Attraction manifests itself in an ordinary type in e.g.

Laches 196 a, τοῦτον οὐ μανθάνω ὅ τι βούλεται λέγειν.

More remarkable Platonic forms are e.g.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διαμολογησασθαι, τί ποι' ἐστίν—where λόγον has been attracted into the principal construction, although this can supply only a loose government for it.

Phaedo 64 a, καυδυνεύοντιν ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὁρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσο-

§ 187. In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun or Noun-phrase, of the Dependent sentence, which is attracted.

Phaedo 102 b, όμολογεῖς τῷ τὸν Σιμμάν ἐπερέχειν Σωκράτους οἷς ὅς 

(Φαίδος 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τῶν Σιμμάν ἐπερέχειν Σωκράτους οἷς ὅς 

Phaedo 102 b, όμολογεῖς τῷ τὸν Σιμμάν ἐπερέχειν Σωκράτους οἷς ὅς 

Crito 44 d, αυτά δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νωί, ὅτι οἱ οἱ τ' εἰσίν οἱ πολλοί οὐ
tὰ συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐργάζεσθαι—i.e. δῆλον ἔστιν ὅτι οἱ αὐτά
tὰ παρόντα ἐργαζόμενοι, οἱ πολλοί, οἱ οἱ τ' εἰσίν οὐ τὰ κ.τ.λ.
Phædo 82 a, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τάλλα οἱ ἄν ἐκάστη ίοι—i.e. δῆλον εἵστε δὴ,
οἱ ἄν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη ίοι.

For the rest of the instances under this head see ‘Binary Structure,’ §§ 213, 218, below.

§ 188. β. Comparative sentence introduced by ἥ, attracted, after
omission of the Copula, into agreement with the principal con-
struction.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἡ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς.
(See the remarks under ‘Idioms of Comparison,’ § 168, above.)

§. 189. B. Attractions involving the Relative.
a. Attraction of Relative to Antecedent.
a. From Accusative into Genitive.
Apol. 29 b, κακῶν ὄν αἰσθά ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν.
Phdr. 249 b, ἄξιως οὗ ἀξιώσαν βίον.
Cf. Hom. II. v. 265, Τῆς γάρ του γενέθη, ἦς Τρωί περ εὐφυότα Ζεὺς
Δῶκε.

β. From Accusative into various cases before βούλει,12, which
with the Relative forms almost one word, like Latin quivis.

Crat. 432 a, τὰ δέκα ἡ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλοις ἀριθμοῖς.

Gorg. 517 a, ἔργα . . . σία τούτων ὃς βούλει εἰργασται.
Phileb. 43 d, τριῶν ὄντων ὄντων βούλει.
γ. From Dative into Genitive.
Legg. 966 c, πάντων ὃν κίμησι . . . οὐσιαν ἐπόρισεν.
δ. From Nominaative into
Genitive.

Thetct. 165 c, ἔνιποδίσθη ὑπ' αὐτοὶ, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενοι . . . ἄν
ἐλύτρων.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 130. p. 270, οὐδὲ γάρ ὃν ἔτυχεν ἦ—i.e. τούτων
ἀ ἔτυχεν.

12 Compare (though these do not involve the Relative)
Rep. 414 c, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δ' οὐ γεγονός οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ γενόμενον ἄν.
Symp. 216 d, ἐνδοθέν δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖς πότης οἰεθέ γέμει σωφροσύνης;
Euthyphro 15 a, τί δ' οἷς ἄλλο ή τιμή τε καὶ γέρα;
Phædo 59 c, τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λύγιοι;
§§ 190, 191. ] 199

Dative.
Rep. 402 a, ἐν ἀπασιν οἷς ἦς τοις περιφερόμενα.
Phædo 69 a, τοῦτο δ' ὤμοιον ἐστιν οὐ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο.
Accusative.
Cf. Thuc. v. III, perhaps, περὶ πατρίδος θουλεύσθε [θουλὴ] ἵν μᾶς περὶ . . . ἔσται. (The same interpretation is suggested as "possible" in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 822 note.)

§ 190. e. Preposition, by which the Relative is governed, absorbed by Attraction.
Rep. 520 d, ἐν πόλει ἦ ἡ κωστὰ πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μελλοντες ἄρχειν.
Ib. 533 d—e, οἷς τωσοτῶν πέρι σκέψεως ὄσων ἥμιν πρόκειται.
Laches 192 b, τίς οὔσα δύναμις ἡ αἰτή ἐν ἀπασιν οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγουμεν αἰτήν εἶναι, ἐπειτι αὐτρία κέκληται—where οἷς must be for ἐν οἷς.
Crat. 438 e, ἄρα δὶ ἄλλου τοῦ ή ὀψερ εἰκος;
Gorg. 453 e, πάλιν δ' εὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰτῶν τεχνῶν λέγουμεν ὀνσερ νῦν δή.
Stallbaum (on Apol. 27 d) cites other instances from Plato, but he is not warranted in giving them the same interpretation. Thus
Apol. 27 d, ἦ ἐκ τιων ἄλλων ὄν ὄν καὶ λέγουται is simply 'or [sprung] from some other beings, whose children accordingly they are called.'
Phædo 76 d, ἐν τούτῳ [τῷ χράνῳ] ἀπωλλυμεν φιπερ κ.τ.λ. Here the best and most MSS. have ἐν φιπερ.


§ 191. b. Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.
Meno 96 a, ἔχεις οὐν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὄσον ἰσοματος οὐ οἱ μὲν φίλοκοντες διδασκαλοῦ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.;
Politic. 271 c, τῶν βίων ὄν κ.τ.λ. πότερον . . . ἵν κ.τ.λ.;
Meno 96 c, ὠμολογήκαμεν δὲ γε, πράγματος ὁμ οὐδὲ διδασκαλοῦ μήτε μαθηταί εἰεί, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτῶν εἶναι.
Crito 45 b, πολλαχοῖ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἀν ἀφίκη.
The last of these instances is of a peculiar type, though the
former are common, and have their prototypes in Homer: cf. II. x. 416, φιλακάς δ' ἂς εἶφει, ... οὕτως κεκριμένη ῥέεται στρατιών, Od. viii. 74, ἀκτιδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν, οὐμης τής τοῦ ἄρα κλέος κ.τ.λ., xxii. 6, σκοτών ἄλλων ὄν ὀφεῖ τις βάλει ἄνθρωπον τοῖς τύχοις, xxiii. 356, Μήλα δ' α μοι κ.τ.λ., Πολλά μὲν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ λήσσομαι, ἄλλα δ' 'Αχαιοὶ Δώτωνοι (where μήλα represents ἀντὶ μῦλων). On Od. viii. 74 Nitzsch holds οὕμη to be attracted from οὐμη not οὐμην because elsewhere the attracted word is the forerunner of a principal sentence to be completed, whereas here it is in sense but part of the exegetic Relative sentence. Thus the sentence would be one on the model of Od. i. 50, Νήσος ἐν ἀμφιρύη ... Νήσος δευδρήσεσσα, or II. vi. 396, 'Ητείωνος' 'Ητείων, ὃς ἐναντικ.τ.λ.

§ 192. c. Construction changed after Relative clause by Attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction.

N.B. This principle, of Attraction to the nearest construction, extends also to other cases where there is no Relative clause. See §§ 201-203. below.

Rep. 402 b, οὐδὲ μονοσκοῖ πρότερον ἐσώμεθα οὐτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὐς φαμεν ἡμῶν παθετέων εἶναι τοὺς φίλακας.

Phaedo 66 c, ημῶν ἐστα τοῦ φαμέν ἐρασταί εἶναι φρονόσεως.

Protag. 342 b, σοφία τῶν 'Ελλήνων περιέσχεν, ὥσπερ οὖς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, τοὺς σοφιστάς.

Crito 48 c, ὃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . . , μὴ ὃς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέψιμα ἰτι κ.τ.λ.

Hir. Ma. 281 c, ἐκεῖνοι δὲν ὁνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιττακοῦ κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 200 d, ἐκείνοις ἐρὰν οὔτως ἐνομοῖο αὐτῷ ἐστιν οὔδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔστειλα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.

Apol. 41 a, εὑρίσκει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστὰς ὡσπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκα δικαίωσιν, Μίνως κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Horn. II. ix. 131, μετὰ δ' ἐσσεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπηφόρων, Κοῦρην Βρισῆος.

§ 193. It is not to be supposed that the Nouns which follow the Relative clauses in the first three of these examples are Antecedents to the Relatives. As in the fourth example the Relative has an expressed Antecedent ἐκεῖνον, so in the others it has one understood; and the Nouns τοὺς φίλακας, τοὺς σοφιστάς, ταῦτα, are respectively exegetic of the understood Antecedent. (Ταῦτα represents a Feminine Noun by another Attraction, which see below, § 201.)
§§ 194—196.]

ATTRACTION. 201

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, Κύκλωτος κεχάλωται ὁν ὀφθαλμοὺ ὄλωσεν, Ἀντίθεων Πολύφημον. Also P. xii. 18–20. To this explanation must be also conformed that of Soph. Antig. 404, ὃν σὺ τὸν μεκρόν Ἀπέισας.

§ 194. The same principle accounts for the following also.

Symp. 206 a, οὐδὲν ἐκλλὸ ἐστὶν ὁν ἔρωσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἡ τοῦ ἀγάθοι.

Phaedo 89 a, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔξειν ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον—where ἐκεῖνος is attracted from ἐκεῖνον, since it is ἔξειν and not λέγοι which requires this Pronoun as its Subject.

Symp. 199 c, καλῶς μοι ἐφοίαν καθήγησασθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν θέου αὐτῶν ἐπιδείξαι ὑποῖος τὸς ἐστὶν ὃ ἔρως, ὕπερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶ—where we should have had αὐτὸν... τὸν Ἐρωτα but for the intervention of ὑποῖος τὸς ἐστὶν, which prevented recurrence to the Accusative.

The same bias shews itself abnormally in Lysias xxv. 18. p. 173, οἷς θηρια, οὐς ἐκεῖνα παρέλησαν... ἱμεῖς ἀπολέσατο.

§ 195. d. Attraction of the entire Relative clause (i.e. of Subject and Predicate,—Copula having been omitted) to the Antecedent.

a.

Symp. 220 b, οὗτος πάγου οὗν δεινοτάτον.

Phaedo 104 a, τοῦ περίττοῦ οὗτος οἷς οἴκερ τῆς τρυάδος.

Soph. 237 c, οἴσε γε ἐρμο παντάπασιν ἄτοπον.

Legg. 674 c, οὗ' ἀμπέλου ἁν πολλῶν δεός οὐδ' ἴττιν πόλει.

Rep. 607 a, ὡςον μόνον ὤμοις ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν—

for ὡςον ποιήσεως ἐστιν ὑμοι.

Cf. Hom. Od. ix. 321, τὸ μὲν... εἰσκομεν... ὁσον θ' ἱστὼν ἡμός, x. 112, γυναίκα Εἴρων ὡσὶν τ' ὠρεος κορυφῆν. 167, Πείσμα δ' ὡςον τ' ἄργεται. Αρ. Εθ. 977, πρεσβυτέρων πιὸν οἷον ἀργαλεωτάτων. Soph. Aj. 488, πατρός Εἴπερ πιὸν σθένεσσον, 1416, ἄνδρι... ἄγαθο... κοιβεῖν πω λάφων θητῶν, Ο. C. 734, πόλιν... σθένουσαν... εἰ τ' Ἐλλάδος μέγα. Arist. Metaph. IX. iii. 1, ἀντικείμενο δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ὃν ἕνα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαιρετόν.

§ 196. b. More peculiar (because the Relative is made to agree with the Subject of the Relative clause—contrast οἷς οἴκερ τῆς τρυάδος above) are
§ 197. y. In the following the Relative clause is represented by the Relative word only, the Subject being identical with that of the main sentence and being therefore, with the Copula, omitted.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 209, ἑδύμαχ' ἣδε καὶ ἀλλοι ὅσοι μνηστήρες ἀγαυοί, —i.e. ἀλλοι μνηστήρες ἀγαυοί, ὅσοι ἔστε and Hdt. iv. 28, ἀφορητοὶ ὅσοι κρυμῦ —'frost which was insufferable,—to such a degree was it;' and ib. 194, οἵ δὲ σφι ἀφθονεὶ ὅσοι ἐν τοῖς οὖσι γίνονται' in all which instances there is no patent Attraction, but it is made possible by the Ellipse, after the Relative, of its Subject and the Copula.

Euthyd. 275 c, σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσην—'inconceivable, so great was it.'

§ 198. The Homeric Idiom with τοῖος differs—e.g. in Od. i. 209, θαμὰ τοῖον, iii. 321, 'Εσ πέλαγος μέγα τοῖον, iv. 371, Νήπιοι ... λίθ τόσον, ib. 776 and vii. 30, σιγή τοῖον, xi. 134, 'Αβδηχρός μάλα τοῖος, xv. 450, Κερδαλέων δῆ τοῖον, xx. 302, Σαρδαίων μάλα τοῖον—'to that degree;'—indicating an imagined, and therefore an intense, degree.

Τοῖον expresses the degree of the epithet preceding; our οἷος justifies the epithet being there at all.

§ 199. e. Attraction of the entire Antecedent clause (Copula omitted) to the Relative.

Charm. 175 c, οὐδενός ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀληγώτερον. So Protag. 317 c.

Politic. 308 b, οὐδαμός ὃς οὐ φήσωμεν.

§ 200. f. Attraction of the Relative into agreement with the Predicate of its own clause.

Phdr. 255 c, ἡ τοῦ ἰείματος ἐκείνου πηγή, ὃν ἤμερον Ζεὺς ἀνόμασε·

(where the Antecedent of ὃν is ἰείματος.)

Cf. the Homer "Ἡ βέμισ ἔστιν. Π. ix. 276, &c.

§ 201. C.

a. Attraction of a Neuter Pronominal Subject into agreement with the Predicate.

Apol. 18 a, δεόμαι ... τούτῳ σκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ. δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἅρετή

—where of course αὕτη refers to τούτῳ σκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 240 b, οὐκ ὅτι ἄρα ἔστιν ὄστως ἢν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

Crat. 386 c, εἰ ... ἔστιν αὕτη ἢ διήθεια (referring to what had just been agreed upon).

Minos 317 a, πολιτικά ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματα ἔστιν, οἷς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλούσιν.

Crito 48 c, διὰ δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις ... , μὴ ὃς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέψεις ὁ—where ταῦτα represents τὰς σκέψεις, but has been assimilated to σκέψεις, the Predicate of its own sentence.

Cf. Hom. Π. i. 239, σκῆπτρον ... ὁ δὲ τοι μέγας ἐσσεται ὅρκος, ν. 305, ἔθα τε μηρὸς ἵσικχ ἐνστρέφεται, κοτίλην δὲ τέ μιν κυλέουσι. Hdt. i. 86, ἀκροβίνα ταῦτα (sc. τὸν Κροίσον) καταγιέναι. Αἰσχ. P. V. 753, Ὁτῳ βανεῖν μὲν ἔστιν οὐ πεπρωμένων Ἀὔτη γὰρ ἢν ἢν πημάτων ἀπαλλαγή. So Virg. Αen. x. 828, Si qua est ea cura.

§ 202. b. Attraction of the Copula into agreement with the Predicate.

Meno 91 c, οὗτοι γε φανερὰ ἔστι λόγιοι.

Legg. 735 e, τοὺς μέγιστα ἡμαρτηκότας ἀνικτοὺς δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ ὄνταν βλάζειν.

Parmen. 134 b, πάντα, δὴ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αἰτῶς οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

Politic. 271 e, τεῖς ἐνεμεν ... , ζῶον ἐν ἐτέρον θείοτερον.

§ 203. c. Attraction of the Article of an Infinitival clause into agreement with a word preceding, with which that clause is in Apposition.

Charm. 173 e, ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐθαίμονα εἰναι τὸν ἐπιστημώνας γοντα.

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔργῳ εἰναι πάντα.

§ 204. Idioms of Sentences:—Binary Structure.

Certain Idiomatic affections of the Sentence are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one.

The immediate use of this artifice is to present the conception to the hearer in two parts, which, after entering his mind separately, will there reunite.

The ulterior use is (1) to facilitate a clear expression of a complex conception, and (2) to set before the apprehension two images of the object, as it presents itself at two successive moments; and by this means to give it the same kind of fullness with which the image of material objects is invested by "binocular vision."

This Idiom has been, in certain of its forms, ranked under Apposition. But it does not resemble it except in a nakedly grammatical point of view. Apposition forms but one description of the object, and therefore is no Binary Structure at all: in other words in Apposition the two representations are simultaneous; whereas in the Idiom before us they are substitutive; the thought has moved in the interval between them; and though the one is in some sort a repetition of the other, they are not identical.

§ 205. Examples of this Idiom in its main forms are to be found in all Greek literature; but its applications in Plato are preeminently various and subtle. These are embodied in the following classification.

A. When the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact. The mark of the Binary Structure is that the two sentences are grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton.

Note, that the first-placed sentence always contains something which is unfolded more fully, or restated in another way (sometimes with anacoluthic redundancy of construction) in the latter.

B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

Note, that the first-placed expression is sometimes the less emphatic, or at least the more general, and is introductory to the other; sometimes it is the more emphatic and sufficient, and the other follows epexegetically.
§ 206. Note, that (1) the forestalled portion thus has a degree of attention ensured to it, which, not being always self-evidently emphatic, it might otherwise fail to obtain: and (2) grammatically, the forestalled portion may be said to suffer Attraction,—Attraction, that is, out of the Dependent construction into the Principal construction.

§ 207. A. Where the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact, and grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton. (Note, that the effect of Asyndeton is always to make the connection closer; it is its office to denote simultaneity or rapid sequence.)

a. Common type of instances.

Apol. 41 a, θαναμαστὴ ἀν εἰη ἡ διατριβή αὐτῶθι,—ὅπωτε ἐντέλομι Πα- λαμήδει κ.τ.λ., ἀντιπαραβαλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνον, ὅς ἐγὼ όμω, οὐκ ἂν ἂθετε εἰη.

Symp. 198 c, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμῆρου ἐπεσώμη,—ἐφοβούμην κ.τ.λ.

Phaed. 67 e, εἷς φοβοῦστο καὶ ἀγανακτοῦν, οὗ πολλὴ ἂν ἀληγία εἰη,—εἷς μὴ ἀσφενοι ἐκεῖν ἢκεν ὥς κ.τ.λ. ;

Ib. 68 d, οὐ ταῦτα τοῦτο πεσόνθει,—ἀκολούθα τινι σώφρονες εἰσιν ;

Ib. 73 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δόματο παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος,—ἀναμνησθῆναι.

So too 74 a, Gorg. 513 c, 519 b, Phileb. 46 c, Menex. 235 b,—in all of which the first-placed expression is formed with πᾶσχειν.

Ib. 70 a, [ψυχῇ] ἐκεῖν ἦ ἡμέρα διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύσθαι, ἦ ἂν ἀνθρώπος ἀποθάνῃ,—εἰ θείς ἀπαλλαγμένη τοῦ σώματος . . . . οἶχηται διαπρομένη καὶ οἴδην ἔτι οἰδαμοί ἦ. Here the sentence εἰ θείς . . . . ἦ is the complete double of the sentence ἐκεῖν . . . . ἀποθάνη.

Ib. 86 b, τοιοῦτον τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν . . . . εἰσι, —ὡσπερ κ.τ.λ., κράσιν εἰσί τούτων κ.τ.λ.;

Gorg. 505 c, ἢν μοι τοῦ τοῦ Ἐπιλάρμου γένηται,—ἀ πρὸ τοῦ διὸ ἄνδρες ἠλεγον, εἰς ὅν ἰκανὸς γένομαι.

Phileb. 35 e, (Α) τι δ', ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τοῖτων γένηται; (Β) Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ; (Α) Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀληγῆ κ.τ.λ.;
DIGEST OF IDIOMS.  [§§ 208, 209.]

Legg. 697 a, τό ἰδιαὶ διελεῖν . . . πειραθώμεν, — διατερεῖν χωρὶς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα.

Ib. 708 b, ὅταν μή τῶν τῶν ἐσμῶν [ὁ κατοικισμός] γίγνεται τρόπον,— ἐν γένοις ἀπὸ μᾶς ὑπὸ χώρας οἰκίζομαι.

This Idiom begins with Homer: see Od. viii. 339, Ἀι γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὡς ἡ ἄκατηθᾶλ "Ἀπολλοῦ, — Ἀπειρόν μὲν τρίς τόσοι ἄσπεροιν ἄφις ἔχοιεν, . . . Αὐτάρ ἐγών εὐθομία παρὰ χρυσὴν Ἀφροδίτην. Cf. Aristoph. Lys. 1219, εἰ δὲ πάντα δεῖ τούτῳ ὅριν, 'Υμῶν χαρίζεσθαι, ταλαπωρήσομεν.

Virtually similar is

Apol. 20 c, οὐ γὰρ δῆτον σοῦ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων περατότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη . . . γέγονεν,— εἰ μὴ τὰ ἐπαρτατο πόλοι ή οἱ πόλοι; (for σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένου is a virtual protasis, of which εἰ . . . πόλοι is the double.)

Cf. Thuc. v. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλές ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆμαι ἄν παράσχοιτε . . ., εἰ μὴ περιγένεσθε.

§ 208. b. 13 Instances involving anacoluthic redundancy.

Phileb. 13 b, οὔτε γὰρ τινὰ συγχρήσασθαι,—θέμενος κ.τ.λ., εἰτα ἀνέξι-

σθαί σου λέγοντος κ.τ.λ.;

Crito 45 c, μή δόξη ὅταν τὸ πρόγμα . . . ἀνανδρίᾳ πεπράχθαι . . . —

κακία καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ διαπεψευδόντα ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν.

Apol. 26 c, οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ,—οὐδένα νομίζω θεύν εἶναι; [So Oxon. 

alone. See note at p. 69, above.]

Legg. 859 d, εἶναι τοὺς δικαίους ἀνθρώπους, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνωσι κ.τ.λ.,—

κατ᾽ αὐτὸ γε . . . παγκάλους εἶναι.

Ib. 933 b, ἐπιχείρειν πείθειν, ἂν ποτὲ ἄρα ἰδωσι κ.τ.λ.,—ὁλιγωρεῖν τῶν τουτών διακελεῦσθαι.

§ 209. c. In Similes or Comparisons. In such cases there is great 

tendency to the Binary Structure: the fact illustrated is stated 

(perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it. 

Note, that in these cases the pre-statement is often broken off 

or merely hinted at, so that the full sense is first expressed in the 

re-statement. (This is especially noticeable in expressions involving 

δοκεῖ or the like.) The instances in other authors begin with Homer: 

e. g. Π. ix. 13, ἂν δὲ Ἀγαμέμνων ἰστατὸ διακρυχέων, ὡστε κρήνη μελίνω-

δρος . . .,— Ως δὲ βαρὺ στενάχων ἐπεὶ Ἀργείωνι μετηύδα. Cf. also Soph.

12 [In the margin of the MS. is written—"Quære. Are these really distinct 

from those given in § 207?"]
§§ 210, 211.] BINARY STRUCTURE.

Ajit. 840, Kai σφάς . . . . Ξυναρπάσειν, ὡσπερ εἰσορῶν ἐμὲ Αὐτοσφαγή πίπτοντα,—τῶν αὐτοσφαγεί . . . . ὀλοίατο. Æed. Col. 1239, ὅδ' . . . . ὡς τις ἄκτα . . . . κλονίται,—ὡς καὶ τῶν κ.τ.λ.

V Gorg. 483 e, οὐ κατὰ τοῖτον τῶν νόμων ὅν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους . . . —ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὡσπερ λέοντις κατεπάδωστε, καταδιουλουμέθα.

Politie. 296 e, τοῖτον δεὶ καὶ περὶ ταῖτα τῶν ὄρων εἶναι . . . . ὡσπερ ὁ κυβερήτης . . . . σοκεί τοῖς συνναῦταις,—οὐτώ καὶ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον τοῖτον, κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 61 a, ὡσπερ ἐπραττόν τοῖτο ὑπελάμβανοι αὐτῷ μοι ἐπικελεύειν, ὡσπερ οἱ τοῖς θίουσι διακελεύομενοι,—καὶ ἐμοί οὐτώ τὸ ἐνύπνων ὡσπερ ἐπραττόν ἐπικελεύειν.

Ib. 109 e, κατείδικτ ἄν ἀνακύψαστα, ὡσπερ εἰσῆδε οἱ ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὰρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε,—οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεί κατείδικτ.

Crito 54 d, ταῖτα ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυφαίτιώντες τῶν αἰλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν,—καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἥχη . . . . θομισθεί.

Politie. 260 c, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε τῆς, καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.,—καὶ τὸ Βασιλικὸς γένος ὄγικεν ἀφορισθηθαί.

Crat. 417 b, ἔοικεν, οὐχὶ καθάπερ οἱ κάπηλοι αὕτῳ χρώνται,—οὐ ταύτῃ λέγειν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ λυπιστεύν.

Ib. 433 a, ἰνὰ μὴ δῆλωμεν, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν Ἀλγήνῃ νύκτιωρ περιώντες ὀψε ὀδοῦ,—καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δοξομεν αὕτη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐτω πὼς ἀληθεύναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος.

Tim. 19 b, προσέοικε δὲ δὴ τινὶ μοι τοιοῦτο τὸ πάθος, οἴον εἰ τίς . . . . ἀφικοίκο κ.τ.λ.,—ταῦτα καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἥν διηλθομεν.

§ 210. As a variation, the Binary Structure is sometimes developed in the illustration, and then there is no re-statement of the illustrated fact,—this being implied sufficiently in the re-statement of the illustration.

Phaedo 60 c, ὃ ἄν τὸ ἐπερον παραγένται ἐπακολουθεῖ ἐπερον καὶ τὸ ἐπερον ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐοικεν, ἑπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.,—ἡκεν δὴ φαῖνεται ἐπακολουθεῖν τὸ ἢδον.

Charm. 156 b, ἐστὶ γὰρ τοιαύτῃ [ἡ ἐπιφίδ] οὐα μὴ δένασθαι τῆς καθηλῶν µόνον ἐγὼ ποιείν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἵσως ἡδὴ καὶ σε ἀκήκοας τῶν ἄγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἑπειδὰν κ.τ.λ.,—λέγουσί πον ὑπὶ κ.τ.λ.

§ 211. d. Pairs of Interrogative sentences, the former of which is partly Pronominal,—a skeleton sentence, which is put forward to arrest attention, and to introduce the re-statement, of which it is
the double. The Pronominal part is the Interrogative τί, which represents the Predicate, or part of the Predicate, of the re-statement. These Binary Interrogative sentences therefore follow the general principle of Double Interrogatives in Greek; which is, that the one introduces the other,—the first-placed being always the less precise and definite.

Plldr. 234 c, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς εἰρήσθαι; —
where τί foreshadows ὑπερφυῶς εἰρήσθαι. (Cf. Symp. 204 d, ὁ ἐρωὶ τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρῷ; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ.)

Ib. 269 a, τί δὲ τὸν μελλήρην "Ἀδραστον οὐκέμεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειν κ.τ.λ.; πότερον χαλεπῶς ἢν αὐτοῦς . . . εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.;

Charm. 154 d, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεωνίκος; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;

Phileb. 27 e, τί δὲ ὁ σός [βίος]; ἐν τίνι γένει ἢν λέγειτο;

Ib. 56 c, τί δὲ λογιστικὴ κ.τ.λ.; πότερον ὡς μία λεκτέον;

Plldr. 277 d, τί δὲ αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἡ αἰσχρῶν ἐγίνετο τὸ λόγος λέγειν κ.τ.λ.; ἢ ἂν οὐ δεδίδοκε τὰ λεξάδεντα . . . ὡς κ.τ.λ.; —τί foreshadows ὡς κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἤ παρ’ ἐκείνου φαίνει;

Soph. 266 e, τί δὲ τίν ς ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἢρ’ οὐκ αἰτήρ μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκος
domēkē φησίνειν πονεῖν;

Phado 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . . ; ἢ ἂν κατὰ ταύτα ἐξεῖ, ἢ κ.τ.λ.; (where the Genitive is suspended in a loose construction, which the re-statement supersedes.)

Gorg. 474 d, τί δὲ τῶδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκατόφιτο καλά; Here the virtual Subject of the re-statement is foreshadowed by τῶδε, which therefore is Nominaive; and the Predicate by τί, which (as in all the other instances) is Accusative.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 101, τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου; Ποῦ σοι τέχνης ἔστηκεν;

§ 212. The passages also (quoted under ‘Accusative Case,’ §§ 15—19, above), in which a Pronoun Accusative is in Apposition to a whole sentence following, are virtually of Binary Structure: for the Accusative is the shadow of a sentence.

§ 213. B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

a. Where the first-placed expression is the less logically specific, or the less emphatic, and is introductory to the other.
a. Where it is a Noun-phrase.

§ 214. Where it is Pronominal.

Euthyphro 8 e, τοῦτο μὲν ἄλληθες λέγεις, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

Apol. 24 e, αὕτω τοῦτο οἴδαι, τοῖς νόμοις.

Crat. 423 e, αὕτῳ τοῖς μεμείθαι δύναιτο ἑκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν.

§ 215. Under this head come also the instances of αὑτῷ in its peculiar Platonic meaning.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 216, 217.

Symp. 199 d, αυτό τοῦτο πατέρα.
Phædo 93 b, αυτό τοῦτο . . . ψυχήν.
Protag. 360 e, τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρετή.
Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις.
Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες.

§ 216. y. Where it is a Relative clause.

Rep. 402 b, οὐτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὗ φαμεν ήμῶν πατεντέον εἶναι, τοὺς φιλάκας.
Phædo 74 d, οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ίσους. Similarly Hip. Ma.
291 c, Gorg. 469 a, Protag. 342 b, Crito 48 e, Legg. 653 c, &c.
Crat. 422 b, ᾧ ἑρωτᾶς, τὰ ὀνόματα. Similarly Phileb. 42 c.
Tim. 33 a, ᾧ ξυνιστά, τὰ σῶματα.
Hip. Ma. 294 a, ὃς πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι.
Symp. 200 d, ἐκείνου ἐρῶν, ὃ οὕτω ἐτοιμὸν αὐτῷ ἐστί οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τῶν ἑπετα ἁρύνων ταῖτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρώντα.
Theoct. 167 b, ὃ δὴ τινὲς τὰ φαντάσματα . . . ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν—'and these, I mean their opinions, some call true.'
Tim. 40 b, ἐξ ἃς δὴ τῆς αἰτίας γέγονεν ὡσα . . . ἀεὶ μένει—'and hence, from this cause namely, arise,' &c.
Legg. 647 a, φοβουμέθα δὲ γε πολλάκις δόξαν . . . δν δη καὶ καλοῦμεν τῶν φόβων ἥμεις γε . . . αἰσχύνην.

Another explanation might have been conceived of some of these passages, that they are simply cases of Antecedent and Relative in reversed order. But this would not apply to the last five; consequently, all must be referred to the principle of Binary Structure. It is to be noticed, that the operation of Attraction, probably in the three last instances, certainly in two of them, complicates the case; i. e. that the Relatives agree not with their Antecedents, but respectively with τὰ φαντάσματα, and τῆς αἰτίας. See 'Attraction,' § 201, above.

Cf., as instances in other authors, ΑEschin. i. 72. p. 10, δν . . . ἡκού-σατε τῶν νόμων. And Soph. Ant. 404, θάπτουσαν δν σύ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπείπας—'him whom thou forbadest to bury, namely that corpse' (the order is hyperbatic).

§ 217. Not to be identified with the foregoing are the following, which contain an implicit sentence, though it has been operated on by Ellipse, and in the first two by Attraction also.

Soph. 246 c, ὑπὲρ ἃς τίδεν ταῦτα τῆς οὐσίας—i. e. ὑπὲρ [τοῦ] δ τίδεν ταῦτα τῆς οὐσίαν εἶναι.
§ 218. b. Where the first-placed expression is the more emphatic and sufficient of the two.

a. Common type of instances.

Gorg. 503 e, τούτος ἄλλοις πάντας δημιουργούσ, ὡτινα Βούλει αὐτῶν.
Critias 110 c, πάνθ' ὤσα ξύννομα ζώα ... πάν δυνατῶν πέφυκεν.
Phdr. 246 c, ἢ δὲ ... [ψυχή] ... σῶμα γῆνον λαβοῦσα, ζῶον τὸ ξύμ- 
παν ἀκλήθη.
Phædo 61 b, οὗ προχειροῦσ εἶχον μίθους ... , τοίτους ἐποίησα, οὗ 
πρώτοις ἑντυχὼν.
Ib. 69 b, χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως, .... μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ τοιαύτη 
ἀρτη.
Ib. 105 a, ὃ ἂν ἔπιφέρῃ ..., αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν ἑπαντιάτη παρα-
ποτε δέξασθαι.
Crat. 408 a, τὸ ἐρμηνεύεται καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον κ.τ.λ., περὶ λόγου δύναμι 
ἔστι πάσα σοῦ ἡ πραγματεία.
Legg. 668 d, τῶν μεμημένων οὶ τοις ποτὲ ἑστιν, ἔκαστον τῶν 
σωμάτων.
Ib. 734 e, καθάπερ οὖν ἢ τινα ἑξυφήν ἢ καὶ πλέγμ' ἄλλ' ὅπιοι οὐκ ἐκ 
τῶν αὐτῶν οἷον τ' ἐστι τὴν τ' ἐφευφήν καὶ τὸν στήμαν ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
Cf. Soph. Aj. 1062, αὐτῶν ... σώμα τιμῄσσεσα ἀφαφ. 1147, Ὀὔτω δὲ 
καὶ ἢ καὶ τὸ σὸν λαίζησαι στόμα ... τάχ' ἂν τὶς ... Χειμῶν κατασβε- 
σεις τὴν πολλῆν βοήν.

§ 219. A curious variation occurs in

Protag. 317 a, τὸ ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδράσαι ..., πολλῇ 
μαρίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχειρήμασι.
Phædo 99 a, εἴ τις λέγῃ ... ὡς διὰ ταύτα ποιῶ ἀ που, ..., πολλὴ ἂν 
καὶ μακρὰ μαθυμία εἰς τοῦ λόγου.

§ 220. β. Where the first-placed expression is collective, the other 
distributive.

Symp. 178 a, τούτων ἕμεν ἔρω ἔκαστον τὸν λόγον.
Ib. 190 d, αὐτοῖς διαστεμῶ δίχα ἔκαστον.
Tim. 32 b, πρὸς ἄλληλα ... ἀπεργαζόμενοι, ὃ τι περ περὶ πρὸς ἀέρα 
τοιτὸ ἄερα πρὸς ὑδωρ, καὶ ὃ τι ἢρ πρὸς ὑδωρ ὑδωρ πρὸς γῆν.

We may trace this back to Homer: e.g. Od. i. 348, ὅστε δίδωσιν
§ 221. γ. Where the latter expression is restrictive of the former, being in fact only a re-mentioning of part of it.

Phaedo 64 b, οἴμαι γὰρ ἂν ἃδικον τοὺς πολλούς . . . ξυμφάναι ἂν, τοὺς μὲν παρὶ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάντα.

Gorg. 517 ε, δόξας καὶ αὐτῶς καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.


§ 222. δ. Where the latter expression is merely pronominal, and resumptive.

Grammatically, the pronominal resumption is (where no change of construction intervenes) a pleonasm: but rhetorically it is not redundant. Its function is to recall to the thoughts in its proper place an expression which has, for a special purpose, been set in advance of the main portion of the sentence, or which has been held in suspense by the intervention of some Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause, or some change of construction.

Instances of main portion of sentence intervening.

Theæt. 155 ε, εἰς τοὺς ἄνδρους ἄναμαστον τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεραμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν.

Apol. 40 d, οἴμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν Βασίλεα εὐαριθμήσωμεν ἂν εἰρέων αὐτὸν ταῦτα.

Rep. 375 d, οἴσθα γὰρ πον τῶν γενεᾶς κυνῶν ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἔδος.

Legg. 700 ε, τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παίδευσιν δεδογμένων ἀκούσει ἢν αὐτοῖς.

Phileb. 30 d (though the pronoun here has more force), ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφημαμένοις ὡς ἂεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει ξύμαχοι ἐκείνοις.

Rep. 353 d, τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τουατὰ πάντα, ἔσθ’ ὑπὸ ἀλλώς ἡ ψυχὴ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδούμεν;

Cf. Soph. O. T. 717, Παῦδος δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ.
§ 223. Instances of Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause intervening.

Symp. 200 a, πότερον δ ’Έρως ἐκείνον, οὗ ἐστὶν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτῷ;

Similarly Charm. 195 a.

Theaet. 188 b, ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, ἥγειται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἔτερα;

Phaedo 104 d, ἢ οἱ τι ἂν κατάσχη, ἀναγκάζει ... αὐτὸ ἵσχειν, and similarly in the next sentence.

Ib. 111 c, τοὺς δὲ, βαθύτερους ὄντας, τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἤχειν.

Alcib. I. 115 e, τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ..., ἢ μὲν κάλον κ.τ.λ., καλὸν αὐτὸ προσέπασ; Legg. 625 a, τοῦτον οὖν φαίμεν ἃν ἥμει ... , ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν κ.τ.λ., τοῦτον τὸν ἐπαμεν αὐτὸν εἰλήφειν.

§ 224. Instances of change of construction intervening.

Tim. 37 d, ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νῦκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐναντίον οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν ὑφανόν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ ἐξυπναμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὅποσοι ... ἀνόητως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἄπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαίωταν ἔσπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 13 b, κακά δὲ ὄντ’ αὐτῶν τὰ πολλά καὶ ἅγαθά δὲ, ὅμως συ προσαγορευέτες ἁγάθα αὐτα. [For it is αὐτῶν, not τὰ πολλά, which is represented by αὐτά.]

Hip. Ma. 292 d, δ’ παντὶ δ’ ἀν προσγένηται ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι.

§ 225. Note, that caution is needed before applying this explanation of the resumptive Pronoun. For instance, in Phdr. 265 c, τοῦτων δὲ τοὺς ... ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ., the τοῦτων ... εἰδοῖν is a Genitive Absolute. So Symp. 195 a, φημὶ οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων Ἐρωτα ... εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν,—πάντων ... ὄντων is a Genitive Absolute. (For the construction, cf. Laches 182 b, ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλου ἀμέμαθα αὐτῶν.) Again, Laches 182 d, τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν τοῦτο εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ μάθημα ... , χρὴ αὐτὸ μαθάνειν,—ὁπλιτικὸν is Nominative. (Cf. a similar construction Symp. 202 b.) Again, Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τοξίτου οὐ καλῶς ἤξει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτῶς ἢ ἀεὶ αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθεῖται τε καὶ προσάθλονται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἢ ἀπωθεῖσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.,—τοῦ τοξίτου belongs to the sentence ἄλλη μὲν ἢ ἀπωθεῖσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.

§ 226. C. Dependent sentence resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction and premising a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts co-ordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.
a. The premised expression may be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Enthyd. 294 c, οἶδα Εἰπεῖδημον, ὅποιος ὑπότας ἔχει;

Hip. Ma. 283 a, τεκμήριον σοφίας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσον διαφέρον σε.

Phædo 75 b, εἰδηφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἤσον, ὅ τι ἔστιν.

Theat. 162 d–e, θεοῦ . . . οὖς ἐγὼ . . . ὡς εἰσίν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἐξαιρό.

Phædo 86 d, Κέβηρος ἀκούσαι, τί αὖ ὁδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

Ib. 95 b, ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαμαι καὶ τῶν Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

Laches 179 e, εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἑμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλῶν
eὶ μαθεῖ τὸ ἐν ὀπλοῖς μάχεσθαι.

Gorg. 449 e, δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγαῖνονευ.

Note, that a very loose government suffices for the premised expression, as in the three instances following.

Soph. 260 a, δεὶ λόγον ἡμᾶς διωμολογήσαισθαι, τί ποι' ἔστιν.

Ibid. d, τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν . . . διαμάχατ' ἂν . . . ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν.

Protag. 354 a, οὐ τὰ τοιοῦτο λέγετε, οἴον τὰ τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρα-
teias κ.τ.λ.,—ὅτι ταῦτα ἄγαθά; 

In the two remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the principal sentence.

Gorg. 448 d, δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . , ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν
. . . . μεμελέτησεν.

Phædo 64 a, κυκυνεύουσιν ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. λειλήθειν τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιστήδευσιν.

The form illustrated by some of the above examples is of course common enough in all authors, beginning with Homer: cf. Od. xvii. 373, Λευτῶν δ' οὗ σάφα οἴδα, πόθεν γένος εἴχεται εἰναι, xviii. 374, Τῷ κὲ μέ οὖς, εἶ ἄλκα διήνεκεν προταμοῖρα. The looser governments are illustrated by Thuc. iii. 51, ἐβούλετο δὲ Νικίας . . . τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, ὅποις μὴ ποιώμεθα ἕσπεροι, Aristoph. Αν. 1269, Δεινὸν γε τὸν κήρυκα, τὸν παρὰ τοὺς βροτοὺς Οἰχόμενον, εἰ μηδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν.

§ 227. b. The Dependent sentence being an Infinitival one.

Legg. 653 a, φρόνησιν δὲ [λέγω, εἰναί] εἰστυχεὶς δορὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο.

Crat. 419 d, οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διώτι ῥήθηνα.

Phdr. 242 b, αἰτίος γεγενήθησαν λόγῳ τωι ῥήθηναι.

Symp. 207 a, τοῦ ἄγαθον εὐαυτῷ εἰναί ἀεὶ ἥρως ἔστιν.
In the remaining instance the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Charm. 153 b, ἡγγελταὶ ... ἡ μάχη πάνι λοχυρὰ γεγονέναι.

§ 228. Note, that Attraction occurs, where possible, in the residuary Dependent sentence also; as in the remaining instances.

Phædo 90 b, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύῃ λόγῳ τινὶ, ἀληθεὶ εἶναι.

Crat. 425 b, σὺ πιστεύεις σαντῷ, οἷος τὸ ἔννεπαι—attracted for οἶον τἴ ἔννεπαι σε.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, ἐφιθώνου τοῖς ἐαυτῶν παισιν, ὡς βελτίστως γενέσθαι.

Rep. 459 b, δεὶ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶνων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οἰον ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτετευκτῶν λόγων εἶναι.

§ 229. b. Or the premised expression may not be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

Consequently redundancy, implicit or explicit, often occurs, as in some of the instances which follow, in which † is prefixed to the words in which the redundancy lies.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Phædo 58 e, εἴδαμων μοι ἄνῃρ ἐφανετο καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεσκός καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα. [ἄνῃρ Herm. with Oxon. and most of the other MMS.]

Crito 43 b, σε ... εἴδαμωνα τοῦ τρόπου, ὡς βεβηλωσ αὐτὴν φέρεις.

Phdr. 264 d, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποζολῆς, δεὶ ἂν ψυχῆς †ἀπορρεῖ.

Symp. 172 a, διαπυθέσαθα τὴν ἀγάθωνος ἔξυνουσίαν ... περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τίνες ἦσαν.

Euthyd. 272 b, οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἡδὴ πρεσβύτερος ἢς;

Political. 309 d, τὸν δὴ πολιτικῶν ... ἀρ' ἵςμεν, ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατῶν εἶναι τῇ τῆς ἄσκησις καταγωγῆς προσαφέρεις ἐν τῷ τούτῳ ἐμποιεῖν;

Protag. 318 e, εἰσθαυλία περὶ τῶν οἰκεῖων, ὡς ἦν ... ἐφικάν ἄνωτοι.

Tim. 24 c, τὴν εἰκρασίαν τῶν ὠρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καταδύσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἀνδραὶς ὀίκοι—(sc. ὁ τότος, referred to in αὐτῷ.)

Critias 108 b, προλέγω σοι τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου διάνοιαν, ὅτι θαυμαστῶς ὁ πρότερος εὐδοκίμηκεν ἐν †αὐτῷ ποιητῆς.

Αpol. 25 e, ἀποφαινεῖ τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὧτι οὐδὲν σοι †μεμελήκει.

Meno 96 e, ὠμολογήκαμεν τούτῳ γε, ὧτι οὐκ ἦν ἄλλῳ ἔχοι.

Phædo 65 d, τῆς οὐσίας, δ ὑπαχάνει ἐκαστοῦ †δι. (Cf. § 213, above.)

Meno 72 b, μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας, δ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ.
In the three remaining instances, the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Phædo 82 a, δήλα δή καὶ τάλλα, οὐ ἤν ἐκάστη ὅιοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης—which means δήλον δή οὐ καὶ τάλλα ἦσσα, τούτεστι οὐ ἤν ἐκάστη ὅιοι κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, αὐτά δήλα τὰ παρόντα, ὅτι οἰοί τ' εἰσίν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρύτατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι—which means δήλον οἱ οἰοί τ' εἰσίν...ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τοιούτων γὰρ ἐργον ἦσσαν αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα.

Ib. 45 e, μὴ δοξῇ ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ των ή ἡμετέρα πεπρώξας, καὶ ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαιστήριον, ὅς ἡ ἐνσῆθες, κ.τ.λ.

§ 230. 3. The Dependent sentence being Infinitival.

Symp. 197 a, τὴν τῶν ἑσόν ποίησιν τίς ἐναντιώσεται, μὴ οὖχ ὦ Ἐρωτος εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ ἀγίγνεται τι καὶ φύται πάντα τὰ ἔσσα;

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖ τὸ τῶν Συμμιᾶν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους, οὐχ ὡς τοὺς ρύμμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλλης ἔχειν.

Legg. 641 d, τὸ ἄλλης διασχυρίζεσθαι, ταύτα οὕτως ἔχεν.

Rep. 489 e, διήμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἀνάγκη φύναι τῶν καλῶν τε καγάδων ἐσόμενον.

Ib. 443 b, ἄρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, ἠργεῖσα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μέθον λεχθέντων διαπεραίσκει.

Politic. 285 c, τοὺς μὲν τῶν ὄντων, ῥαδίως καταμαθεῖν, ἀισθητί τινες ὁμοιότητις πεθύκασι.

Hip. Ma. 294 e, οἶχειται ἄρ' ἡμῖς διαπεφευγός τὸ καλὸν, γρώναι ὃ τι πυρ' ἐστίν.

Crito 52 b, οὔθ ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι.

Critias 115 d, ἦσε εἰς ἕκπληξιν μεγέθεσι τε κάλλεσι τε ἔργον ἱδεῖν τὴν ἀικήτα ἀπεφιγάσαντο.

Phædo 84 c, ὡς ἱδεῖν ἐφαίνετο.

Apol. 33 b, παρέχας ἐμαυτῶν ἐρωτῶν.

Virtually similar is

Phileb. 26 b, ὑζριν . . . κατιδώσα ἢ θεός, πέρας, . . . οὖδὲν . . . ἐνών.

In the remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

§ 231. Idioms of Sentences:—Abbreviated Construction.

A. Antecedent and Relative clauses supplying each other's Ellipses.

Symp. 212 e, ὃ τι καὶ ὅπη χαῖρεις ὁνομάζων, τοῦτο ὄνομαζε—where we must supplement the Antecedent sentence thus—τοῦτο καὶ ταύτη ὄνομαζε.

Phaedo 98 a, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει—where the Relative sentence intended is fully ἢ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.

Symp. 178 a, ἃ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὅν ἐδοξέμοι μοι ἀδιομιμημένουν, τοῦτων ἔμιν ἑρῶ ἐκάστοι τῶν λόγων—where the Antecedent sentence fully is τοῦτων ἐκάστοι τῶν λόγων, καὶ ταῦτα, ἔμιν ἑρῶ.

§ 232. B. Ellipses supplied from parallel constructions in co-ordinate clauses.

Phaedo 62 a, τυγχάνει . . . ἐστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βελτιων τεθωνὶς ἢ ζην, οἷς δὲ βελτιων τεθωνὶς, θυμαστῶν . . . οἳ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὁσιὼν ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.,—where after οἷς δὲ must be supposed to be repeated καὶ ὅτε, and after τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις similarly καὶ τότε.

Pl. 69 b, τοῦτον μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ἀνοικόμενα τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα . . . μετὰ φρονήσεωι—where must be supplied φρονήσεωι καὶ before μετὰ φρονήσεωι, parallel to τοῦτον καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον.
Politic. 258 a, Θεατήτω ... συνέμειξα χθές διὰ λόγων καὶ νῦν ἀκήκοα, Σωκράτους δὲ οὐδέτερα—where the clauses supply each other crosswise; ἀκήκοα requires the Genitive Θεατήτου, and οὐδέτερα implies a Σωκράτει parallel to Θεατήτῳ, as well as a Σωκράτους.

§ 233. C. Dependent Noun silently supplied from one of two co-ordinate clauses to the other, in a new and different government.

Apol. 19 d, ἄξιω ὑμᾶς ἄλληλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν—where ἄλληλος is to be supplied to φράζειν.

Laches 187 d, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ’ ἄλληλων—where ἄλληλος is to be supplied to διδόντες.

Legg. 934 c, διδασκέω καὶ μανθανότω τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα—τὸ μανθανέτω supply παρὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος.

Protag. 349 a, σὲ παρακαλεῖν ... καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι—sc. σοὶ.

Phdr. 238 e, τῷ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἁρχαίῳ, δονείοντι τε—sc. ἐπιθυμία.

Ib. 278 e, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἁφαρῶν—sc. ἀπ’ ἄλληλων.

Symp. 195 b, μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀεὶ ἕνεκτι τε καὶ ἔστω, i. e. καὶ ἔστι τῶν νέων.

Cf. Xen. Hell. I, iii. 9, ὅρκους ἐλάβον καὶ ἔδοσαν παρὰ Φαρμακίζον.

§ 234. D.14 New Subject in the second of two clauses silently supplied from the former.

Rep. 333 c, ὅταν μηδὲν δὲν αὐτῷ χρησθαι, ἄλλα κείσθαι—sc. αὐτῷ.

Symp. 212 c, δόραν ψάφον παρασχεῖν, ... καὶ αὐλητρίδος φωνήν ἀκοίνεω—sc. αὐτοῦς, from αὐτοῖς implied by παρασχεῖν.

Ib. 187 e, ὡς ἄν τὴν μὲν ἥδον αὐτοῦ καρπώσῃ, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μηδεμιάν ἐμποίησῃ—sc. ἡ ἥδον.

Rep. 414 d, ἔδοκον ταῦτα πᾶσχειν τε, καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ—sc. ταῦτα.

Phaedo 58 b, νόμος ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πολίν, καὶ δημοσία μηδένια ἀποκτιστέναι—sc. αὐτοῖς.

Ib. 72 c, Λήμον τὸν Ἑνδύμιον ἐνδείξει καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φαινοτο—sc. Ἑνδύμιον.

Apol. 40 a, ἄ γε δὴ οἰηθεὶς ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἑσχατα κακῶν ἐτι—where the Nominative to νομίζεται is ὁ supplied from the preceding Accusative ὁ. (This is an instance of the next head also.)

14 [Under this section is written in the MS. "Illustr. from Homer:" and so under §§ 235, 269, 300, 301, 308, "Illustr.:" but the illustrations were never put in.]
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§ 235. E. Relative Pronoun, in a new and different government, supplied to the second clause.

Symp. 200 d, δ αὑτῷ ἑτοιμὼν αὑτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἔχει.
Ib. 201 a, οὐ εὑνὰθείς ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἔχει.
Phaedo 65 a, ὥμηδὲ ἦδυ τῶν ποιούσων, μὴ δὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.
Gorg. 482 b, ἀ σὺ νῦν θυμάζεις, παρῆσα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις.
Menex. 243 c, δὲν χρῆς ἐδεί μεμνησθαί τε καὶ ἐπανεῖν.

§ 236. In the following passages, the force of the Relative is still to be supplied, although a Demonstrative Pronoun fills its place in the construction.

Rep. 357 b, ἡδοναί ἵσαν ἅθλαζεσ καὶ μηθὲν διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται.
Ib. 395 d, ἄν ψαμέν κόρεσσαν καὶ δεῖν αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας ἀγαθῶς γενέσθαι.
Phaedo 100 b, α ἐὰν μικρὸν τε καὶ ἀνεξωρίεσ εἶναι ταῦτα.
Virtually similar is Rep. 337 c, πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδῶς, ἥτις ἑπτα...

§ 237. F. Common part supplied from a preceding to a subsequent clause.

a. Definite Article.

The brackets indicate where Articles have to be supplied. The complete irregularity with which they are expressed and omitted shews that the object is, next to conciseness, to produce variety of expression and sound.

Rep. 344 c, τὸ μὲν τῷ κρείττονος ἐμφεβρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει δυ, τὸ δ' ἀδικον [ ] ἑντῷ λυσίτελου.
Ib. 438 b-c, τὰ πλείω πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω ... καὶ αὖ [ ] ζωοτέρα πρὸς [ ] κουφώτερα καὶ [ ] βάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα.
Ib. 477 a, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσει, ἀγνωσία δ' ἐπὶ [ ] μὴ ὄντι.
Ib. 544 c, ἦ τε ... ἐπανομένη, ἦ Κρητικῆ ... καὶ [ ] δευτέρα ... καλομένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία.
Ib. 545 a, τῶν ἰσολόνεκον ... καὶ [ ] ὀλιγαρχείαν αὖ καὶ [ ] δημοκρατικῶν καὶ τῶν τυραννικῶν.
Phaedo 67 d, χωρίσιμοί τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπὸ [ ] σώματος. [So Oxon.]
Gorg. 469 c, καὶ τὰ γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρα καὶ [ ] τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοία.
[So most MSS.]
Symp. 186 e, ἦ τε ἱατρικῆ ... ὄσαίτως δὲ καὶ [ ] γυμναστικῆ καὶ [ ] γεωργία.
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Phdr. 253 d, ἀρετὴ δὲ τὶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ [ ] κακοῦ κακίας, ὃν διεἰσομεν.
Phileb. 45 a, μείζους γέγονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας . . . , ἢ περὶ [ ] ἵνα καθαίρῃς;
Legg. 789 c, τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττωνας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, [ ] μείζους δὲ ύπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην.
Ib. 960 c, [ ] Δάχεσθω μὲν τὴν πρώτην, [ ] Κλώθω δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν "Ατροπον δὲ τὴν τρίτην.

§ 238. b. Preposition.
Symp. 209 d, καὶ εἰς ὁμηρον βλέψας καὶ Ἑσίοδον.
Apol. 25 b, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.  So Phædo 111 d, &c.

§ 239. c. Some larger part of the clause.
Political. 308 e, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν . . . ὅσα ἐστὶ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετῆν, ἄλλ' εἰς ἀθεισμότα.

§ 240. G. Anastrophe; that is, the supplying of a word from a subsequent to a former clause. The object is, as Dissen (Pind. Nem. x. 38) remarks, to give liveliness to the sentence by strengthening the later clauses of it.
The use of this figure is more extensive in poetry than in prose; the following species of it, however, occur in Plato.

a. Anastrophe of Definite Article. (This is the converse of the usage considered under the last head.)
Rep. 491 d, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζωῶν.
Phileb. 35 e, ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζωῶν καὶ τὴν φθοράν.
Legg. 795 b, διαφέρεται μαθῶν μὴ μαθῶντος, καὶ ὁ γεννασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγονασάμενον.

Rep. 455 c, καὶ γυνὴ ἱστρική, ἢ δ' οὔ.  So 451 c.
Symp. 207 d, νέος ἀδὲ γεγονόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς—where we must supply τὰ μὲν το νέος γεγονόμενος.
Phædo 105 d—c, (Δ) τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἄν μοντικὸν μὴ δέχηται [τὶ ὑπομαχομεν]; (B) "Ἀμουσαν, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον—where before ἀμουσαν must be supplied τὸ μὲν.  So Soph. 221 c, 248 a, Phileb. 36 e, &c.
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Theat. 191 c, κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, . . . τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηρῷ, τῷ δὲ κοσμωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληρωτέρου, εὐνόις δὲ ἵγροτέρου—where before σκληρωτέρου must be supplied εὐνόις μὲν.

Apol. 18 d, ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ . . . . χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες—where before φθόνῳ must be supplied οἱ μὲν.

Cf. Hom. II. xi. 536, ὃς ἐπιπείων ὑπλέων ραβδάμιγγες ἐξαλλοὺ, Λ悠闲 δ' ἀυτ' ἐπισωφτήρων, xxii. 157, παραβδραμέτην, φείγον, ὁ δ' ὀπισθε διάκων, ix. 511, Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δῶρα φέροι, τὰ δ' ὀπισθ' ὄνομάζοι, Od. iii. 33, κρέα ὀπτῶν ἄλλα δ' ὑπειροῦν, xiv. 232, Τῶν ἐξαιρεύμην μενοεικέα, πολλά 6' ὀπίσω, λάγχανον (i.e. πολλά μὲν μενοεικέα).

§ 242. c. Anastrophe of Correlative Adverbs.

Theat. 192 d, ὧκοιῳ, . . . τότε δὲ αἰσθησιν οὐδεμιᾶν ἔχω. Phædo 116 a, διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦστες, τότε δ' αὕτη περὶ τῆς ἐξωμοφορίας διεξόντες—where before διαλεγόμενοι. So also Critias 119 d, Phileb. 35 e, Tim. 22 e.

The leaving μὲν to be supplied from an expressed δὲ in the Correlative clause is common: e.g. Rep. 357 c, 358 a, 572 a, Symp. 199 b, 201 e.


§ 244. e. Anastrophe of Prepositions.

Phileb. 22 c, τῶν μὲν οὖν νυκτηρίων πρὸς τῶν κοινῶν θίων οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπερ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δειτερείων ὃρᾶν καὶ σκοτείν χρῆ πέρι τί δράσομεν.

This kind of Anastrophe is as common in Homer as it is in later poets.

The converse usage is noticeable in peculiar instances: cf. Hom. II. xi. 374, Ἡτοί δὲ μὲν θώρηκα Ἀγαστρόφου ἵθελμοι Αἰνυτ' ἀπὸ
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στίθεσθι παναύλου ἀστίδα τ' ὤμων. And Theocr. i. 83, Πάσας ἀνὰ κράνας, πάντ' ἄλσεα, ib. 117, Οὐκ ἔτ' ἀνὰ δρύμως, οὐκ ἄλσεα.

§ 245. H. Verb supplied from a co-ordinate clause either preceding or subsequent.

Symp. 213 a, κελεύειν εἰς ἑνακαὶ, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν—in the second clause is to be supplied λέγειν out of κελεύειν.

Apol. 38 b, κελεύοντι με τριάκοντα μνών τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυ-ἀσθαι.

In the following instance the Verb is supplied after an intervening complete clause.

Symp. 183 a, ἡ χρήματα βουλόμενοι παρά τον λαβεῖν ἡ ἀρχὴν ἂρξαι ἡ τε' ἄλλην δύναμιν—where to the last clause must be supplied λαβεῖν from the next but one preceding.

In all the following it is the Substantive Verb that has to be supplied.

Symp. 186 a, ὅς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει—where ἐντί is to be supplied to μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός.

Soph. 256 e, ξύμπαντα . . . ἐρωμέν . . . οἴναι τε καὶ [supply 'are'] ὄντα.

Phdr. 234 c, σαφὴ καὶ στρογγύλα καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτελόμεντα.

Tim. 22 d, ὁ Νεῖλος εἴς τε τὰ ἄλλα σωτὴρ καὶ τότε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σώζει.

Ib. 56 b, οὖτως ὅς καθ' ἐν ἐκαστὸν μὲν . . . οὖθεν ὀρώμενον, ξυναθρο-σθένον δὲ . . . ὀράσαθα.

Legg. 872 a, ἐὰν δὲ αὐτόχειρ μὲν μῆ, βουλεύσῃ δὲ βάνατον τις ἄλλος ἐτέρω.

§ 246. I. Verb or Participle supplied from subordinate construction to main construction, or vice versa.

Phdr. 330 d, ὄσπερ οἱ τὰ δρέμματα βαλλών . . . προσεῖνοντες ἀγονοῦι—where to οἱ τὰ δρέμματα must be supplied ἀγονοῦτε.

Phædo 114 b, οἱ ἄν δόξους διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ δοῦσι βιῶναι—where to διαφερόντως must be supplied βεβαιώμεναι.

Thearet. 180 a, ὑπερβίβλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδ' σμικρὸν ἐνεώ—where to τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν must be supplied ἐνεώ.

Cf. Isocr. ix. 28. p. 194, παρακαλέσας ἀνθρώπους, ὡς οἱ τοὺς πλείο-στους λέγοντες, περὶ πεντήκοντα—where to οἱ . . . λέγοντες must be supplied λέγοντι. (Cf. Epist. ad Hebr. x. 10.) Hdt. ii. 86,
**§§ 247—249.] ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION.** 223

οὗτοι μὲν τοῦς τὰ πολυτελέστατα σκευάζουσιν νεκροῖς. Thuc. ii. 53, μίθων γὰρ ἐστίν μὲν τὰ αἰτῶν ἐκδέχει—which is to be supplemented thus—οὐκ ἐπέκρυπτη τοῦτον μὲν καθ' ἱδονὴν ποιεῖν—ἐστὶν μὲν τοῦτον μὲν καθ' ἱδονὴν ποιεῖν.

**§ 247. J.**

Apol. 18 c, δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ δύοματα οἶνον τε αἰτῶν εἰδέναι—which is to be supplemented thus—δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἄλογώτατον, ἦστιν τοῦτο, ὅτι τ.λ.

Symp. 183 b, δὲ δεινότατον, ὅσα γε λέγονσιν οἱ πολλοὶ, ὅτι καὶ ὁμίτυντι μόνον συγγράμμα.

Still more elliptical is

Phdr. 248 b, οὖν δὲ ἔνεκ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ, ἡ προσήκουσα... νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει ὑστα—i. e. οὐ δὲ ἔνεκ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ ἐστιν, ἦστιν τοῦτο, ὅτι τ.π.κ.λ.


§ 248. K. Of two Nouns in regimen, the governing Noun left to be supplied by the context, while its place in the construction is taken by the governed Noun.

Symp. 214 c, μεθύσαται ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφώτων λόγων παραζάλλειν—where μεθύσαται ἄνδρα stands for μεθύσατο τοιοῦτον λόγων.

Ib. 217 d, τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ—where ἐμοῖ stands for κλίνεσ τῆς ἐμῆς.

Protag. 310 c, οὐτ' ἀν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποιμι οὐδὲν ὀστὶ τῶν φίλων. This natural idiom begins with Homer: cf. II. xvii. 51, κόμας Χαρί-...

**§ 249. L. Complementary ἄλλος omitted.**

Theaet. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἀ νὴν διόλθομεν—where πάντα stands for 'all besides.'

Ib. 145 a, ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς... καὶ ὅσα παύδεις ἔχεται.

Phaedo 69 b, τούτον πάντα... πιπρασκόμενα—'all other' things being parted with for this.'

So τί μὴν; 'what, if not what you say?'
§ 250. M. Contrasted clause to be mentally supplied.

Rep. 475 c, οὐδ’αμόσ [φιλοσόφους φήσομεν], ἀλλ’ ἀμοίονς μὲν φιλοσό-

§ 250—253.

φος—sc. φιλοσόφους δ’ οὐ.

Thevet. 201 b, οὐδαμῶς ἐγὼ γε οὗμα [δύνασθαι διδάξαι], ἀλλὰ πέσαι

μὲν—sc. διδάξαι δ’ οὖ.

Crito 43 d, οὐ δὴ τοι ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν [so Oxon. and two more

MSS.] μὲν μου, ἥξειν τῆμερον—sc. ‘I am not sure.’

Phdr. 242 c, εἰμι μάντις μὲν, οὐ πάντως σπουδάζω, ἀλλ’, ὡσπερ οἱ τὰ

γράμματα φαίλου, ὅσον μὲν ἔμαθο μόνον ἰδιώσ.

Cf. Andoc. i. 22. p. 4, ταύτι ἐλέγειν ἢν, ἢ οὔ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἷμαι—sc. ‘but

another might not.’ (οἷμαι μὲν ἐγὼ would have been ‘I think,

but am not sure.’

§ 250*. MM. Disjunctive clause to be mentally supplied.

Crat. 389 G, ἔν τίνι αὐτῷ ἰδέαν ἀποδίδω, ἐὰν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ συνῆρσε,

[ἐὰν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.] ὃμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὀργανον.

§ 251. N. Protasis of a hypothetical reason left to be mentally

supplied.

Symp. 236 b, (A) ἔχεις εἴπειν; (B) Οὐ μέντ’ ἂν . . . ἐφοίτων παρὰ σέ

—i.e. ‘No: for else I should certainly not have,’ &c.

Phdr. 227 d, εἰθε γράψειειν κ.τ.λ.: ἢ γὰρ ἂν ἄστειος καὶ δημοφιλεῖς εἰεν

οἱ λόγοι.

Euthyd. 280 a, οὐ γὰρ ἄπειτον ἀμαρτάνοι γ’ ἂν ποτὲ τις σοφία . . . .

خرى ἢ γὰρ ἂν οἰκέτη σοφία εἰη.

§ 252. O. Hypothetical sentence ;—εἴπερ representing the Pro-

tasis.

Euthyd. 296 b, οὐκ οὖν ἡμὰς γε [σφαλεῖ], ἀλλ’, εἴπερ, σέ.

Rep. 497 c, οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ’, εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακο-

λύσει.

Legg. 667 a, οὖκ, δ’ ἤθε, προσέχων τοῦτο τὸν νοῦν δρῶ τούτο, εἴπερ.

Ib. 900 c, καὶ τὸν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῶν, εἴπερ, ὡς πολλαπλασιάσα.

Cf. Arist. Eth. VIII. iii, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αἰτῶν, ἵνα

αἰτῶς ἔχη: also ib. IX. vii, X. iii, And Aristoph. Nub. 227, ἐπείρῳ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ σοῦ της γῆς,

eἴπερ.

§ 253. P. Hypothetical sentence ;—εἰ δὲ representing the Pro-

tasis.

Symp. 212 c, εἰ μὲν βούλει, οὐς ἐγκόμιον εἰς "Ερωτα νόμισον εἰρήσθαι:

eἰ δὲ, δ’ τι καὶ ὡς θαύμα μυθικήν, τούτο ὀνόμαζε.
Euthyd. 285 c, ei μὲν βούλεται, ἐψέτω, ei δ', δ' τι βούλεται τοῖτο ποιεῖτω.

Legg. 688 b, ei μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίζων' ei δ', ὡς σουνδιζων.

A lc. I. 114 b, τι οὐκ ἀπεδείξας, ei μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν μὲ ὁσπερ ἐγὼ σε' ei δε, καὶ αὐτὸς έπὶ σεαιτού λόγγ διεξέλθε.

This ei δε does not stand for ei δε μή, in reference to the βούλει of the former clause; but refers to a βούλει of its own, with reference to the coming clause.

The usage is common in Homer: cf. Π. vi. 376, Eι 3', ἀγέ, xx.ii 381, Eι 3', ἀγέτε, ix. 46, ei δε και αἰττο, Φευγόντων κ.τ.λ., 262, Eι δε, συ μὲν μὲν ἄκονσον.

§ 254. Q. Hypothetical sentence;—suppression of Apodosis.

Rep. 575 d, οὐκον 'εϊν μὲν ἑκόντες ἵππεκώσων—' εϊν δε κ.τ.λ.

Γρογ. 520 ε, ei ει παύσας ταύτην τὴν εὐφρασίαν ἂντ' ει πείσεται—

ei δε μή, συ.

More commonly the form is 'εϊν μὲν . . . ei δε, as also in Thucy-dides.

Symp. 185 d, 'εϊν μὲν σοι ἐπαλη παύσεσθαι ἢ λύγς—' ei δε μή, κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 854 c, και 'εϊν μὲν σοι λοφά τι τὸ νόσημα—' ei δε μή, κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 325 d, 'εϊν μὲν ἑκόν πείθηται— ei δε μή, κ.τ.λ.

Ιβ. 311 d, 'εϊ μὲν εξικνηται . . .— ei δε μή, κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 287 a, 'εϊν . . . αὐτηλαμβάνωμαι—' suppose Ι' &c.

Symp. 199 e, ἀποκριναί δλίγα τλείω, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθης ὁ βούλο-

μαι' ei γάρ ἐρώτημα κ.τ.λ.—' suppose Ι were to ask, now,' &c.

Rep. 440 d, ἀλλ' ei πρὸς τούτω καὶ τοῦτε ἐνθυμεῖ . . ., στι κ.τ.λ.—

Symp. 177 b, ei δε βούλει αὐ τεκφασθαι κ.τ.λ.—

With ei βούλει, or ei βούλεσθε, the Protasis also is often curtailed.

Symp. 220 d, ei δε βούλεσθε εν ταῖς μάχαις κ.τ.λ.—where ei βούλεσθε represents ei βούλεσθε σκέφσασθαι τον Ἐρωτή ὁποῖος ἐστῖν.

Crat. 392 a, ei δε βούλει περὶ τῆς ὀρνεὺς.

Theact. 196 e, ei δε βούλει, . . . κεκρήμεθα.

Cf. Ηομ. Π. i. 580, Eιπερ γάρ κ' ἐθέλησιν κ.τ.λ., xvi. 559, ἀλλ' ei μιν ἀνεκκοιτάσαιμεθ', κ.τ.λ., xxi. 487, Eι δ' ἐθέλεις πολέμου δαμίουσαι κ.τ.λ.,

Od. xv. 80, Eι δ' ἐθέλεις. Suppression of the Apodosis is also common in Homer after etei,—as Π. iii. 59, Od. iii. 103, viii. 236.

§ 255. R. Form of Apodosis of a Hypothetical represented by ἃν, the Verb or Participle being understood.

Phædo 98 c, ἐδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὁσπερ ἃν ei τις . . . λέγοι.
In this common phrase the ἂν represents not so much a particular sentence, such as e.g. here πεποήθος ἂν εἶ ὑς, but rather a vague sentence such as τὸ πράγμα ἂν εἶ.

Apol. 29 b, τοῦτῳ καὶ ἐπαναθή ἵσως διαφέρω... ... καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερῷ τοῦ φαίνῃ εἶναι, τοῦτῳ ἂν—sc. σοφώτερος ἂν φαίνῃ εἶναι—but this suppression is a graceful escape from the appearance of self-assertion.

Politic. 308 c, εἰ τις πράγμα ὑποῖν,... κἂν εἰ τὸ φαύλοτατον, ... ἐξεισέγεισθαι. Here the κἂν... φαύλοτατον is exegetic of ὑποῖν—'any whatever, so that even if you understood it of the vilest it would mean that.' The κἂ is hyperbatically placed, and belongs to the εἰ clause.

Synp. 221 c, διόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἑξωθεν περιαμπέχουσα, Σατύρου ἂν τω διὰ υἱομποστοῦ δορῶν—'something [like] what a satyr's hide would be.' In this instance, as also in the last, it is a Participle, not a Verb, which is to be understood.

Rep. 468 a, τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τέρτὶ τὸν πόλεμον; πῶς ἐκτένω κ.τ.λ.; Λέγ', ἐφη, ποί ἂν;

§ 256. S. Condition or Reason referring to an implicit Proposition.

Phædo 61 b, Εἶπε γράμε... ἂν σῳφρονῇ ἐμὲ διώκειν—'tell him to follow me,—which he will do if he is wise.'

Synp. 173 d, ὃπόθεν... τὴν ἐπονομαίαν ἐλαβε... ... οὐκ οἴδα ἔγογγε' ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοὺς λόγους αἰέ τουοῦτος εἰ—'I do not know how you came by it, but at all events it suits you; for' &c.

Theaet. 158 a, οὐκώ ἐπείν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω δ τι λέγω' ἐπεί κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 333 c, αἰσχυνομένην ἂν ἔγογγε τούτῳ ὀμολογεῖν' ἐπεί πολλοὶ γέ φασι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 335 c, εἴμι' ἐπεί καὶ ταὐτ' ἂν ἵσως οὐκ ἀπόδεικτα Σου ἕκονον.

§ 257. T. Direct conjunction of one or more particulars with a clause covering the rest.

a. In summarily breaking off enumeration of particulars.

Phædo 100 d, ἡ έκείνην τοῦ καλοῦ ἐίτε παρουσία ἐίτε κοινωνία ἐίτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευόμην.

Logg. 834 c, ἐίτε τριετηρίδες ἐίτε αὖ διὰ πέπτωτων ἐτῶν ἐϊθ' ὅπη καὶ ὅπως ἂν... ... διανεμηθοῦσαν.

Tim. 48 c, τὴν μὲν περὶ ὑπάντων ἐίτε ἄρχον ἐίτε ἄρχας ἐίτε ὅπη δοκεῖ.

Crito 50 a, εἶτ' ἀποδιδόμθεκεν, εἴθ' ὅπως δὲι ύπομάκατο τούτο.

| Apol. 41 b, ὄθυνσεν ἡ Σάμυφον ἡ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι. |
Phaedo 70 e, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον [πυγχάνει όν], καὶ ἄλλα ἢ μυρία οὕτως ἤξει. Similarly Phaedo 73 d, 94 b, Gorg. 483 d, Legg. 944 b.

Protag. 325 a, ἀπαισισίην, καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ τῷ ὀσιόν εἶναι, καὶ συλήζον ἐν αὐτῷ προσαγαρεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν.

The peculiarity of these contracted forms of expression may be appreciated by comparing the following regularly composed sentence:

Protag. 358 a, εἶτε γὰρ ἢδυ εἶτε τερπνῶν λέγεις εἶτε χαρτῶν, εἶτε ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνομαξών, ὦ θελτυτε Πρόδικε, τούτῳ μοι πρὸς ὅ βοιλομαι ἀπόκριναι.

The contracted forms give us always the feeling of abbreviation, as if the speaker was himself impatient of prolixity.

Gorg. 494 d, (A) φημὶ τῶν κνώμενοι Ἦδεως ἄν βιώναι. (B) Πότερον εἶ τήν κεφαλήν μόνον κυπηφό, ἢ ἢτι τε σε ἐρωτῶ; Apol. 20 d, οἴτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν … μεἴω τινα ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶλεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω.

§ 258. b. In summary transitions to one particular.

Legg. 715 c, τοὺς ἄρχοντας … ἐπηρέτας … ἐκάλεσα οὗ τὶ κανονομίας ὀνομάτων ἑνεκα, ἀλλ' ἡγούμαι κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν … ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνελπιστῶν μοι γέγονε τῷ γεγονός τούτῳ.


Hip. Ma. 281 c, (A) τί ποτε τὸ αἵτιν ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ … φαίνονται ἀπεχθεμένοι … ; (B) Τί δ' οἴει ἄλλο γε ἡ ἠδίνατο ἤσαν; Phaedo 63 d, (A) σκεψώμεθα τί εὐτίν ὁ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πᾶλαι εἰπεῖν. (B) Τί δὲ ἄλλο γε ἡ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων κ.τ.λ.;

§ 259. U. Use of πολλοῦ δεῖ instead of οὗ.

In the regular or full construction πολλοῦ δεῖ is either interjected parenthetically, or subjoined, to strengthen a negation. But, in the instances which follow, a Negative is dropped out, and the πολλοῦ δεῖ made to fill the same place in the construction which the Negative filled.

Rep. 378 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ μεθολογητέον …, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.
Symp. 203 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπαλὸς …, ἄλλα σκληρῶς. Fully and regularly this would have been σιχ ἀπαλός,—πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ,—ἄλλα σκληρῶς.

Q 2
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 260—262.

§ 260. V. Extension of the government of a Verb, irrationally, so as to admit of the addition of an afterthought to a Participial clause without a new construction.

§ 261. W. Two Participles, representing the reciprocal action of two parties, made to agree each of them with both conjointly,—to avoid specification in set terms.

§ 262. Idioms of Sentences:—Pleonasm of Construction.

From instances of Pleonasm must be excluded

1. Cases in which the force of a word has been attenuated by its frequent use in that particular connection; e.g. ἐίναι subjoined to ἐκὼν and the like:

2. All cases in which redundancy has resulted from Change of Construction, or from Binary Structure:

3. Cases of fullness of Construction: e.g.

Phaedo 62 a, τοιτὸ μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων—which is simply the full form of which μόνον ἀπάντων would have been an abbreviation; as ‘distinct from all the rest’ is more accurate than ‘distinct from all:’

Or the use of ὀστὲ with the Infinitive, following δύναμαι &c.

Or the use of a deliberate form of speaking, as in

Apol. 19 b, τι δὴ λέγωτε διέβαλλον οἷ διαιδήλλοιτες;

Ib. 34 d, ἐπιεικὴ ἂν μοι δοκῶ . . . λέγειν λέγον κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 36 a, οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῖτο.
§ 263. A. Pleonasm of particular words.

a. Of the Negative.

a. In the same clause.

Rep. 339 b, oîpaw ðhλων oîd' ei meγάλη.

Ib. 389 a, oîkoîn 'Oμήρον oîdē tà toiaúta àpodeξόμεθα.

Crito 43 b, ou 'μα τών Δ' oîd' άν αίτων ἥβελον.

Euthyd. 279 a, oîdē sêmuν ðvðρος πάνυ τι oîdē toîtò êoîκεν êinav εîporeíν. So Phaedo 115 c.

Politic. 300 e, μηδὲν πλήθος μηδ' ἡντινοῦν δικατῶν λαξεῖν τέχνην.

Phaedo 100 a, ou 'μα τών Δλα ou σφόδρα.

Hip. Ma. 292 b, oû moi dokei, ð 'Ιππία, oûk, ei taîtά ye àpokri- naîmèn.

Lysis 221 c, oûk ἄν, ei γε τό κακῶν κ.τ.λ., oûk ἄν ἦν κ.τ.λ.

Crat. 398 e, ou'd' ei τι οἶδας τ' ἄν εἶπ̣ ἐιρέων, ou sînsteîṇ.

Euthyphro 4 d, oît' ei ð τι μάλιστ' àpêktenên, ... ou deîn.

Cf. Hom. Π. ii. 86, &c.

The usage is common, of course, where the Negative is distributed to subdivisions of the sentence, as in

Thucid. 163 a. ἄλλ' ou δικαίων oîte ou oît' ἄν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.

The object of the Pleonasm is, after premising the Negative as an announcement of the general form of the sentence, to place it also in close contact with the word which it immediately concerns.
§ 264. \( \beta \). Not in the same clause. In this case the repetition seems almost 15 irrational.

Apol. 27 ε, ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἂν ὡς οὐ, κ.τ.λ., οὐδεμιᾶ μηχανὴ ἑστι.

Legg. 747 δ, μὴδὲ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς λαμβανότω περὶ τόπων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλον πρὸς τὸ γενόμεν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους· οἷς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετήτην. οἱ μὲν γε πόν διὰ πνευματα κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Antipho vi. 10. p. 142, ὥστε ὅστις οὐκ ἄλλα κατηγορεῖ ἢ ἃ διώκει ἐν πράγματι τοιοῦτο, πιστεύσαι ὅπην αὐτῷ ἀξιώτερον ἐστιν ἡ ἀπιστήσαι —where οὐκ is irrational.

§ 265. \( \beta \). Of Prepositions.

Phdr. 278 α, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις . . . ἐν μόνοις τὸ ἐπαργές εἶναι.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 53, ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι γενέσθαι ἡ ὑμίν.

§ 266. \( \epsilon \). Of Conjunctions.

Symp. 210 \( \beta \), καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὴς ὃν τὴν ψυχὴν τις καὶ ἐὰν σμικρῶν ἄρθος ἔχῃ.

d. Of ἄν.

Phdr. 276 b, τῇ γεωργικὴ χρώμενος τέχνη ἃν σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσήκον ἀγαπᾶ ἃν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 31 a, κρούσατες ἃν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ὁμίλιος ἃν ἀποκτεῖναι.

c. Of ἔφη, &c.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὐ ἃν ἔχει, φάναι, ὡς Ἀγάθων.

Tb. 190 c, λέγει ὅτι Δακῶ μοι, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.

§ 267. B. Resumption of a Noun, where no Change of Construction has intervened, by Oblique Cases of αὐτός.

See under 'Binary Structure,' § 222, above.

§ 268. \( \epsilon \). Pleonasm in sentences of Contrast.

Politic. 262 a, τὸ ἐγνώμενον ἐν διπλασίῳ τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσεις ἐγνώσθαι.

Legg. 805 a, ἡμίσεως πόλις ἄντι διπλασίας.

Tim. 39 c, ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν.

Phædo 58 a, πόλαι γενομέναι αὐτῆς πολλῷ ύπερευς φαίνεται ἀποθανόν.

Tb. 7 c, ἐκ μείζονος ὅποτε πρότερον ύπερευς ἐλάσσων γενόμενω.

13 Cf., perhaps, Thucyd. iii. 36, πόλιν ὃλην διαφεύραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς.
§§ 269—271. CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

Soph. 219 b, ὀπερ ἐν μῇ πρότερον τίς ὅν ὑστερον εἰς οὖσιάν ἔγγ. So 263 b.


Phædo 64 c, ἡν ἄρα καὶ σοι ἐξυνδοκῆ ὀπερ καὶ ἔμοι.

Ib. 76 ε, ἀναγκαίοι, οὕτως ὀπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχήν ἔβαι.

Cf. Xen. Anab. II. i. 22, καὶ ἡμῖν ταῖτα δοκεῖ ὀπερ καὶ βασιλεῖ, Hom. II. vi. 476, δότε ἡ καὶ τὸνε γενέσθαι Παῖδ' ἐμόν, ὡς καὶ ἐγώ περ, ἀρπρεπεία Τρώεσσι, (and more in Heindorf, on Phædo 64 c).

§ 269. D. Pleonasm in stereotyped phrases.

Phædo 91 d, πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις καταρέψασα.

Ib. 99 b, πολλῇ καὶ μακρᾷ ῥαθυμία.

Ib. 79 e, ὀλφ καὶ παντί (perhaps).

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐγγιγγοροί μήτε εὕδους κύρτους ἄργον θήραν διαποσμένους. (This perhaps approaches nearer to Hyperbole—for which see § 317, below.)

§ 270. Idioms of Sentences:—CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

A. As to Cases of Nouns.

a. Nominative Absolute—in exposition.

Soph. 266 d, τίθημι δόο διχή ποιητικῆς εἴδη. θεία μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη κατὰ βάτερον τμῆμα, κατὰ δὲ βάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ, τὸ δὲ ὀρμωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

Ib. 218 e, τὸ δῆτα προταζαίμεθ' ἀν εὐγροστὸν καὶ σμικρὸν . . .; οἶον ἀσπαλειτής.

§ 271. b. Inversion of government.

Theæt. 192 a, δεὶ ὅδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἄρχῆς διοριζομένους.

| Apol. 21 c, διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὕτως ὁ ἄνὴρ κ.τ.λ. |
| Legg. 811 c, ἀποθέλεσα πρὸς τοὺς λόγους . . ., ἔδοξάν . . . μοι . . . εἰρήσθαι. |

Ib. 922 b, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἴπειν, ἐλέψας κ.τ.λ.

Philob. 49 b, πάντες ὁπόσιοι κ.τ.λ., ἀναγκαστάτων ἐπεσάθαι τοὺς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 173 d, σπουδάι δ' ἐταιρεῖσθαν ἐπ' ἄρχᾶς καὶ σύνοδῷ καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αἰλητρίαι κόμω, οὐδέ δὲναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.
Symp. 208 c, oί δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν—εἰσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—τοῦτον ὅταν τις κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 474 e, καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους...οὔ δὴπον ἐκτὸς τοῦτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλὰ.

Rep. 565 d–e, ὃς ἁρα ὁ γενομένους τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου σπλάγχνου..., ἀνίγκῃ δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα...οὔ περὶ τοῦτον ὁ λόγος αὐτώς εἶναι.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἢν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγενώσκειν χρεών.

§ 272. c. Different governments, either of them regular, brought together into one sentence.

Rep. 378 d, τοιαύτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εἴδος καὶ γέρουσι.

Ib. 566 e, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐκθροὺς τοὺς μὲν καταλλαγῇ τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ.

Symp. 203 a, διὰ τοῦτον πᾶσα ἐστὶν ἡ ὁμιλία...θεοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐγγηγοροῦσι καὶ καθεύδουσι—the words καὶ ἐγγηγοροῦσι καὶ καθεύδουσι referring to ἀνθρώπους.

Phaedo 88 c, εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλέων οὐ μόνον τοὺς προειρημένους λόγους, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑπότερον μέλλοντα μῆδησθαι.

§ 273. d. Change to a previous construction.

Rep. 413 e, τῶν ἀκριματον ἐκθαίνοντα καταστατέων ἀρχοντα...καὶ τιμαὶ δοτέων καὶ ζωντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι...γέρα λαγχάνοντα.

§ 274. e. Change to a Genitive Absolute.

Rep. 590 d, ἐμεῖνον παντί...ἀρχεσθαί, μᾶλλον μὲν οἰκεῖον ἐχοντος κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 755 d, τούτους εἶναι στρατηγοὺς..., δοκιμασθέντων καθόπερ οἱ νομοφύλακες.

§ 275. f. The following are simple Anacolutha, reducible to no principle whatever.

Legg. 823 d, εἴθε ὑμᾶς μήτε τις ἐπιθυμία...ποτε λάβοι...μήτε ἐγγηγοροῦσι μήτε καθεύδουσι κύρτοις ἄργοι θήραι διαπονομένους.

Critias 116 d, νεώς ἦν σταδίου μὲν μήκος, εὗρος δὲ τρυπῇ πλέθρος.

§ 275*. AA. As to Number of Nouns and Pronouns.

a.

Phaedo 62 a, τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ...ἐστὶν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βιλτιοῦ.
§§ 276, 277.] CHANGED CONSTRUCTION. 233

Phaedo 82 a, οἱ ἂν ἔκαστη ἵνα κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοίωσης τῆς μελέτης.

Symp. 207 b, ἑρωτικῶς διατίθεμεν περὶ τὴν τροφήν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἑτοιμά ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τοῦτων διαμάχεσθαι—where τοῦτων = τοῦ γενομένου.

Protag. 345 e, ὦχ ὅσ ἂν μὴ κακὰ πονῆ ἐκώ, τοῦτων φησιν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι.

Rep. 426 c, ὡς ὀποθανομένους, ὅσ ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ. Conversely to the last two instances

Symp. 187 e, προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν προσφέρῃ, ὡπως ἂν τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπώσηται.

b. Rep. 554 a, θησαυροῖς ἄνηρ, οὐς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος.

§ 276. B. As to Verbs.

a. Original construction abandoned, after interposed clause, in favour of that of the interposed clause. (For other applications of the same principle, see ‘Attraction,’ §§ 192–194, above.)

Phaedo 107 b, τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ἵμιν εἰσίν, ὡμοὶ ἑπισκεπτέας σαφέστερον.

This change is commonest after such interposed clauses as express saying, seeming, or thinking.

Crat. 384 c, ὅτι δὲ οὐ φησὶν κ.τ.λ., ὡσπερ ὑποπτείω, αὐτῶν σκόπεων.

Phdr. 272 d, παντάπασι γάρ, ὅ καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς εἶσομεν, ... ὃτι οὐδέν ... δέοι κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 493 b, τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἐφὶ ὁ πρὸς με λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

Legg. 728 d, τὸ δὲ τρίτων, τἀς ἂν τοῦτο νοῆσει, τὴν τοῦ σῶματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμῆν.

§ 277. b. Construction changing from Infinitive to Finite Verb.

Symp. 177 c, τὸ ... Ἐρωτείς μὴ δέναι τὸν ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι ἀξίως ἑμνήσαι, ἄλλ' οὕτως ἱμέληται.

Ib. 184 b, ἔστι ... νόμος, ὡσπερ κ.τ.λ., οὗτο δὴ καὶ ἀλλή μία μόνη δουλεία ἐκάστους λειτείται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος.

Apol. 19 e, τοῖτων ἐκαστὸν οἶdos τε ἐστὶν ἵνα εἰς ἓκαστήν τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προκά ἔπειναι ὃ ἂν βοιλωται, τοῖτως πείθουσι κ.τ.λ.

Theaet. 190 d, αἰ μαία δύνανται τὰς ὀδύνας μαθηκατέρας ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὄν δόξῃ ἀμβλύσκειν, ἀμβλύσκουσι.
§ 278. c. Construction begun afresh with Conjunction or Relative, after intervention of a Participial or Adverbial clause.

Legg. 810 d, κελεύεις γάρ δή με, τῆς αὐτῆς όδου ἕκθειομαι γεγονόν τολοθος, ίσως δ’ οὐκ ἑλάθτοσιν ἑτέρως προσφυλοῦσθα , μεθ’ δ’ οὖν δια-κελεύει με κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 b, χωρίς μὲν τοῦ ἑσπερῆθα τουαύτου ἐπιτηδεύου, οὖν ἔγω οὐδένα μῆποτε εἰρήσω, ὅτι δὲ καὶ πολλοίς δάδω κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 457 b, εάν δέ, οἷμα, ῥητορικός γενόμενος τις κάτα ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ.

§ 279. d. Construction begun with ὅτι, after Verbs of knowing or saying, and finished without regard to it.

Gorg. 481 d, αἰσθάνομαι σου ἐκάστοτε . . ., ὅτι ὑπόν’ ἄν ψῆ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπος ἄν ψῆ ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλεγεῖν.

Legg. 892 b, εἰπὼν ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆμα πειραθῆναι κατ’ ἐμαυτόν.

Crito 50 b, ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις ; Protag. 356 a, εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι ὅτι Ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει.

§ 280. Often, from the frequency of this use with οὖν, and with λέγω or εἰπὼν, ὅτι becomes in such contexts a mere expletive.

Rep. 501 a, οὖνίθ’ ὅτι τούτῳ ἄν διενεχεῖν.

Apol. 37 b, δὖν εὖ εὖ’ ὅτι κακῶν οὕτων.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὖ ἄν ἔχοι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 189 a, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μᾶλ’ ἐπαύσατο.

§ 281. C. As to Oratio Obliqua.

a. Change from Indicative to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Gorg. 517 c–d, σε ... οἶμαι ... εὐρωκέναι ὡς ... ἡ μὲν ἔτερα διακονικὴ ἐστίν, ὥς διανυϊν εἴναι εκπορίζειν κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 391 c–d, μηδ’ ἔωμεν λέγειν, ὡς Ὑθεσίος ... ἀφρίσχων οὖτος ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἄρταγάς, μηδέ τιν’ ἄλλου ... ἡμων τολμῆται ἄν κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 164 d, δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακείσθαι ... ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρε, ὡς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὅρθον οὖσος τοῦ προσφήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δειν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἄλληλους.

Laches 198 b, ἡγούμεθα ... δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.: δέος δὲ παρέχει κ.τ.λ.: δέος γὰρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.
§ 282. b. Change from Indicative to Optative Oratio Obliqua.

Protag. 327 c–d, ei δει αυτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μὴ παιδεία ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ εἶν τὰ γῆρια.

Phædo 95 c–d, οὐδὲν καλὸς ἐν θάνατα μηρὲν . . . . ὅτι πολυχρώματι τέ ἐστιν ἴπολη κ.τ.λ.: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τί μᾶλλον ἤν ἀδάνατον κ.τ.λ.· καὶ τάλακερομείνη . . . ζῷον κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 96 b, ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέξαλλον σκοπῶν . . . . πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τοῦτον δὲ γίγνετο μυήμη.

Phdr. 241 b, ὃ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται κ.τ.λ., θανατήκως . . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἀρα ἐδει ποτὲ ἐμοί . . . χαρίζεσθαι . . . , εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἀναγκαίον εἰς κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 301 d, δόξαι εἴχομεν περὶ ἐμὸν τὸ καὶ σοῦ, ὅσ᾽ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν ἐστὶν, τοῦτο δὲ, ὃ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἶν, οὐκ ἀρα ἐδεικνύον ἀμφότεροι.

Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ εἶ μὲν τις . . . . , τοῦτο δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον οὐνήσει σε.

Phileb. 41 d, [εἰρηταί] ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον τὸ καὶ ἤπτον ἀμφοὶ δέχεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴη.

Charm. 156 d–e, Ζάμολξις, ἐφη, λέγει ὅτι . . . . οὐ δεὶ κ.τ.λ., ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἰτίον ἐις κ.τ.λ.

It should be observed, however, that the Optative in these passages is not simply the effect of Oratio Obliqua: for some of the passages are in Present time. The emergence of the Optative marks the transition from fact to inference; it indicates that we are not called upon to accept an additional assertion, but only to follow one step further in the direction already supposed. This is the principal account to be given of this change of construction: it may be, however, that a subsidiary cause is the increasing need, as the sentence unwinds, of marking the dependence upon the main construction of the later and therefore more remote clauses.

§ 283. c. The contrary change, from the Optative Oratio Obliqua to the Indicative, is in Plato very uncommon; such as is found in Tim. 18 c, ἐπίθεμεν, μηχανώμενο ὡς μηθείς . . . γνώσιμο, νομαίοι δὲ πάντας κ.τ.λ.

§ 284. d. Change from Optative Oratio Obliqua to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Phædo 96 b, ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέξαλλον σκοπῶν . . . . δρ’, ἐπειδὰν κ.τ.λ., ὡς τινὲς ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ γόμα ἐκτρέφεται καὶ πότερον κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τοῦτον δὲ γίγνετο μυήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μυήμης καὶ δόξης γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. This passage exemplifies b. also (where it
is quoted). The justification of this further change to the Infinitive lies in the parenthetical ὡς τινες ἔλεγον, which usurps here the influence properly due to πότερον.

§ 285. e. Participial clause, in a sentence of Infinitive Oratio Obliqua, changing into Infinitive.

Phædo 111 c, τῶτος δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν βαθύτερον καὶ ἀνά-


πεταμένους μᾶλλον ἦ ἐν φ' ἴμεις οἴκοιμεν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ χῶσμα . . .

ἐλαττων ἐχειν.

Politic. 293 e, λεκτόν μεμιμημένας . . . , ἀς μὲν ὡς εὐνόμους λέγομεν

ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίνα μεμιμήσασθαι.

Cf. Hom. Il. xviii. 335, Ἐν δ' Ἔρις ἐν δὲ Κυδομός ὀμίλεον, ἐν δ' ὀλοὴ

Κῆρ, "Ἀλλον ζωὸν ἔχουσα ψευτήσαν, ἄλλον ἄσωτον, "Ἀλλον τεθνεώτα

κατὰ μόδον ἔλκε ποδῶιν. Od. vii. 125, ὴμφακες εἰς "Ἄθνος ἄφωείται,

ἐτερα δ' ὑποπερκάζουσιν.

§ 286. D. Inversion of the Antecedent clause, so that the Pronoun in it does not refer to the Relative foregoing, but to some other word in the Relative clause.

Thetet. 201 b, οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντο τινες . . . , τοῦτος δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ.,

where τοῦτος refers to τινες.

Phædo 70 e, ἅρα ἄναγκαιον, ὅσοις ἐστὶ τι ἐναπτί, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν

αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ.;—αὐτὸ refers to τι.

Lysis 219 d, ὃ ἐν τίς τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσῃ . . . , ἅρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἄν

περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῶσθο.

Phædo 105 b, ὃ ἐν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγενηται, θερμῶν ἔσται ;—sc. τὸ

σῶμα.

Symp. 204 b, ὅν δὲ σὺ φήσῃ "Ἐρωτα εἶναι, θαυμαστῶν οὐδὲν ἐπάθες.

§ 287. Idioms of Sentences:—Arrangement of Words and Clauses.

A. Hyperbaton.

The displacement of the natural order of words, which is called Hyperbaton, is not of capricious adoption. Its use is 1. to increase the facility of regulating the emphasis; and 2. to enable language to represent, in a degree, the rapidity of thought, by making one expression literally catch up another.

The Hyperbaton which results from the close adherence of Pre-

positions to their cases (see below, § 298) is to be excepted from the account just given. It is the result simply of a grammatical exigency.
§ 288, 289.] ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 237

The name Hyperbaton had been given, and the fact recognised, in Plato's own time. Socrates in the Protagoras (343 c), in rectifying the explanation of the passage of Simonides, says ἰπερβατόν δέι βείναι εν τῷ ἄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως.

§ 288. a. Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 693 c, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτ' ἄν γίγνηται βήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω.

Th. 860 d, ἀκούσιος δὲ ἐκούσιον οἷκ ἡξει πράττεσθαι ποτε λόγον—where the two clauses οἷκ ἡξει λόγον and ἀκούσιος ἐκούσιον πράττεσθαι are counterchanged.

Apol. 26 a, οὗ δεύρο νῦν οἰσάγαν εἰσί.

Instances frequently occur in clauses incidental to the machinery of the dialogue,—as in

Phaedo 71 c, ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, ἔρω, ὦ Σωκράτης.

Symp. 214 c, ἄλλα, φάναι, ὦ Ἐρεξίμαχε, τῶν Ἀλκαῖαδήν.

Apol. 25 c, εἰπὲ δ' πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε. Similarly 26 c, Meno 71 d.

Symp. 212 e, ἢνα... τίν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλήν—

eιν εἰπὼ οἰτωσὶ—ἀναδήσω—ἀρα καταγελάσησθι μου ὡς μεθύοιστο; Two sentences are here counterchanged. As Alcibiades rehearses the form of words with which he intends to accompany the crowning of Socrates, he interrupts himself to justify them, and does his best to carry on the two sentences together. These, if one had been postponed to the other, would have run—"That from my own head to the head of the wisest and handsomest of men I may transfer this garland—Well! and if I shall say that,—what then! will you make fun of me?"

In trying to carry on both together, he breaks and counterchanges them, distinguishing them doubtless by difference of tone.

Even so violent a trajecction as this has its parallels in Homer.

§ 289. b. Grammatical governments intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Laches 195 a, πρὸς τί τοιτ' εἰπες βλέψας;

Symp. 191 d, ἔστιν... οἳ ἐµφύτους ἄλληλων τοῖς ἀνδρώποις.

Phdr. 249 d, ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεύρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας.

Politic. 309 a, ἵτο κακῆς βία φίσεως ἀπωθούμενα.

Phileb. 19 e, παίζαι τόν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῖτον.

§ 290. c. Pronouns (unemphatic) postponed by Hyperbaton. Politic. 261 b, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀφύσων γενέσεων αὐτοῖς τάσσοντες —where αὐτοὶ belongs to τὸ μὲν.
Theæt. 166 d, τῶν δὲ λόγων αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματι μου διώκει—where μου belongs to τῶν λόγων.
Gorg. 469 d, κἂν τινα δόξη μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγείναι δεῖν—where αὐτῶν belongs to τινα.
Plaedo 60 b, ὡς ἄτοπον ... ἔοικε τι εἶναι τούτο—where τι would normally have found its place beside ἄτοπον.

A common type is the postponement of an Antecedent τις.
Theæt. 188 α, ἀνάγκη τῶν διαξιζοῦσα διαχώζων ἡ ὡς τι οἴδειν ἢ μὴ οἴδειν.
Crito 53 b, εὖν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτερα τινα πόλεων ἐλθεῖσι.

§ 290*. cc. Correlative Conjunctions,—the former postponed by Hyperbaton.
Apol. 18 d, δοστερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογοιμένων τε καὶ ἑλέγχειν.
Ib. 28 d, οὐ ἄν τις ἐαυτῶν τάξη ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ἐπ' ἄρχοντος ταξιθῆ.

§ 291. d. Adverbs and Particles displaced by Hyperbaton.

Oὐτω.
Legg. 747 b, ἐν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν ἔχει παῖδειον μάθημα μεγάλην—
where οὕτω belongs to μεγάλην.
Theæt. 169 c, οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινῶς ἐνδέδυκε—where οὕτω belongs to δεινῶς.

§ 292. Ἴςως.
Legg. 640 c, τάχ' ἄν ὀρθὸς Ἴςως μέμφοιτο.
Symp. 194 c, τάχ' ἄν αἰσχύνοικα αὐτοῖς εἰ τι Ἴςως οἷον κ.τ.λ. That this is a trajectory of Ἴςως we have ground for inferring, 1. from the analogy of the preceding instance, 2. from the familiarity of the combination τάχ' ἄν Ἴςως, and 3. from the perfect unfamiliarity of εἰ Ἴςως.

§ 293. Ἐτι.
Symp. 187 b, οὐ γὰρ ὄπθον ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ Ἐρέσος ἄρμονία ἄν εἶη—where ἔτι is constructed with οὐκ ἄν εἶη.
§§ 294—296. ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 239

Crat. 399 a, ἐν διενεύσω ἐτι τίμερον σοφότερος τοῦ δεόντος γενέσθαι—
ἐτι with σοφότερος.
Tim. 53 d, τὰς δ' ἐτὶ τοῦτων ἄρχας ἀνωθεν θεός οἶδε.

§ 294. Μέντοι intrusive, i. e. displacing rather than displaced.

Phdr. 267 c, Ὑπαγορεύει δὲ, οὐ δόξητε, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαύτ', ἀπά; 
Apol. 35 c, μὴ οὖν ἀξιοίτε με τουαίτα δεῖν πρὸς ὡμᾶς πράττειν, . . . 
ἀλλως τε μέντοι νῦ ᾿Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσθειας φεύγοντα. The phrase ἀλλως τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the words μέντοι νῦ ᾿Διά, which could have found no other convenient place. It is because ἀλλως τε πάντως καὶ had become a fixed phrase that it can suffer this Tmesis without bringing the sense into doubt. In the disengaged μέντοι νῦ ᾿Διά another familiar sequence (as pointed out by the Zurich editors, coll. Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a,) is to be recognised.
Cf. Ar. Nub. 788, Τίς οὖ ἐν ᾿Η ματτόμεθα μέντοι τάλφατα ;

§ 295. Γε intrusive.

Crito 48 a, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ φαίη γ' ἀν τις οἶοι τ' ἐίσων ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτηνώναι. It might seem at first sight improbable that this γε should not belong to the clause within which it stands. But we have ground for recognising a trajectory here 1. in the sense, which is not helped by γε with φαίη 2, in the familiarity of the sequence ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . . γε, coll. Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d: and 3. in the consideration that φαίη ἀν is not consciously to the speaker a separate clause; that is, it is a parenthesis so familiar that it does not interrupt the thought. It is parallel to Phædo 59 c, τίνες φης ἦσσαν ὃι λόγοι; Euthyphro 15 a, τι δ' οἴει ἀλλο ἢ τιμή; Symp. 216 d, πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει . . . . σωφροσύνης; and to the instance next following. (It is plain that in all these cases the meaning does not admit of separating off the parenthetic Verb by commas.) Moreover we find the ἀν preceding the φαίη, as in Phædo 87 a, τι οὖν, ἀν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἐτι ἀπιστεῖς; but ἀν could not commence the clause if it were consciously regarded as distinct.

Gorg. 492 e, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βιός.

§ 296. Ἅν, anticipated Hyperbatically with οἷμαι and the like.

Apol. 32 e, ἄρ' οὖν ἄν με οἷεσθε τοσάδε ἐτη διαγενέσθαι; 
Phædo 64 b, οἷμαι γὰρ ἀν δὴ τούς πολλοῖς . . . δοκεῖν.
Soph. 223 a, τὸ προσήκον ὅψομ' ἀν ἡγούμαi καλεῖν αἰτῶν.
§ 297. e. Prepositions postponed by Hyperbaton.
Legg. 711 e, ὄσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐξυπάθης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτῶς πέρι λόγος.
Soph. 265 b, καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἴδεσιν.
Phædo 83 e, οὐχ δὲν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασί.
 Cf. Andoc. i. 117. p. 15, ὃν ἐπὶ αὐτῶν εἶνεκα ἐπεζουλεύθην.

§ 298. f. Prepositions intrusive; that is, retaining their place next to the Adjective prefixed to their Substantive, to the exclusion of Adverbs and the like which qualify that Adjective.
Rep. 391 d, οὐτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγάς.
Ib. 395 b, ἐπὶ τοῦτον εἰς σμικρόσερα.
Ib. 397 b, διέλογον πρὸς τὴν αὑτὴν.
Symp. 195 c, ἐξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς—for ἐν ἐξῆς πάσαις.
Theact. 205 c, διέλογον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν.
Phædo 70 c, οὗ περὶ προσθηκῶτων.
Ib. 110 c, πολὺ ἐπὶ ἐκ λαμπροτέρων.
| Apol. 40 a, πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς.
Phædo 245 d, μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός. So Politic. 310 c.

§ 299.
Note, that Plato not unfrequently admits Tmesis: e.g.
Phdr. 230 c, ἐν ἥρμα ἀρπαγάτην.
Hip. Ma. 297 b, ἐν πατρός τινος θείᾳ.
§ 300, 301. ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 241

Legg. 797 d, év, ὃς ἔτος εἴπειν, οὗ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' οὖ.

(Apol. 19 a, and 24 a, ἐν οὐτῶς ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ (cf. Isæus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πάνιν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ).

Phileb. 20 b, πρὸς δὲ αὖ τοῖς.

Legg. 666 c, εἰς μὲν γε τὸ προάγειν.

Ib. 729 d, εἰς μὴν πόλιν.

Ib. 832 c, σὺν δὲ τινὶ βία.

Phædo 59 a, διὰ δὴ ταῦτα.

Phileb. 35 e, διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος.

Rep. 371 d, α(Blueprintς α') ἀργυρίῳν.

Phdr. 238 c, ἐπὶ αὖ τῶν . . . ἐπιθυμίων.

§ 300. B. Primary intention of a sentence suspended by interposition of clause of (a) Contrast or (b) Explanation.

a. Clause of Contrast interposed.

Rep. 401 e, καὶ ὅρθως δὴ ἐνσχεραίων, τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαυσὶν κ.τ.λ., τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγου τ' ἄν ὅρθως καὶ μετοῦ—where ὅρθως δὴ ἐνσχεραίων is continued in τὰ αἰσχρὰ ψέγου.

Symp. 173 e, ὅπερ ἐδειμεθαί σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποίησης ἄλλα διήγησαι.

Ib. 179 c, ἔργων οὖτω καλοῦ . . . ὡστε . . . εἰαμβηθήτωσι δὴ τωσ τὸσσαν τοῖτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ ἄλθους ἀνείναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄλλα τὴν ἑκεῖνης ἀνείσαν—where ὅστε being continued at τὴν ἑκεῖνης ἀνείσαν.

Theaet. 145 d, ἄλλ᾿ ὅρμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αἰτία μετρίως, σμικρὸν δὲ τὰ ἀπορῶ—where ὅμως appertains to σμικρὸν τι ἀπορῶ.

Phædo 69 d, οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὅρθως. ὅν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ ἐνυστὸν οἰόν ἀπελίπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἄλλα πασί τρόπῳ προειμήθην γενέσθαι—where the construction of ὅν is continued at πασὶ τρόπῳ.

Ib. 87 d, ἄλλα γὰρ ἄν φαῖν, ἐκάστην . . . ἀνυφαίρειον, ἀναγκαίον μεντ᾿ ἄν εἰπ. κ.τ.λ. The objection started by ἄλλα γὰρ ἄν φαῖν is suspended, while allowance is made for opposite truth, until ἀναγκαίον μεντ᾿ ἄν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 106 b, τί κωλεῖ, ἀρτιον μὲν τὸ περιτον μη γίγνεσθαι . . . ἀπολομένου δὲ αἰτοῦ ἀντ᾿ ἑκεῖνον ἀρτιον γεγονέναι;

Legg. 822 c, ἃς ὀχί οἴωμεθα γελοίων τε καὶ οἶκ ὅρθων, ἐκεὶ γιγνόμενον ἣν ἄν τότε, νῦν ἐνταθοί καὶ ἐν τοῖτος γίγνεσθαι;

§ 301. b. Clause of Explanation interposed.

Symp. 206 b, οἱ μὲν τ᾿ ἄν σὲ ἑθαίμαχον εἵπ' σοφίᾳ καὶ ἑφόιτων παρά σε—where, in meaning, οἵ μὲν τ᾿ ἄν goes with ἑφόιτων, the ἑθαίμαχον εἵπ' σοφίᾳ being explanatory.
Protag. 335 c, τών διαλογισμῶν τῷ διαθείν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι.
Phdr. 244 d, ἡ μανία ἐγγενεῖται καὶ πραγματεύεται οἷς ἐδικασθείν.
Legg. 648 e, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττοτον πρῶτες ἀφικνείσθαι. V Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ κ.π.λ.—an elaborate instance.

§ 302. In other writers we have as illustrations

Of a.


Of b.

Thuc. i. 39, ἢν γς καθ' τῶν προβλόντων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀσφαλεῖς προκαλούμενον κ.π.λ., ii. 91, περὶ ἢν ἢ 'Αττικῇ νῶς φθάσασα καὶ περιπλέσασα. Hom. II. Χ. 307, "Οστίς τε τλαίρη, οἰ τ' αὐτῷ κίνδυν ὁρᾶτο, Ἡμῶν ὅκυτριόν προσέλθουσαν ἐδήμεων. Ἀσχ. Pr. V. 331, Πάντων μετασχοῦν καὶ τετολμηκέως ἐμοί. Soph. Ant. 537, Καὶ ἐμφατίσω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας. 1279, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμως Ἐοκας ἤκειν καὶ τάχ' ὀψεσθαί κακά, El. 1154, ἦς σὺ πολλάκις Φήμας λάβαρα προθυρμήσετε ἡς φανοῦμενος Τιμορίκης, O. T. 717. Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διεσχοῦ ἡμέρα Τρεῖς καὶ νὰ ἄρθρα κείσας ἐνεξείσας ποδοῖς. Theoc. Id. xxv. 72, τόν δὲ γέρωντα . . . κλάζων τε περισσοῦν τ' [Ἀλλ] κλάζουτε], Εὔριγ. XIX. 1, 'Αρχιλόχου καὶ στάθη καὶ εἰσίδε.

§ 303. C. Primary Intention of a sentence expressed apart from the Verb—(i.e. the virtual Primary Predicate to be sought in some other word, or in a Participial clause.)

Rep. 495 d, οὐ δὴ ἐφ' ἑμένων πολλοί ἀπελείπουσι . . . τυγχάνωσιν—where ἐφ' ἑμένων is the virtual Primary Predicate.

Theat. 1142 c, δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι διέγειν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐνυχθεὶν αὐτῷ.

Th. 173 b, πάντερον βοώδει διελθότες ἡ ἔσωσιν . . . τετραμένοι ἢ.

Phaedo 63 c, ὅτι παῦλῳ δεόν διεσκότην πάνω ἄγαθοις [ἐπίτευχον] ἤξεν . . . διασχεύσατοι ὁπὶ. The virtual Primary Predicate is διεσκότης πάνω ἄγαθοις.

Th. 63 d, σκυφώρεθα τί ὡς ἡ βουλεύσαμα μοι δοκεῖ πῶς εἴπειν. The virtual Primary Predicate is βουλεύσαμα, not δοκεῖ.

Th. 65 b, ἡ . . . καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . θρυλοῦμεν. οὗτοι . . . ἄρμον. The
Primary Intention, with which it connects itself, is in the ὁρώμεν clause.

Ib. 69 c, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡντι πάλαι αἰνίτεσθαι ὅτι ... κείσται. The ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡντι connects itself with the κείσται clause.

Ib. 88 b, οἷδει προσάκει θάνατον θαρροῖντι μὴ οἷκ ἀνοίτως ἐφαρμῖν. Of the Infinitival sentence θάνατον ... θαρροῖν το Primary Predicate is θάνατον θαρροῖτι— in other words, it would normally be θάνατον θαρροῖν, but is changed into a Participial clause for the sake of linking a further sentence to it.

Symp. 207 d, οἷος μέντοι οἰότιτο τὰ αἰτὶ ἔχουν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμοὶ ὁ τοιού τι καλεῖται. The Primary Intention of the sentence is satisfied at ἔχων.

Soph. 224 d, οἷαί σε, κἂν εἰ τις αἴτως καθιδριµένως ... προϊτάξατο, καλείν οἰδίθεν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νῦν δή.

Apol. 31 b, τοῖτο γε οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπανασχεύησιν παρασχέµενοι μάρτυρα. The οἷοί οἷοί τε connects itself with παρασχεῖ. μάρτ.

In illustration, we have in Thuc. i. 2, ἀδηλων ὅν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν, καὶ ὑπεριστάσατο ὁμὰ ὅπων, ἀλλὸς ἀφαίρησεται. Hdt. ii. 134. οἷδεν ὁ νῦν οἰδεί εἰσόδες μοι φαίνοισαι λέγειν, ix. 105. τοῖτον δὲ κατελαζε ἐσπερον τοῖτον ἀποδηλάνται κείσται. Hom. Od. iv. 739. Εἰ δή ποι των κείνων ἐνί φρεσί μὴν ἐφήναι 'Εξελθὼν λαοίσαν εἴςφασε. Ἀισχ. Ἀγ. 479. τίς ὁδε παιδὸς ... παραγγέλμασιν νέως πυρωθίνα καρδίαν, ἄλλοιλα λόγον καμεῖν; (the virtual Predicate in the Infinitival sentence being πυρωθίτα), 740, πορ' αἰτὰ δ᾽ ἐλθέν εἰς ἵλιον πλὴν λέγειµ' ἄν φρόνημα νυκτέον γαλάνως ('there came what I should call a spirit' &c.—virtual Predicate not ἐλθεῖν but φρόνημα ν. γ.). 796, οἷε ἐστι λαβένω ὁματα φωτός το ἐποίκητ 'εἴφρονοι ἐκ διαψει ἔθαρει σαίνων φαύλητη (where in the Infinitival sentence depending on ἐποίκητα the virtual Predicate is ἐφροῦνοι, not σαίνει—'which with seeming—kindly heart fawn' &c.). Soph. Αἰ. 798. τίριθε δ᾽ ἐξόδον Ὀλεθριων λαυατός ἐλπίζει φέρειν—'he fears that this foray, which [by me his messenger] he interprets, will be fatal to him.' Here ἐλεθριῶν is the virtual Predicate.

§ 304. D. Chiasmus—, or Inverse Parallelism of clauses and sentences.

Rep. 438 c, ἐπιστήμη δε τις καὶ τοια ὑπερ τινας ἐπιστήμην ἐστιν τως καὶ τινῶς.

Ib. 494 c, πᾶν μὲν ἔργων πᾶν δ᾽ ἐπος λέγοιται τε καὶ πράπτοιτος.
§ 305. In Dialogue, however, the Parallelism is often Direct, instead of Inverse.

Rep. 337 c, (A) ἀλλα τι ... ποιήσεις; ἃν ἐγὼ ... ἀποκρινεῖ; (B) Οὐκ ἀν θανάσαιμεν εἰ μαὶ ακεφαλομένοι ὅπως δύ&epsi;&egrave;ε.  
Ib. 428 d, (A) τίς, καὶ ἐν τίς; (B) Ἀὐτή, ἢ φυλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτως τοῖς ἀρχοντις.  

Soph. 267 a, (A) Λυμπρικιδικόν δὴ ... ἀπονεμώμεθα τὸ δ' ἀλλο πών ἀφώμιεν κ.τ.λ. (B) Νευμενήσθω, τὸ δ' μεθείδω.  

Cf. Hom. Od. vi. 170–197, where Odysseus is answered in order by Nausicaa,—170–4, corresponding to 187–190, and the remainder to the remainder.  
And Æsch. Ag. 622, 623, and ib. 1202–5, K.A. Μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων τὸδ' ἑπέστησεν τέλει. Προτὸν μὲν αἰών ᾗν ἕμοι λέγειν τάδε.  
Χ. Ἡμών καὶ θεῶς περ Ἰμέριο πεπληγμένοι; Ἀβρυ-νεται γὰρ πᾶς τις εὗ πράσσουν πλέον.

§ 306. Often, also, of two points put by A, the former only is taken up by B.
§ 307. E. Comparative emphasis in co-ordinate expressions marked by the order (which is often the reverse in Greek of what it would be in English).

Symp. 173 c, καὶ δὸλον γε δὴ ὡτι οὕτω διανοούμενοι καὶ περὶ ἐματοί καὶ περὶ ἐμῶν μάνσωμαι. The emphasis is on ἐματοῖ, and the ἐμῶν is quite faint.

Ib. 175 b, νῦν οὖν νομίζοντες καὶ ἐμὲ ἵνα ἐμῶν κεκλήθησαν ἐπὶ ὑέσταν καὶ τούσδε τοῖς ἄλλοις, θεραπεύετε—'I your master, as well as the others.'

Ib. 185 c, τεχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἢ ἡ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγγα ἐπεπεπτωκέναι—'from some cause, most probably repelition.'

Ib. 189 e, καὶ εἴδος καὶ ὄνομα—'the class as well as the mere name.'

Euthyphro 3 d, εἰτ' οὖν φθόνω, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἰτε δὲ ἄλλο τι—'for whatever cause, most probably for envy.'

Apol. 39 b, καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμένω καὶ οἴτων—'I as well as they.'

§ 308. F. Hysteron Proteron: where (in other words) the order of expression, following that of thought, reverses the order of occurrence of facts.

Theaet. 162 b, εἴπερ μέλλοιεν μοι ἐπιπρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι.

 Aç Pol. 19 d, ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν.

Gorg. 474 a, γέλωτα παρείχων καὶ οἷς ἡπιστάμεν ἐπιψηφίζειν.

Phaedo 80 c, συμπεσόν τό σώμα καὶ ταραχεύθεν.

Ib. 100 b, ἐπιθέσειν καὶ ἀνερήσειν.

Ib. 87 c, πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἴματι καὶ ἵφηρόμενοι.

Symp. 190 c, τάς... μιτίδας τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαιναι καὶ τά στιθή διήρθον. 
DIGEST OF IDIOMS.  

§§ 309, 310.

Symp. 209 c, τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ.
Tim. 73 c, γῆν ἐφύρασε καὶ ἔδευσεν.
Apol. 32 b, ἡμαντιώθην ὡμὶν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τούς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην.
Cf. Hdt. viii. 114, ὁ δὲ γελάσας τε καὶ κατασχῶν πολλῶν χρόνων . . . εἶπε.

§ 309. G. Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.

a. With Negative.
Philo s 80 c, ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται κ.τ.λ.—οὐκοῦν οὐτω μὲν ἐχόωσα κ.τ.λ.;
Rep. 402 a, ἀστερ ἢρα γυμμάτων πέρι τοτε ἱκανός εἴχομεν οτε κ.τ.λ.—οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνις κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 581 e, τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον παϊόμεθα τᾶς ἄλλας ἡδονᾶς νομίζειν... τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πᾶν πόρρω κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 587 a, πλείοτον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὧπερ νόμον καὶ τάξεως;
Ib. 590 a, ἢ δ' αἰθάδεια καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὦταν τὸ λεοντόδε... αὐξηται;
Legg. 830 d, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ φοβηθεῖσ... μὴ φαίνεται τισι γελοία, οὐκ ἢρα νομοθετήσει;
Protag. 351 c, ἐγώ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδὲα ἄστιν, ἢρα κατά τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά;
Ibid. d, ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα;
Men. 78 c, ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχ ὧν ὑγίειαν κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 88 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν... εἶναι, ἃρ' οἷς ἀστερ κ.τ.λ.;
Symp. 216 d, καὶ αὖ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἴδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ σειληνώδες; [The Zurich editors give τούτο. οὐ σ.;]

§ 310. b. Without Negative.
Soph. 233 c, ὁδρῶς δὲ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἄπαντα, φαμέν;
Hip. Ma. 301 c, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σου ταῦτα νουθετηθοῖναι, ὡς εὐθὺς διεκείμεθα, ἔτι σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω κ.τ.λ.;
Gorg. 496 c, τὸ πεινῶν ἐλέγεις πότερον ἢδο ἢ ἄραιν εἶναι;
Phileb. 44 d, ὁμια τοιοῦτε τε λέγειν αὐτοῦς, ὡς εἰ βουληθέσμεν ὄτουον ἑδοὺς τὴν φύσιν ἱδεῖν, πότερον κ.τ.λ.;
§§ 311, 312. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

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Politic. 263 c, ὃ πολιτικὸς ἄρ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν φαίνεται πότερα κ.τ.λ.;
Legg. 683 c. Βασιλεία δὲ καταλέγεται, ὅ πρὸς Διός. ἢ καὶ κ.τ.λ., μον ἢ των ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν;

Apol. 37 b. πολλοί δὲ ψαίνειν γε ἀδικήσει κ.τ.λ., τί δεῖσας; [So Hermann punctuates.]

Crito 53 c. ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἄναυγχυτῆσεις διαλεγόμενος—
tináς λόγοις. ὃ Σωκράτες;

Ibid. e. ἐπερχόμενος ὅ ψάσας πάντως άνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων.—τι
pōwv: [The Zurich editors give δουλεύων’]

Cf. Lysias xiii. 64. p. 135, Ἀγοράτος τοῖς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοῖς δὲ
φαγάδας ἐπεκλέψει ἐποίησε.—τίς ὁν αὑτὸς;

§ 311. H. Enclitic recommencing, or even commencing, a clause.

Phileb. 16 c. ωθῶν μὲν εἰς αὐθρώπους δόσις, ὃς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοὶ,
pοτὲ εκ τελῶν ἐρρίθη.

Ib. 25 b. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῖν νῦν δὴ
gεγένεται.

Ib. 46 c, ὡσπερ ... τις τάσσεται ἡμὰς πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ μεγάλουs θέρηται
καὶ διηγομένους εἰς τοὺς ἴχθυς.

Phaedo 65 d, τί ἐκ οὖν; πῶστε τι ... εἴδες: [So Oxon. But the
cdd. give ἠξ αὖν πῶστε τι εἴδες;]

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 44. p. 240. Περιῶν ὁ Φιλόππος Ἰλλερίος καὶ
Τρισαλλείς. τοιαὶ ὅ καὶ τῶν Ἱλλερίων, κατεστρέφετο.

Similarly ἀν commences a parenthetic clause.

Phaedo 87 a. τι οὖν, ἄν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἄτι ἀπίστεις: (See above.
§ 295.)

[So one Paris MS. τι ὁν Ζurich editors.]

§ 312. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

A. Metonymy.

Rep. 497 d, ὅν ἐμεὶς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε—‘of those
[objections], your allegation of which has shewed me that’ &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνίην ἂλες ἑπαύων ἑκουσες—equivalent to ἐνιὴν
ἑπαύων ἂλες ἑκουσες. A strange instance.

Ib. 203 b, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ λυτος εἰς τὸ ἐν ἱντι ὅπως ἅτια—that is, ἡ
τοῦ ἱέκαν ὅπως ἅτια.

Theaet. 167 c, ὁτὶ ποιηρῶν ὅπως ἅτιοι ἑκάστων ἡρμῆτα ἑποίησεν
ἐναι καὶ δοκεῖν.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 313, 314.

Theat. 190 c. αἰσχυνοίμην ἀν ὑπέρ ἡμῶν ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν—'I should be ashamed at our being compelled' &c.

Apol. 33 c. χαίροντιν ἐξεταζομένους τοῖς οἰδομένοις εἶναι σοφοῖς.

Phædo 88 d. ὁ λόγος . . . . δισεπτ ὑπέμνησε με ῥήθης—'the recital of the argument as it were reminded me.'

Ib. 68 a, τούτων ἀπηλλαχθα ἐξωντός αὐτῶς—'be rid of the company of this.'

Charm. 173 b, ἐκ τούτων οὖτως ἔχοντων. So Legg. 959 c.

Legg. 959 c, καλῶν ἦστω καλῶς καὶ μετρίως τὰ περὶ τὸν τετελευτηκότα γιγνόμενα—'let it be a credit to have the obsequies handsomely or decently performed.'

§ 313. B. Catachresis.

'Ὑποπτεύειν for 'to expect.'

Theat. 164 a, καὶ ἐγώ, νη τὸν Δία. ὑποπτεύον, οὐ μὴν ἰκανός γε συννοώ. Ἀμήχανος of number.

Phdr. 220 d, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλῆθη τερατολόγων τεινὸν φυσέων. 

Δαιμόνιος.

Critias 117 b, κάλλος ὤψες τε δαίμόνιον ἔχοντα.

§ 314. θαυμάστως, θαυμάσιος, has many gradations of Catachrestic meaning.

a. 'Strange,' 'eccentric.'

Symp. 182 c, θαυμάστα ἔργα. So 213 d, θαυμάστα ἔργαζεται.

β. 'Incomparable,' 'capital;'—only the intention of superlativeness being retained.

Apol. 41 b, θαυμάστῃ ἂν εἶναι ἤ διατρεψῇ αὐτῶθα.

γ. Of a recommendation or a feeling or an assertion,—'decided,' 'emphatic,' 'positive.'

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακλήσεως τῷ ἐρώτατι παρὰ πάντων θαυμάστῃ—'most positive is the encouragement given by all.'

Tim. 29 d, τὸ μὲν οὖν προαιρόμενον θαυμασίων ἀπεδεξάμεθα σοι—'most decidedly approved.'

Euthyd. 283 c, θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζομεν—'were particularly anxious.'

Phædo 74 b, (A) φῶμεν τι εἶναι ἣ μηδέν; (B) Ψῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δία, θαυμαστῶς γε. θαυμαστῶς qualifies φῶμεν not εἶναι—'say Yes most positively.'

Ib. 92 a, θαυμαστώς ὡς ἐπείσδηθη—'was most decidedly convinced.'
§ 315. *Ὑπερφυώς, καλῶς, σφόδρα, are also in the same way used to express decided assertion or assent to an assertion.

Gorg. 490 c, (A) ὁμολογῶμεν ταῖτα; . . . (B) Ἀλλ᾽ ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ—'I agree most decidedly.'

Phaed. 76 e, ὑπερφυῶς δοκεῖ μου ἢ αἰτή ἀνέγκη εἶναι.

Phileb. 26 a, (A) ἂρ᾽ οὐ ταῖτα ἐγγυγρόμενα ταῖτα . . . μονασκήν ἔχυμπα-σαν τελεῖται ἔπενετήσατο; (B) Ὀλίγος γε. Probably an intermediate step to this Catachresis is the use of καλῶς λέγειν for 'to say truly,' e. g. Phdr. 227 b.

Ib. 24 b, (A) ἀτελὴ ὡς ὄντε δῆτον παντάποιν ὑπείρω γίγνεσθον.

(B) Καὶ σφόδρα γε. Ἔρως 39 c.

Phdr. 263 d, (A) εἰπέ . . . εἶ ὁρισάμην ἔρωτα ἦρχομενος τοῦ λόγου.

(B) Ὡς Δί᾽ αἰμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα—'most decidedly you did.'

§ 316. Μέγας.

Phaedo 62 b, ὁ . . . λόγος . . . μέγας τι τᾶς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ μάδος διδών, 'cumbersome,' i. e. 'perplexing.'


§ 317. C. Hyperbole.

Euthyd. 303 b, ὁλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Δυκελῷ ἑθορίζοσιν τ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνδροῦ καὶ ἡσθηταν.

Hip. Ma. 295 a, ἀκριβεστέρον τῆς ἀπάτης ἀκριβείας.

Legg. 823 e, μὴτε ἐγγυγρώσι μὴτε εἴδουσι κύριος εἰρήν τιμα-νυμέως—the supposition of the alternative εἴδουσι, in order to make the denial total, is hyperbolical. Cf. Arist. Eth. X. ix. 11, διεί . . . μὴτε ἀκούτα μὴθ β' ἐκώπατα πράττειν τὰ φατίλα. Soph. Antig. 1108. τ' ἐτ' ὑπάρχειν οἴ τ' ὑστει ποί ἀπώπειτε.
§ 319. a. Ποῖον;

Gorg. 490 d, (A) ἄλλ' ἵσως ἰματίων [τὸν βελτίων πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν φής]

. . . (B) Ποίον ἰματίων;—'Clothes, forsooth!'

Charm. 174 b, (A) ἀρά γε ἢ [οὐδε] τὸ πεπευτικὸν; (B) Ποίον

πεπευτικὸν;

§ 320. c. Plural of Singular Terms.

Menex. 245 d, οὐ γὰρ Πέλοπτες οὐδὲ Κάδμου κ.τ.λ.

Phedo 98 c, ἀέρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὑδάτα αἰστώμενον.

Symp. 218 a, Φαίδρους, Ἀγάθωνας, Ἦρωδιμάχους.

Rep. 387 b, Κώκυτοις τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλλατας.

Cf. Æsch. Ag. 1439, Χρυσήδων μελεγμα τῶν ἐπ' ἑλιόφ. It is frequent in Aristophanes: cf. Ecclez. 1069, & Πάνες, & Κορύβαντες, Ασχ. 270, καὶ Λαμᾶχων ἀπαλλαγεῖς, Ran. 963, Κύκνους ποιῶν καὶ Μέμονας. It is equally used with a sense of dignity,—as in the dithyrambic fragment of Pindar [p. 224 ed. Dissen], γόνων ὑπάτων μὲν πατέρων μελέτεμεν γυναικῶν τε Καθεων ἔμολον, &c.

Bacchus the son of Zeus and Semele.


Legg. 953 e, θρέμματα Νείλου—for Egyptians.

§ 322. E. Simile introduced as a Metaphor,—i. e. with the Particle of Comparison omitted.

(See this noticed by Aristotle, Rhet. III. x–xi, where he characterises it as πρὸ ὑμᾶτον ποιεῖν.)

Euthyphro 11 c, οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθεῖς, ἀλλὰ σὺ μου δοκεῖς ὁ Δαιδαλός.


§ 323. F. Play upon Words.

Rep. 621 b, μυθὸς ἑστόθη καὶ οὐκ ἑπόλετο, καὶ ἰμᾶς ἐν σόσεισιν.

Symp. 185 c, Παντισαίον δὲ πινοπαρέν,—διδάσκουσι γὰρ μὲ ὥσα λέγειν οὗτοι οἱ σοφοί.

Ib. 198 c, Γοργίου κεφαλῆων δεινῶν λέγειν.

Ib. 174 b, ὡς ἀρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ διαίτας ὡςσιν αὐτῶματοι ἀγαθοὶ—in allusion to Agathon.
§§ 324, 325. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

Apol. 25 c, ἄλλα γὰρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ... σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντού ἀμέλειαν.

Theæt. 194 c, κεάρ, ὦ ἐφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιό-

Phædo 80 d, εἰς ... τόπον ... ἀειδή, εἰς Λίδου ὡς ἄληθώς.

Ib. 89 b, εἶνερ ἦμιν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώ-

σάσθαι. The play upon the words lies in their reference to the subject of the discussion.

Ib. 92 c, πρέπει γε εἰςπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἑνακαὶ καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας.

Logg. 802 e, δεινὸν γάρ ὅλη γε ἀρμονία ἀπάθειν ἡ μυθικὴ ἀρραβών.

Ib. 803 d, ἢν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὔτ' ὁν παιδὰ πεφυκὼν οὔτ' οὐν πατεία.

Cf. Hom. II. xiii. 773, νῦν τοι σῶς αὐτίς ὀλέθρος.

§ 324. G. Hendiadys.

The Hendiadys which occurs in Plato (belonging to the last of Lobeck's four kinds,—cf. note on Soph. Ajax, 145) is that where Synonyms are set side by side with the view of expressing the idea more forcibly. This might be called Rhetorical Hendiadys. With Demosthenes it is a favourite instrument of δείνωσις.

Phædo 98 b, τῷ μὲν νῷ οἶδεν χρώμενον οἰδὲν τινα αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον.

Ib. 111 d, συντρήσθαι τε πολλαχὶ καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν.

Crito 47 b, γεμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῖτο πράττων.

Gorg. 472 b, ἐκάλλεως μὲ ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ ἄληθος.

Tim. 87 d, ἢν οἰδέν σκοτοῦμεν, οἰδέ' ἐννοοῦμεν ὡτι κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 23 a, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αἰτή προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἔξε-

λέχοντα.

Logg. 953 a, ἐπιμελείσθαι καὶ τημελεῖν.

§ 325. H. Interrogation answered by the speaker himself.

This may be called Rhetorical Interrogation. Its object is to awaken the attention.

Phædo 73 c, λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τούτῳ ἐὼν τίς τι κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 360 c, τίς οὖν ἡ δυϊστασις; ἢδε. μηδὲν ἀφαιρώμεν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 34 d, τί δῆ οὖν οἶδεν τοίτων ποιήσατο; οίκ οἰδαδιδομένος, ὃ

Ἀθηναίοι, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 40 b, τί οὖν αἰτίον εἶναι ἵππολαμβίνω; ἐγὼ ἤμιν ἐρώ.

Protag. 343 b, τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῖτα λέγω; Ἡτι κ.τ.λ. So Gorg. 457 e.
Gorg. 453 c, τοῦ οὖν ἑνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ἐποπτεύον σε ἐρῆσομαι, ἄλλ' οὖν αὐτὸς λέγω; οὖ σοῦ ἑνεκα, ἄλλα τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 458 a, ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἥδεως μὲν ἄν ἐλεγχθέντων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 487 b, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰ εὗνος; τίνι τεκμηρίω χρώμαι; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα κ.τ.λ.

Meno 97 e, πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς.

Legg. 701 c, τίνως δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἑλέσθη; δεῖν φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 780 a, τίνως δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἰρηται; τοῦδε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Tim. 31 a, πῶτερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἐνα οὕρανων προσειρήκαμεν, ἡ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἤν ὀρθότερους; ἐνα, εἰπὲρ κ.τ.λ.

Critias 111 a, πῶς οὖν δὴ τούτῳ πιστῶν, καὶ κατὰ τί λείψανον τῆς τότε γῆς ὀρθῶς ἄν λέγειτο; πῦσα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 206 e, πῶς μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

[So Hermann punctuates. The Zurich editors give the answer to another speaker.]
May, 1878.


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